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This thesis examines the evolution and implementation of international 
standards on countering the financing of terrorism. There are two dimensions to be 
taken into account to understand the structure of this thesis. The first is concerned 
with a sequential perspective. Given that 9/11 has provided a critical momentum in 
this area, chapter 2 deals with the international position prior to 9/11, whereas 
chapters 3,4 and 5 analyse development following 9/11. The second is related to a 
hard law and soft law perspective. Chapters 2 and 3 look into the development of 
hard law in this area, while chapters 4 and 5 focus on international standards and 
their monitoring and enforcement from a soft law perspective. Firstly, it is classified 
that terrorist financing and money laundering shares much in common and thus, 
anti-money laundering tools can be used for the purpose of countering the financing 
of terrorism. Then, the activities of the Security Council and other specialist bodies 
are examined in depth and suggestions are made for improvement of current counter- 
terrorist financing and anti-money laundering campaign. 
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Chapter One: 
Terrorism and its Financing 
I. Introduction 
"Terrorists want a lot of people watching and a lot of people 
listening and not a lot of people dead"(emphasis added). This is a famous 
remark made by Brian Jenkins in 19751, and there was for decades 
widespread acceptance of his observation. ' However, the September 1 1th 2001 
attack on the US has shaken this general acceptance to its foundations. 
Nowadays there is a growing concern that terrorists might use even weapons 
of mass destruction (WMD) thus annihilating as many innocent people as 
possible. 
Nevertheless, some may ignore this concern simply by saying, "I 
am not living in the Western Hemisphere". Then the scenario of "Pandora's 
Boxi3 about which Western intelligence agencies have serious concerns, may 
be helpful in awakening indifferent readers to the devastating and universal 
1 Jenkins, B. M., "International Terrorism: A New Mode of Conflict" in Carlton, D. & Schaerf, 
C., eds., International Terrorism and World Security, 1975, p. 15. 
2 Hoffman, B., "Re-Thinking Terrorism in Light of a War on Terrorism", Testimony before the 
Subcommittee on Terrorism and Homeland Security, House Permanent Select Committee on 
Intelligence, U. S. House of Representatives, 26 September 2001. 
3 Felsted, A. & Odell, M., "Agencies fear extent of al-Qaeda's sea network", Financial Times, 
21 February 2002. 
impact of this new kind of terrorism. With this scenario, terrorists could for 
example load a portable nuclear suitcase bomb4, or a dirty bomb made with 
nuclear material wrapped around conventional explosives onto a cargo ship 
and detonate it in a major port. ' Unfortunately, this is not a remote possibility. 
For instance, roughly 6 million containers enter U. S. ports annually and only 
2 percent of them are checked. 6 If this scenario happens, needless to say, there 
would be huge casualties, and to make matters worse, government 
authorities might have to check all containers physically, thus seriously 
depressing international trade. ' 
Facing such overwhelming challenges, it is worthwhile to 
examine the question of why terrorism has recently changed so much in 
character and scope, and what the implications for the future are. In this vein, 
this chapter points out that among several kinds of terrorism, religious 
terrorism has emerged as a major driving force behind the international 
terrorist movement. Then, as countermeasures, analysis is given to the 
' Al-Qaida reportedly obtained several nuclear suitcase bombs in the autumn of 1998 (See 
Reeve, S., The New Jackals: Ramzi Yousef, Osama bin Laden and the future of Terrorism, 1999, 
pp. 214-216). This allegation seems to be supported by the remarks of General Aleksandr 
Ivanovich Lebed, the former security czar of Russia. He told a visiting U. S. congressional 
delegation in May 1997 that of 132 "suitcase bomb" in the former Soviet arsenal, he had been 
able to locate only 48, leaving 84 unaccounted for. Other senior Russian officials also told the 
congressional delegations that tactical nuclear weapons were missing (See, Stern, J., The 
Ultimate Terrorist, 1999, p. 90). 
Felsted, A. & Odell, M., supra note 3. 
6 "An Overview of International Terrorist Organizations", Hearing before the Subcommittee 
on International Terrorism, Nonproliferation and Human Rights of the Committee on 
International Relations, House of Representatives, 108`' Congress, 1s` Session, 26 March 2003, 
Serial No. 108-10, p. 36. 
Currently, 35 million containers are estimated to be in use around the world (Felsted, A. & 
Odell, M., supra note 3). 
'The U. S. was concerned about this scenario that it brought up the issue at the G8 summit in 
June 2002(For the result, see "G8 Recommendations on Counter-Terrorism" (visited on 7 July 
2004) <http: //www. iaea. org/NewsCenter/Features/RadSources/G8_Recomend. html>). 
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appropriateness of waging a financial war on terrorism and the roles of anti- 
money laundering regimes in this campaign. 
I. Terrorism in the 21s' Century 
1. An overview of general trends in modern terrorism 
a. The types of terrorist groups 
In the 20th century, terrorist activities with various causes were 
observed, but three are of significance and direct relevance to the present 
analysis': ethno-nationalist/separatist terrorism, ideological terrorism, and 
religious terrorism. 
The ethno-nationalist/separatist groups seek political self- 
determination as is the case with the IRA(Irish Republican Army), the ETA 
(Basque Homeland and Liberty), and the PLO(Palestinian Liberation 
Organisation) of the 1970s. 9 Secondly, the ideological terrorist groups attempt 
to change the entire political, social and economic system either to an 
extreme left, or extreme right model. "' The Revolutionary Armed Forces of 
8 Thus far, there is no clear-cut categorisation of terrorism phenomenon in literature but a 
common thread can be drawn without difficulty. See, e. g., Hoffman, B., Inside Terrorism, 1999; 
Wilkinson, P., Terrorism Versus Democracy: The Liberal State Response, 2001, pp. 19-21; Russell, C. 
A. & Banker Jr., L. J. & Miller, B. H., "Out-Inventing the Terrorist" in Alexander, Y. & Carlton, 
D. & Wilkinson, P., eds., Terrorism: Theory and Practice, 1979, pp. 31-32; Dinse, J. & Johnson, S., 
"Ideologies of Revolutionary Terrorism: Some Enduring and Emerging Themes", in Han, H. 
H., ed., Terrorism & Political Violence: Limits & Possibilities of Legal Control, 1993, pp. 61-68; 
Comb, C., Terrorism in the Twenty-First Century, 3`d edn., 2003, pp. 44-47. 
9 Russell, C. A. & Banker Jr., L. J. & Miller, B. H., supra note 8, p. 31. However, it should be 
pointed out that although the PLO began as a terrorist group, it was later recognised as a 
legitimate political organisation by the international community. See, Adams, J., The 
Financing of Terror, 1988, p. 145 and p. 158. 
10 Wilkinson, P., supra note 8, p. 20. 
3 
Columbia(FARC) and Red Brigades in Italy are cases in point. 11 Lastly, 
religious terrorist groups conduct terrorist activities for the realisation of 
their religious goals as illustrated by Al-Qaida's attack on the U. S. or Dr. 
Goldstein's massacre in the Cave of the Patriarchs. 12 However, in reality, it is 
difficult to simply classify certain terrorist groups into one category given 
that a group might comprise several components at the same time as with the 
"Catholic" IRA or the "Islamic" Hamas. 13 
b. The trend in the late 1960s and 1970s 
Among the three major types of terrorism, it was the ethno- 
nationalist/separatist groups that brought the advent of modern international 
terrorism in the late 1960s. 14 The Popular Front for the Liberation of 
Palestine(PFLP), one of the six groups then comprising the PLO, hijacked an 
El Al commercial flight en route from Rome to Tel Aviv, and diverted it to 
Algiers on 22 July 1968.15 Importantly, this incident is different from many of 
the post-war anti-colonial terrorist campaigns. 16 For the first time, the 
transnational "third country operation" concept was applied in modern 
" Ibid., p. 20. 
12 In 1994, Dr. Baruch Goldstein, an orthodox Jew and ardent disciple of Kahane, entered the 
Ibrahim Mosque located at the Cave, and opened fire on Muslim worshippers, killing 22 and 
wounding 150 (Ranstorp, M., "Terrorism in the Name of Religion" in Howard, R. D. & 
Sawyer, R. L., eds., Terrorism and Counterterrorism: Understanding the New Security Environment, 
2002, p. 121). 
13 Hoffman, B., supra note 8, p. 87; Ranstorp, M., supra note 12, p. 122; Russell, C. A. & Banker 
Jr., L. J. & Miller, B. H., supra note 8, p. 8. 
14 Hoffman, B., supra note 8, p. 67. There seems to a general consensus to this argument. See, 
e. g, Wilkinson, P., supra note 8, p. 28; Russell, C. A. & Banker Jr., L. J. & Miller, B. H., supra 
note 8, p. 5. 
's Hoffman, B., supra note 8, p. 68. The negotiations extended over forty days, and both the 
hijackers and hostages went free later. 
16 For example, most hijacks before the late 1960s were generally aimed at facilitating refugee 
escapes to otherwise inaccessible countries such as Cuba. 
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terrorism. 17 Terrorists began to travel regularly from one country to another 
to launch their attacks. 18 In addition, the terrorist operation was aimed at 
promoting their political cause worldwide19 and bringing about changes in 
20 government policies. In this sense, it ushered in the era of international 
terrorism in the full sense. It was followed by a wave of terrorist operations 
of a similar nature. 21 
Along with the surge of ethno-nationalist/separatist terrorism, 
ideological terrorism, mostly revolutionary left-wing terrorism, began to flex 
its international muscles in the late 1960's and early 1970's. 'ß However, these 
kinds of terrorist groups, such as the Red Army Faction and the Japanese Red 
Army, for the most part originated within industrialised liberal democracies, 
and did not seem to constitute any serious long-term threat to Western 
states. 23 Perhaps, the unprecedented economic prosperity allowed the youth 
" Alexander, Y. & Carlton, D. & Wilkinson, P., supra note 8, p. 6. 
Ibid., p. 68. 
For example, Zehdi Labib Terzi, the PLO's chief observer at the UN, remarked in a 1976 
interview, "The first several hijackings aroused the consciousness of the world and 
awakened the media and world opinion much more- and more effectively-than 20 years of 
pleading at the UN", quoted in Schmid, A. P. & de Graaf, J., Violence as Communication: 
Insurgent Terrorism and the Western News Media, 1982, p. 32. 
20 Hoffman, B., supra note 8, pp. 67-69. Consequently, the PLO could force the Israeli 
government to communicate directly with it, despite the Israeli government's previous 
policy pronouncements to the contrary. 
21 For example, the PLO's attack on the Israeli athletes' dormitory during the Munich 
Olympic Games in 1972 earned it wider publicity given that estimated 900 million people 
saw the crisis on their TV screens. As a result, Yassir Arafat, the PLO's leader, was invited to 
address the UN General Assembly and shortly afterwards the PLO was granted special 
observer status in the UN (Ibid., pp. 71-75). 
22 The revolutionary left-wing terrorists attempted to benchmark the success of the PLO. 
Furthermore, an alliance had developed between these different movements in the form of 
the training of the German Red Army Faction(RAF) by the PLO. Eventually, this 
unprecedented cooperation led to the Lod airport massacre by the Japanese Red Army in 
1972, and the seizure of the OPEC oil ministers' conference in Vienna 1975 by the combined 
teams of German RAF and Palestinian Terrorists (Ibid., pp. 82-83). 
23 Wilkinson, P., "Terrorist Movements", in Alexander, Y. & Carlton, D. & Wilkinson, P., eds., 
5 
of affluent and privileged homes the "luxury of introspection and self- 
criticism" on socio-economic iniquities. 24 Yet, these ideological sects were 
politically marginalised, especially after the demise of the Cold War. ' 
Nonetheless, some left-wing local terrorists groups, such as the FARC, are 
still very active in the 21s' century. However, it is doubtful whether they 
could be properly classified as "modern international" terrorist groups given 
their indigenous nature and the limited scope of their operations. 26 Moreover, 
they are criticised for the allegation that their criminal enterprises have 
assumed greater priority than their own ideological agendas. 27 
c. The trend since the 1980s 
To make a long story short, the late 1960s and 1970s were 
characterised by the rise of "secular" ethno-nationalist/separatist and left- 
wing terrorist groups. In contrast, the early 1980s saw the dramatic 
emergence of "religiously" motivated terrorism, more precisely that 
involving extreme Islamist movements. 28 
supra note 8, pp. 106-107. 
24 Ibid., p. 107; Hoffman, B., supra note 8, p. 80. 
25 For example, the Red Army Faction finally collapsed in 1992. See, Hoffman, B., supra note 8, 
p. 84. 
26 Berry, L. V. & Curtis, G. E. & Hudson, R. A& Kollars, N. A., "A Global Overiview of 
Narcotics-Funded Terrorist and Other Extremist Groups", Library of Congress, May 2002, 
pp. 50-57. 
27 For example, the FARC is alleged to pursue power and economic gains under the guise of 
promoting their Marxist agenda (Ibid., p. 2). 
28 Wilkinson, P., supra note 8, p. 34. According to Bruce Hoffman, there has been a dramatic 
increase in identifiable religious terrorist groups from none in 1968 to eleven in 1992. A 
decade later, if we look at the list of the terrorist organisations designated by the U. S. 
government, more than half of the 37 designated groups include strong religious 
components (U. S. Department of State, "Patterns of Global Terrorism-2003", 
29 April 2004). 
For the use of the term "Islamists", see, Paz, R., "Targeting Terrorist Financing in the 
Middle East", International Policy Institution for Counter-Terrorism, 23 October 2000. 
6 
What triggered this change was the success of the Iranian 
Revolution in 1979.29 It was a great surprise to the world that a theocratic state 
should emerge in the secularised international political arena. The concern 
about theocracy was recently summarised by Francis Fukuyama as follows: ` 
"If politics is based on religion, there will never be any civil peace because 
people cannot agree on fundamental religious values. Secularism is a relatively 
recent development in the West: the modern democratic state emerged out of 
the bloody religious conflicts in Europe during the sixteenth and seventeenth 
centuries in which different Christian groups slaughtered one another 
mercilessly. The separation of church and state became a necessary component 
of modernization precisely because of the need for civil peace. " 
When the international community took secularism for granted, 
the Iranian Revolution seemed to turn the wheels of history backwards. 31 
Following the success in Iran, the modern Islamist terrorist groups have 
aimed at exporting the Islamic revolution all over the world, especially from 
the Middle Eastern countries such as Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Turkey, etc. 32 
Indeed, the same "domino theory" used in the Cold War is now deployed by 
analogy to the spread of militant Islam. 33 
29 For the background to the Iranian Revolution, see, Han, H. H., "Autocracy of the Shah of 
Iran: Views of the Media Reporters", in Han, H. H., ed., supra note 8, pp. 167-185. 
30 Fukuyama, F., "History and September 11", in Booth, K., & Dunne, T., World in Collision: 
Terror and the Future of Global Order, 2002, p. 30. 
31 From the point of view of the Islamists, legitimacy of a nation can be conferred only 
through the adoption of Islamic law(Sharia) with sovereignty resting with Allah. See, 
Capitanchik, D., "Terrorism and Islam", in O'Sullivan, N., ed., Terrorism, Ideology, and 
Revolution, 1986, pp. 126-127. 
32 See, Bodansky, Y., Bin Laden: The Man Who Declared War on America, 1999, pp. 53-55; Robbins, 
J. S., "Bin Laden's War", in Howard, R. D. & Sawyer, R. L., eds., supra note 12, pp. 354-355; 
Gunaratna, R., Inside Al Qaeda: Global Network of Terror, 2002, pp. 88-89. 
33 According to Simon Reeve, if the fundamentalists take over in Egypt, the theory goes, the 
whole of North Africa and the Middle East will follow. Then Afghanistan, and the Muslim 
Central Asian states will fall consecutively (Reeve, S., supra note 4, p. 227). 
In their revolutionary campaign, the Islamists emphasise their role as a vanguard of 
7 
In order to secure a "domino success", it is imperative for the 
Islamist terrorist groups to keep the Western powers from influencing the 
Middle East. ' However, since they cannot overwhelm the Western states, 
more precisely the U. S., by military force, they instead employ terrorism as 
an alternative tactic to engage the enemy. 35 Nevertheless, it is extremely 
difficult to bring about a sufficient change in the policies of the Western 
states (e. g., to withdraw from the oil-rich Middle East). Thus, terrorist attacks 
need to be very powerful to "inflict so much pain on these states that their 
governments would find it impossible to tolerate the pubic outcry and be 
compelled to withdraw and stop the Islamist terrorism at home". 36 To this 
end, the attacks need to be carried out on a huge scale, even using weapons 
of mass destruction (WMD), but more importantly with continuity. The case 
of the Vietnam War would be a good scenario: a benchmark. 37 In this context, 
it seems that a significant change has taken place in the nature of terrorism, 
constituting a real threat to international peace and security indeed. 38 The 
professional revolutionaries to awaken and lead the Muslim masses. In this context, we can 
find a surprising analogy with communist revolutionary terrorism theory. See, e. g., Dinse, J. 
& Johnson, S., "Ideologies of Revolutionary Terrorism: Some Enduring and Emerging 
Themes" in Han, H. H., ed., supra note 8, pp. 61-63; Napoleoni, L., Modern Jihad: Tracing the 
Dollars Behind the Terror Networks, 2003, p. 155. 
" Bodansky, Y., supra note 32, p. 177, p. 190, p. 349, and p. 385. Furthermore, for the situation of 
the Central Asia, see, Olcott, M. B., "Narco-Terror: The Worldwide Connection Between 
Drugs and Terrorism", Testimony, United States Senate Committee on the Judiciary, 
13 
March 2002. 
35 Bodansky, Y., supra note 32, p. 203, pp. 334-335; Richardson, L., "Global Rebels: Terrorist 
Organisations as Trans-National Actors", in Howard, R. D. & Sawyer, R. L., eds., supra note 
12, p. 99; Gearson, J., "The Nature of Modern Terrorism" in Freedman, 
L., ed., Superterrorism: 
Policy Responses, 2002, p. 23. 
36 Bodansky, Y., supra note 32, p. 177. 
37 The U. S. public opinion was then sick of endless war, and subsequent 
huge casualties and 
costs, thus urging to pull U. S. troops out of Vietnam. 
38 Murphy, S. D., "Contemporary practice of the United States relating to international law: 
the U. S. Adoption of New Doctrine on Use of Force", (2003) American Journal of 
International 
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concerns about this change are well exemplified by the US adoption in 
September 2002 of a new doctrine in the use of force, the core of which is 
recourse to pre-emptive strikes based on the right to self-defence. 39 
Given these scenarios, as the next logical step, there can be 
conceived an important question: "If the Western powers withdraw, could 
the Islamist groups succeed in winning support at grassroots level, thus 
transforming a political system into a theocracy, by either revolution or a 
peaceful referendum ? ". 40 Unfortunately, many scholars are of the view that 
the Islamist trend has grown and will continue to expand because of its 
genuine grassroots and popular appeal. " 
Among many complicated factors underlying its popular appeal, 
two common reasons can be observed: economic poverty, and loss of self- 
esteem. For the purpose of understanding the widespread economic poverty 
in the Middle East, let us consider for example Saudi Arabia which is the 
biggest oil-producing country in the region. Oil revenues that had earned the 
nation more than US$ 140 billion a year during the 1980s appeared to 
dwindle to just US$ 20 billion a year in the 1990s. ' Moreover, GDP per capita 
is said to have fallen from US$ 15,000 per year a decade ago to as low as US$ 
Law, vol. 97, p. 207. 
'9 Ibid. 
" In Algeria, an Islamist party(the Islamic Salvation Front) scored a stunning victory in the 
June 1990 municipal elections, and in the June 1997 parliamentary elections. However, the 
Algerian military intervened, arresting the Islamist party's leaders and imprisoned them in 
desert camps. Thus, a cycle of violence and counterviolence was set in motion. See, Esposito, 
J. L., Unholy War : Terror in the name of Islam, 2002, pp. 102-103. 
4' See, e. g., Bodansky Y., supra note 32, p. 133 and p. 334; Esposito, J. L., supra note 40, pp. 79-84, 
pp. 93-95, and p. 116; Wilkinson, P., supra note 8, p. 35; Capitanchik, D., supra note 31, pp. 127- 
129; Fukuyama, F., supra note 30, p. 33; Ranstorp, M., supra note 12, p. 129 and p. 132; Reeve, S., 
supra note 4, pp-228-230- 
42 Reeve, S., supra note 4, p. 230. 
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4,000 in 1998.43 Consequently, unemployment and discontent is growing 
among the population. ` Saudis who used to travel to smaller Gulf countries 
to party and shop are now being forced to take employment there, even in 
menial jobs, which is almost unprecedented for Saudi citizens. 45 Bin Laden 
did not overlook this point, utilising it as a rallying cause. 46 He claimed in 
1997 that the U. S. was stealing Muslim oil given that the price of Arab oil 
increased by no more than 8 dollars while the price of American wheat 
increased threefold over a period of 24 years. ' Needless to say, this kind of 
revolutionary message exacerbates a sense of deprivation among Muslims. 
However, more fundamentally, incompetent authoritarian 
regimes in the region are criticised for aggravating their problems. It is 
understandable in some sense that several Middle Eastern states were 
created by the West following the First World War" and thus have a 
relatively short experience of governance. Nonetheless, the governments 
within the region have not made good use of the opportunities for economic 
and political reform, thus failing to create a self-sustaining industrial 
society. 49 
43 Ibid., p. 230. 
'` Ibid., p. 230- 
41 Ibid., p. 230. 
46 Ibid., p. 230. 
4' Ibid., p. 230. For every barrel sold over the period, he further claimed that the US swindled 
US$ 135 and the total loss of income has been estimated at US$4 billion a day, thus entitling 
the 1.2 billion Muslims worldwide to claim US$ 30 million each in compensation from the 
US (Jacquard, R., In the Name of Osama Bin Laden, 2002, p. 96). 
According to The Economist, this argument seems to make some sense, given that oil prices 
in the late 1970s equaled US$ 80 a barrel in today's money("Pain at the pump", The Economist, 
22 May 2004, pp. 85-86) 
48 Esposito, J. L., supra note 40, pp. 80-81. 
49 Fukuyama, F., supra note 30, p. 33. Fukuyama further pointed out that no Arab 
governments have decided on their own to voluntarily step down in favour of democratic 
10 
Along with underlying economic poverty, Arab states have 
suffered a continuous loss of self-esteem. For instance, they saw a 
humiliating defeat of the combined forces of Egypt, Jordan, and Syria by 
U. S. -backed Israel in the 1967 Six-Day war. 5° To the despair of Arab people, 
they are continuously reminded of the U. S. 's pro-Israel policy through the 
development of the Palestine issue. " The U. S. military presence on the "holy 
soil" of Saudi Arabia since the first Gulf war in the early 1990s also inflamed 
anti-Western feeling. 52 To make matters worse, the U. S. was not free from the 
suspicion of abusing the Iraq issue for domestic purposes as was the case in 
the U. S. bombing campaign against Iraq and Afghanistan in 1998 when the 
U. S. House of Representatives decided to seek to impeach President Clinton 
for his sex scandals. 53 Since the U. S. and the UK invaded Iraq in 2003 in large 
measure on the pretext of preventing the development of WMD, anti- 
Western feelings seems to have reached a peak. This may be explained, in 
part, by the fact that the war was fought without any substantial proof of 
Iraq's development of WMD. S4 
Indeed, where there is no way out to express their despair and no 
reason to expect any solutions from their own governments, the Muslim 
masses are thought by some to have no option but to admire and eulogise the 
rule, like the Spanish monarchy after the dictator Franco. 
50 Esposito, J. L., supra note 40, pp. 83-84. 
51 Ibid., pp. 83-84. 
52 On the occasion of the 2nd Gulf war in 2003, the U. S. finally withdrew its troops from Saudi 
Arabia. 
53 Bodansky, Y., supra note 32, pp. 351-355. 
5' Duelfer, C., "Comprehensive Report of the Special Adviser to the DCI on Iraq's WMD", (30 
September 2004) <http: //www. cia. gov/cia/reports/iraq_wmd_2004/>; The BBC News, "US 
gives up search for Iraq WMD", 12 January 2005. 
Islamist terrorist groups" which dare to confront the Western states as well 
as local authoritarian secular regimes. 56 Moreover, where governments fail to 
meet the basic needs of their people, Islamist groups sometimes establish 
their own structures of health, education and welfare provision, in many 
cases better than governments have been able to deliver. 57 
In addition to increasing popularity, Islamist groups have become 
more and more emboldened by their continuous victories in Iran in 1979, 
Lebanon in 1983, Afghanistan in 1989, and Somalia in 1994 where they 
succeeded in evicting the "Imperialist powers". 58 These Islamist groups have 
further strengthened their powers since the mid 1990s. In this, the role of 
Usama bin Laden cannot be overlooked given his ability to use his financial 
resources and charismatic appeal to unite disparate groups throughout the 
Muslim world under a common cause to attack the West. 59 
ss Retired lieutenant general Asad Durrani of Pakistan, quoted in Bodansky, Y., supra note 32, 
p. 334. 
56 Islamists continue to weaken or topple the secular regimes as with Pakistan or Egypt. In 
relation to Pakistan, Benazir Bhutto warned that Islamists try to infiltrate every class of 
society as follows: 
"These Islamist groups are working to try and influence the placing of people within the 
military, within the intelligence services, within the election commission, and they are 
creeping towards power in every sphere of the country. "(Reeve, S., supra note 4, p. 227) 
In the case of Egypt, they employed a bolder tactic as illustrated by the assassination 
attempt on President Mubarak in 1995 who adopted a strict policy to repress Islamist 
challenges (Bodansky, Y., supra note 32, pp. 121-133). 
57 Wilkinson, P., supra note 8, p. 35. 
5' The eviction of the Soviet army from Afghanistan by Mujahideens(Islam's holy warriors) 
in some degree restored the injured self-esteem of the Muslim masses since the 1967 defeat 
in the Six-Day war. In Somlia, Islamists are said to have been behind the attacks on the U. S. 
troops, thus forcing them to withdraw. For further details, see, Bodansky, Y., supra note 32, 
p. 55 and pp. 78-90. 
59 Kressel, N. J., Mass Hate: The Global Rise of Genocide and Terror, 2002, p. xiii; Bodansky, Y., 
supra note 32, p. 404. 
The differences between Sunni and Shi'a originated from the position on whether to 
recognise the legitimacy of the first three caliphs elected after the death of Prophet 
Muhammed. Sunnis recognise the legitimacy of the three caliphs but Shi'as reject them on 
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2. The importance of financing for modern terrorism 
a. Context 
A common criticism against the effectiveness of a financial war on 
terrorism is that terrorist operations do not necessarily cost much, and thus 
the targeting of the financial aspects of terrorist organisations might not be as 
effective in preventing terrorism as people expect. 6° This argument seems in 
some sense to hold water, especially given that some modem terrorist 
organisations tend to adopt a decentralised cell structure, thus eliminating 
the need for significant financing to maintain their entire organisations. 6l 
However, it should be remembered that we are here aiming not at 
preventing a single terrorist attack but at staving off a transnational mega- 
trend in our time. Any terrorist groups that are engaged in a sustained and 
the ground that they were not descendants of Muhammed and only when the fourth caliph, 
the cousin of Muhammed, succeeded the post, the legitimacy was restored. As a result, 
Shi'as are opposed to all Arab monarchies and secular regimes in that the leadership of the 
Muslim world should be appointed by divine ordinance. The success of Shi'a was illustrated 
by the Iran Revolution that overthrew the regime of the Shah(Capitanchik, D., supra note 31, 
pp. 118-128). See also, Adams, J., supra note 9, p. 91. 
In particular, given that even within the Muslim world different sects have antagonised 
and competed with each other as illustrated by the rivalry between Sunni and Shi'a, bin 
Ladens capacity to unite disparate groups in a common cause to attack the West is worthy 
of note. See, Richardson, L., "Global Rebels: Terrorist Organisations as Trans-National 
Actors", in Howard, R. D. & Sawyer, R. L., eds., supra note 12, pp. 72-73; Reeve, S., supra note 
4, pp. 224-225. 
60 Navias, M. S., "Financial Warfare as a Response to International Terrorism", in Freedman, 
L., ed., supra note 35, p. 69; Gunaratna, R., supra note 32, pp. 64-65; U. S. Department of States, 
"International Narcotics Control Strategy Report", March 2002, p. XII-5. 
61 The cell structure has many strong points. First of all, since cells do not know each other, 
even if a cell gets caught, other cells would not be affected and proceed with their work 
normally. Moreover, individual cells usually finance themselves, and thus financial needs are 
not so big as they are in a traditional hierarchical organisation. Furthermore, even a single 
cell might constitute an individual terrorist group. Therefore, sometimes, this cell structure 
is compared to the "Hydra". For further details, see, e. g., Gunaratna, R., supra note 32, p. 76; 
Arquilla, J. & Ronfeldt, D. & Zanini, M., "Networks, Netwar, and Information-Age 
Terrorism", in Howard, R. D. & Sawyer, R. L., eds., supra note 12, pp. 102-103; Wilkinson, P., 
"Fighting the Hydra" in O'Sullivan, N., ed., supra note 31, p. 210. 
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significant campaign, will require some degree of organisation, some training 
in the special skills of terrorism, as well as weapons, and other supplies. " 
Furthermore, given the grand goals of major terrorist groups, which include, 
for example, the reestablishment of a Caliphate from North Africa to Central 
and Southeast Asia, it goes without saying that global, long-term 
coordination among various groups and support for each other would be 
necessary to realise their aims. 63 This course of action would inevitably 
require constant and reliable funding sources. ' A glimpse into the financial 
structure of Al-Qaida, the most successful and broadest terrorist network yet 
known, 65 confirms the old premise that "there is no successful organisation 
without successful financing". 66 Indeed, it has built the most complex, robust 
and resilient financial network yet seen, as acknowledged by Western 
intelligence agencies. 67 This success in financial management was possible 
62 Wilkinson, P.,, supra note 8, p. 62. See also Bell, R. E., "The Confiscation, Forfeiture and 
Disruption of Terrorist Finances", (2003) Journal of Money Laundering Control, vol. 7, no. 2, 
p. 105. 
63 Robbins, J. S., supra note 32, pp. 354-355; Gunaratna, R., supra note 32, pp. 88-89. 
64 The importance of financing of terrorism was also hinted by Osama bin Laden himself in 
an interview by al-Quds a-Arabi, a Arab newspaper: 
"If we wanted small actions, the matter would have been easily carried out. But the nature of 
the battle calls for operations of a specific type that will make an impact on the enemy, and 
this, of course, calls for excellent preparation. "(recited from Bodansky, Y., supra note 32, 
p. 326) 
65 Along with his doctrinal flexibility, bin Laden has attracted widespread support due to his 
anti-Western and anti-Israeli rhetoric. Moreover, he has advocated pan-Islamic unity rather 
than just pan-Arabism. See, Gunaratna, R., supra note 32, pp. 86-87. 
6h The best success story of an old-style terrorist group is the case of the PLO. Its survival and 
transition to mainstream politics were primarily due to its skillful handling of finances. 
Initially, the PLO depended on donations from other Arab countries but a prudent and 
clever handling of long-term investment transformed it into a financial colossus in the 
Middle East that cannot be ignored any more. See, Napoleoni, L., supra note 33, p. 63. As of 
1999, the PLO was said to possess assets worthy of US$ 58 billion. See, Ehrenfeld, R. 
"Intifada Gives Cover to Arafat's Graft and Fraud", Insight on the news, 16 July 2001. 
67 Gunaratna, R., supra note 32, p. 61. 
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with Al-Qaida's policy placing a high priority on sustained generation and 
investment of funds. " Bin Laden seems to clearly understand that money 
facilitates and speeds the growth and self-sufficiency of the jihad he has 
instigated. 69 
b. Various needs for financing 
Although currently published data is not conclusive, it helps us to 
understand the importance of financing in strengthening the overall capacity 
of modern terrorist groups. For the purpose of facilitating the understanding 
of various needs for financing, terrorist organisations can be classified into 
two simple categories depending on whether they have a specific 
constituency or not. While most of both religious terrorist groups and secular 
terrorist groups are tied to their specific constituencies such as Hamas of 
Palestine, the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU), Abu Sayyaf of the 
Philippines, and the FARC of Colombia, some modern religious terrorist 
groups such as Al-Qaida, a transnational revolutionary movement, do not 
have any fixed constituencies. Despite this distinction, what both types of 
terrorist organisations have in common is that they need money, typically for 
spending on recruiting and training, the procurement of weaponry and the 
launching of operations. However, importantly, terrorist groups without any 
specific constituency tend to need financing for more strategic and broader 
" Ibid., p. 61. Rohan Gunaratna explains that Al-Qaida's finance and business committee 
which consists of professional bankers, accountants, and financiers, manages the group's 
funds across continents. 
69 Anonymous, Through Our Enemy's Eyes: Osania bin Laden, Radical Islam, and the Future of 
America, 2003, p. 32. 
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causes. 70 With this basic difference in mind, let us proceed to examine the 
financing needs of modern terrorist groups. 
Firstly, solid financing is necessary for the purpose of recruiting 
and training. Numerous cases can be identified to confirm the importance of 
this dimension. For instance, Al-Qaida was reported to have had 70,000 
Islamist militants trained in its camps in Afghanistan prior to 9/11. " In the 
Philippines, the Abu Sayyaf group, one of the most violent Islamist separatist 
groups, 72 was once suffering financial difficulty, and its armed militants 
reduced to only 200.73 However, after raising US$ 5.5million through 
kidnapping in 2000, the Abu Sayyaf's ranks expanded to at least 3,000.74 
According to Philippine intelligence sources, Abu Sayyaf paid US$ 1,100 to 
its militants. In a desperately poor area with high unemployment, Abu 
Sayyaf has become the single biggest employer. 75 In Uzbekistan, the IMU 
which aims at establishing an Islamic state there, is reported to be a major 
employer in the region, paying its men between US$ 100-500 a month. 76 
Young men in the poverty-stricken local area have no choice but either to go 
70 Since 1998, Al-Qaida consists of three major parts: a pyramidal structure to facilitate 
strategic and tactical direction; a global cell network; a base force for guerrilla warfare inside 
Afghanistan. Among these parts, the pyramidal structure is the brain of the entire 
organisation and is made up of four committees: a military committee, a finance and 
business committee, afatwa and Islamic study committee; and, a media and publicity 
committee. See, Gunaratna, R., supra note 32, p. 57. 
" "Bin Laden's martyrs for the cause", Financial Times, 28 November 2001. 
72 Unlike other terrorist groups in the Philippines, Abu Sayyaf clearly belongs to the world of 
Islamism. For a comparison of the Islamist terrorist groups in the Philippines, see, Yom, S. L., 
"Abu Sayyaf in the Philippines: More Than Just Criminal", CSIS Prospectus, vol. 2, no. 3, Fall 
2001. 
73 Shahar, Y., "Libya and the Jolo Hostage: Seeking a new image, or polishing the old one? ", 
International Policy Institute for Counter-Terrorism, 20 August 2000. 
' Ibid. 
75 Ibid. 
76 Ahmed, R., Jihad: The Rise of Militant Islam in Central Asia, 2002, p. 163. 
16 
to Russia to look for work or to join the IMU. " Indeed, this terrorist group 
seems to greatly benefit from its financial ability in promoting its cause. In 
Palestine, the more extreme examples can be noted in relation to recruitment 
of suicide bombers in the occupied territories who are reported to be given 
US$ 30,000 for their families. The money comes mostly from outside 
sponsors such as charitable organisations, groups of sympathisers or foreign 
regimes. " In Colombia, the FARC and M19(Movimiento 19 Abril) were 
struggling to survive on an income from armed robbery and the kidnapping 
of local businessmen until 1980.79 The number of their followers dropped to 
around 200, and recruitment was at a standstill since there was no cash for 
salaries, and the leaders of the two organisations predicted the end of their 
campaign. 80 However, in 1981, the FARC and M19 struck a deal with the 
Colombian drug mafia; they would provide armed protection against the 
army in exchange for a share in the coca profits. 81 By 1984, the FARC and 
M19 were said to earn US$ 150 million a year from the business of protecting 
drug traffickers. 82 A large percentage of the profits were spent on recruitment, 
so that by 1988 both groups commanded a combined militia of 10,000 people, 
large enough to be feared by the government. 83 
Secondly, terrorist groups attempt to get access to a stock of 
" Ibid. 
78 Goldberg, S., "The Man behind the Suicide Bombers", Guardian, 12 June 2002. 
79 Adams, J., supra note 9, p. 303 
Ibid., p. 303. 
Rl The FARC levied a 10 per cent protection tax on all coca growers in areas under its control. 
82 Ibid., p. 303. 
83 Adams, J., supra note 9, p. 303. It is said to cost about US$ 75 million a year to equip a 
militia army of 10,000 troops with light arms (Block, R. & Doyle, L., "Drug 
Profits Funds 
Weapons for Balkans", Independent, 10 December 1993). 
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weaponry. For instance, bin Laden has paid attention to "high-tech" 
conventional weaponry such as surface-to-air missiles(SAM). Since 1998, 
there has been something of a race between bin Laden and the Pentagon, 
with the latter trying to recover all the Stinger missile launchers that had 
been distributed during the war in Afghanistan. 84 If the American military 
offered US$ 100,000 for a Stinger, bin Laden was said to offer twice that. 85 The 
current black market price is said to be about US$ 200,000.6 Recent examples 
of the use of the SAMs was the firing on a US military aircraft taking off from 
the Prince Sultan military base in Saudi Arabia in December 2001,87 and the 
attack on an Israeli chartered jet in Mombasa in November 2002. Moreover, 
governments believe that terrorist would love to get their hands on weapons 
of mass destruction(WMD). For example, there is evidence from Al-Qaida 
training manuals and other intelligence, that they have investigated the 
means of developing WMD. 88 In particular, Al-Qaida created a "WMD 
committee", which is known to have approached a number of Muslim 
scientists to assist the terrorist network with the creation and procurement of 
chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear weapons. " Needless to say, 
solid financing would be necessary for this intention to materialise. 9o 
Jacquard, R., supra note 47, p. 127. 
Ibid., p. 127. 
Napoleon, L., supra note 33, p. 185. Coupled with the transportation capability of the Al- 
Qaida which is believed to operate a fleet of vessels, high-tech weaponry could be employed 
anywhere in the world. See, e. g., Felsted, A. & Odell, M., "Agencies fear extent of al-Qaeda's 
sea network", Financial Tinies, 21 February 2002; Gunaratna, R., supra note 32, p. xxxii. 
87 Gunaratna, R., supra note 32, p. xxvi. 
88 UN, "Letter dated 7 July 2003 from the Chairman of the Security Council Committee 
established pursuant to resolution 1267(1999) addressed to the President of the Security 
Council", S/2003/669,8 July 2003, p. 24. 
Ibid., p. 24. 
y0 There is an allegation that in the autumn 1998, bin Laden was reported to have acquired 
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Thirdly, terrorist groups need to buy popular support to take 
solid root on their home ground. For example, the Palestine-based Hamas 
has cleverly mixed guerrilla warfare with political and social activism. " It 
has extensively engaged in community and charitable programmes, pouring 
money into a wide network of social services which support schools, 
orphanages, mosques, health care clinics, soup kitchens and sports clubs in 
the poorest areas. 92 As a result, its popularity is particularly high in the 
shanty towns of the Gaza Strip. 93 As seen in this example, where poor 
Muslim migrant populations have suffered the lack of basic social welfare 
services for decades, Islamist parties and groups have filled the vacuum by 
establishing their own socio-economic and welfare organisations. 94 This 
interaction with Muslim communities has given these organisations an 
opportunity to politicise and radicalise the Muslim masses into supporting 
their aims and objectives. 95 A similar case can also be found in relation to 
several tactical nuclear warheads, costing him US$30 million in cash and two tons of Afghan 
heroin that was worth US$70 million (Riyad Alam-al-Din, "Report Links Bin Laden, Nuclear 
Weapon", 13 November 1998, recited from Anonymous, supra note 69, p. 191). 
Furthermore, bin Ladens representative reportedly bought three chemical and biological 
laboratories in the former Yugoslavia in early May 1998 (Olimpio, G., "Islamic Cell 
Preparing Chemical Warfare, Toxins, Gases against West", Corriere della Sera, 8 July 1998, 
recited from Anonymous, supra note 69, p. 188). 
" Hamas calls for the destruction of Israel and its replacement by a Palestinian pan-Islamic 
state stretching from the Mediterranean Sea to the River of Jordan, while the PLO's goal is a 
secular state with equal rights for all citizens, Muslims and Christians (Napoleoni, L., supra 
note 32, p. 70 and p. 96). Since 1994 when Goldstein opened fired on Muslim worshippers in 
the Mosque of the Patriarch in Hebron, Hamas introduced a new type of warfare, the suicide 
bombers (Esposito, J., supra note 40, p. 99). 
92 Esposito, J., supra note 40, p. 97 
93 Ibid., p. 97. 
9' Gunaratna, R., supra note 32, p. 239. 
' Ibid., p. 239. In addition, these activities also served as a tool to attract recruits as well as 
attracting foreign donations for charity purposes. Indeed, interesting synergy effects can 
be 
observed between social services and recruiting and the flow of money. However, Islamist 
groups are not the only ones to appeal to the general public. For example, see the 
IRA's use 
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ideological terrorist groups. For instance, in Colombia, the FARC has also 
carried out social and public works in its constituency. It has built and paved 
new roads and improved the communal areas of some towns. It has also 
provided people with security, a luxury they had lacked for a long time. As 
with many Palestinians helped by Hamas, the local Colombians might share 
a similar sentiment, and give support to the cause of the FARC. 96 
Fourthly, terrorist organisations without any specific constituency 
support and strengthen the capacity of other fledgling local terrorist groups 
with a similar cause through financial support. 97 This is said to be the case, 
for example, with Al-Qaida. It has reportedly provided considerable financial 
help to other Islamist groups in conflict areas all over the world, " thus 
establishing a universal jihad network. " In this context, Al-Qaida has been 
compared to a holding company and its associated Islamist groups as its 
subsidiaries, with Al-Qaida providing the venture capital. 10° In the 
Philippines, the Moro Islamic Liberation Front(MILF) was suffering from the 
shortage of weapons in 1998, and reportedly it was bin Laden who rectified 
the problem by funding the delivery of 3,000 high-powered weapons, and 
of financing in buying votes in electoral campaigns (Adams, J., supra note 9, pp. 203-206). 
96 Ibid., p. 77. 
97 In addition to financial support, Al-Qaida dispatches cadres who were the vanguard 
fighters and the most accomplished trainers, to its associate groups. See, Gunaratna, R., supra 
note 32, pp. 55-56. 
98 Ibid., p. 235. Having the grand picture in mind, Al-Qaida has tried to orchestrate overall 
Islamist movements worldwide. For example, bin Laden launched the Islamic Front in 1998, 
in which many clandestine organisations participated, such as the Egyptian Islamic Jihad, 
the Egyptian Armed Group, the Pakistan Scholars Society, the Partisans Movement in 
Kashmir, the Jihad Movement in Bangladesh, and the Afghan military wing of the "Advice 
and Reform" commission. See, Bodansky, Y., supra note 32, pp. 316-317. 
99 Shahar, Y., "Tracing bin Laden 's Money: Easier said than done", International Policy 
Institute for Counter-Terrorism, 21 September 2001; Reeve, S., supra note 4, pp. 184-185. 
10° Gunaratna, R., supra note 32, pp. 68-69. 
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the procurement of an international satellite communication system to assist 
its fight for an independent Islamic state in Mindanao. 1 ' In June 2000, 
according to the Philippine military intelligence, bin Laden had further 
transferred US$ 3 million to the MILE 102 In Uzbekistan, bin Laden reportedly 
offered US$ 20 million to the IMU in the spring of 2000 and also paid for 
three MI-8 transport helicopters as well, thus securing a solid partner in 
Central Asia where he did not have an operational base before. 103 Moreover, 
in September 2003, the Groupe Salafiste pour la Predication et Combat made 
a public announcement of its affiliation with Al-Qaida to allow it to seek 
bases in the poorly policed area of sub-Saharan Africa. " This strategic 
alliances with local groups seems to gain increasing importance for Al-Qaida 
because it has to rely more on associate local organisations for its operations 
due to the setback it has suffered since 9/11. Furthermore, it would earn Al- 
Qaida some influence as well, thus facilitating its search for a safe haven in 
'u' As a result, the MILF was said to expand its arsenal of firearms from 3,000 in 1997 to more 
than 11,000 in 2000, thus transforming itself into a threatening armed group in the region 
(Anonymous, supra note 69, pp. 181-182). Muslims in the Philippines, called Moros constitute 
5% of the population and waged bloody wars for independence from the late 1960s. For the 
further history of the conflict, see, Iacovou, C., "From MNLF to Abu Sayyaf : The 
Radicalization of Islam in the Philippines", International Policy Institute for Counter-Terrorism, 
11 July 2000. 
102 "Information on Bin Laden's Plans to Set Up Base in Somalia", Al-Sharq Al-Awsat, recited 
from Anonymous, supra note 69, p. 41. 
'03 Rashid, A., "They are only sleeping: Why militant Islamists in Central Asia aren't going to 
go away", The New Yorker, 14 January 2002. 
The price of a MI-8 helicopter is US$ 3.2 million (the price of a used MI-8 is approximately 
one third of the original price)(visited on 20 July 2004)<http: //www. fas. org/man/dod- 
101/sys/ac/row/mi-8. htm>. 
104 UN, "Letter dated 14 February 2005 from the Chairman of the Security Council 
Committee established pursuant to resolution 1267(1999) concerning Al-Qaeda and the 
Taliban and associated individuals and entities addressed to the President of the Security 
Council", S/2005/83,15 February 2005, p. 7. 
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various regions in case of emergency. "' 
Fifthly and in a similar context, terrorist groups without any 
constituency seek to buy influence over top-class power elites to establish a 
parasitic operational base in a targeted area. For instance, before 9/11, bin 
Laden tried to extend his friendship with Mullah Mohamed Omar, the most 
powerful man in Afghanistan at that time. Bin Laden sustained Omar 
financially"' and he also secured Omar's friendship with gifts, which 
included an offer to take over the funding of an irrigation canal in Helmland 
province in 1997.107 Moreover, in Pakistan, bin Laden reportedly donated US$ 
10 million to opposition politicians to bring about the approval of a vote of 
no confidence in Benazir Bhutto's government in the late 1990s. 108 During this 
period, bin Laden was trying to destabilise the Bhutto government to ensure 
the election of politicians who would be more amenable to his presence in 
Afghanistan. 10' In Somalia which Al-Qaida also intended to use as a base 
from which to reach out elsewhere in Africa and to use it as a potential safe 
haven, it provided unspecified support to the United Front for the Liberation 
105 Anonymous, supra note 69, p. 182. 
106 Al-Qaida paid US$10-20 million annually to its Taliban hosts prior to 9/11 (UN, "Letter 
dated 23 August 2004 from the Chairman of the Security Council Committee established 
pursuant to resolution 1267(1999) concerning Al-Qaeda and Taliban and associated 
individuals and entities addressed to the President of the Security Council", 
S/2004/679,25 
August 2004, p. 12). 
107 Reeve, S., supra note 4, p. 189. 
'oR Ibid., p. 188. 
'oy Ibid., pp. 188-189. After winning the General Election, Benazir 
Bhutto was nominated as 
the first female Prime Minister to lead a Muslim nation on 2 December 1988 
but was 
dismissed on 6 August 1990 by President Ghulam Ishaq Khan. 
Following victory in the 1993 
election, she was once again nominated as the 
Prime Minister but was dismissed by her 
own-nominated President Farooq Ahmad Khan 
Leghari in 1996(visited on 20 July 2004)< 
http: //www. storyofpakistan. com/person. asp? perid=P024&Pg=3>. 
ýý 
of Western Somalia(UF). 110 In return, Al-Qaida also had some of its fighters 
trained in UF camps, which the West watched far less closely than those in 
Sudan, Yemen, and Afghanistan. 
"' 
Sixthly, although decentralised terrorist groups like Al-Qaida do 
not need to support hierarchical structures, they still have to look after their 
fledgling cells which are loosely linked worldwide. In other words, the 
central command sometimes has to provide "seed money" to help cells settle 
down and sustain themselves, or "operational money" to launch a strategic 
attack on a considerable scale. "' For instance, in 1994, bin Laden dispatched 
Mohamed Sadeek to Kenya to create a cell in the Al-Qaida network. 11' He 
was financed with Al-Qaida money to buy a seven-tonne boat and set up a 
fishing business. 114 Catches from the boat were used to support other Al- 
Qaida members who then began arriving in the country. "' This cell was 
eventually employed in the US embassy bombing in Nairobi in 1998.116 
Moreover, the arrest in July 2004 of Ahmed Khalfan Ghailani revealed that as 
a follow-up to bin Laden's February 2003 broadcast appealing to Muslims, 
Al-Qaida recruiters were sent to northern Nigeria to establish a presence 
10 The political chaos and economic collapse after the civil war and UN intervention 
in the 
1990s made the Somali groups eager for bin Laden's financial and military support as they 
compete for supremacy in Somalia. See, Anonymous, supra note 
69, pp. 179-180. 
11' Sa'id al-Qaysi, "Report on U. S. Embassy Bombing Probe", Al-Watan 
AI-Arabi, 30 October 
1998, recited from Anonymous, supra note 69, p. 180. 
12 As of 2004, conservative intelligence estimates indicate that al-Qaeda 
is present over 60 
countries and a rump leadership is still intact and over 
18,000 potential terrorists at large, 
with recruitment accelerating on account of Iraq. 
See, International Institute for Strategic 
Studies, Strategic Survey 2003/2004, pp. 6-7. 
13 Reeve, S., supra note 4, p. 198. 
114 Ibid., p. 198. 
'15 Ibid., p. 198. 
16 Ibid., p. 198. 
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there. " ' This must have cost seed money. Moreover, the "operational 
funding" for cells is also common expenditure for Al-Qaida, and some have 
likened it to the Ford Foundation, where researchers present projects and 
after careful consideration, some are funded while others are discarded. "' 
For example, in mid 1999, Hambali and his group which are best known for 
the Bali bombing in 2002, once made a video that contained a plan to blow 
up a bus service used by U. S. soldiers in Singapore. 119 They showed bin 
Laden the video in the hope of receiving funds for their terror activity in 
Southeast Asia. 12° The video was found in late 2001 in Kabul, in the house of 
Mohammad Atif, bin Laden's military commander. 12' In 1999, bin Laden and 
his network were said to be receiving hundreds of similar requests. " All in 
all, they must be presumed to be still engaged in this kind of funding 
assistance as long as there is no trustworthy counter evidence. 
In conclusion, as illustrated by the cases of terrorist spending on a 
large scale for various purposes, it is clear that money plays an important 
role in facilitating terrorist activities worldwide. 
III. Terrorist Financing and Money Laundering 
1. The sources of terrorist financing 
Given the constant need for a ready supply of cash, weaponry, 
11' UN Doc., S/2005/83, supra note 104, p. 6. 
Gunaratna, R., supra note 32, pp. 68-69; Williamson, H. & Burns, J. & Fidler, S. & Huband, 
M., "A catastrophic failure of intelligence", Financial Times, 29 November 2001. 





ammunition, and other essential resources, modern terrorist groups turn to 
various financing activities which can fall into three categories: criminal 
activities, donations, and legitimate businesses. 123 
a. Criminal activities 
Criminal activities are believed to be the single most important 
source for terrorist groups. For example, the narcotics trade has given 
various terrorist groups a new breath of life, making it possible for them to 
achieve self-sufficiency. 114 In Columbia, 60 to 90 per cent of the funding for 
paramilitaries and guerillas comes from drug trafficking. 125 Furthermore, 
Islamist groups in Central Asia, the Balkans, Kashimir, the Caucasus, India, 
Western China, and Southeast Asia, are also involved in narcotics since they 
need solid financing to run their wars. The IMU is known to control opium 
movement through Central Asian routes, including as much as 70 per cent of 
the opium trade entering Kyrgyzstan. 126 Al-Qaida has also been alleged to 
have used drug-trafficking to finance itself. 12' In fact, almost all Islamist 
'23 For the categorisation, see, Greenberg, M. R. & Wechsler, W. & Wolosky, L. S., "Terrorist 
Financing: Report of an Independent Task Force", Council on Foreign Relations, 25 
November 2002, pp. 6-7. For the analysis of bin Laden 's case, see, e. g, Shahar, Y., supra note 99. 
124 Napoleoni, L., supra note 32, p. 94. 
125 Berry, L. V., supra note 26, p. 52. Particularly, the United Self Defence Forces of Columbia 
(AUC) has admitted earning up to 70 percent of its income from the drug trade (Berry, L. V., 
supra note 26, p. 52). 
126 Smith, R. G., "Narco-Terror: The Worldwide Connection Between Drugs and Terrorism", 
Testimony, United States Senate Committee on the judiciary, 13 March 2002; Berry, L. V., 
supra note 26, p. 92. In 2001, the IMU reportedly set up laboratories in Tajikistan to refine 
heroine, which explained the arrival of large quantity of raw opium from Afghanistan to 
Central Asia (Ahmed, R., supra note 76, pp. 165-166). 
127 Although there is some reservation with regard to Al-Qaida's involvement in drug 
trafficking, it should be remembered that overall Islamist terrorist groups are already 
actively engaged in this field, and there are circumstantial cases for Al-Qaida's involvement 
in the drug trade as well as bartering drugs for weaponry and other costs. For example, three 
individuals were arrested in Hong Kong in November 2002 when they attempted to trade 
25 
terrorist groups identified as being involved in narcotics trafficking 
reportedly have had contacts with Al-Qaida. 728 Furthermore, specific 
fatwas(theological decrees) from Islamist luminaries openly authorised 
Islamist terrorist groups to use drugs as another weapon to attack the West. 129 
In this context, it is a matter of grave concern that Afghanistan which 
accounted for over 70 per cent (4,600 metric tonnes) of the world's supply of 
opium in the year 1999, recently resumed poppy cultivation despite the 
official renewal of the ban on poppy growth by the Karzai government. 
Although Afghanistan has not yet reached its peak of poppy production 
recorded in 1999, the country is estimated to have produced 4,200 metric 
tonnes of oven-dried opium in 2004, substantially recovering its original 
production capacity. 130 This is a huge quantity of opium worth US$ 2.8 billion. 
Kidnapping is also another important funding source and has 
become an extremely lucrative business for some groups. The Abu Sayyaf 
case as mentioned above is a good example. Similarly in 1999, the IMU raised 
about US$ 5 million as ransom for the release of four Japanese geologists 
abducted in Kyrgyzstan. 131 The ETA(Basque Homeland and Liberty) is also a 
heroin and hashish for Stinger missiles which were needed for Al-Qaida. For details, see, US 
Department of State, "International Narcotic Control Strategy Report 2002", 1 March 2003, 
p. XII-26; UN Doc, S/2005/83, supra note 104, p. 30. 
128 See, Berry, L. V., supra note 26, p. 1, p. 7, p. 28, pp. 43-44, and p. 68; Hutchinson, A., "Narco- 
Terror: The Worldwide Connection Between Drugs and Terrorism", Testimony before United 
States Senate Committee on the Judiciary, 13 March 2002; Ehrenfeld, R., Funding Evil: How 
Terrorism Is Financed-and How to Stop It, 2003, pp. 51-57. 
'2' Beers, R. & Taylors, F. X., "Narco-Terror: The Worldwide Connection Between Drugs and 
Terror", a hearing held by the U. S. Senate Judiciary Committee, Subcommittee on 
Technology, Terrorism and Government Information, 13 March 2002; Bodanksy, Y., supra 
note 32, p. 322. 
'30UNODC, Afghanistan Opiuni Survey 2004, November 2004, p. 4. 
131 Napoleoni, L., supra note 33, p. 89. 
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major actor in this field, reportedly generating US$ 15 million in 1997 
alone. 732 
Besides, there are many other lucrative criminal enterprises. In 
2001 alone, the IRA is said to have raised US$ 11 million through criminal 
activities, 
133 Tobacco smuggling from Eastern Europe to England and the 
Irish Republic was the largest source of income. Evading duties, the IRA 
resold this tobacco, netting profits of up to US$ 640,000 per lorry. " 
Furthermore, Al-Qaida's financial network in Europe, which is dominated by 
Algerians, relies heavily on credit card fraud. Security and intelligence 
agencies estimate that nearly US$ 1 million a month is raised in this 
fashion. 135 
Interestingly, a new trend can be noted with regard to terrorist 
groups' involvement in criminal activities. Some terrorist groups are now 
gradually turning into a big business as exemplified by the practices of the 
FARC and Abu Sayyaf. 
136 Although these groups may originally have 
embarked on revolutionary terrorism from motives of political idealism, they 
seem to enjoy the unexpected fruits of their way of life. 137 In this regard, to 
tackle the symbiotic and synergetic link between terrorism and criminal 
activities seems to be an increasing challenge for the international 
community. 
'32 Ibid., p. 36. 
133 Clarke, L. & Leppard, D., "Photos link more IRA Men to Colombia", Sunday Times, 28 
April 2002. 
134 Ibid. 
'35 Gunaratna, R., supra note 32, p. 65. 
136 Berry, L. V., supra note 26, p. 2. 
137 Wilkinson, P., "Terrorist movement", in Alexander, Y. & Carlton, D. & Wilkinson, P., eds., 
supra note 8, p. 114. 
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b. Donations 
In the 1960s and 1970s, the IRA secured funding through 
donations from the US. The Irish Northern Aid(Noraid) was established in 
the 1960s for this purpose and within a decade, Noraid achieved a budget of 
US$ 7 million, funding more than 50 per cent of the IRA's cash needs. '38 In a 
similar context, Islamist terrorist groups also have recourse to donations. '39 In 
particular, Al-Qaida is believed to utilise a financial network which was 
developed to finance the mujahideen in the 1980s. 14° This network is said to 
include various sources ranging from wealthy Persian Gulf Arabs who could 
be solicited directly to give huge sums of money, "' to the masses who would 
make regular charitable donations as part of their religious obligations. "' In 
this context, it is of value to note the zakat which is a religious donation of at 
least 2.5 per cent of one's accumulated wealth held for a full year for 
charitable purposes. 
143 Interestingly, Islamic banks also apply zakat to every 
contract or transaction they handle. They deduct the appropriate amounts, 
equivalent to 2.5 per cent of assessed personal wealth, and transfer them to 
13' Adams, J., supra note 9, p. 172 
139 Greenberg, M. R., supra note 123, p. 7- 
141 Ibid. 
"' For some cases of fund-raising tours of Al-Qaida to Saudi merchants, see, e. g., Huband, 
M., "Bankrolling bin Laden"', Financial Times, 28 November 2001. 
The way bin Laden utilised donations is worthy of note as illustrated by the words of the 
late leader of the anti-Taliban Northern Alliance, Ahmed Shah Masood: 
"He did not have large savings. Even today when he is supplying the Taliban with 
everything they need, he does not have the flow of finance people ascribe to him. He knows 
where to find finance and how to persuade interested people to invest in him and his cause. 
You cannot take that away from bin Laden" (Yemelyarenko, V., "Ahmed Shah Mas'ud: 
Afghan War Will End in Pakistan", Izvestiya, 2 December 2000, recited from Anonymous, 
supra note 69, p. 37). 
'. 2 APG, "Annual Typologies Report 2003-2004", P. M. 
143 Buckmaster, D., ed., Islamic Banking: an overview, 1996, p. 98; Lewis, M. K. & Algaud, L. M., 
Islamic Banking, 2001, pp. 27-30. 
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Islamic charitable organisations. l However, zakat transfers are generally off 
the balance sheets and therefore hardly traceable. "' In addition, all records 
are destroyed as soon as transactions are complete. "' Indeed, it could be 
turned into one of many tricks used to finance terrorist groups especially in 
connection with charities. 147 In 2003, the Chief Executive Officer of the 
Benevolence International Foundation was convicted of diverting more than 
US$ 315,000 of charitable donations to terrorist organisations by a U. S. 
court. 148 Moreover, it was also revealed that the Holy Land Foundation for 
Relief and Development raised millions of dollars for the Hamas prior to its 
designation by the U. S. government as a terrorist supporter. 149 
c. Legitimate businesses 
Lastly, legitimate businesses are a versatile tool for terrorist 
financing. This area has been highlighted since 9/11, especially in connection 
with bin Laden's firms scattered worldwide. "' Government sources and 
'.. Brisand and Dasquie, La Verita' Negata, p. 71, recited from Napoleoni, supra note 33, p. 120. 
145 Ibid.; Greenberg, M. R., supra note 123, p. 7. 
146 Brisand and Dasquie, supra note 144, p. 120. 
''" However, there is also some criticism that the vast majority of Islamic charities is not 
radical and should not be stereotyped as terrorist supporting organisations. Furthermore, 
sometimes the collections of resources are misused without the knowledge of donors. See, 
the statement of Dr. Quintan Wiktorowicz at pp. 15-18 and the statement of Kenneth W. Dam 
at pp. 32-34 in "The Role of Charities and NGO's In the Financing of Terrorist Activities", 
Hearing before the Subcommittee on International Trade and Finance, U. S. Senate 
Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, 107th Congress, 2"d Session. 
148 APG, "Annual Typologies Report 2003-04", p. 29. 
149 Ibid., p. 29. 
'50 In an interview in 1996, bin Laden admitted that his economic and financial establishment 
was present in more than 13 countries-Albania, Pakistan, Malaysia, the Netherlands, UK, 
Romania, Russia, Turkey, Lebanon, Iraq and several Gulf states. See, Leppard, D. & Sheridan, 
M., "London Bank Used for bin Laden Cash", Sunday Times, 16 September; Mintz, J., "Bin 
Laden's Finances are Moving Target", Washington Post, 28 August 1998; Shahar, Y., supra note 
99. 
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other experts on terrorism indicated that a large portfolio of ostensibly 
legitimate businesses continues to be maintained on behalf of bin Laden by a 
number of as yet unidentified intermediaries and associates across North 
Africa, Europe, the Middle East, and Asia. "' For example, bin Laden is said 
to have invested in the wood and paper industries in Norway about US$ 40 
million; and hospital equipment in Sweden to the tune of US$ 15 million. "' 
He also invested in Qudarat Transport, a fleet of fishing boats. 153 In addition, 
real estate investments are believed to be scattered around the globe to offset 
losses and to maximise profits. The portfolio is said to include real estate in 
London, Paris and the French Riviera. 154 However, one of the most profitable 
businesses that bin Laden cannily obtained is the Gum Arabic Company 
Limited, a Khartoum-based firm which has a virtual monopoly over most of 
the Sudan's exports of gum arabic, and comprises around 80 per cent of the 
world's supply. 
155 Gum arabic comes from the sap of the Sudanese acacia 
tree. 
156 It makes newspaper ink stick to printing presses, prevents sediment 
forming in soft drink at the bottom of a can, and forms a film around sweets 
and medical pills. 15' Even now the US State Department and the CIA remain 
unsure whether bin Laden is still profiting from his investment. 1 ' While 30 
per cent of the shares in Gum Arabic Company Limited are held by the 
I" UN, "Letter dated 19 September 2002 from the Chairman of the Security Council 
Committee established pursuant to resolution 1267(1999) concerning Afghanistan addressed 
to the President of the Security Council", S/2002/1050,20 September 2002, p. 11. 
152 Jacquard, R., supra note 47, p. 128. 
153 Ibid., p. 128. 
151 Ibid., p. 128. 
155 Reeve, S., supra note 4, pp. 178-179. 
's' Ibid., p. 179. 
157 Ibid., p. 179. 
's' Ibid., p. 179. 
30 
Sudanese government, the other 70 per cent is held by individual 
shareholders and banks, any or all of whom may be acting as fronts for bin 
Laden. '59 
However, since 9/11 there is a belief that bin Laden suffered 
serious losses to his legitimate businesses, due to strengthened international 
scrutiny and the defection of his accountant to the Saudi regime who knew 
quite a bit about bin Laden's remaining small companies. This developing 
situation is said to have forced bin Laden to sell those companies with 
significant losses before being exposed. 16° 
Nevertheless, even after 9/11 legitimate business still seems to be 
an important factor both for terrorist groups and for counter-terrorism policy 
makers. Above all, these companies operate to provide income to support Al- 
Qaida and to provide cover for money laundering, procurement of 
explosives, weapons and chemicals and for the travel of Al-Qaida 
operatives. 161 For example, honey is a very popular and profitable trade item 
in the Middle East and is also considered a good product in which to conceal 
contraband. When drugs, arms, cash, etc. are literally buried in honey, the 
smell and consistency of the honey put off customs officers from examining 
the containers. 162 Moreover, legitimate businesses are worthy of added 
attention by law enforcement authorities since even a few remaining firms 
can provide a very good chance of tracing the money trail to catch a "big 
159 Ibid., p. 179. 
"'0 Interview with Dr. Saad al-Faqih. Frontline Online. (visited on 20 July 2004) 
< http: //www. pbs. org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/binladen/interviews/al-fagih. html> 
"'' Reeve, S., supra note 4, p. 178. 
162 Miller, J. & Gerth, J., "Trade in Honey is Said to Provide Money and Cover for bin Laden", 
New York Times, 11 October 2001. 
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fish". For policy makers, the focus on legitimate businesses can be an 
efficient use of limited resources if it is supported by appropriate intelligence. 
Although there is no accurate data on how terrorist groups make 
money from these respective sources, some empirical research might be 
worthy of note and give a rough picture of financial flows to international 
terrorism. Based on the statistical theory which takes into account some 
hidden variables, Friedrich Schneider estimated the wealth of Al-Qaida at up 
to US$ 5 billion, and its annual financial flow at US$ 20-25 million. The 
proportion of each financing source is calculated as follows. 
Ways of financing of terror organisation 
(using the example of Al Qaida) 
Drug business (mainly transporting drugs) 30-35% 
Donations/tribute payments of governments or wealthy individuals or 
religious groups 
25-30% 
Classic criminal activities (blackmail, kidnapping, etc. ) 10-15% 
Illegal diamond trading 10-15% 
Additional unknown financial means (legal + illegal) 5-25% 
Table. Friedrich Schneider's own calculation"' 
2. The role of money laundering in terrorist financing 
a. Context 
Terrorist financing consists of two activities: money making and 
its distribution. Thus, naturally there are two corresponding strategies to 
'h3 Schneider, F., "Macroeconomics: The Financial Flows of Islamic Terrorism", in 
Maschiandaro, D., ed., Global Financial Crime: Terrorism, Money Laundering and Offshore 
Centres, 2004, p. 120. 
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suppress the financing of terrorism: one to combat the money making 
activities (criminal activities, legitimate businesses, and donations) and the 
other to tackle the distribution process. With regard to the first strategy, 
unfortunately nobody can guarantee that such an initiative will be efficient 
and effective in terms of cost-benefit analysis. 1 Although it partially 
overlaps with conventional policing strategy, especially in relation to 
criminal activities, the other methods such as donations and legitimate 
businesses entail more complicated challenges. Given that terrorist money 
could be accumulated under almost any circumstances such as donations at 
grassroots level, it would require enormous resources to establish a 
mechanism to take control of every aspect of the money-making activities in 
the private sector. 
Given such constraints, it seems to be better to target terrorist 
funds at their transfer and distribution stages. It could be an efficient use of 
limited investigative resources, 
165 For example, if investigators trace any 
significant distribution of funds based on either human intelligence or the 
amount of money, they can concentrate their limited resources on the major 
players, first catching them and as a result, eliminating the funding 
channels. 16' It could generate the positive cycle of following money, catching 
"big fish", eliminating the funding channels and shifting the investigation to 
"' For example, zakat are collected across every walk of the Middle Eastern societies, and it is 
distributed to various sectors in need such as charities and social services. In this case, 
without hard evidence on the connection with terrorism, it would be extremely difficult 
for 
governments to interfere with every use of zakat, thus courting public anger. Moreover, it 
would be indeed beyond the capability of government authorities to place all those 
voluntary collection activities in the private sector under the strict government control. 
11' The 9/11 Commission Report, pp. 381-383. 
'66 Ibid., p. 383. 
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others who are exposed through the links with those originally 
apprehended. 16' The possibility is already confirmed by the investigators' use 
of wire transfer data in identifying the accomplices and supporters of the 
9/11 attack. 168 
Fortunately the international community does not have to 
develop a new infrastructure for this purpose but can utilise the already 
existing one that was established in the context of combating the laundering 
of the proceeds of acquisitive crimes. 169 This is for the reason that in practice 
the "distribution process" is quite close to the concept of "money 
laundering". In addition to the primary focus on the distribution process, the 
international community can also pay additional attention to some money- 
making activities that are unique to terrorist financing. The monitoring of 
charities can be a case in point. 
b. The relationship of money laundering and terrorist financing 
Originally, the term "money laundering" was used in the 1920s in 
the U. S. At the time, Mafia groups owned and used launderettes to gain a 
167 Ibid., p. 382. 
'6s "The Role of Charities and NGO's In the Financing of Terrorist Activities", supra note 147, 
p. 18. See also the view of the 9/11 Commission on the use of terrorist financing in 
incapacitating the capability of Al-Qaida: 
"Vigorous efforts to track terrorist financing must remain front and center in U. S. 
counterterrorism efforts. The government has recognized that information about terrorist 
money helps us to understand their networks, search them out, and disrupt their operations. 
Intelligence and law enforcement have targeted the relatively small number of financial 
facilitators-individuals al Qaeda relied on for their ability to raise and deliver money-at the 
core of al Qaeda's revenue stream. Their efforts have worked. The death or capture of 
several important facilitators has decreased the amount of money available to al Qaeda and 
has increased its costs and difficulty in raising and moving that money. Captures have 
additionally provided a windfall of intelligence that can be used to continue the cycle of 
disruption. "(The 9/11 Commission Report, p. 382) 
'69 FATF, "Report on Money Laundering Typologies, 2000-2001", p. 20. 
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legitimate appearance for money derived from acquisitive crimes. 10 Later, 
although there were subtle differences, a three-stage definition was generally 
employed by scholars and policy makers. For example, the FATF described 
the process of money laundering as follows: firstly, cash enters into the 
domestic financial system either formally or informally; secondly, it is sent 
abroad to be integrated into the financial systems of regulatory havens; and, 
thirdly, it is repatriated in the form of transfers of legitimate appearance. "' 
Thus, despite several variations of the definition of money laundering, it can 
be generally described as a legitimisation-oriented concept: from a dark side to 
a sunny side. 
However, terrorist financing does not put an emphasis on 
legitimisation. Money has only to be distributed to final terrorist cells but it 
does not need to be legitimate. Rather, added weight must be given to the 
activity of brushing off or breaking the money trail. Especially, if the amount 
of money on the move is small, this approach is more appropriate. Thus, 
terrorist financing can be categorised as a lead line cutting-oriented concept: 
the dark or sunny side does not matter. To move funds clandestinely from 
source to recipient, terrorist group networks disguises the true identities of 
both parties. 1' 
170 Stessens, G., Money Laundering: A New International Law Enforcement Model, 2000, p. 82. 
"' For an overview of various definitions of money laundering, see, e. g., Mitsilegas, V., 
Money Laundering Counter-Measures in the European Union: A New Paradigm of Security 
Governance versus Fundamental Legal Principles, 2003, pp. 25-30. Similarly, the UN defines 
money laundering as a dynamic three-stage process that requires: firstly, moving the funds 
from direct association with the crime; secondly, disguising the trail to foil pursuit; and, 
thirdly making the money available to the criminal once again, with its occupational and 
geographic origins hidden from the view. See, United Nations Office for Drug 
Control and 
Crime Prevention, Financial Havens, Banking Secrecy and Money Laundering, 1998, p. 4. 
172 Gunaratna, R., supra note 32, p. 61; Thachuk, K. L., "Terrorism's Financial Lifeline: Can It 
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In sum, money laundering begins with brushing off the audit trail 
and ends by achieving legitimisation, while terrorist financing begins with 
money making and ends by distributing it. Despite the difference in their 
final goals, what money laundering and terrorist financing share in common 
is the concerns about how to erase money trails as represented by the 
overlapping middle bold line in the diagram below. Out of this similarity, the 
skills of the money launderer have become an indispensable tool for 
terrorists to hide the flow of their money as well as to keep sustainable 
financing sources intact. 173 Consequently, there is significant room for anti- 
money laundering counter-measures to attack terrorist financing. 
Money Laundering 
Making money : 
(crimes) Movement of money 
At the destination: 
Legitimisation 
Terrorist Financing 
Making money : 
(crimes, donations, 
legitimate 
businesses) Movement of money 
At the destination: 
Legitimisation is 
not necessary 
However, as mentioned briefly above, this approach to share the 
be Severed? ", Strategic Forum, Institute for National Strategic Studies, National Defense 
University, no. 191, May 2002, p. 3 
173 Thachuk, K. L., supra note 172, p. 3. 
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anti-money laundering infrastructure is in some ways vulnerable to the 
criticism that terrorist money is not always criminal in origin and the amount 
of terrorist money might not be so conspicuous as to attract the attention of 
relevant authorities. Accordingly counter-terrorist financing efforts needs to 
rely on relevant intelligence more than general anti-money laundering 
measures. 174 In practice, numerous money laundering cases can be found in 
the use of terrorist financing as below. 
c. Some cases of money laundering in terrorist financing 
In the late 1970s, the Italian Red Brigades were always short of 
cash, and turned to kidnapping and bank robbery to raise funds. At one time, 
the Red Brigades discovered that the banknotes of their victim's ransom had 
all been stained with yellow ink and were thus unusable. Unwilling to give 
up the money, the kidnappers physically washed it. Three people spent days 
washing the banknotes one by one and drying them with a hair dryer in a 
damp Milan basement flat. 175 In contrast to such curious practices, current 
terrorist groups employ state of the art techniques, sometimes emulating or 
outdoing professional transnational criminal organisations. Some money 
174 In this context, it should be noted that even if investigators focus on the movement of 
money in both terrorist financing cases and money laundering cases, a different approach 
needs to be employed. In other words, since money laundering derives from acquisitive 
crimes, the amount of money plays an important role in developing the suspicion of 
investigators. It is an operation that targets money itself, and catches some fish as a by- 
product. By comparison, terrorist financing does not necessarily involve money in bulk and 
needs to be supported by human intelligence. Thus, it is more likely that the operation 
targets money trails first, and catches the fish eventually. For a discussion of the need for 
intelligence, see, e. g., Navias, M. S., "Financial Warfare as a Response to International 
Terrorism", in Freedman, L., ed., supra note 35, p. 73. 
"5 Napoleoni, L., supra note 33, p. 54. 
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laundering techniques shared by terrorist groups are illustrated below. 1' 
First of all, Al-Qaida used to move the money it raised by the 
hawala system. This is an underground, unregulated system based on trust by 
which money is transferred from one location to another, without the actual 
physical movement of cash. 17 Following its move to Afghanistan in 1996, Al- 
Qaida had increased recourse to the hawala system because the banking 
system there was unreliable and formal banking was risky due to the 
scrutiny that Al-Qaida received after the August 1998 East African Embassy 
bombings. 178 It relied on the established hawala networks operating in 
Pakistan, in the United Arab Emirates, and throughout the Middle East. 19 
Since 9/11, it is said that the dependence of Al-Qaida on the hawala system 
has become even greater. 180 
Secondly, wire transfer has long been regarded as one of most 
popular and convenient means of transferring money. 18' This refers to any 
financial transactions carried out for a person through a financial institution 
by electronic means. 182 The speed and efficiency with which funds can be 
moved across international boundaries by the wire transfer system appeals 
to financiers of terrorism as exemplified by the essential role played by this 
method in providing the 9/11 hijackers with necessary financial means to 
176 For an overview of Al-Qaida's use of money laundering techniques, see, 
Bell, RE, " The 
Confiscation, Forfeiture and Disruption of Terrorist Finances", (2003) Journal of Money 
Laundering Control, vol. 7, no. 2, pp. 107-108; Lilley, P., Dirty Dealing: The Untold Truth about 
Global Money Laundering, International Crime and Terrorism, 2003, pp. 141-142. 
177 UN Doc., S/2005/83, supra note 104, p. 24. 
178 The 9/11 Commission Report, p. 171. 
179 Ibid., p. 171. 
'80 UN Doc., S/2002/1050, supra note 151, p. 3. 
APG, "Annual Typologies Report 2003-2004", p. 23. 
'ýZ FATF, "Report on Money Laundering and Terrorist Financing Typologies 
2003-2004", p. 3. 
38 
carry out their attack. 183 However, it was also wire transfers that provided the 
first and most concrete leads for investigators to outline the full scope of 
those involved in the attack, including the identities of the perpetrators, their 
logistical and financial support networks, and links to other terrorist groups 
and accomplices-"' In this sense, the potential of the use of wire transfer data 
in identifying the link between known terrorist groups and individuals 
cannot be ignored. "' 
Thirdly, terrorist groups often employ the traditional and 
extremely basic money laundering method of cash smuggling. Al-Qaida 
employed this technique to provide Jemmah Islamiya (JI) with the funding 
for the Bali bombing that took place in October 2002.186 JI's head of operations 
who was hiding in Thailand passed US$ 30,000 to the perpetrators of the 
bombings in two batches using several cash couriers. '' The couriers took 
several weeks to complete the runs. 188 Al-Qaida also provided the funding for 
the J. W. Marriott Hotel bombing in Jakarta by this method of cash 
smuggling. 
"' A total of US$ 30,000 was sent to Indonesia in April 2003 
through a string of cash couriers. "' 
Fourthly, precious metals and stones such as gold and diamonds 
'R3 For details, see the statement of the FBI to the US Congress 
<http: //www. fbi. gov/congress/congress02/lormeIO21202. htm>. 
184 "The Role of Charities and NGO's in the Financing of Terrorist Activities", US Congress, 
supra note 147, p. 18. 
185 APG, "Annual Typologies Report 2003-2004", p. 23. 
''Greenberg, M. R., supra note 123, p. 11. The JI is a Southeast Asia-based terrorist network 
which aims to create an Islamic state in the area. See, U. S. Department of State, "Patterns of 
Global Terrorism-2003; Appendix B", 29 April 2004. 
187 APG, "APG Annual Typologies Report 2003-04", June 2004, p. 34. 
188 Ibid., p. 34. 
189 Ibid., p. 34. 
'ý0 Ibid., p. 34. 
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are another method that terrorist groups use to generate and hide revenues. 
For example, gems are easy to hide and virtually untraceable, while 
generally maintaining their value. "' Bin Laden's associates reportedly 
converted US$ 20 million into diamonds following the 1998 bombings of two 
U. S. Embassies in East Africa to put it out of reach of the asset freezing 
regime imposed on Al-Qaida. 192 
Fifthly, money laundering techniques provide terrorists with the 
opportunity to make money. For example, there have been claims that Al- 
Qaida financed itself through manipulation of the stock market based on its 
advanced knowledge of the 9/11 attack, 
193 However, since the stock market 
was not an area strictly controlled under the anti-money laundering regime 
at the time, no trail could be found to prove that speculation. 
194 This 
allegation may be true or not true. However, it clearly points to a future 
possibility that terrorists may utilise this loophole. 
IV. Conclusion 
Terrorism has evolved greatly over the last few decades, and has 
19' Thachuk, K., supra note 172, p. 4. Diamonds purchased illegally and below fair market 
value from rebels in Sierra Leone can be resold in Europe at a significant profit. 
192 UN Doc., S/2005/83, supra note 104, p. 29. 
193 For example, in the three days prior to 9/11, the volume of put options in the U. S. surged 
285 times the average trading level. A similar trend was reported in the insurance business 
with leading companies becoming the object of exceptional and unexpected speculation on 
the futures market (Napoleoni, L., supra note 33, pp. 163-165). For further details in relation to 
the allegation of Al-Qaida's involvement in the speculation in the stock market, see, 
Radlauer, D., "Black Tuesday: The World's Largest Insider Trading Scam? ", International 
Policy Institute for Counter-Terrorism, 19 September 2001. 
For reference, stock options are contracts that give their owner the right(but not the 
obligation) to buy("call" option) or sell("put" option) stocks at a set price. 
'y' Napoleoni, L., supra note 33, p. 165. 
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now become a serious threat to international peace and security. One of the 
effective counter strategies will be to launch a financial war on terrorism 
since solid financing is essential for terrorist groups in order to promote their 
cause. For this purpose of targeting terrorist money, it has been noted that 
fortunately the international community can benefit from the already 
established anti-money laundering strategy, given the similarity of the two 
strategies. This thesis which has its roots in the international criminal law 
approach will primarily focus on this money laundering-related aspect of 
terrorist financing. In addition, efforts will also be extended to undertake 
some other activities at the money-making stage such as the abuse of 
charities. 
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Chapter Two : 
The International Position on the Financing of 
Terrorism Prior to 9/11 
I. Introduction 
In Chapter One, the characteristics of modern terrorism were 
reviewed. It is clear from the analysis that "A successful terrorist group, like 
any criminal organization, is necessarily one that is able to build and 
maintain an effective financial infrastructure". ' In this context, the current 
prominence of Al-Qaida, the broadest terrorist network yet known, would be 
nearly impossible without its clandestine and resilient financial 
infrastructure. 2 
However, there might be a criticism that the financial capability of 
a terrorist organisation is not so crucial to its operation as illustrated by the 
financial profile of the September 111'' attack which, it has been estimated, 
cost less than US$ 500,000.3 In respect of this criticism, it should be noted that 
' FATF, "Guidance for Financial Institutions in Detecting Terrorist Financing", 24 April 2002, 
p. 3. 
2 For terrorist groups' various needs for financing, see, Chapter One, Section II. 2. b. of this 
study. 
3 Gunaratna, R., Inside Al Qaeda, 2002, p. 64. 
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although it would be very difficult ever to stop a single terrorist attack, what 
we can hope to do is to stop major attacks, and to stop the major movement 
of funds and thus cut off the long-term ability of terrorists to launch attacks. ' 
Given the significance of targeting terrorist financing, this chapter 
will examine the manner in which the international community dealt with 
this issue prior to 9/11. To this end, Section II will analyse the international 
position concerning terrorism in general. Then Section III will examine the 
text of the International Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of 
Terrorism (1999), and explain the origin of the 1267 Sanctions Committee of 
the Security Council. As the 1999 convention was heavily influenced by the 
general anti-money laundering strategy, in Section III, a theoretical basis of 
the anti-money laundering framework will also be provided as preliminary 
work for the main discussion on the development of counter-terrorist 
financing strategy. 
During this period, despite the fledgling attempts to combat 
terrorist financing, it should be admitted that this was a neglected area, 
illustrated by the fact that only four countries before 9/11 had ratified the 
1999 convention. ' 
' Juan Zarate, the then US Deputy Assistant Secretary for Terrorist Financing, cited in BBC 
News, "Choking off al-Qaeda's cash lifeline", 2 October 2003. 
<http: //newsvote. bbc. co. uk/mpapps/print/news. bbc. co. uk/1>. 
5 Gilmore, W. C., "International Initiative", in Graham, T., ed., Butterzvorths International Guide 
to Money Laundering Lain and Practice, 2"`' edn., 2003, p. 137. The four countries are Botswana, 
Sri Lanka, the UK and Uzbekistan. 
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II. The Orthodox Stance of the International Community 
concerning International Terrorism 
1. The UN General Assembly and anti-terrorism conventions 
The UN has been at the centre of the counter-terrorism campaign 
at the international level, especially since the 1970s. In this process, the 
General Assembly has played an essential role. Its involvement in 
international terrorist affairs can be said to have commenced with the 
adoption of Resolution 3034 in 1972, following the massacres at Lod airport 
in Israel, ' and at the Olympic Games in Munich. ' In the resolution, the 
General Assembly decided to establish an ad hoc Committee on Terrorism 
with a mandate to submit recommendations for the speedy elimination of 
international terrorism. 8 However, this ad hoc Committee did not make any 
substantial progress by reason of the divided attitudes between the West and 
the Third World. ' The West was nervous that a definition of terrorism could 
be used to include 'state terrorism' which was defined by the Third World 
countries, for instance as acts practised by states against the sovereignty of 
' On 30 May 1970, three members of the Japanese United Red Army opened fire at Lod 
Airport terminal near Tel Aviv, killing 27 and injuring 69. See, Sederberg, P. C., Terrorist 
Myths: illusion, rhetoric, and reality, 1989, p. 114. 
'On 5 September 1972, eight Palestinian terrorists broke into the Olympic Village, killing 
eleven Israeli team members. See, Rosie, G., The Directory of International Terrorism, 1987, 
pp. 179-180. 
' UN, A/RES/3034,18 December 1972, para. 9,10. There was an unsuccessful attempt by the 
League of Nations to draft a universal definition. On 16 November 1937, the League of 
Nations adopted the Convention for the Prevention and Punishment of Terrorism, but it was 
a failure since the convention was signed by only twenty-four states and ratified by one, 
India. See, Cassese, A., Terrorism, Politics and Law: The Achille Lauro Affair, 1989, p. 9. 
' For the final recommendations of the ad hoc committee, see, UN, "Analytical Study 
Prepared by the Secretariat in accordance with General Assembly Resolution 
32/147"(hereafter, "Analytical Study"), A/AC/160/4,28 February 1979, para. 51-58, in 
Friedlander, R. A., Terrorism: Documents of International and Local Control, vol. 111,1981. 
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other states, particularly smaller states, through the use of force, economic 
blockade or threatening the security and sources of wealth of the smaller 
states; acts of imperialist or racist regimes against peoples struggling for their 
liberation; the insistence of colonialist states on remaining in the colonised 
regions, draining their resources; and, the collective expulsion of peaceable 
peoples from their homelands, scattering them over various parts of the 
world, etc. 1° By comparison, the Third World countries insisted that the acts 
performed by recognised national liberation movements in their struggle to 
obtain their goals of self-determination and independence should be 
excluded from any definition of international terrorism. " Consequently, it 
could not even draft a definition of terrorism. 12 
In 1996, the General Assembly once again established an ad hoc 
committee, one of whose mandates was to draw up a universal definition of 
terrorism and to draft a comprehensive convention. 13 This committee is still 
10 Higgins, R., "The general international law of terrorism", in Higgins, R. & Flory, M., eds., 
Terrorism and International Law, 1997, pp. 14-16; UN, "Analytical Study", supra note 9, para. 33- 
37; Zeidan, S., "Desperately Seeking Definition: The International Community's Quest for 
Identifying the Specter of Terrorism", (2004) Cornell International Law journal, vol. 36, p. 494. 
" UN, "Analytical Study", supra note 9, para. 27-32. The Organisation of the Islamic 
Conference(OIC) recently insisted on including the exception of the national liberation 
movement, see, Halberstam, M., "The Evolution of the United Nations Position on 
Terrorism: From Exempting National Liberation Movements to criminalizing Terrorism 
Wherever and by Whomever Committed", (2003) Columbia Journal of Transnational Law, vol. 
41, p. 573. 
12 UN, "Report of the Ad Hoc Committee on International Terrorism", A/9028,1973, para. 26, 
in Friedlander, R. A., supra note 9; UN, "Report of the Ad Hoc Committee on International 
Terrorism", A/32/37,1977, para. 10, in Friedlander, R. A., supra note 9; UN, "Analytical 
Study", supra note 9, para. 16-39. 
13 UN, A/RES/51/210,17 December 1996; UN, A/RES/53/108,26 January 1999; UN, 
A/RES/545/110,2 February 2000; UN, A/RES/56/88,24 January 2002. The 1996 ad hoc 
committee has been mandated with several important tasks ever since its establishment, 
such as the elaboration of an international convention for the suppression of terrorist 
bombings, international convention for the suppression of the financing of terrorism, 
international convention for the suppression of acts of nuclear terrorism, and comprehensive 
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working on the issue, 14 but at the same time the old tradition of legal debate 
related to terrorism is also going on in and outside the UN as illustrated by 
the exclusion of terrorism from the jurisdiction of the International Criminal 
Court (ICC), the statute of which entered into force in 2002.15 
In the meantime, what was possible despite the constraint of 
divided positions during this period was the conclusion of international 
conventions to prohibit certain types of act, for instance, the hijacking of 
aeroplanes or ships, hostage taking and attacks on internationally protected 
persons, rather than addressing terrorism as a whole. 16 Obviously, the UN 
and its specialised organisations have played a crucial role in preparing these 
instruments. 17 Some efforts have also been made at the regional level. " 
convention on international terrorism. 
14 UN, "Report of the Ad Hoc Committee established by General Assembly resolution 51/210 
of 17 December 1996: Sixth Session (28 January-1 February 2002)", A/57/37,2002. 
15 Terrorism has not been included within the jurisdiction of the ICC since a majority of 
countries opposed inclusion by reason of the lack of definition, and terrorist acts were 
viewed as crimes of a different character for which effective systems of international 
cooperation were already in place. See, UN, "Report of the Ad Hoc Committee on the 
Establishment of an International Criminal Court", A/50/22,1995, para. 55,83, in Bassiouni, 
M. C., ed., The Statute of the International Criminal Court: A Documentary History, 1998, p. 624, 
p. 629; UN, "Report of the Preparatory Committee on the Establishment of an International 
Criminal Court", vol. I, A/51/22,1996, para. 103,107, in Bassiouni, M. C., ed., The Statute of the 
International Criminal Court: A Documentary History, 1998, p. 401. For further discussion, see, 
McKay, F., "U. S. Unilateralism and International Crimes: The International Criminal Court 
and Terrorism", (2004) Cornell International Law journal, vol. 36, p. 456; Morris, M., "Terrorism 
and Unilateralism: Criminal Jurisdiction and International Relations", (2004) Cornell 
International Law journal, vol. 36, pp. 486-487; Kittichaisaree, K., International Criminal Law, 
2001, p 227. 
16 Kittichaisaree, K., supra note 15, p. 228. 
" Currently, there are 12 global conventions directly pertaining to the subject of international 
terrorism (visited on 1 June 2005)<http: //untreaty. un. org/English/Terrorism. org>. For an 
overview of the contents of these conventions, see, McClean, D., International 
Co-operation in 
Civil and Criminal Matters, 2002, pp. 289-294. 
18 Currently, there are seven regional anti-terrorism conventions: Organization of the Islamic 
Conference, Convention on Combating International Terrorism(1999); European Convention 
on the Suppression of Terrorism(1977); Organization for American States, 
Convention to 
Prevent and Punish the Acts of Terrorism Taking the Form of Crimes Against Persons and 
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Interestingly, the majority of these crime-specific treaties are very similar in 
terms of their approach in that they criminalise certain types of violent acts; 
provide the bases for jurisdiction; and, include basic provisions on 
extradition and other issues for international cooperation. " 
Yet, the weakest point of this piecemeal approach was that these 
conventions focus on the symptomatic treatment of terrorist attacks. In other 
words, when certain acts of violence took place, a new convention attempted 
simply to criminalise these specific acts, but did not go further in any 
meaningful way to target the overall terrorist movements with a view to their 
destruction. Indeed, the international community had to wait until the late 
1990s to see the emergence of a more fundamental solution: the International 
Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism(1999). For the 
first time, an anti-terrorism convention was adopted with the insight to 
tackle the basic financial infrastructure of terrorist groups, thus weakening 
their long-term viability. This convention will be reviewed in Section 111.2. 
2. The Security Council and the Lockerbie Incident 
While the General Assembly and other UN specialised 
Related Extortion that are of International Significance(1971); African Union, Convention on 
the Prevention and Combating of Terrorism(1999); South Asian Association for Regional 
Cooperation, Regional Convention on Suppression of Terrorism(1988); Commonwealth of 
Independent States, Treaty on Cooperation among the States Members of the 
Commonwealth of Independent States in Combating Terrorism(1999)(visited on 1 June 2005) 
<http: //untreaty. un. org/English/Terrorism. org>. 
19 For an analysis of the patterns of international convention concerning international crimes, 
see, Clark, R. S., "Offenses of International Concern: Multilateral State Treaty Practice in the 
Forty Years Since Nuremberg", (1988) Nordic Journal of International Law, vol. 57, p. 49. This 
article classifies a multitude of issues into four categories: (a) the question of jurisdiction; (b) 
the package of extradition-related issues; (c) the rights of the accused; (d) the "general part" 
of criminal law such as inens rea, complicity, and diplomatic immunity. 
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organisations were struggling to deal with international terrorism, the 
Security Council appeared to stand behind them with its arms folded until 
the late 1980s. 2° It was on the occasion of the Lockerbie incident (1988) that the 
organ began to engage in the fight against international terrorism on a full 
scale, eventually flexing its muscles through recourse to its Chapter VII 
powers. 21 
On 21 December 1988, Pan Am Flight 103 exploded over 
Lockerbie, Scotland, killing 270 people. Following this incident, another 
aerial tragedy of UTA Flight 772 took place on 19 September 1989, causing 
171 deaths. The results of the investigations by the victim states indicated the 
involvement of the Libyan government in both cases. Accordingly, the victim 
states made demands on the Libyan government to settle the case. In the 
Lockerbie incident, the UK and US governments were interested parties, and 
demanded the Libyan government cooperate on several requests such as the 
surrendering of the accused and the paying of compensation. ' In contrast to 
the UK and US approach, the French government which was an interested 
20 Occasionally, the Security Council adopted resolutions to condemn terrorism, however, 
this organ confined its role to employing political rhetoric without taking any substantive 
measures. See, e. g., Resolution 286(1970); Resolution 579(1985); Resolution 635(1989). 
21 Gilmore, W. C., "International Financial Counterterrorism Initiatives", in Fijnaut, C., & 
Wouters, J. & Naert, F., eds., Legal Instruments in the Fight against International Terrorism: A 
Transnational Dialogue, 2004, p. 194. 
22 The British and American Governments demanded that the Government of Libya must: (i) 
surrender for trial all those charged with the crime; and accept complete responsibility for 
the actions of Libyan officials; (ii) disclose all it know of this crime, including the names of all 
those responsible, and allow full access to all witnesses, documents and other material 
evidence, including all the remaining timers; (iii) pay appropriate compensation (Joint 
US/UK Declaration of 27 November 1991, Annexed to UN Doc. A/46/826-S/23307 and 
A/46/827-S23308, in Grant, J. P., The Lockerbie Trial: A Documentary History, 2004, p. 101). For an 
overview of the negotiation history on the Lockerbie case, see, Aust, A., "Lockerbie Case", 
(2000) International and Comparative Laze Quarterly, vol. 49, p. 278. 
48 
party in the UTA 772 Flight case, did not seek extradition of the six Libyan 
nationals but tried them in absentia. To this end, the French government 
called upon the Libyan government to cooperate and assist the French 
criminal proceedings by means of the production of all material evidence 
and the facilitation of access to all documentation by the French authorities. ' 
Although the victim countries in both cases made different 
requests vis-a-vis the Libyan government, they adopted the same strategy to 
bring the Libyan government into compliance with their demands. This 
means they involved the Security Council in their affairs. At first, the Security 
Council adopted Resolution 731(1992), 24 urging the Libyan government to 
provide a full and immediate response to those requests by the victim states. 
However, given that the operative paragraphs of Resolution 731 were not 
adopted under Chapter VII authority, the Security Council could not evoke 
any response from the Libyan government. 25 Subsequently, the Security 
Council passed Resolution 748(1992)26, but this time under the mandatory 
Z3 France called upon Libya (i) to produce all the material evidence in its possession and to 
facilitate access to all documents that might be useful for establishing the truth; (ii) to 
facilitate the necessary contacts and meetings, inter alia, for the assembly of witnesses; (iii) to 
authorise the responsible Libyan officials to respond to any request made by the examining 
magistrate responsible for judicial information (French Communique of 12/20/91, UN 
Doc. A/46/825-S/23306, in Grant, J. P., supra note 22, p. 102). 
24 UN, S/RES/731,21 January 1992. 
25 Libya instead instituted two parallel proceedings in the ICJ, against the UK and the US. 
However, with the adoption of Resolution 748, the ICJ dismissed Libya's request for 
provisional measures in 1992. For details with regard to the involvement of the ICJ in the 
Lockerbie case, see, e. g., Vera, G. D., "The Relationship between the International Court of 
Justice and the Security Council in the light of the Lockerbie case", (1994) The American Journal 
of International Law, vol. 88, pp. 644-647. In 1998, the ICJ rejected the objection to jurisdiction 
raised by the US which argued that there was no legal dispute between the parties under the 
Montreal Convention(Grant, J. P., supra note 22, p. 512). Finally in 2003, Libya, the UK and the 
US agreed to discontinue the proceedings initiated by the Libyan Application 
filed on 3 
March 1992(Grant, J. P., supra note 22, p. 553). 
26 UN, S/RES/748,31 March 1992. In the resolution, the Security Council stated its view that 
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Chapter VII powers, imposing sanctions such as aviation restrictions and an 
arms embargo. Following this measure Resolution 883(1993) was further 
adopted with a view to reinforcing the sanctions regime, which is 
particularly worthy of note in that it was made obligatory for all states to 
freeze Libyan public assets under their jurisdiction. 27 For the purpose of 
resolving the impasse among the parties concerned, various suggestions 
were made, including a Scottish trial of the accused Libyan officials in the 
Netherlands. 28 Accordingly, the Security Council adopted resolution 
1192(1998) which provided for the immediate suspension of sanctions if the 
accused Libyan officials arrived in the Netherlands for the purposes of trial 
as mentioned above. 29 In accordance with this resolution, when the two 
accused Libyan officials arrived in the Netherlands in 1999, the sanctions 
were suspended immediately. 3° The sanctions were finally lifted when Libya 
complied fully with the requests of the Security Council in 2003.31 
the suppression of international terrorism is essential for the maintenance of international 
peace and security, and adopted countermeasures with its Chapter VII powers. In fact, this 
change was of note since no form of terrorism had previously been found to constitute a 
threat to international peace and security (Beveridge, F., "Current Developments: Public 
International Law; I. The Lockerbie Affair", (1992) International and Comparative Law Quarterly, 
vol. 42, p. 912). 
27 UN, S/RES/883,11 November 1993. In para. 3, the Security Council "decides that all States 
in which there are funds or other financial resources(including funds derived or generated 
from property) owned or controlled, directly or indirectly, by the Government or public 
authorities of Libya, or any Libyan undertaking, shall freeze such funds and financial 
resources and ensure that neither they nor any other funds and financial resources made 
available, by their nationals or by any persons within their territory, directly or indirectly, to 
or for the benefit of the Government or public authorities of Libya or any Libyan 
undertaking.... ". 
28 For the summary of the suggestions, see, Black, R., "Analysis: The Lockerbie Disaster", 
(1999) The Edinburgh Law Review, vol. 3, p. 88. 
29 UN, S/1999/378,27 August 1998. 
30 UN, "Secretary-General's Letter of 4/5/99", S/1999/378,5 April 1999, in Grant, J. P., supra 
note 22, pp. 171-173. 
" UN, S/RES/1506,12 September 2003. In the meantime, with regard to the UTA 772 Flight 
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In conclusion, the Security Council joined the counter-terrorism 
campaign late but it has brought the great potential of Chapter VII powers 
into the campaign. The Lockerbie incident laid the groundwork in this respect. 
III. The Emergence of the Counter-Terrorist Financing Strategy 
1. The prototypes 
a. Context 
In Chapter One the sources and methods of terrorist financing 
were analysed. It was noted that the financing techniques of terrorists are in 
large part not distinct from the money laundering skills used by organised 
criminal groups to launder their criminal proceeds. 32 In both cases, what 
these two distinct groups have in common is the concerns about how to erase 
their money trails. In other words, both criminal groups and terrorist groups 
attempt to hide or obscure the link between the nature of the funds, and their 
case, Libya already paid damages totalling US$ 30 million which the French Foreign 
Ministry acknowledged in 1999(Aust, A., supra note 22, p. 296). 
32 With regard to the financing methods used by terrorists, there was a discussion within the 
FATF whether the same technique as criminal organisations employ to launder their monies 
is applicable to terrorist financing since terrorist groups have legitimate funding sources as 
well as illicit sources. Later, the FATF concluded that there is little difference in the methods 
used by terrorist groups or criminal organisations in attempting to hide or obscure the link 
between the source of the funds and their eventual destination or purpose. See, e. g., FATF, 
"Guidance for Financial Institutions in Detecting Terrorist Financing", 24 April 2002, p. 5; 
FATF, "Report on Money Laundering Typologies: 2000-2001", 1 February 2001, pp. 19-21; 
FATF, "Report on Money Laundering Typologies: 2001-2002", 1 February 2002, p. 2; FATF, 
"Report on Money Laundering Typologies: 2002-2003", 14 February 2003, p. 3. 
However, it should be pointed out that there exists a distinction between these two crimes 
in that monies are the objective of typical organised crimes, whereas they are simply a means 
to achieve a goal with regard to terrorism. For a related discussion on this aspect, see, e. g., 
Kersten, A., "Financing of Terrorism-A Predicate Offence to Money Laundering? ", in 
Pieth, M., ed., Financing of Terrorism, 2002, p. 56. 
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eventual destination. 33 
As a result of this similarity, the strategy to target the financing of 
terrorism has been heavily influenced by the strategy to combat the dirty 
money of acquisitive crime such as drug trafficking and people smuggling. 
In this context, this study examines the development of anti-money 
laundering strategy as a preliminary work for the discussion on the 
development of counter-terrorist financing strategy. The anti-money 
laundering framework can be divided into four categories: (a) public sector; 
(b) private sector; (c) a bridging mechanism; (d) international cooperation. 34 
Firstly, in the public sector, for the purpose of coping with 
acquisitive crimes that have taken on new dimensions in the last quarter of 
the 201'' century, " governments have strengthened their criminal law and 
criminal justice systems with a fresh perspective: a proceeds-oriented 
approach instead of a perpetrator-oriented approach. 36 The main rationale of 
this approach is to promote an effective campaign against organised crime 
33 FATF, "Report on Money Laundering Typologies: 2002-2003", 14 February 2003, p. 3. 
For backgrounds of this categorisation, see, Gilmore, W. C., Dirty Money: The evolution of 
international measures to counter money laundering and the financing of terrorism, 3rd edn., 2004, 
pp. 19-23 and pp. 93-94; Albrecht, H. J., "The Money Trail, Developments in Criminal Law, and 
Research Needs: An Introduction", (1997) European Journal of Crime, Criminal Law and 
Criminal justice, vol. 5, pp. 193-195; Mitsilegas, V., Money Laundering Counter-Measures in the 
European Union: A New Paradigm of Security Governance versus Fundamental Legal Principles, 
2003, pp. 8-14; UN, "Commentary on the United Nations Convention Against Illicit Traffic in 
Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances 1988", 1998, pp. 65-70. 
In a similar context, it is worthy of note how the U. S. and Switzerland have developed their 
anti-money laundering legislation in a different way. See, Stessens, G., Money Laundering: A 
New International Law Enforcement Model, 2000, pp. 109-112. 
35 For an overview of the threats posed by organised crime, see, e. g., Williams, P., & Savona, 
E. U., eds., The United Nations and Transnational Organised Crime, 1996, pp. 32-39. 
36 Verbruggen, F., "Proceeds-oriented Criminal Justice in Belgium: Backbone or Wishbone of 
a Modern Approach to Organised Crime? ", (1997) European Journal of Crime, Criminal Law and 
Criminal justice, vol. 5, p. 314. In particular, given that members of modern criminal 
organisations are easily replaceable, this change of perspective seems more persuasive. 
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through "financial devastation". 37 The intended effect is to incapacitate 
criminal organisations by undermining their financial infrastructure, 
eliminating their capacity to trade and reducing their attractiveness to 
recruits. 38 However, when government authorities pursued the huge 
proceeds of organised criminal groups, it was difficult for them to recover 
the proceeds since these criminal assets are hidden somewhere as legitimised 
property through money laundering. Accordingly, government authorities 
sought, to begin with, the criminalisation of money laundering and 
strengthened legal powers for confiscation of criminal proceeds. 39 Indeed, it is an 
orthodox approach of a sovereign state to control crime. It was the UN 
Convention against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic 
Substances of 1988 (the 1988 Vienna Convention) that introduced these 
instruments into the international arena. " 
37 Gilmore, W. C., Dirty Money, supra note 34, p. 20. Of course, in addition to this new 
justification, traditional rationales of punishment is also applicable such as to make sure that 
"crime does not pay", and the subsequent deterrent effect. 
3' Levi, M., "Taking the Profit Out of Crime: The UK experience", (1997) European Journal of 
Crime, Criminal Law and Criminal justice, vol. 5, pp. 228-229. 
39Stessens, G., supra note 34, pp. 3-6. The experience of the US law enforcement agencies 
provides a case in point. For details, see, Stessens, G., supra note 34, pp. 96-100, and pp. 108- 
112. For relevant discussions, see, Giovanoli, M., "Switzerland. Some Recent Developments 
in Banking ", in Cranston, R., ed., European Banking Law: The Banker-Customer Relationship, 
1993, pp. 189-198; Grant, T. D., "Toward a Swiss Solution for an American Problem: An 
Alternative Approach for Banks in the War on Drugs", (1995) Annual Review of Banking Law, 
vol. 14, p. 225. 
40 Prior to 1988, there existed two central pillars to combat drugs: the Single Convention on 
Narcotic Drugs(1961) and its 1972 Protocol, and the Convention on Psychotropic 
Substances(1971). For the purpose of covering the various aspects of the drug problem as a 
whole, especially those not envisaged in existing instruments, the drafting of the Vienna 
Convention was then proposed with the adoption of a General Assembly Resolution in 
1984(UN, A/RES/39/141,14 December 1984). As a result, a draft convention was prepared by 
the ECOSOC Commission on Narcotic Drugs, and later adopted at the UN Conference in 
Vienna on 19 December 1988 (Gilmore, W. C., Combating International Drugs Trafficking: The 
1988 United Nations Convention Against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic 
Substances, 1991, p. 1). 
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Secondly, however, it should also be admitted that there is a limit 
to the capacity of a state in preventing crime in every comer of society. ' Thus, 
modern governments have developed a new strategy of crime control. This is 
called the responsibilisation strategy by which a government delegates its 
responsibility for crime control to relevant private sector actors. ' This 
strategy regards the private sector as a valuable counterpart to share the 
burden of policing society and at the same time, attempts to utilise the 
expertise and resources of the private sector to the maximum. 43 In particular, 
such a possibility should not be overlooked that agencies in the private sector 
could act more efficiently and effectively than the government field agencies 
in the relevant area. 44 It was the Forty Recommendations (1990) of the 
Financial Action Task Force on Money Laundering (FATF)4s that fully 
brought forward this idea of responsibilisation into an international context, 46 
41 Garland, D., "The Limits of the Sovereign State: Strategies of Crime Control in 
Contemporary Society", (1996) The British Journal of Criminology, vol. 36, p. 448. 
42 Garland, D., "The Punitive Society: Penology, Criminology and the History of the Present", 
(1997) Edinburgh Law Review, vol. 1, pp. 189-191; Mitsilegas, V., supra note 34, p. 12. 
" For example, with adequate training provided, the staff of financial institutions can, in 
effect, be turned into field agents for a government. In some sense, a well-trained and 
motivated staff behind the counter could be in a better position to develop the suspicion of 
money laundering on the spot than relevant government authorities. In this vein, the 
practice of Switzerland is worthy of note. The Swiss reporting model tries to make the best 
use of the resources and expertise of the private sector. See, Noble, R. K. & Golumbic, C. E., 
"A New Anti-Crime Framework For the World: Merging The Objective and Subjective 
Models for Fighting Money Laundering", (1998) New York University Journal of International 
Law and Politics, vol. 30, p. 79; Grant, T. D., supra note 39, p. 225. 
Noble, R. K. & Golumbic, C. E, supra note 43, at section I. 
`'S The FATF was established by the G-7 Economic Summit in Paris in July 1989 as an 
independent international body whose Secretariat is housed at the OECD. It is a temporary 
body and its mandate has been renewed four times (1989-1994,1994-1999,1999-2004,2004- 
2012). See, FATF, "Annual Report 1989-1990", 7 February 1990, p. 3; FATF, "Annual Report 
1993-1994", 16 June 1994, p. 3; FATF, "Annual Report 1997-1998", 25 June 1998, p. 9; FATF, 
"FATF mandate renewed for eight years", Press Release, 14 May 2004; Gilmore, W., C., supra 
note 34, p. 92. 
46 Prior to the Forty Recommendations(1990), there were two important precursors of the 
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the core of which is "to identify your customers, retain their records and 
report any suspicious transactions". However, it should also be pointed out 
that this responsibilisation strategy is not premised on the unilateral sacrifice 
of the private sector. To some extent the strategy can also be of mutual benefit, 
for instance, by reducing the reputational risk of the private sector, given that 
money laundering operations can put financial institutions at risk through 
the loss of credibility and investor confidence. 47 
Thirdly, with the emergence of the private sector as a counterpart 
to control crime, it seems apparent that there is necessarily an interaction 
between the public and private sectors. For instance, one of the major tools 
for the private sector to prevent money laundering is to report suspicious 
transactions to a relevant law enforcement agency. Thus, there could be 
generated a flow of substantial financial data from the private sector to the 
responsibilisation strategy in anti-money laundering context: Recommendation No. R(80)10 
on "Measures Against the Transfer and Safekeeping of Funds of Criminal Origin" adopted 
by the Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe in June 1980 and the Statement on 
"Prevention of Criminal Use of the Banking System for the Purpose of Money Laundering" 
issued by the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision in December 1988. For details of the 
Basle Committee, see Chapter IV of this study. For the summary of this statement, see, Drage, 
J., "Countering Money Laundering: The Response of the Financial Sector", in Macqueen, 
H. L., ed., Money Laundering, 1993, p. 65. 
`7 Sherman, T., "International Efforts to Combat Money Laundering: The Role of the 
Financial Action Task Force", in Macqueen, H. L., ed., supra note 46, p. 16. For relevant 
discussions, see also BCBS, "Customer due diligence for banks", October 2001, pp. 3-4; Clark, 
A. & Burrell, P., "The Money Laundering Threat", in Clark, A. & Burrell, P., eds., A 
Practitioner's Guide to International Money Laundering Law and Regulation, lst edn., 2003, pp. 7-8. 
The Chiasso Affair, the worst financial scandal in Switzerland's history, is perhaps a case in 
point in this regard. In 1977, two Credit Suisse officials engaged in fraud and money 
laundering at one of the bank's Italian branches. The episode cost Credit Suisse US$ 830 
million, caused a run on the branch, and led Swiss bankers to create their own code of 
conduct on the acceptance of suspicious funds (Bartlett, B. L., "The Negative Effects of 
Money Laundering on Economic Development", For the Asian Development Bank 
Countering Money Laundering in The Asian and Pacific Region Regional Technical 
Assistance Project No. 5967, May 2002, p. 16). 
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public sector. For the purpose of facilitating this interaction, a new bridging 
mechanism was created by policy makers. It is called a Financial Intelligence 
Unit (FIU). It acts as an intermediary between the two sectors in effect 
providing a service of information-filtering, and encouraging a climate of 
mutual trust. 48 With pooled specialised expertise the FIU can select really 
suspicious cases that deserve investigation, and prevent the situation where 
all reported clients are subject to immediate police investigation. ` 9 This helps 
to relieve the concerns of the private sector thus encouraging it to provide 
proactive cooperation. 50 It was the Egmont Group established in 1996 that 
consolidated the concept of an FIU in the international arena. 
Lastly, modern money laundering techniques commonly and 
increasingly include a transnational dimensions' Accordingly, for a 
successful anti money-laundering strategy, the significance of international 
cooperation cannot be overlooked. In fact, most of the measures in relation to 
the international cooperation have long been discussed in the literature of 
public international law, mainly in relation to treaty practice on criminal 
matters. If there is any substantial change to the traditional perception, the 
FIU has also emerged as an important actor in this area of international 
cooperation for the anti-money laundering purposes. 52 Now, having this 
48 Stessens, G., supra note 34, p. 185. 
''y Ibid., p. 185. 
50 Furthermore, the FIU can also provide a feedback to the private sector on the cases that 
they reported, which would elicit more proactive reports from the private sector (FATF, 
"Annual Report 1997-1998: Annex E-Providing Feedback to Reporting Financial Institutions 
and Other Persons: Best Practice Guidelines", June 1998, pp. 73-74). 
s' Peterson, N. H., "Toward a European Security Model for the 21St Century", (1997) NATO 
Review, Nov. -Dec., p. 4. 
52 In effect, the FIU constitutes a versatile coordinator that runs across all these three areas: 
public sector, private sector, and international cooperation. This aspect becomes clear in the 
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contextual background in mind, let us proceed to the theoretical basis of 
countermeasures in each category. 
b. Public sector 
Firstly, let us consider the criminalisation of money laundering. 
The decision to establish money laundering as an independent criminal 
offence rather than dealing with it as an ancillary offence under the 
traditional criminal law, provided considerable advantages to law 
enforcement agencies in hunting down criminal proceeds. Above all, in a 
practical sense, when the track of the original offence disappears or is hardly 
traceable, it is the offence of money laundering that helps law enforcement 
agencies to tackle suspicious assets either in the hands of a frontman or the 
real owner. 53 For the purpose of confiscating the targeted proceeds, the 
prosecution does not have to prove the guilt of the perpetrator of the initial 
money-making offence, the professional terminology of which is a "money 
laundering predicate offence" or simply a "predicate offence". ' The 
confiscation of the targeted assets is possible by proving the charge of money 
laundering behaviour by the ownership. 55 Particularly, the law enforcement 
agencies do not have to trouble to establish the guilt of their predicate 
2003 revised Forty Recommendations of the FATF. 
53 Stessens, G., supra note 34, pp. 85-86; Verbruggen, F., supra note 36, pp. 318-319. Usually, the 
suspicion is developed from the reports of financial institution in that huge criminal 
proceeds are most vulnerable at the stage when they first come into contact with legal 
economy (Gilmore, W. C., supra note 34, p. 33). 
" For the definition of "predicate offence", see the 1990 Council of Europe Convention on 
Laundering, Search, Seizure and Confiscation of the Proceeds from Crime, Article 1(e). 
ss Stessens, G., supra note 34, p. 85. 
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offence beyond reasonable doubt. " 
Moreover, a justification can also be made given that money 
laundering can be defined as a "primary harm" crime rather than "ancillary 
harm" crime. This point of view considers that money laundering involves a 
"separate harm" from its predicate offence, constituting threats to a 
multitude of interests. 57 For example, money laundering could seriously 
undermine the soundness of the financial system and legitimate economy. 58 
A good example of the devastating and far-reaching effect of money 
laundering is the Bank of Credit and Commerce International(BCCI) Affair 
revealed in 1988.59 
In the international arena, the 1988 Vienna Convention for the 
first time established money laundering as "independent criminal offence" 
although it confined its application only to drug-related proceeds. 6° Article 
Verbruggen, F., supra note 36, p. 318. 
57 Mitsilegas, V., supra note 34, pp. 105-106. 
58 Ibid., pp. 103-106; Alldridge, P., Money Laundering Lazv: Forfeiture, Confiscation, Civil Recovery, 
Criminal Laundering and Taxation of the Proceeds of Crime, 2003, p. 27, pp. 63-66. For a broader 
justification for the criminalisation of money laundering, see also Bosworth-Davies, R., The 
Impact of International Money Laundering Legislation, 1997, pp. 5-6. 
5v It was a huge scandal involving money laundering, allegations of corruption, and bribery. 
Later the BCCI was convicted and was subject to forfeiture which amounted to US$ 
15.3million, eventually being closed down in 1991 with an estimated 530,000 creditors left 
worldwide (Gilmore, W. C., supra note 34, p. 34). For further details, see also Kerry, J. & Brown, 
H., "The BCCI Affair: A Report to the Committee on Foreign Relations United States Senate", 
102nd Congress 2nd Session Senate, December 1992. 
60 The scope of the predicate offence expanded beyond drug trafficking later to include other 
organised crime, for example the 1990 Council of Europe Convention on Laundering, Search, 
Seizure and Confiscation of the Proceeds from Crime defines predicate offence as any 
criminal offence as a result of which proceeds were generated in Article 1(e); the Council of 
European Communities Directive of 10 June 1991 on Prevention of the use of Financial 
System for the Purpose of Money Laundering, as amended in 2001, expands the list of 
predicate offences by reference to set thresholds of punishment in Article 1; the 1996 revised 
Recommendation 4 of the FATF extends the predicate offence to any serious crimes 
generating a significant amount of proceeds; and, eventually, the 2003 version of the FATF 
Forty Recommendations lists twenty predicate offences. 
58 
3(1) imposes a "binding" obligation on "all party states" to make it a criminal 
offence to convert or transfer property for the purpose of concealing or 
disguising its illicit origin. The contribution this bold initiative made to the 
fight against transnational organised crime was significant. It promoted the 
concept of money laundering both domestically and internationally, thus 
emphasising the significance of "financial warfare" on organised crime. 
Furthermore, with the "international" criminalisation of money laundering, 
law enforcement agencies could secure a solid basis for international criminal 
cooperation in respect of confiscation, mutual legal assistance and 
extradition, 61 especially by eliminating the obstacle of the double criminality 
rule. 62 Indeed, the 1988 Vienna Convention has worked as a major force in 
harmonising national laws and enforcement actions around the world. ' 
Secondly, it should be remembered that the overall strategy to 
fight dirty money is ultimately aimed at facilitating the "confiscation" of 
criminal proceeds. In other words, confiscation lies at the heart of this 
financial warfare on organised crime and is considered to be one of the most 
important legal tools. ' Originally this concept of confiscation developed in 
various ways in different legal cultures, and three standards can be identified 
for its categorisation. (a)With regard to the form of confiscated property, two 
Gilmore, W. C., Combating International Drugs Trafficking, supra note 40, p. 6. 
62 "Report of the United States Delegation to the United Nations Conference for the adoption 
of a Convention Against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances", 
reproduced in Gilmore, W. C., ed., International Efforts to Combat Money Laundering, 1992, 
p. 120. 
63 Stewart, D. P., "Internationalizing the War on Drugs: The UN Convention Against Illicit 
Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances", (1990) Denver Journal of International 
Lazv and Policy, vol. 18, p. 388.170 states are parties to the 1988 Vienna Convention (visited on 
1 June 2005)<http: //www. unodc. org/unodc/en/treaty_adherence. html#1988>. 
64Stessens, G., supra note 34, p. 29. 
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models of confiscation can be distinguished: object confiscation and value 
confiscation. The object confiscation is imposed on the concerned property 
itself, while the value confiscation is implemented through the obligation to 
pay a certain amount of money corresponding to the value of the concerned 
property. 65 (b) In respect of whether it is a means or end of crime, a 
distinction can be made between confiscation of the proceeds(end) and 
confiscation of instrumentalities(means) of crime. 66 The instruments of crime 
can be diverse, for example, ranging from a knife used as a killer's weapon to 
a yacht on which lessees transported drugs. 67 (c) In relation to the necessity of 
a criminal conviction of the suspect for a confiscation order, two types can be 
distinguished: criminal confiscation and civil confiscation. The criminal 
confiscation operates in personam(against a specific person) and needs a 
criminal conviction, while the civil confiscation is an in rem(against a thing) 
procedure by nature and is not conditional upon a criminal conviction. 68 
65 Ibid., pp. 31-35. According to Stessen, value confiscation is to be preferred to object 
confiscation in that it can be enforced on legitimate property, thus covering more diverse 
situations such as when (i) proceeds of crime are already consumed at the time of the judicial 
decision or cannot be traced any more; (ii)when the right of bona fide third parties might 
suffer because of the 'blind' application of object confiscation. See also, UN Commentary, 
supra note 34, p. 119. 
66 Confiscation of instrumentalities rests on such assumptions that the convicted person is 
unworthy to use property by using it for criminal purpose, or that the property itself is 
considered to be tainted, or that the society must be protected against the uncontrolled use 
of dangerous property (Stessens, G., supra note 34, pp. 43-45). 
6' Calero-Toledo v. Pearson Yacht Leasing Co., 416 US 663(1974). 
68 In civil confiscation, the state bears a lower burden of proof than in criminal confiscation. 
In other words, for criminal confiscation, the state should prove its case by criminal standard 
of proof("beyond reasonable doubt"). However, for civil confiscation, the state has only to 
establish its case by civil standard of proof ("probable cause"). The evidence does not need 
to be sufficient to free the mind wholly from all reasonable doubt, and the burden of proof is 
reversed to the side of defendants (Palm, C. W., "RICO Forfeiture and the Eighth 
Amendment: When is Everything too much? ", (1991) The University of Pittsburgh Law 
Review, vol. 53, at section II ). 
Moreover, criminal confiscation covers only property which was held by the criminal at 
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Civil confiscation is quite a powerful legal tool and is widely used in the 
U. S. " Recently it was also introduced in the UK as illustrated by the Anti- 
Terrorism, Crime and Security Act 200170 and the Proceeds of Crime Act 
2002.71 
What is common in these classifications is that the former model 
in each category generally serves as a basic approach, whereas the latter 
model further strengthens the legal powers of law enforcement agencies 
although sometimes it entails controversies. 72 The 1988 Vienna Convention 
includes all three basic models (object confiscation, 73 confiscation of 
proceeds, 74 and criminal confiscation75) and further provides for strengthened 
models in the first two categories(value confiscation, " confiscation of 
the time of conviction. In contrast with this, civil confiscation relates back to the original date 
of the illegal use of property, no matter whether it is still owned by the defendant or not. 
This aspect of civil confiscation is called the 'relation-back' doctrine. Under this doctrine, 
when property is used to further an illegal activity, title immediately vests in the government, 
even though the government does not take actual possession until it eventually seizes the 
property (Jankowski, M. A., "Tempering the Relation-Back Doctrine: A More Reasonable 
Approach to Civil Forfeiture in Drug Cases", (1990) Virginia Law Review, vol. 76, p. 165). 
69 Considering the U. S. experience, however, civil confiscation entails fierce legal 
controversies surrounding the fundamental right to a fair trial such as the danger of double 
jeopardy, the undermining of presumption of innocence, the violation of the prohibition of 
self-incrimination, and, the encroachment of the rights of third parties (Stessens, G., supra 
note 34, p. 29). 
70 See, e. g., Section 1. 
" See, e. g., Section 243-244. 
72 See, supra note 69. 
73 Article 5(1)(a). 
'' Article 5(1)(a). 
75 With regard to the third category, the Vienna Convention seems to mean only criminal 
confiscation because Article3(4)(a) expressly refers to confiscation as a sanction to which the 
commissioner of the offence is liable. In other words, confiscation is a result of criminal 
conviction of an offender (See, UN Commentary, supra note 34, p. 117). 
' Article 5(1)(a). In contrast to the brief mentioning of value confiscation in the Vienna 
Convention, the "1990 Council of Europe Convention on Laundering, Search, Seizure and 
Confiscation of the Proceeds from Crime" goes further by providing a very detailed 
procedure for value confiscation. See, e. g., Article 7, para. 2(a); Article 13, para. 
3 and 4; 
Article 14, para. 4; Article 16. 
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instrumentalities"). In fact, only civil confiscation is left out. Importantly, it 
should be noted that the Vienna Convention prudently introduces a 
"reversed burden of proof" in Article 5(7) on a non-mandatory basis. The 
reversed burden of proof is useful in confiscation proceedings because it will 
be very difficult for the prosecution to prove, beyond reasonable doubt, the 
criminal origin of proceeds, for example when they have been generated in 
violation of foreign criminal law, ' or when suspicious assets are owned by 
legal persons that are domiciled in offshore finance centres. 79 In particular, it 
should also be considered that many predicate offences are without a victim 
to give evidence on the nature of the offences and the extent of the 
proceeds. 8° This reversed burden of proof can sometimes be introduced in 
criminal proceedings by way of establishing a separate in rem confiscation 
procedure following a conviction of perpetrators. ' Furthermore, it is also 
included in civil confiscation proceedings since the burden of proof is 
already lowered to the level of balance of probabilities. 82 
Thirdly, issues concerning the "general part" of international 
Article 5(1)(b). 
78 Stessens, G., supra note 34, p. 67. For further justification for the reversal of the burden of 
proof, see also Smellie, A., "Prosecutorial Challenges in Freezing and Forfeiting Proceeds of 
Transnational Crime and the Use of International Asset Sharing to Promote International 
Cooperation", (2004) Journal of Money Laundering Control, vol. 8, no. 2, p. 107. 
7' Council of Europe, Combating organised crime, August 2004, p. 44. 
80 Stessens, G., supra note 34, p. 67. 
Rl Ibid., pp. 42-43. In relation to the separate in rent confiscation, Netherlands can be a case in 
point. See, Daams, C. A., Criminal Asset Forfeiture: One of the most effective weapons against 
(organised) crime?, 2003, pp. 104-105. 
8z It is the reversed burden of proof that accounts for most of the criticism on civil 
confiscation such as the undermining of presumption of innocence and the danger of self- 
incrimination. For details, see supra note 69; Council of Europe, Combating organised crime, 
August 2004, pp. 49-50. 
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criminal law need to be mentioned. 83 In this category, issues concerning the 
state of mind, inchoate(or incomplete) offences and complicity, and corporate 
criminal liability are of particular significance for the study. First, state of 
mind(mens rea) is an essential requirement in convicting a perpetrator of a 
money laundering offence. A useful categorisation can be found in the OAS 
Model Regulations that the accused (a) knows that the property constitutes 
proceeds of a criminal activity (b) should have known that...; (c) is 
intentionally ignorant that.... ""' The first type is a basic mental standard for 
obtaining a conviction, while the second constitutes a form of negligent 
money laundering. 85 The third type means that the accused was wilfully 
blind86 when he or she "could have known" of the criminal nature of the 
money concerned by investigation or inquiry. 87 This state of mind falls 
between negligence and the knowledge standard of intent. " The Vienna 
Convention is conservative in this respect by adopting only the first type 
(knowing that the proceeds are the product of a predicate offence). 89 With 
regard to the "test" of state of mind, the Vienna Convention also stipulates 
that "knowledge, intent or purpose as an element of an offence may be 
inferred from objective factual circumstances". 90 Second, inchoate(or 
" For an overview of the issues, Clark, R. S., supra note 19, p. 72. 
84 The OAS Model Regulations Concerning Laundering Offenses Connected to Illicit Drug 
Trafficking and Other Serious Offenses, Article 2 (Schott, P. A., Reference Guide to Anti-Money 
Laundering and Combating the Financing of Terrorism, 2003, p. V-8). 
g5 Schott, P. A., supra note 84, p. V-7and V- 8. 
Wilful blindness probably exists when a person deliberately shuts his eyes to the means of 
knowledge because he prefers to remain in ignorance(Gordon, G. H., Criminal Law, p. 296). 
Schott, P. A., supra note 84, p. V-8. 
sR Ibid., p. V-8. 
R9 Article 3(1)(b). 
9u Article 3(3). 
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incomplete) offences and complicity also entails matters for consideration. " 
In fact, it should be admitted that these concepts vary and depend upon 
national legal systems, making it very difficult to draft a universal formula. 92 
Accordingly, the Vienna Convention stipulates to cover as many types of 
activities as possible. It provides for inchoate offence such as incitement, 
conspiracy, and attempts. 93 It also enumerates different kinds of complicity as 
well. 94 The suspect can be regarded as an accomplice when joins in the 
association or conspiracy to commit a crime or when they encourage the 
91 Clark, R. S., supra note 19, p. 78. 
92 Although the terminology employed in the international text needs a different 
interpretation dependent upon national legal systems, the relevant theory of the common 
law system might be of help in understanding the relevant text. To begin with, it should be 
remembered that a distinction can be made between inchoate offence and complicity offence 
based on whether a specific crime is committed or not. 
Then, the inchoate offence can be divided into two categories: conspiracy and attempt. A 
conspiracy is an agreement of two or more persons for a criminal purpose (Gordon, Criminal 
Law, p. 228) and an attempt is the act of a person who has necessary intent to commit a crime 
but falls short of its commission(Garner, B. A., ed., Blacks Law Dictionary, p. 123). The concept 
of conspiracy is sometimes more useful to the prosecution than attempt, constituting a 
"complete" crime in the absence of a specific crime or acts(attempt) that falls short of the 
specific crime. Furthermore, both concepts can be combined together as "attempted 
conspiracy", creating a new offence that is called "incitement". This means that merely to 
invite someone to commit a crime is a completed crime. Once the invitation has been given, 
there is a "complete" crime (Gordon, Criminal law, p. 243). 
With regard to complicity, the old common law made a distinction between principals and 
accessories. A principal could be either of two degrees. A principal in the first degree is the 
actual perpetrator. A principle in the second degree is one who is present physically 
(standing watching) or constructively (outside at the wheel of the getaway car) who is said 
to "aid and abet". Accessories also come in two varieties, before the fact and after the fact. 
Accessories before the fact "procure", "counsel" or "command" others to commit the offence. 
An accessory after the fact "receive", "relieve", "comforts" or "assist" one of the other 
perpetrators, typically to effect an escape. Principals in the second degree and accessories are 
often referred to generically accomplices on which modern penal codes draw no distinctions 
for the purposes of trial, except that accessories after the fact are not guilty of the substantive 
offence and liable to less punishment than the others (Clark, R. S., supra note 19, p. 78). 
93 The Vienna Convention, Article 3(1)(c) (iii) and (iv). With regard to "induce", the 
Commentary explains it as a form of incitement which involves the offering of money or 
money's worth (UN Commentary, supra note 34, p. 75). 
94 Article 3(1)(c)(iv). 
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commission of the crime by facilitating or counselling or when they 
participate in the criminal activity by being present thus aiding and 
abetting. 95 Third, the concept of corporate criminal liability needs to be 
considered. 96 This can be of particular utility for example, where complex 
management structures can render the identification of the real perpetrator 
difficult or impossible. 97 In such cases, the imposition of liability on the legal 
person may be the only choice if the activity in question is not to go 
unpunished. 98 Furthermore a sanction imposed on an institution rather than 
an individual can act as a catalyst for the management and supervisory 
structures to maintain due diligence so that similar conduct might be 
prevented in the future. 99 However, the Vienna Convention which is quite 
innovative in every other respect remained silent on this issue. Eventually, 
the concept of corporate criminal liability was introduced two years later in 
the 1990 FATF Forty Recommendations. '00 
In sum, the Vienna Convention was in effect the first international 
convention to emphasise the law enforcement aspect of the fight against 
9s UN Commentary, supra note 34, p. 75. 
96 Most of the common law countries subject corporations to criminal liability, while in civil 
law countries corporations may not be covered by criminal laws. See, Schott, P. A., supra note 
84, p. V-9; Council of Europe, "Liability of enterprises for offences: Recommendation 
No. R(88) adopted by the Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe on 20 October 
1988 and explanatory memorandum", 1990, pp. 10-11. For further discussions on the 
basis for 
corporate criminal liability, see also, Savla, S., Money Laundering and Financial Intermediaries, 
2001, pp. 186-188; Wells, C., Corporations and Criminal Responsibility, 2nd edn., 2001, pp. 63-83. 
9' UN Commentary, supra note 34, p. 67. 
98 Ibid., p. 67. 
99 Ibid., p. 67. For example, in the UK, banks have been indirectly obliged to take on the 
responsibility for the prevention of money laundering due to the possibility of 
being 
prosecuted. See, FATF, "Annual Report 1989-1990", 7 February 
1990, p. 14. 
100 The 1990 Recommendation 7 stipulates that "where possible, corporations themselves-not 
only their employees-should be subject to criminal liability. 
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acquisitive crime, 101 and has established both a framework for cooperation 
and a common minimum standard for implementation across national 
boundaries. 102 Particularly, it should be noted that the Vienna Convention for 
the first time criminalised money laundering at the international level with 
an explicit definition. However, the Vienna Convention still left much to be 
desired in that it is related only to initiatives in the public sector. "' A more 
balanced strategy came to the fore with the establishment of the FATF which 
deals with initiatives both in the public and private sectors. "' 
c. Private sector 
Major issues to be considered with regard to the private sector are 
three: (a) on whom is the responsibility imposed?; (b) what is the content of 
that responsibility?; (c) and, how to control and supervise the work of the 
private sector? 
Firstly, let us consider the scope of the private sector placed under 
the responsibilisation regime. What should be noted here is that the boundary 
of this responsibilisation regime cannot be fixed once and for all but has a 
tendency to sprawl horizontally and vertically. This is mainly because of the 
fast development of money laundering techniques and its displacement 
effect, 
105 In respect of the horizontal expansion, the industries which were 
101 McClean, D., International Co-operation in Civil and Criminal Matters, 2002, pp. 172-174. 
102 Ibid., p. 3. 
'03 UN Commentary, supra note 34, p. 68. 
" For a detailed discussion on this aspect, see, e. g., Gilmore, W. C., supra note 34, pp. 92-94. 
105 The displacement effect takes place, for example, when an increased compliance by 
financial institutions with anti-money laundering measures brings about a shift in the 
money laundering phenomenon to other sectors of the economy (FATF, "Annual Report 
1996-1997", p. 7). 
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initially placed under the anti-money laundering regime included financial 
institutions such as banks but nowadays spreads farther to cover non- 
financial institutions such as real estate agencies and professions such as 
lawyers. "' Wherever any loopholes are found which can be utilised by the 
money launderer, the responsibilisation regime needs to be imposed. On the 
other hand, vertical extension means that the responsibilisation regime 
should be applied not only to a headquarters operation but also to branches 
and major subsidiaries. 107 It is needless to say that the partial application of 
anti-money laundering regimes within the same institution will seriously 
undermine consistency and effectiveness. 
In the international arena, the 1990 Forty Recommendations of the 
FATF can be said to realise the idea of responsibilisation on a full scale, 
maintaining a balanced approach by including initiatives in respect of the 
public and international sectors as well as the private sector. The 1990 
Recommendation 9 clearly stipulated that the responsibility for fighting 
money laundering should apply not only to banks, but also to non-bank 
financial institutions. However, it should be noted that the scope of 
application was confined to "non-bank financial institutions" rather than 
"non-financial institutions". This position was not changed in the revised 
1996 Recommendations. All in all, the scope of application was limited to 
"financial institutions of any kind". A significant change was eventually 
introduced in the revised 2003 Forty Recommendations which designate 
106 For instance, see the treatment of so-called "gate keepers" by the 2001 EU Directive 
Amending Council Directive 91/308/EEC on Prevention of the Use of the Financial System 
For the Purpose of Money Laundering, Article 2. a.; the 2003 FATF Recommendation 12. 
'u' Schott, P. A., supra note 84, p. VI-3. 
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non-financial institutions in detail but not exhaustively"' Unlike the 
horizontal expansion, the progress in the vertical extension was fast. The idea 
was already incorporated in the Forty Recommendations from the revised 
1996 version. The 1996 revised Recommendation 20 stipulated that financial 
institutions should ensure that the principles of responsibilisation also be 
applied to branches and majority owned subsidiaries located abroad, 
especially in countries which did not or insufficiently applied these 
recommendations. 109 If local law and regulations prohibited such 
implementation, compulsory enforcement measures could be collectively 
employed by the FATF member countries. "' Lastly in the context of 
discussion on the scope of the responsibilisation strategy, one classic case 
should not be overlooked. It is the responsibility imposed on an individual. 
When an individual personally carries a certain amount of cash across an 
international border, a number of countries require that person to provide 
identification, and report the amount of money to relevant authorities. 11' In 
effect, this obligation is quite similar in content to those imposed on financial 
institutions that will be explained below. Importantly, the 1990 
Recommendation 23 addressed (in a permissive fashion) the reporting of the 
10' In Glossary of the 2003 revised Forty Recommendations, non-financial business and 
professions means; a) Casinos (which also includes internet casinos); b) Real estate agents; c) 
Dealers in precious metals; d) Dealers in precious stones; e) Lawyers, notaries, other 
independent legal professionals and accountants; f) Trust and company service providers. 
For the open attitude of the FATF concerning the scope of application, see Recommendation 
20. 
109 Where the minimum regulatory standards of the home and host countries differ, branches 
and subsidiaries in the host jurisdiction should apply the higher standard of the two (BCBS, 
"Customer due diligence for banks", October 2001, para. 66, p. 16). 
110 Recommendation 21. For further discussion, see Section 11.2. of Chapter Five of this study. 
111 See, e. g., Special Recommendation IX, issued on 22 October 2004 by the FATF. 
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physical cross-border transportation of cash, and the attention of the FATF to 
this issue remains undiminished in spite of subsequent revisions of the 
text, 112 
Secondly, with regard to the content of responsibility, this can be 
reduced to three key measures: customer identification, record keeping, and 
the reporting of (suspicious) transactions. 113 First, it is clear that customer 
identification is the starting point of the responsibilisation strategy, given that 
the measure concerns the initial placement stage of money laundering and 
that de facto anonymity at this stage would be the optimal haven for money 
laundering criminality. "' The core elements of this measure are (i) identifying 
and verifying the customer and any beneficial owners; (b) understanding the 
financial and personal circumstances of customers; and, (c) ongoing 
monitoring and updating the information obtained on a regular basis, 
115 
Although the logic is very simple, it is indeed a difficult task to implement in 
practice, given the various scopes and complicated nature of the private 
sector into which the dirty money might flow. 116 Each relevant industry in the 
private sector needs to prepare their own set of rules for customer 
identification tailored to their service. Second, the obligation to keep the 
112 Similar provisions can be found in the 1996 Recommendation 23 and the 
2003 
Recommendation 19(a). 
113 Stessens, G., supra note 34, p. 159. 
114 Ibid., p. 146. 
115 Clark, A. & Russell, M., "Know Your Customer", in Clark, A. & Burrell, P., eds., A 
Practitioner's Guide to International Money Laundering Law and Regulation, 1" edn., 2003, p. 93. 
"'There exist various methods to disguise the genuine ownership such as shell companies, 
trust, independent professionals such as lawyers, etc. For the details of the 
development of 
techniques, see, e. g., FATF, "Report on Money Laundering Typologies 
1999-2000", 3 
February 2000, pp. 8-10; FATF, "Annual Report 1997-1998: Annex C-1997-1998 
Report on 
Money Laundering Typologies", June 1998, pp. 52-53. 
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records on the identity of customers or transactions is of great value because 
a paper trail can be formed. This database could also facilitate the post hoc 
investigation by the government authorities seeking to follow the paper 
trail. 117 Lastly, there is an obligation to make a report on transactions. This 
obligation is the climax of the responsibilisation strategy. Generally there 
exist two types of reporting regime in international practice: threshold-based 
reporting and suspicion-based reporting. 1 ' The first type can be regarded as 
an objective model in that all transactions above a fixed amount (what is 
called the "threshold") must be reported. 119 In contrast, the second type can 
be considered as a subjective model since the decisions to report transactions 
in question are based on a subjective judgement by the financial institutions 
themselves. "' In fact, the suspicion-based model seems to fit better into the 
responsibilisation strategy. However, it should be noted that both models 
have merits and demerits respectively and they could be complementary to 
each other if mixed wisely. 121 Furthermore, two rules relating to the reporting 
Schott, A. P., supra note 84, p. VI-13,14. 
'1R Usually, the American practice is subsumed under the threshold-based model, while the 
Swiss practice belongs to the suspicion-based model. For a relevant discussion, see, Clark, A., 
& Russell, M., "Reporting Regime", in Clark, A. & Burrell, P., eds., A Practitioner's Guide to 
International Money Laundering Law and Regulation, 1st edn., 2003, pp. 130-134; Grant, T. D., 
supra note 39. 
119 Stessens, G., supra note 34, p. 161. For example, in the U. S., the threshold is US$ 10,000. 
120 Ibid., p. 161. 
12' Noble, R. K., & Golumbic, C. E., supra note 43. The threshold-based model has the 
following merits (i) it has psychological deterrent effect on money launderers; (ii) it ensures 
an extensive paper trail for investigators to follow; (iii) it promotes uniformity and 
consistency in enforcement. However, the demerits are (i) the model entails the increase in 
the data which financial institutions have to produce, thus overburdening both financial 
institutions and law enforcement authorities; (ii) it might discourage the private sector from 
making a proactive report for the private sector may easily conclude that their task is 
complete upon the mere submission of the reporting form; (iii) all in all, in terms of cost- 
benefit analysis, the efficiency is quite low. By way of comparison, the merits and demerits of 
the suspicion-based model correspond to those of the objective model in reverse. The 
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obligation need to be explained. One is the "safe harbour" provision which 
protects financial institutions and employees from criminal and civil liability 
when reporting suspicious transactions to competent authorities in good 
faith. 122 The other is the "no-tipping off" provision which prohibits the 
private sector from informing its customers of its reporting to the 
authorities. 123 
In the international arena, to begin with, the 1990 Forty 
Recommendations provided for the obligation of customer identification in 
general terms. 124 Later the 1996 revised Forty Recommendations inserted a 
paragraph on legal entities for the purpose of identifying beneficial owners 
but did not go further in any meaningful way. 125 Finally, significant progress 
has been made in the 2003 revised Recommendations, including the 
elaboration of detailed procedures for customer identification. 
126 Next, the 
1990 Recommendation 14 stipulated that financial institutions should 
maintain, for at least five years, all necessary records on transactions, both 
domestic and international. This requirement was not changed in the 
subsequent revised versions of the Forty Recommendations. Lastly, with 
suspicion-based model (i) markedly reduces the amount of data; (ii) promotes better 
efficiency, namely, the law enforcement can spot money laundering with less effort by 
utilising the expertise of the financial institutions. However, (i) the deterrent effect might be 
weaker; (ii) it fails to establish an extensive paper trail; (iii) no uniformity or consistency; (iv) 
the private sector might under-report suspicious transactions due to lack of information or 
because of the desire to reduce costs and protect customer confidentiality. 
122 Schott, A. P., supra note 84, p. VI-12. For the justification for this provision, see, e. g., Clark, 
N., "The Impact of Recent Money Laundering Legislation on Financial Intermediaries", in 
Rider, B. & Ashe, M., eds., Money Laundering Control, 1996, pp. 138-140. 
12' For an overview of this concept, see, Mitsilegas, V., supra note 34, pp. 143-146. 
124 Recommendations 12 and 13. 
125 Recommendation 10. 
126 See, Section 11.2. c. of Chapter Four of this study. 
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regard to the reporting obligation, the FATF has always opted for the 
suspicion-based model. 12' However, it should be noted that the FATF also left 
the choice of the threshold-based reporting model open by encouraging 
countries to consider the introduction of that model as well. "' In respect of 
the reporting obligation, the FATF has also introduced the rules of "safe 
harbour" and "no-tipping off" into its text. 129 
Thirdly, two mechanisms have been conceived for the purposes of 
monitoring and controlling the work of the private sector: internal control 
and training, and exterior supervision. Internal control and training are 
organised by the management of a private enterprise, while exterior control 
is conducted by an outsider, i. e., the supervisory authority in the relevant 
industry such as the central bank of a country. Internal controls and training 
are important because they allow the staff of an obligated institution to 
detect suspicious transactions more, 
130 On the other hand, exterior 
supervision provides objective mechanism to monitor the development of 
the anti-money laundering framework within relevant industries. 
127 The 1990 Recommendation 16; the 1996 Recommendation 15; the 2003 Recommendation 
13. 
128 The 1990 Recommendation 24; the 1996 Recommendation 23; the 2003 Recommendation 
19. For an example of an effective internal control mechanism, see, Hyland, M., "Corporate 
Culture", in Clark, A. & Burrell, P., eds., A Practitioner's Guide to International Money 
Laundering Law and Regulation, 1sß edn., 2003, pp. 57-66. 
129 For the safe harbour provision, see the 1990 Recommendation 16; the 1996 
Recommendation 16; the 2003 Recommendation 14. As to the no-tipping off rule, see the 
1990 Recommendation 17; the 1996 Recommendation 17; the 2003 Recommendation 14(b). 
130 These internal compliance programmes are particularly important to avoid wilful 
blindness. Especially in the U. S. the internal programmes are in some degree considered as a 
means of avoiding criminal liability than as a means of cooperating with the government 
(Stessens, G., supra note 34, p. 178). For a further discussion, see, Adams, W., "Effective 
Strategies for Banks in Avoiding Criminal, Civil, and Forfeiture Liability in Money 
Laundering Cases", (1993) Alabama Law Review, vol. 44, pp. 699-701. 
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The FATF requires financial institutions to develop programmes 
against money laundering such as internal policies, the designation of 
compliance officers at the management level, an ongoing employment 
training, and an auditing function to test the system. 131 Similarly, the role of 
supervisory authorities in establishing an effective anti-money laundering 
strategy has always been emphasised by the FATF. The 1990 
Recommendation 26 required supervisory authorities to ensure that the 
supervised institutions have adequate programmes to guard against money 
laundering. Moreover, the 1990 Recommendation 29 warned against the 
possibility that the management level may be infiltrated by criminals, and 
thus it pointed out the importance of prudential supervision. 132 There was no 
change of treatment to this issue in the 1996 text. 
d. A bridging mechanism: the FIU 
According to the Egmont Group the FIU has three core functions: 
to act as a centralised repository of financial information; to undertake the 
analysis of the information; and, to facilitate the dissemination of the 
results. 133 FIUs can take various forms in different national situations, and 
they can be classified into three basic models: an administrative model; a 
'31 The 1990 Recommendation 20; the 1996 Recommendation 19; the 2003 Recommendation 
15. 
'32 The BCCI case is a good example. The investigation was originally initiated with the 
information provided by the US Federal Reserve (Stessens, G., supra note 34, p. 
201). 
133 See the definition of the FIU in "Statement of purpose of the Egmont Group of Financial 
Intelligence Units", the Hague: the Egmont Group, 13 June 2001, p. 2; Schott, AT, supra note 
84, p. VII-4-9. In addition, the FIU may have other functions such as monitoring compliance 
with AML/CFT requirements, blocking transactions and 
freezing accounts, training, 
conducting research, and, enhancing public awareness of 
AML/CFT issues. For details, see, 
IMF, Financial Intelligence Units: An Overview, 2004, pp. 71-82. 
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law-enforcement model; and, a prosecutorial model. " In the administrative 
model, it is either attached to a supervisory authority such as the central 
bank or the ministry of finance, or exists as an independent administrative 
authority. 135 In the law-enforcement model, it is annexed to and forms part of 
a police force. 136 In the prosecutorial model, the FIU is affiliated with the 
prosecutor's office as a judicial authority. 13' In practice, it is not so easy to 
simplify the types of the FIU because many existing FIUs actually use a 
mixed model. 138 
Given the short history of the FIU, most international texts did 
not explicitly mention it before 9/11 as with the Vienna Convention or the 
Forty Recommendations of 1990 and 1996. In its recommendations, the FATF 
simply laid out a concept of the FlU implicitly by way of mentioning the role 
of competent authorities in coordinating all anti-money laundering 
strategies. 
139 
'34 Schott, P. A., supra note 84, p. VII-9; Clark, A. & Burrell, M., "Reporting Regimes" in Clark, 
A. & Burrell, P., eds., A Practitioner's Guide to International Money Laundering Law and 
Regulation, 1st edn., 2003, pp. 121-129; Thony, J. F., "Processing Financial Information in Money 
Laundering Matters: The Financial Information Unit", (1996) European Journal of Crime, 
Criminal Law and Criminal Justice, vol. 4, no. 3, pp. 265-272. 
135 It can better enjoy the trust of the private sector, acting as a buffer between the private 
sector and law enforcement agencies, and can also better exchange information with other 
foreign FIUs. However, it is less independent and may be slow in law-enforcement measures. 
France is a case in point. See, Mitsilegas, V., supra note 34, pp. 161-163. 
136 There is no need to set up a new agency but it can build on an existing infrastructure, and 
it can enjoy the merits of a law enforcement agency. However, it may have difficulty in 
establishing mutual trust with the private sector, and be less independent. See, IMF, Financial 
Intelligence Unit, 2004, pp. 13-14. In this regard, see, the UK practice in Mitsilegas, V., supra 
note 34, pp. 163-168. 
137 It is independent and the judiciary's powers (e. g., seizing, freezing) are immediately 
available. However, it lacks the trust with the private sector, and is less efficient in 
exchanging information with foreign FIUs. See, IMF, Financial Intelligence Unit, p. 16. See also 
the practice of Luxembourg in Mitsilegas, V., supra note 34, pp. 168-169. 
138 Schott, A. P., supra note 84, p. VII-10. 
139 The 1990 Recommendations 26-29; the 1996 Recommendations 26-29. 
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At this point, one premise and two important principles should 
be mentioned which come to the fore wherever the "flow of information" 
matters. First, as a premise, the tap of information sources should be opened 
to generate the flow of information. In the anti-money laundering context, it 
is the lifting of the bank secrecy rule which is of paramount importance. l"o 
Then as a compensatory gesture for the elimination of this bank secrecy rule, 
two principles follow. '4' One is the principle of confidentiality that is used as 
protection against abuse of private financial information. 142 The other is the 
principle of specialty, which limits the use of information reported by the 
private sector or requested by the FIU for any other purpose other than 
fighting money laundering. 
'43 They are necessary to promote the climate of 
trust between concerned parties regardless of whether it is the exchange of 
information between relevant sectors in domestic terms or with foreign 
counterparts in international terms. 
In the international context, the Vienna Convention stipulates the 
lifting of the bank secrecy rule both in domestic and international terms. 
1' 
With regard to the principles of confidentiality and specialty, the Vienna 
Convention provides for them only in terms of international cooperation. 
145 
In a similar context, the 1990 FATF Recommendations 16 and 
37 indirectly 
140 For the traditional justification for banking secrecy and the changing attitudes on this 
issue in the banking industry, see, Hinterseer, K., Criminal Finance: The Political 
Economy of 
Money Laundering in a Comparative Legal Context, 2002, pp. 285-289; Campbell, 
D., ed., 
International Bank Secrecy, 1992, pp. vii-x. 
141 Stessens, G., supra note 34, p. 341,347. 
142 Schott, AT, supra note 84, p. VII-14. 
143 Ibid., p. VII-15. 
144 Article 5(3); Article 7(5). 
'4; Article 7(12) and (13). 
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provide for the lifting of the bank secrecy rule both in domestic and 
international terms and this position does not change much in the 1996 
revised text. 116 The 1990 Recommendation 32 also implicitly provided for the 
need for strict safeguards with regard to privacy and data protection only in 
terms of international cooperation, and this provision remains in the 2003 
revised text. 147 
e. International cooperation 
This area has a long history of discussion in pubic international 
law, but for this study three major areas will be dealt with briefly: (a) how to 
decide upon questions of jurisdiction?; (b) what kinds of cooperation should 
be promoted?; and, (c) what are the principles relevant to international 
cooperation in this context? 
Firstly, given the transnational nature of money laundering and 
predicate offences, the question of which state has primary jurisdiction is 
initially significant for international cooperation. Two standards can be 
identified in categorising jurisdiction: function and basis. In terms of function, 
legislative, judicial, and executive jurisdiction can be distinguished. In other 
words, jurisdiction to prescribe, adjudicate, and enforce can be 
differentiated. 148 On the other hand, according to the basis for jurisdiction, a 
distinction can be made between jurisdiction based on territory and 
"' The 1990 Recommendation 16 and 37; the 1996 Recommendation 16 and 37. In the 2003 
Recommendation 14(a), 36(d), 40(b), these provisions become more explicit. 
'" The 1996 Recommendation 32; the 2003 Recommendation 40. 
'" Oxman, B. H., "Jurisdiction of States", Encyclopaedia of Public International Law, vol. 3,1997, 
p. 55. 
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jurisdiction based on persons. 149 If we go into details in this regard, a further 
distinction can be made. Firstly, with regard to territory there are the 
principles of objective territoriality and subjective territoriality. 150 The 
principle of objective territorial jurisdiction(or effects doctrine) is established 
when an offence is completed in its territory or its effect is felt in its territory. 
The subjective territorial jurisdiction is established when partial elements of a 
whole offence take place in its territory but the offence is consummated in a 
foreign territory, 151 Secondly, in respect of persons, two types can be 
distinguished: the principle of active and passive personality. The active 
personality principle allows a state to assert extraterritorial jurisdiction when 
one of its nationals commits an offence, whereas the passive personality 
principle provides a state with extraterritorial jurisdiction when its national 
is the victim of an offence. 152 In addition, the all-inclusive principle of 
universality can be noted. Under the principle, every country has 
extraterritorial jurisdiction over such offences that are regarded to be 
particularly offensive to the international community as a whole like piracy 
and war crimes. 153 Furthermore, there are variations such as the principle of 
the flag, "' the principle of protection, 155 the representation principle, 156 etc. 
'49 It should be remembered that the categorisation by this standard is in respect of criminal 
jurisdiction rather than civil jurisdiction (Shaw, M., International Law, 4th edn., 1997. pp. 457- 
458). 
Aso See, Oxman, B. H., "Jurisdiction of States", Encyclopaedia of Public International Law, vol. 3, 
1997, p. 57; Camreon, I., The Protective Principle of International Criminal jurisdiction, 1994, p. 53; 
the Council of Europe, Extraterritorial criminal jurisdiction, 1990, pp. 8-9. 
15' The subjective territorial jurisdiction is an American terminology, and a similar concept 
can be found in Europe as "ubiquity theory"(Stessens, G., supra note 34, p. 
218). 
152 See, the Council of Europe, supra note 150, pp. 10-13. 
153 Shaw, M., supra note 149, p. 470. 
154 A country possesses jurisdiction over offences committed on 
board ships or aircraft flying 
its flag (the Council of Europe, supra note 150, pp. 11-12). 
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In the international arena, nearly all international legal texts 
include provisions on these principles of jurisdiction. For example, the 
Vienna Convention requires all countries to adopt the objective territorial 
principle and the principle of the flag on a mandatory basis, and further 
encourages them to choose the active personality principle, and some tailor- 
made principles in the context of fighting drugs. 15' In practice since elements 
and participants of money laundering offences may involve more than one 
country, it would not be so easy to apply these rules in a clear-cut way. In this 
sense, the needs for international cooperation are greater than ever as 
indicated by the 1990 FATF Recommendation 39. 
Secondly, with regard to the content of cooperation, it should be 
understood that it can include almost everything imaginable in relation to 
investigation, prosecution, judicial proceedings, and sanctions. Nowadays, 
with the increase in transnational criminality, relevant international 
instruments tend to make provisions on international criminal cooperation as 
detailed as possible. 
In this regard, the Vienna Convention set the standards. By way 
Iss A country has jurisdiction over offences which are committed abroad with the intention of 
damaging its fundamental interests such as counterfeiting its currency or attacking its 
diplomatic missions (Ibid., pp. 13-14). 
's' A country possesses extraterritorial jurisdiction for another country which is more directly 
involved, provided certain conditions are met (Ibid., p. 14). 
157 Article 4. The tailor-made principles do not fit into any of traditional principles. Article 
4.1. (b)(ii) appears to be a variant of the representation principle, whereas Article 4.1. (b)(iii) 
seems to be a variant of the protective principle. For a relevant discussion, see, Sproule, D. W., 
& St. Denis, P., "The UN Drug Trafficking Convention: An Ambitious Step", (1989) The 
Canadians Yearbook of International Law, vol. 27, pp. 276-277; Shutte, J. J. E., "Extradition for Drug 
Offences: New Developments Under the 1988 U. N. Convention Against Illicit Traffic In 
Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances", (1991) International Review of Pedal Law, vol. 62, 
pp. 135-136. 
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of illustration, the Vienna Convention makes it mandatory to cooperate in 
the enforcement of a confiscation order. To this end, it provides for two 
alternative approaches: the traditional approach and the reformative 
approach. Under the former approach, the requested state should submit the 
foreign request to a competent domestic authority for the purpose of 
obtaining a confiscation order. 1 ' By the latter approach, the requested state 
directly enforces a foreign confiscation order and in this sense, it is quite 
reformative. 159 Other relevant provisions of the Vienna Convention are also 
much more detailed than previous multilateral treaties by way of including 
issues such as evidence-taking, "' identifying proceeds, 161 extradition, 162 the 
transfer of proceedings, 163 provisional measures, 164 enforcement of 
confiscation orders, 165 asset sharing, 166 etc. In particular, while other criminal 
law conventions set out the general obligation to render assistance, Article 7 
of the Vienna Convention deals with mutual legal assistance in such a 
detailed way that it could in itself be considered a mini-mutual legal 
assistance treaty or as a treaty within a treaty. 167 
Thirdly, let us proceed to some principles required for 
international cooperation. To begin with, the smooth flow of information is 
important at the international level. Thus, the same principles as already 
'sg Gilmore, W. C., Combating International Drugs Trafficking, supra note 40, p. 16. 
'sy Ibid., p. 16. 
160 Article 7(2). 
161 Article 7(2). 
162 Article 4(2), 6. 
163 Article 8. 
'6' Article 5(4)(b). 
115 Article 5. 
166 Article 5(5)(a). 
'b' Sproule, D. W. & St. Denis, P., supra note 157, p. 285. 
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mentioned in relation to the work of the FlU are also applicable in this area. 
These are the lifting of the bank secrecy rule and the principles of 
confidentiality and specialty. 168 Next, some issues on extradition need to be 
considered. These are the principle of auf dedere auf judicare(the duty to 
extradite or prosecute), the exceptions of political offence and fiscal offence. 
The principle of auf dedere auf judicare is in effect an alter ego of the principle 
of universality, and aims to prevent criminals from escaping criminal 
justice. 169 On the other hand, the political offence exception provides a 
country with a justification to refuse a request for extradition of political 
refugees. 17° With a similar mechanism, the fiscal offence exception allows a 
country to refuse the request for extradition of offenders in relation to fiscal 
offences such as tax evasion or the violation of customs regulations. "' This is 
mainly to protect the economic interest of nationals of the requested country 
or to prevent the outflow of national wealth. 172 
In international criminal texts, the principle of auf dedere auf 
judicare is increasingly adopted as with Articles 4(2) and 6(9) of the Vienna 
Convention and most anti-terrorism conventions. 173 Likewise, the exceptions 
168 However, it should be noted that the principle of specialty finds its use also in respect of 
extradition. Namely, an extradited fugitive may not be detained, tried and punished for any 
offence other than the one for which extradition was granted (Stein, T., "Extradition", 
Encyclopaedia of International Law, vol. 8,1985, p. 224). 
'69 Clark, R. S., supra note 19, pp. 49-50. 
170 Gilbert, G., Transnational Fugitive Offenders in International Law, 1998, p. 204. For an 
overview of this concept, see Nadelmann, E. A., Cops across borders: the Internationalization of 
U. S. Criminal Law Enforcement, 1993, pp. 419-426. 
''' Stessens, G., supra note 34, pp. 299-300. 
172 It is criticised for an obsolete notion of sovereignty and protectionism and for immorality 
of, say conserving tax havens (Ibid., pp. 299-300). 
173 For instance, Article 6(4) of the 1997 convention on terrorist bombings contains the 
principle of auf dedere auf judicare. 
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of the political offence and fiscal offence are disappearing gradually as 
illustrated by Article 3(10) of the Vienna Convention and recent anti- 
terrorism conventions. " All these phenomena serve to promote the 
development in mutual assistance in criminal matters. 
2. The UN General Assembly and the 1999 Convention 
a. Context 
In 1996, the General Assembly once again established an ad hoc 
committee to deal with terrorism affairs with the adoption of Resolution 
51/210.175 This ad hoc committee has been involved in drafting several anti- 
terrorism conventions thus far. 176 The International Convention for the 
Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism(ICSFT) was one of the anti- 
terrorism convention series drafted by this committee. Originally in 
paragraph 3(f) of Resolution 51/210, the General Assembly called upon all 
states to take steps to prevent the financing of terrorists and terrorist 
organisations. '" In May 1998, this attention of the General Assembly to the 
174 For instance, Article 11 of the 1997 convention on terrorist bombings excludes the political 
offence exception. 
175 UN, A/RES/51/210,17 December 1996. 
16 The ad hoc committee first drafted the International Conventions for the Suppression of 
Terrorist Bombings, which was adopted by the UN in December 1997. Currently, this 
committee is involved in drafting a comprehensive convention on international terrorism as 
well as a convention for the suppression of acts of nuclear terrorism. 
177 The paragraph 3(f) of Resolution 51/210 is as follows: all states are called upon to 
"prevent and counteract, through appropriate domestic measures, the financing of 
terrorists and terrorist organizations, whether such financing is direct or indirect through 
organizations which also have or claim to have charitable, social or cultural goals or which 
are also engaged in unlawful activities such as illicit arms trafficking, 
drug dealing and 
racketeering, including the exploitation of persons for purposes of 
funding terrorist activities, 
and in particular to consider, where appropriate, adopting regulatory measures to prevent 
and counteract movements of funds suspected to be intended 
for terrorist purposes without 
impeding in any way the freedom of legitimate capital movements and to intensify the 
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issue of terrorist financing was reinforced by a statement of the Foreign 
Ministers of the G-8 countries which identified the issue as a priority area for 
action. The President of France further called for the immediate negotiation 
of a convention against the financing of terrorism. 17' The idea of fighting 
terrorist financing then materialised with the adoption of Resolution 53/108 
which required the ad hoc committee to elaborate a draft international 
convention for the suppression of terrorist financing, based on the French 
proposed draft text. 19 As a result, the ICSFT was adopted by the UN on 9 
December 1999 and can be recorded as a significant breakthrough in the 
history of combating terrorism by directly targeting the financial 
infrastructure of terrorist movements. "' 
With the focus on the ICSFT, a comparative study will also be 
made in this section for the purpose of having an overview of the current 
development of the anti-money laundering framework, given that anti- 
money laundering provisions are increasingly included as an essential 
element in recent international criminal conventions such as the UN 
Convention against Transnational Organized Crime(the Palermo 
Convention), 181 and the UN Convention against Corruption. 182 
exchange of information concerning international movements of such funds". 
"8 See also, Johnson, C. M., "Introductory Note to the International Convention for the 
Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism", (2000) International Legal Materials, vol. 39, p. 268. 
179 UN, A/RES/53/108,26 January 1998, para. 12. 
180 UN, A/RES/54/109,9 December 1999. 
By resolution 53/111 of 9 December 1998, the General Assembly established an ad hoc 
committee open to all States to elaborate the international convention against transnational 
organised crime and three additional international legal protocols. The first session of the ad 
hoc committee took place in Vienna, Austria, from 19-29 January 1999 and the draft 
convention was later adopted by the General Assembly at its Millennium meeting in 
November 2000. It was opened for signature at a high-level conference in Palermo, Italy and 
thereby it is called "the Palermo Convention" (visited on 25 November 
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b. Nature and scope 
Given its nature as a multilateral treaty, the ICSFT is legally 
binding on all state parties. However, it should also be admitted that there 
exist some limitations in enforcing the countermeasures of the ICSFT. For 
example, some of its articles are not drafted in mandatory terms and certain 
provisions are not detailed enough to expect any substantial change of 
attitude in state parties. 183 Nonetheless, with its binding nature the ICSFT for 
the first time promotes the harmonisation of national legislation and 
provides the minimum basis for police and judicial cooperation in the 
specific area of countering terrorist financing. 
The scope of application of this instrument can be viewed from a 
couple of perspectives. Firstly, Article 3 of the ICSFT limits the scope of its 
application to terrorist financing involving elements from more than one 
country; i. e., it does not apply to cases that lack an international aspect. '' 
This limitation appears to reflect the influence of precedent anti-terrorism 
conventions including the International Convention for the Suppression of 
2003)<http: //www. unodc. org/adhoc/palermo/theconvention. html>. 
182 In its resolution 55/61 of 4 December 2000, the General Assembly established an ad hoc 
committee which drafted the text of the United Nations Convention against Corruption 
through seven sessions, held between 21 January 2002 and 1 October 2003. The Convention 
was adopted by the General Assembly with resolution 58/4 of 31 October 2003. A high-level 
political conference was held by the government of Mexico in Merida for its signing in 
December 2003 (visited on 29 December 
2004)<http: //www. unodc. org/unodc/en/crime_convention - corruption. 
html>. 
183 For example, the lifting of the bank secrecy rule is not compulsory in Article 12(2). 
Moreover, the provisions on confiscation and mutual legal assistance lack a detailed content 
as illustrated by Articles 8 and 12. 
184 U. S. Senate, International Convention for Suppression of Financing Terrorism: Message from the 
President of the United States, 106t'' Congress, 2"d Session, Treaty Doc. 106049, Washington: 
U. S. Government Printing Office, 2000, p. VIII. 
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Terrorist Bombings(1997). 185 Secondly, Article 2 of the ICSFT excludes 
"legitimate military activities during an armed conflict" from the scope of its 
application. It results from the understanding that the activities of armed 
forces against lawful targets should be dealt with by international 
humanitarian law rather than in a counter-terrorism context. " This is also 
apparently following the position of the 1997 convention on terrorist 
bombings. 187 This issue will be revisited in more detail in the following 
section. Thirdly, the ICSFT cannot be applied beyond the limitation of public 
international law such as doctrines of sovereign equality and the territorial 
integrity of states, and that of non-intervention in the domestic affairs of 
others. 188 These are common safeguard provisions which can be found in 
most international criminal conventions. 189 
c. Public sector 
Definition of terrorism 
Logically, the international strategy to combat the financing of 
terrorism has to begin with the defining of terrorism. Without defining 
'8s Article 3. See further the 1970 Convention Against the Taking of Hostages, Article 13; the 
1971 Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of Civil Aviation, 
Article 4(4); the 1980 Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material, Article 2; 
the 1988 Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of Maritime 
Navigation, Article 4. 
186 Article 2(2); Aust, A., "Counter-Terrorism- A New Approach: The International 
Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism", (2001) Max Planck Institute 
UNYB, vol. 5, p. 14; U. S. Senate, supra note 184, p. VII. 
18' Article 19(2); Perera, A. R., "Reviewing the UN Conventions on Terrorism: Towards a 
Comprehensive Terrorism Convention", in Fijnaut, C., & Wouters, J. & Naert, F., eds., supra 
note 21, pp. 573-576. 
188 Articles 20 and 22. 
189 Similar provisions can be found in Article 2(3) of the Vienna Convention (see, Gilmore, 
W. C., Combating International Drugs Trafficking, supra note 40, p. 3) and in most anti-terrorism 
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terrorism, it is clear that the financing of terrorism can neither be defined nor 
be criminalised. However, as explained above, the international community 
could not make progress on this issue until the late 1990s due to the divided 
positions among states. Instead it responded to the increasing threats of 
terrorism by criminalising certain types of terrorist acts. 19o 
Under these deadlock circumstances, the achievements of the 
ICSFT in drafting a definition of terrorism for the purpose of the Convention 
is highly commendable, although the definition is not entirely 
comprehensive in its formulation. To the surprise of the international 
community, it was a critical success made with unexpected ease. 19' In this 
regard, the text of Article 2(1) is of particular significance: 
Article 2. 
1. Any person commits an offence within the meaning of this Convention if that 
person by any means, directly or indirectly, unlawfully and wilfully, provides 
or collects funds with the intention that they should be used or in the 
knowledge that they are to be used, in full or in part, in order to carry out: 
(a) An act which constitutes an offence within the scope of and as defined in one 
of the treaties listed in the annex; or 
(b) Any other act intended to cause death or serious bodily injury to a civilian, 
or to any other person not taking an active part in the hostilities in a situation of 
armed conflict, when the purpose of such act, by its nature or context, is to 
intimidate a population, or to compel a government or an international 
organization to do or to abstain from doing any act. 
The ICSFT thus adopts a two-fold approach: a listing of offences 
and a mini-definition. "' The first approach is to list anti-terrorism 
conventions including the 1997 convention on terrorist bombings(Articles 
17 and 18). 
190 See, Section 11.1 . of this chapter. 
191 Gilmore, W. C., supra note 34, p. 72. 
192 Aust, A., supra note 186, p. 7. 
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conventions which deal with specific acts of terrorism such as hijacking and 
hostage-taking, allowing the acts prohibited by each convention to be 
considered as acts of terrorism. 193 On the other hand, the second approach to 
make a mini-definition initially did not seem to be a good option since it 
could "reopen the dormant debate" since the 1970s on what terrorism is. 194 
However, to the astonishment of the participants in the negotiation process, 
this mini-definition for the purpose of this convention was approved and 
included in the main text without too much difficulty. 195 The mini-definition 
has several policy implications of significance. To facilitate understanding, 
two qualifiers are of note: "active" and "armed conflict". First, if a person is 
applicable to both qualifiers which means he takes an active part in armed 
conflicts, the attack on that person does not constitute an offence within the 
meaning of the ICSFT. In other words, the ICSFT excludes from the definition 
of terrorism "legitimate military activities during armed conflicts"' . 
'9' 
Importantly, it should be recalled that international humanitarian law is 
already in existence for this case. This law controls the conduct of hostilities 
during armed conflict and protects the victims of the war. 197 Second, let us 
193 At present, nine conventions are listed in the annex, but new treaties could be added in 
accordance with Article 23, taking into account the development of treaty law in the field of 
counter-terrorism. This listing approach is quite similar to that adopted in the European 
Convention on the Suppression of Terrorism(1977) and its amending Protocol(2003)(Aust, A., 
supra note 186, p. 7). 
194 Ibid., p. 8. 
'95 Ibid., pp. 7-15. 
19' This is a simpler form of the so-called "military carved-out" (Ibid., p. 14). 
197 See, Perera, A. R., supra note 187, p. 576. International humanitarian law has developed 
from two sources: the law of Geneva and the law of The Hague. The law of Geneva is to 
protect the victims of the war, while the law of The Hague is to control the conduct of 
hostilities during armed conflict (Bugnion, F., "Droit de Geneva et droit de la Haye", 
International Review of the Red Cross, no. 844, p. 901, abstract)(visited on 4 January 2005) 
<http: //www. icrc. org/Web/Eng/siteengO. nsf/html/57JRLQ? OpenDocument>. 
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consider the situation where a person is connected with only one qualifier. 
For the persons who do not take any active part in hostilities during armed 
conflicts, the assault on them constitutes terrorism. The attack on off-duty 
military personnel is a case in point. 198 In particular, the U. S. government 
intended this phrase to encompass the attacks on off-duty military personnel, 
as in the cases of the 1996 Al Khobar Towers bombings in Dhahran, Saudi 
Arabia, and the 1983 Beirut barracks bombings. 199 Furthermore, it can be 
inferred from this reasoning that military personnel should be protected in 
peacetime, given that even during armed conflict, the persons who do not 
take an active part in the hostilities need to be protected. However, with 
regard to the situation where there is no awned conflict, further discussion is 
pointless since without an armed conflict, no part can be taken in it. 
Another point of note is that the ICSFT evades the issue of 
national liberation movement, while retaining the mini-definition of 
terrorism as a whole. This aspect is of significance, given that the strong 
obstacle to the universal definition of terrorism mainly derives from the 
Third World's insistence to include an exceptional provision on the principle 
of self-determination and national liberation movements. For instance, the 
Convention of the Organisation of the Islamic Conference on Combating 
International Terrorism(1999) provides for a definition of terrorism200 which 
'98 UN, "Measures to eliminate international terrorism", Report of the Working Group, 
A/C. 6/54/L. 2,26 October 1999, pp. 61-63. 
`9 U. S. Senate, supra note 184, p. VII. 
20° The OIC defines terrorism in a superficial way, for example making no specific reference 
to the type of affected persons. In Article 1(2), terrorism means: 
"any act of violence or threat thereof notwithstanding its motives or intentions perpetrated 
to carry out an individual or collective criminal plan with the aim of terrorizing people or 
threatening to harm them or imperiling their lives, honour, freedoms, security or rights or 
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is immediately followed by a provision on the exception of national 
liberation movements in the next article. 20' Given this attitude of the OIC 
convention whose drafting almost synchronised with the drafting period of 
the ICSFT, the absence of an exceptional provision of this kind apparently 
constitutes progress. Yet, given the controversial nature of "armed conflict" 
which might be interpreted to include national liberation movements, there 
still remains a possibility of legal dispute when the ICSFT is applied to a real 
case. 202 
Criminalisation of terrorist financing 
In the negotiation process it was argued that the offence of 
terrorist financing could be punished with the provisions on accomplices in 
existing anti-terrorism conventions without making it an independent 
offence. 2113 This skepticism is quite similar to that raised in relation to the 
exposing the environment or any facility or public or private property to hazards or 
occupying or seizing them, or endangering a national resource, or international facilities, or 
threatening the stability, territorial integrity, political unity or sovereignty of independent 
States. " 
201 Article 2(a) of the OIC Convention on combating international terrorism stipulates that: 
"People's struggle including armed struggle against foreign occupation, aggression, 
colonialism, and hegemony, aimed at liberation and self-determination in accordance with 
the principles of international law shall not be considered a terrorist crime". 
202 UN, "Report of the Ad Hoc Committee established by General Assembly resolution 
51/210 of 17 December 1996", A/54/37,5 May 1999, p. 64. Due to this ambiguity, for example, 
the U. S. government included upon ratification an understanding that the term "armed 
conflict" does not include internal disturbances and tensions, such as riots, isolated and 
sporadic acts of violence and other acts of a similar nature. See, U. S. Senate, supra note 184, 
p. VIII. Basically, "armed conflict" is classified into two categories: international armed 
conflict and non-international conflict. However, in practice, it is not so easy to make a clear- 
cut distinction. For the types of armed conflicts and relevant applicable rules of 
international 
humanitarian law, see, Wouters, J. & Naert, F., "Shockwaves through International Law after 
11 September: Finding the Right Responses to the Challenges of International Terrorism", in 
Fijnaut, C. & Wouters, J. & Naert, F., eds., supra note 21, pp. 476-477. 
203 Aust, A., supra note 186, p. 4. 
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criminalisation of money laundering. Yet, the criminalisation of terrorist 
financing is necessary for the following reasons. 
Firstly, attention should be paid to the problems deriving from 
the likely absence of a principal offence, i. e., the terrorist act itself. This 
situation is similar to the background where the criminalisation of money 
laundering was required. 204 In other words, when the principal offence is 
hardly traceable, it is the offence of money laundering that helps law 
enforcement agencies to tackle the suspicious assets either in the hands of a 
frontman or the real owner. However, the need for "criminalisation" is far 
greater with terrorist financing since the principal offence of terrorist 
financing in most cases does not take place or is not yet attempted, while 
money laundering cases are at least premised on the existence of a predicate 
offence. 205 In particular, it should be noted that in most jurisdictions, ancillary 
offences such as the acts of aiding and abetting only occur when the principal 
act is committed or at least attempted. 20' Under this constraint, without 
establishing the actual guilt for the principal terrorist offence, it would be 
nearly impossible to punish the act of financing of terrorism separately. 
Likewise, with regard to a conspiracy offence, it should be remembered that 
the financing of terrorism could be committed by one person acting alone, a 
situation that a theory of conspiracy cannot cover. 207 
Secondly, terrorist financing can be considered to constitute a 
Z`4 See, Section III. 1. b. of this chapter. 
205 Terrorist money is generally used for the preparation of terrorist acts at some future 
date(Aust, A., supra note 186, p. 13). 
206 IMF, Suppressing the Financing of Terrorism, 2003, p. 50. 
207 Ibid., p. 51. 
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separate primary harm rather than an ancillary harm. To this end, the 
concept of harm needs to be approached from a different perspective by way 
of two standards: endurance and size. The conventional harm of terrorism 
can be characterised as sporadic and local. However, reliable financing 
changes the nature of this conventional harm, making it continuous and 
broader. Reliable financing breathes everlasting life into the sporadic harm, 
and expands the scope of its influence across vast areas and diverse people. 
For instance, in Chapter One, it was indicated that reliable financing enabled 
the FARC to continuously recruit new members and supply itself with 
adequate weaponry. Similarly, Al-Qaida was capable of launching its 
operations anywhere in the world utilising its global network based on its 
solid financial infrastructure. In addition, although relatively minor, the logic 
for condemning money laundering can be similarly cited with regard to 
terrorism-related money laundering, for example such as the undermining of 
the integrity of the financial industry or the legitimate economy. 20' 
In this context, the explicit criminalisation of the financing of 
terrorism in the ICSFT constitutes a major accomplishment. 209 Eventually the 
financing of terrorism can be dealt with as an independent offence rather 
than just an ancillary offence. As noted in Chapter One, the financing of 
terrorism is comprised of both money-making activities (criminal enterprises, 
legitimate businesses, donations) and distribution activities(terrorism-related 
money laundering), and the wording "provides or collects" in Article 2(1) of 
20. See, Section III. 1. b. of this chapter. For a case study of the BCCI in the context of terrorist 
financing, see, Ridley, N., "Law Enforcement" in Clark, A. & Burrell, 
P., eds., A Practitioner's 
Guide to International Money Laundering Law and Regulation, 15` edn., 2003. pp. 46-47. 
209 Article 2(1). 
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the ICSFT seems broad enough in scope to cover both aspects. 21' Interestingly, 
although the ICSFT does not make explicit reference to "money laundering", 
Article 18 provides for the detailed measures to prevent terrorism-related 
money laundering in the private sector. 21' Similarly, both the 2000 Palermo 
Convention and the 2003 Convention against Corruption provide for the 
employment of the AML framework in the private sector but their texts 
further includes express criminalisation of money laundering. "' 
Confiscation 
The ICSFT provides for confiscation in Article 8, and it is worded 
as follows: 
1. Each State Party shall take appropriate measures, in accordance with its 
domestic legal principles, for the identification, detection and freezing or 
seizure of any funds used or allocated for the purpose of committing the 
offence set forth in article 2 as well as the proceeds derived from such offence, 
for purposes of possible forfeiture. 
2. Each State Party shall take appropriate measures, in accordance with its 
domestic legal principles, for the forfeiture of funds used or allocated for the 
purpose of committing the offences set forth in article 2 and the proceeds 
derived from such offences. 
Firstly, it is of note that there is no specification of the types of 
21° In the original French proposal, the word "financing" was used. The definition of 
"financing" included the concepts of both money-making activities and money distributing 
activities. However, during the negotiation process, the terminology was replaced 
by the 
current phrase "provides or collects". Nonetheless, considering the positions of national 
delegations, it seems clear that the basic concept of the French proposal 
has remained. See, 
UN, "Letter dated 3 November 1998 from the Permanent Representative of France to the 
United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General", A/C. 6/53/9,4 
November 1998, Article 1 
at p. 3; UN Doc. A/54/37, supra note 202, p. 26,57; UN 
Doc., A/C. 6/54/L. 2, supra note 198, 
p. 37,41, pp. 57-58. 
211 However, in the past, attempts were already made to link the AML regime with 
terrorism 
by way of including terrorism in money laundering predicate offences. 
See, supra note 60. 
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confiscation in the ICSFT which individual states should or may adopt. 
Nonetheless, the ICSFT would definitely include criminal confiscation, given 
that its confiscation regime is tied to the offences as set forth in the 
convention. Yet, the decision of an appropriate model is still entirely at the 
discretion of each state as indicated by the phrase "in accordance with its 
domestic legal principles". The ICSFT is giving a general mandate, simply 
obliging each state to enact relevant legislation without further elaboration. 
However, by way of comparison, the 2000 Palermo Convention and the 2003 
Convention against Corruption give a detailed treatment to the issue which 
is quite similar in content to that of the Vienna Convention. 213 These 
conventions not only allow for five models of confiscation(object and value 
confiscation, confiscation of instrumentalities and proceeds, and criminal 
confiscation) but further introduce the concept of the reversed burden of 
proof. 214 In this regard, it leaves much to be desired in the approach of the 
ICSFT to this issue which is one of the most essential elments in fighting 
terrorist financing. 
Secondly, other issues related to confiscation need to be 
considered. These are provisional measures, lifting of the bank secrecy rule, 
the protection of the rights of a third party, and compensation 
for victims of 
the offence. In respect of provisional measures, the ICSFT adopts a common 
212 The Palermo Convention, Article 6; the Convention against Corruption, Articles 
14 and 23. 
213 In fact, the more detailed an international instrument is, the more 
harmonised domestic 
legal systems are. For a discussion on this harmonisation effect of a 
detailed mandate, See, 
e. g., Keyser-Rignalda, F., European Integration with regard 
to the Confiscation of the 
Proceeds of Crime", (1992) European Law Review, vol. 
17, pp. 502-505. 
21' The Vienna Convention, Article 5; the Palermo Convention, Article 
12; the Convention 
against Corruption, Article 31. 
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provision such as "freezing and seizing" as with other conventions 
mentioned in comparison in this study. With regard to the lifting of the bank 
secrecy rule, however, the ICSFT takes a lukewarm position by referring to 
the lifting of the bank secrecy rule in a non-mandatory term and only in 
connection with international cooperation. 215 In contrast, to say nothing of the 
Vienna Convention, both the 2000 Palermo convention and the 2003 
Convention against Corruption impose a binding obligation on all states to 
lift the bank secrecy rule for both domestic and international purposes. 21' In a 
broad and long-term context of fighting terrorist financing, this lack of 
binding force seems to be problematic, undermining the essential legal 
infrastructure. In relation to the rights of bona fide third parties, the ICSFT 
provides in Article 8(5) that "the provisions of this article shall be 
implemented without prejudice to the rights of third parties acting in good 
faith", which is a reflection of the Vienna Convention. 2' Considering the 
devastating effects of confiscation on bona fide third parties, each state needs 
to ensure that effective legal remedies are available in order for interested 
parties to preserve their rights as indicated by the 1990 Council of Europe 
Convention. 21' Lastly, the provision on the rights of victims which is absent 
in the Vienna Convention constitutes progress made by the ICSFT. Article 
8(4) requires states to consider the establishment of a mechanism 
to 
Z's Article 12, para. 2. 
216 The Vienna Convention mentions the bank secrecy rule two times in Article 
5(3)(confiscation), and Article 7(5)(mutual legal assistance); the Palermo 
Convention also 
mentions this rule twice in Article 12(6) (confiscation), and 
Article 18(8)(mutual legal 
assistance); the Convention Against Corruption similarly 
deals with this rule twice in Article 
31(7) (confiscation) and Article 46(8)(mutual legal assistance). 
Z1' The Vienna Convention, Article 5, para. 8. 
21' The 1990 Council of European Convention, Article 5. 
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compensate victims of terrorist offences. However, no clarity is provided as 
to the manner in which this mechanism might operate. Similar provisions 
can also be found in the Palermo Convention219 and the Convention against 
Corruption. 22° 
General part of criminal law 
Now let us review some issues relating to what might be termed 
the general part of criminal law. Of particular significance for present 
purposes is the approach taken to state of mind, inchoate offences and 
complicity, and corporate criminal liability. 
Firstly, the issue of state of mind(mens rea) needs to be analysed in 
connection with the definition of terrorism and the financing of terrorism 
respectively. To begin with, for terrorism itself, the ICSFT adopts the 
standard of intent as a requirement to constitute terrorism as it is clear in the 
phrase "any other acts intended to cause death or serious bodily harm" of 
Article 2(b). Also in respect of terrorist financing, Article 1 requires the 
standard of intent (or alternatively knowledge) to make up terrorist 
financing offences by way of inserting of the phrase "with the intention that 
they should be used or in the knowledge that they are to be used". " 
Furthermore, another relevant issue of note is how to prove the intent or 
knowledge of perpetrators. With regard to this "test" of state of mind, the 
2'9 The Palermo Convention, Article 14(2). 
22° Article 35. Interestingly, the Convention against Corruption further guarantees victims 
the right to initiate legal proceedings against those involved in corruption. 
221 In effect, the phrase "wilfully" is another indicator of this intent standard, 
however, it 
seems to be redundant, given the following phrase which explicitly 
includes both intent and 
knowledge(Aust, A., supra note 186, p. 11). 
()4 
ICSFT indirectly follows the precedent of the Vienna Convention, which, as 
noted earlier, adopts the position that the subjective elements like intent, or 
knowledge may be inferred from objective factual circumstances. 222 In Article 
2(b), the ICSFT implicitly adopts this position by inserting the phrase "by its 
nature and context" in the definition of terrorism. Considering that during 
the negotiation process the drafters adhered to the phrase "by its nature and 
context" with a view to including an "objective factual circumstance 
standard" within the text of the ICSFT, it can be understood that this 
standard is also applicable to terrorist financing offence indirectly. " By 
comparison, both the 2000 Palermo Convention and the 2003 Convention 
against Corruption expressly include the "objective factual circumstance 
standard". " 
Secondly, given that concepts of incomplete offences and 
complicity are highly controversial and subject to different interpretations 
under various legal systems, the ICSFT adopted a safer approach by copying 
a corresponding provision from the 1997 convention on terrorist bombings. " 
Article 2(4) provides for attempts; paragraph 5(a) deals with accomplices; 
222 This is a statement of the obvious simply because people cannot read other people's mind 
(Verbruggen, F., "On Containing Organised Crime Using "Container Offences": Some 
Reflections on Substantive Criminal Law Issues", in Albrecht, H. J. & Fijnaut, C., eds., The 
Containment of Transnational Organised Crime: Comments on the UN Convention of December 
2000,2002, p. 124). Furthermore, the 1990 Recommendation 6 and 1996 Recommendation 5 
contain a similar provision. 
223 Initially a proposal was made during the negotiation that this phrase be deleted, however, 
opposition was raised in that it would suggest the offence require proof of the perpetrator's 
subjective state of mind (UN Doc., A/C. 6/54/L. 2, supra note 198, p. 62). 
224 The Palermo Convention, Article 6(2)(f); the Convention against Corruption, Article 28. 
225 UN, "Report of the Ad Hoc Committee established by General Assembly resolution 
51/210 of 17 December 1996", A/52/37,31 March 1997, p. 51; Aust, A., supra note 186, p. 16. In 
fact, it is very difficult to find any consistent formulation on these subjects in the multilateral 
treaty practice so far. For further details, see, Clark, R. S., supra note 19, pp. 78-81. 
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paragraph 5(b) addresses organising and directing others to commit the 
offence; and, paragraph 5(c) concerns conspiracies. Indeed, the difficulty in 
drafting a universal formulation on these subjects did not seem to be met 
only by the drafters of the IOSFT. The drafters of the 1998 Rome Statute of the 
International Criminal Court already ran into this situation of considerable 
difficulty and likewise benefited greatly from a formulation of the 1997 
convention against terrorist bombings. 226 In other words, the wording of 
paragraph 5(c) of the ICSFT which is concerned with conspiracy (a concept 
strongly advocated by common law countries but unknown in some civil law 
systems) already found its place in Article 25(3)(d) of the Rome Statute. 227 
Thirdly, the concept of corporate liability in Article 5 needs to be 
noted. In a similar context to money laundering, corporate criminal liability 
would be useful in dealing with, for example, the front charities for terrorist 
groups or securing the compliance of the private sector in terms of 
responsibilisation strategy. However, given the diverse national legal cultures 
in relation to this issue, it is provided that corporate liability may not 
necessarily be criminal but could also be civil or administrative in nature. 
This is a unique provision for an anti-terrorism convention... but a similar 
approach can be frequently found in other recent international instruments 
containing anti-money laundering provisions such as the 2000 Palermo 
22. Saland, P. "International Criminal Law Principles", in Lee, R. S. ed., The International 
Criminal Court: The Making of the Rome Statute: Issues, Negotiations, Results, 1999, pp. 198-200. 
227 In the common law system, a conspiracy is committed once two or more persons agree to 
commit a crime, whether or not the crime itself is committed. In contrast, under continental 
systems inspired from the Napoleonic tradition, conspiracy is generally viewed as a form of 
complicity or participation in an actual crime or attempt (Schabas, W. A., An Introduction to 
the International Criminal Court, 2001, pp. 82-83). 
228 Aust, A., supra note 186, p. 17. 
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Convention, 229 the 2003 Convention against Corruption, '3° and the FATF 
Forty Recommendations. 231 
d. Private sector 
This part of the ICSFT has been strongly influenced by the FATF 
Forty Recommendations, although this is not specifically acknowledged as 
with the 2000 Palermo Convention and the 2003 Convention against 
Corruption. 232 In Article 18, the ICSFT stipulates: 
1. State Parties shall cooperate in the prevention of the offence...... by taking all 
practicable measures...... including: 
(b) Measures requiring financial institutions and other professions involved in 
financial transactions to utilize the most efficient measures available for the 
identification of their usual or occasional customers, as well as customers in 
whose interest accounts are opened, and to pay special attention to unusual or 
suspicious transactions and report transactions suspected of stemming from a 
criminal activity. For this purpose, State Parties shall consider: 
(i) Adopting regulations prohibiting the opening of accounts the holders or 
beneficiaries of which are unidentified or unidentifiable, and measures to 
ensure that such institutions verify the identity of the real owners of such 
transactions; 
(iv) Requiring financial institutions to maintain, for at least five years, all 
necessary records on transactions, both domestic or international. 
3. State Parties shall further cooperate in the prevention of offences...... by 
considering: 
(a) Measures for the supervision, including, for example, the licensing, or all 
money-transmission agencies; 
(b) Feasible Measures to detect or monitor the physical cross-border 
229 Article 10. 
23° Article 26. 
2-31 The 1990 Recommendation 7; The 1996 FATF Recommedation 6. In some sense, the FATF 
is more aggressive since it only mentioned corporate criminal liability, unlike 
the ICSFT. 
232 Gilmore, W. C. supra note 34, p. 73. See the Palermo Convention, Article 7; the 
Convention 
against Corruption, Articles 23 and 52. 
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transportation of cash and bearer negotiable instruments, subject to strict 
safeguards to ensure proper use of information and without impeding in any, 
way the freedom of capital movements. 
The scope of the affected industry 
To begin with, the scope of affected industry by the 
responsibilisation strategy needs to be considered. 3 In paragraph 1(b), the 
ICSFT imposes the responsibility for proactive crime control on both 
financial institutions and "other professions" involved in financial 
transactions. ` Thus, the ICSFT covers a far wider area than other anti- 
money laundering regimes envisaged in recent legal texts. Both the 2000 
Palermo Convention and the 2003 Convention against Corruption confine the 
scope of affected industry only to bank and non-bank financial institutions, 
namely "financial institutions of any kind", and do not extend its anti-money 
laundering regime to non-financial institutions. 
In addition, like the anti-money laundering framework as seen 
above, an individual is included in the responsibilisation regime by 
paragraph 3(b). This insertion was suggested by the German delegation 
based on their experience in the counter-terrorist financing area. 5 The 2000 
Palermo Convention236 and the 2003 Convention against Corruption237 follow 
Stilt. 
233 For relevant discussions, see, Section III. I. c. of this chapter. 
234 However, the approach of the ICSFT adopted leaves something to be desired in that these 
professions are not specified. The enumeration of "other professions" has eventually been 
made in the 2003 Forty Recommendations. 
235 UN Doc., A/54/37, supra note 202, p. 40. 
236 Article 7(2). 
237 Article 14(2). 
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The content of responsibility 
For the contents of responsibility, the ICSFT provides for the three 
basic measures: customer identification, record keeping, and reporting of 
suspicious transactions. 
Firstly, the detailed treatment of the ICSFT to the measure of 
customer identification is worthy of note. The convention provides for the 
procedures and standards of customer identification over three sub- 
paragraphs, the text of which is very similar to that of the FATF Forty 
Recommendations. 238 In contrast, the 2000 Palermo Convention simply 
mentions customer identification as one of the requirements with no 
additional explanation. 239 This distinction in treatment becomes much clearer 
and more meaningful, considering that the Palermo Convention is more 
detailed than the ICSFT in most other aspects. Perhaps given that some 
terrorist money might be derived from legitimate sources and its amount 
might also be trivial unlike typical criminal proceeds, the improved 
identification of customers might be a major way of developing suspicion in 
most cases. 24° The added weight given to the customer identification issue 
within the ICSFT is in this regard beneficial to relevant authorities. 
Secondly, with regard to the record keeping obligation, the ICSFT 
similarly borrowed the text of the FATF Recommendations. 241 However, in 
some sense it could be argued that the ICSFT follows the wording of the 
238 The 1996 FATF Recommendation 10 and 11. 
239 The Palermo Convention, Ariticle 7(1). The level of the touch of the 2003 Convention 
against Corruption in Article 52(1) falls between those of the ICSFT and the 2000 Palermo 
Convention. 
240 See, the discussion in Section III. 2. b. of Chapter One of this study. 
241 See, the 1996 FATF Recommendation 12. 
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FATF too faithfully. It should be noted that under the initial French text, both 
financial institutions and other professions were obligated to keep records on 
necessary documents. 242 However, during the negotiation process, attempts 
were made to clarify this phrase and the text from the FATF 
Recommendations replaced the original phrase, thus resulting in the 
omission of other professions from the regime of record-keeping obligations. 243 
In other words, the 1996 FATF text imposed a recording obligation only on 
financial institutions and the ICSFT borrowed the phrase of this 1996 text as 
it was, thus leaving out other professions from the reporting regime. This 
formulation of paragraph 1(b)(iv) seems be an error undermining 
consistency within the whole article, unless the drafters left out other 
professions on purpose. 
Thirdly, in respect of the reporting obligation, the ICSFT adopts 
the suspicion-based reporting model. In fact, the choice of the ICSFT is not so 
different from the main international trend. " However, it should be noted 
that in some instruments such as FATF Forty Recommendations the choice of 
adding the threshold based reporting model is open as well. 
245 As argued 
earlier, the optimal mixture of both models might possibly create in practice 
more effective methods. Another point of note is that the ICSFT covers only a 
subjective test of suspicion by requiring financial institutions to report 
242 UN, "Letter dated 3 November 1998 from the Permanent Representative of France to the 
United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General", A/C. 6/53/9,4 
November 1998, Article 
17. 
243 UN Doc., A/54/37, supra note 202, p. 44, p. 63. 
244 See, e. g., the 1996 FATF Recommendations 14 and 
15; the Palermo Convention, Article 
7(1)(a); the 1991 European Communities Directive, Article 6. 
245 The 1996 FATF Recommendation 23. 
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transactions "suspected of" stemming from criminal activities. In contrast, an 
objective test of suspicion means that financial institutions should report 
when they "have reasonable grounds to suspect". Z" Other conventions such 
as the 2000 Palermo Convention and the 2003 Convention against Corruption 
are not distinct from the approach of the ICSFT while the 2003 FATF 
Recommendations eventually adopts the objective test of suspicion as well. "' 
Also, the two rules in connection with the reporting obligation should be 
reviewed. These are the "safe harbour" provision to protect the private sector 
from the possible liability for breach of any restriction on disclosure of 
information, and the "no-tipping off" rule to secure the success of police 
investigation, should be reviewed. The ICSFT includes only the "safe 
harbour" provision but this partial treatment seems better than no treatment 
in that the 2000 Palermo Convention and the 2003 Convention against 
Corruption do not provide for any of these rules. 
Last but not least, some flaws in the ICSFT mechanism for the 
responsibilisation strategy need to be indicated. The head text of paragraph 1 
of Article 18 is worded in mandatory terms. Although at first glance there 
seems to be some neutralising words such as "cooperate", the whole sentence 
imposes a binding obligation if it is read together with the following phrase 
"by taking all practicable measures". Indeed, this binding effect is once again 
confirmed by way of comparison with the non-binding wording of 
paragraph 2 within the same article which 
drafts a provision in a similar way 
z.. FATF, "Review of the FATF Forty Recommendations: 
Consultation Paper", 30 May 2002, 
p. 43. 
247 The 2003 Recommendation 13. 
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but employing a different and non-mandatory verb "consider". 248 In this 
regard, it should be pointed out that unlike the binding requirement of 
customer identification, record keeping is dealt with on an optional basis. 249 If 
this inconsistency in the degree of binding power is taken together with the 
optional requirement of the lifting of the bank secrecy rule, it might cause 
serious problems in the operational mechanism of the ICSFT as will be 
indicated below. For instance, given that the lifting of bank secrecy rule is not 
obligatory under the ICSFT regime, 25° domestic authorities might not get 
access to the data on the identity of suspicious customers if a bank refuses to 
cooperate on the ground of the bank secrecy rule. This logical flaw of the 
ICSFT is illustrated as follows: 
Data should be created through customer identification-, Data may be kept for a 
certain period within financial institutions - Authorities may be able to 
demand the data from the financial institutions 
Indeed, it is apparent in the flow that the success of the next step 
is totally dependent upon the success of the former step. If data does not 
exist, it is not kept. Furthermore, although the data could be available, if 
relevant authorities could not get access to the data, the former two steps 
would be really meaningless. So to speak, there is no reason to make the first 
step obligatory, since the data on customer identification secured through the 
2.8 The ICSFT, Article 18, para. 2 which provides: 
"2. State Parties shall further cooperate in the prevention of offences... 
by considering 
measures... " 
249 It should be reminded, however, that an attempt was made 
during the negotiation process 
to render the provision mandatory by the delegation of the 
Netherlands but did not get 
public support. See, UN Doc., A/54/37, supra note 202, p. 
62. 
250 For a relevant discussion, see, Section III. 1. c. of this chapter. 
Particularly, see, supra note 
215 and its related text. 
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first step might be shredded anyway, or be inaccessible. 
Monitoring and controlling the work of the private sector 
In addition to these mentioned above, there are other necessary 
elements in building a successful strategy to combat money laundering and 
terrorist financing in the private sector. What is noteworthy among those are 
"internal control and training" and "supervision". 251 As said before, since the 
successful prevention of terrorist financing in the private sector is dependent 
on the proactive cooperation of the private sector, the need of the two 
elements is higher than ever before. However, the ICSFT is silent about them 
as are the 2000 Palermo Convention and the 2003 Convention against 
Corruption. 
In respect of supervision, the ICSFT does not make a general 
statement but focuses on the "licensing aspect" of all money-transmission 
agencies. 252 The emphasis on the licensing efforts derived from the concern 
about hawala, an informal value transfer system, to which attention was 
increasingly given in the context of clarifying terrorist financing mechanism 
in the late 1990s. This is when the ICSFT was being drafted. 
253 Interestingly 
and in contrast, the 2003 Convention against Corruption specifically focuses 
on the use of shell banks in the context of supervision. ' The tendency to 
focus on a specific technique among such various typologies illustrates what 
is the drafters' major concern in their area of responsibility. 
251 For a relevant discussion, see Section III. 1. c. of this chapter. Especially, see supra note 130, 
131,132 and their related text. 
252 Article 18(2)(a). 
253 UN Doc., 54/37, supra note 202, p-40- 
254 Article 52(4). 
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e. A bridging mechanism 
As explained above, despite the significance of the FlU, most 
instruments were silent on this issue prior to 9/11.25' For the ICSFT, its 
emphasis on the exchange of information is evident across several articles. 
Article 12(4) recommends countries to establish mechanisms to share 
information or evidence with other countries, and Article 18(3) requires 
countries to cooperate in exchanging information and to establish 
communication channels. Yet, this requirement is not detailed enough to 
conceive an FIU-style body in any respect. Alternatively, countries may 
exchange information through the Interpol. 256 In contrast to this, both the 
2000 Palermo Convention and the 2003 Convention against Corruption make 
a quantum leap by explicitly urging countries to establish an FlU to serve as 
a national centre for the collection, analysis and dissemination of information 
regarding potential money laundering. 25' 
In the context of a bridging function, additional points of note are 
with regard to the matters concerning the "smooth flow of information". 
These are the lifting of the bank secrecy rule and the principles of 
confidentiality and specialty. To begin with, as indicated in connection with 
the discussion of confiscation, the lifting of the bank secrecy rule is not 
obligatory in the ICSFT. To make matters worse, it is mentioned only 
regarding international cooperation. 258 Given that most recent global 
conventions such as the Vienna Convention, the 2000 
Palermo Convention 
255 This issue was directly dealt with only when the FATF issued a revised 
Forty 
Recommendations in 2003. See, the 2003 Recommendation 26. 
256 Article 18(4). 
25' The Palermo Convention, Article 7(1)(b); the Convention against 
Corruption, 14(1)(b). 
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and the 2003 Convention against Corruption render the lifting of the bank 
secrecy rule obligatory in both local and international cooperation, the stance 
of the ICSFT appears somewhat retrogressive.? Furthermore, with regard to 
the two principles, the ICSFT mentions only the principle of specialty in 
Article 12(mutual assistance) in binding terms. By comparison, the 2000 
Palermo Convention and the 2003 Convention against Corruption provides 
for both principles with regard to mutual assistance. 260 
f. International cooperation 
It should be pointed out that the main purpose of international 
cooperation in the field of the suppression of the financing of terrorism is to 
confiscate the terrorists' monies and their financial resources, thus 
undermining their capability of sustaining a terrorist campaign. With a 
specific emphasis on this aspect in mind, let us proceed to the following 
issues. 
Firstly, with regard to the basis for jurisdiction, the ICSFT adopts 
the standard approach of other anti-terrorism conventions. This means that 
the ICSFT provides for the mandatory application of both the territorial 
principle and the active personality principle. 261 Given that the use of the 
active personality principle differs considerably between common law and 
Z5$ Article 12(2). 
259 See, supra note 215. 
26° The Palermo Convention, Article 18(19) and (20); the Convention against Corruption, 
Article 46(19) and (20). 
26' The ICSFT, Article 7. For the examples of other conventions, see, e. g., IMO Convention for 
the Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of Maritime Navigation(1988), 
Article 6; 
IAEA Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material(1980), 
Article 8; UN 
Convention Against the Taking of Hostage(1979), Article 5. 
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civil law states, 262 and for this reason it is mostly stipulated in a non-binding 
manner, the mandatory status of the active personality principle in the ICSFT 
could be regarded as progress. 263 In addition, several principles are inserted 
on an optional basis such as the passive personality principle, the protective 
principle, etc. However, given the unique financial nature of the offences set 
forth within the ICSFT regime, this conventional approach appears to be a bit 
trite. In this regard, the innovative formulation of the Palermo Convention is 
of particular note. To begin with, Article 15(1) designates the classic principle 
of territoriality as a minimum standard. Then, Article 15(2)(c)(ii) indicates the 
basis for jurisdiction in the context of money laundering offence on an 
optional basis. The requirements are (i) the offence has the characteristic of 
incomplete offence or complicity, and (ii) the offence is committed outside 
one's territory in order to commit the offence of converting or acquiring 
criminal proceeds within one's territory. In effect, it provides a jurisdictional 
basis for an extraterritorial reach. In relation to the issue concerning the 
conflict of jurisdictional claims, Article 6(5) of the ICSFT stipulates that state 
parties shall strive to coordinate their actions appropriately. 21 
262 The common law countries rely heavily on the territorial principle, while the civil law 
states insist on the inclusion of the active personality principle as well. This is for the reason 
that the civil law states are reluctant to extradite their own nationals. Irrespective of the 
original background, the establishment of active personal principle will contribute to the 
reduction of the possibility that criminals escape punishment (Gilbert, G., "Crimes Sans 
Frontiers: Jurisdictional Problems in English Law", (1992) British Yearbook of International Law, 
vol. 63, p. 416). 
263 The Vienna Convention, Article 4. Interestingly, the Palermo Convention adopted the 
Vienna Convention's approach, borrowing its text nearly word for word. See, Sproule, D. W. 
& St. Denis, P., supra note 157, p. 275. 
264 For example, in practice, some solutions can be considered such as the harmonisation of 
legislation; arrangements for the settlement of disputes; and, international agreements 
concerning mutual assistance in criminal matters (The Council of Europe, supra note 150, 
pp. 32-38). 
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Secondly, in respect of international cooperation, it should be 
recalled that this area is also the exact reflection of former anti-terrorism 
conventions. Namely, the ICSFT provides for a basic principle that countries 
should afford one another the greatest measure of mutual legal assistance 
without further elaboration. 265 The treatment of the ICSFT in this area is, 
however, dwarfed in its depth and variety when compared with other 
conventions mentioned in this study. For example, the Palermo Convention 
which was drafted during almost the same period as the ICSFT, goes several 
steps farther than the Vienna Convention whose provisions on international 
cooperation were already called "a treaty within a treaty". In particular, 
given that the ultimate goal of international cooperation in this area is the 
confiscation of terrorists' financial resources, there should be some guideline 
on the cooperation concerning the enforcement of confiscation as with the 
Vienna Convention, the 2000 Palermo Convention, and the 2003 Convention 
against Corruption. 
266 
Thirdly, some principles related to international cooperation need 
to be reviewed. As explained above, the principles in relation to the flow of 
information are also applicable to international cooperation, and they have 
already been examined in the analysis of the bridging mechanism. 
26' Next, 
the principle of auf dedere auf judicare and the exceptions of political offence 
and fiscal offence need to be considered. In a similar way to other anti- 
terrorism conventions, the ICSFT also stipulates the principle of "extradite or 
265 Article 12(1). 
2b The Palermo Convention, Article 13. 
267 For a relevant discussion, see, Section 111.2. e. of this chapter. 
Particularly, supra note 246, 
247 and 248, and their related text. 
prosecute" in Article 10. Furthermore, the ICSFT contains provisions on non- 
recognition of the exceptions of both political offence and fiscal offence. This 
position stands in stark contrast with the existing anti-terrorism conventions 
which do not contain these exclusive provisions. Only the 1997 convention 
on terrorist bombings contains a relevant provision but it is only about the 
political offence exception. 268 
3. The Security Council and the Afghanistan situation 
While the General Assembly was striving to formulate a legal tool 
to tackle the financing of terrorism in the late 1990s, the Security Council had 
another opportunity to launch a major campaign against terrorism. It was on 
the occasion of the terrorist bombing of the US embassies in Kenya and 
Tanzania in 1998. However, this time the approach of the Security Council 
could be distinguished from the past since for the first time it engaged in 
financial warfare on terrorism in a real sense. The Security Council adopted 
Resolution 1267(1999), demanding that the Taliban surrender Usama bin 
Laden to appropriate authorities in a country where he has been indicted, or 
to appropriate authorities in a country where he will be returned to such a 
country, or to appropriate authorities in a country where he will be arrested 
and effectively brought to justice. 269 In fact, this resolution was designed in a 
similar way to the Lockerbie case, imposing sanctions on the Taliban regime. 
However, what makes the involvement of the Security Council at 
this time totally different from that of the Lockerbie incident is its subsequent 
268 The ICSFT, Article 13 and 14: the 1997 convention, Article 11. 
269 UN, S/RES/1267,15 October 1999, para. 2. 
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Resolution 1333(2000) that commenced to target Usama bin Laden(an 
individual) and his property. Indeed, the sanctions regime of the Security 
Council has for the first time begun to aim at undermining the financial 
infrastructure of terrorist groups, i. e., the financial property of Usama bin 
Laden and his organisation. Another thing of note is that an individual, who 
was a non-actor in international law with the exception of the human rights 
area, has emerged as a subject of the international sanctioning regime. 
Following 9/11, the Security Council continues to maintain this sanctions 
regime with the adoption of subsequent resolutions. 270 Importantly, this 
approach has formed one of the two pillars that the Security Council has 
built to combat terrorist financing since 9/11. These two pillars will be dealt 
with in detail in the next chapter. 
IV. Conclusion 
It was not until the 1990s that the international community 
started to pay serious attention to terrorist financing. The increased 
awareness of this issue then led to the adoption of the ICSFT by the General 
Assembly in 1999 and the utilisation of the Chapter VII powers of the 
Security Council in 2000. 
Notwithstanding these precedents, the suppression of the 
financing of terrorism was quite a neglected area before the 9/11 attack, being 
marginalised both within the strategy to combat money laundering, as well 
as within the strategy to combat terrorism as a whole. 
In these circumstances, it is the attack on the Twin Towers which 
270 UN, S/RES/1390,28 January 2002. 
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has shaken the reticence of the international community, giving the financing 
of terrorism a status of the highest priority as an agenda item in the 
international community. Consequently, various international and regional 
organisations have since come to establish a broad coalition against the 
financing of terrorism. In the following chapters, this major change in the 
international community will be reviewed with a specific focus on the UN 
Security Council and other specialist bodies. 
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Chapter Three: 
The Role of the Security Council Since 9/11 
I. Introduction 
In the past, the Security Council intermittently engaged in the 
suppression of the financing of terrorism on an operational basis, allowing a 
leading role to be taken by others such as the General Assembly. However, 
the September 11th attack marked a turning point in the role of the Security 
Council, placing the mighty UN organ into the vanguard of the international 
campaign against terrorism. Needless to say, this change also had a great 
impact in the field of the suppression of the financing of terrorism which is 
one of the crucial sub-areas of the counter-terrorism campaign. 
In its efforts the Security Council has adopted two radically 
different strategies: a structural approach and an operational approach. ' The 
structural approach comprises long-term measures to build up a counter- 
terrorism infrastructure at both the international and national level, and 
Security Council Resolution 1373 of 2001 might conceivably be said to be an 
unprecedented example for the international community in this category. 
By 
comparison, the operational approach refers to immediate measures taken 
in 
'A similar categorisation was once employed by the UN 
Secretary-General in his report on 
the prevention of armed conflict, see, UN, "Report of the 
Secretary-General on Prevention of 
the context of an imminent or actual crisis or danger caused by some 
terrorists. In other words, this approach could be said to be a crackdown on 
particular terrorists, and Security Council Resolution 1390 of 2002 plays a 
pivotal role in this operational campaign. 
Against this backdrop, this chapter aims at analysing the Security 
Council's role in suppressing the financing of terrorism since 9/11. For this 
purpose, Section II will examine the nature and function of Resolution 1373 
and its monitoring mechanism. It will clarify how the Security Council 
constructs a counter-terrorism infrastructure in the international community. 
Then Section III will diagnose Resolution 1390 in a way similar to Section II. 
After analysing these parallel efforts of the Security Council, Section IV will 
draw some lessons to facilitate the Security Council's further involvement in 
this area. 
However, it should be emphasised that this chapter is focused 
only on the financial aspect among the contents of these two resolutions. 
Accordingly, although there are other important counter-terrorism measures 
contained in the resolutions, the discussion will be confined to the 
suppression of the financing of terrorism. For a similar reason, in-depth 
analysis will not be extended to Resolution 1540 of 2004 since it is mainly 
concerned with the weapons of mass destruction (WMD) issue and the 
weight given to the financial aspect is very light in comparison with 
Resolutions 1373 and 1390. 
armed conflict", A/55/985-S/2001/574,7 June 2001, p. 7. 
z Furthermore, Resolution 1540 adopts the same "structural approach" as Resolution 1373 
and thus the working mechanism of its monitoring committee is almost 
identical to that of 
Resolution 1373. However, given that the financing issue mentioned in Resolution 1540 has 
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li. The Structural Approach: Security Council Resolution 1373 
1. The background 
With the terrorist attack on 11 September 2001, the international 
community was increasingly sensitised to the danger posed by international 
terrorism. There immediately arose a sense of urgency that the international 
community had to take action in the face of such an unprecedented and 
heinous attack. In Resolution 1368, which was adopted a day after the attack, 
the Security Council declared any act of international terrorism as a threat to 
international peace and security, thus laying the legal foundation for further 
action at Security Council level. ' Once international terrorism was declared 
to be a threat to international peace and security, the Security Council was 
entitled to exert its powerful Chapter VII authority. ' Subsequently, on 28 
September 2001, the Security Council adopted Resolution 1373 which was the 
first manifestation in a concrete form of the international community's 
determination to combat international terrorism since 9/11. This time, the 
Security Council did not intend simply to take a one-off action but had it in 
mind to establish a permanent counter-terrorism legal and executive 
infrastructure within the international community. Considering that in the 
past, the international community lacked appropriate legal and 
administrative tools to cope with international terrorism and there was 
still an overlapping aspect with that of Resolutions 1373 and 1390, Resolution 1540 will be 
briefly dealt with at the end of this chapter in the context of avoiding duplication among the 
relevant committees of the Security Council. 
3 UN, S/RES/1368,12 September 2001, para. 1. 
' See. e. g. Kirgis, Jr., F. L., "The Security Council's First Fifty Years", (1995) The American 
Journal of International Law, vol. 89, p. 512. 
113 
hardly any coordinated international response to it, Resolution 1373 seems to 
have great potential to counter this failing. ' 
2. The nature of Resolution 1373 
The Security Council, acting under its Chapter VII powers, can 
make a simple recommendation or a binding decision to maintain 
international peace and security. ' In the case of this binding decision, it could 
involve either non-forcible measures or military measures in accordance with 
Articles 41 and 42 respectively. Generally, the Security Council has exercised 
various functions under Article 41 such as quasi-judicial functions, quasi- 
legislative functions and territorial administration, especially since the end of 
the Cold War. ' As pointed out in the Prosecutor v. Tadic case, ' the measures set 
out in Article 41 are not exhaustive but merely illustrative. With a view to 
exercising these functions, the Security Council usually has had recourse to 
economic sanctions. This strategy appeared to be somewhat effective but also 
'Ward, C. A., "Legal Imperatives for Implementation of Resolution 1373(2001)", Paper 
presented at the 2003 Caribbean Regional Conference of the International Law Association, 
Barbados, West Indies, 26-29 March 2003(typescript), p. 1. 
'See, UN Charter, Article 39. The Security Council has the primary responsibility for the 
maintenance of international peace and security under Article 24(1) of the UN Charter. If the 
Security Council considers certain situations or acts as a threat to the peace, or breach of the 
peace, it can make recommendations or decide what measures should be taken, and these 
decisions are binding since UN member states agree to accept and carry out them under 
Articles 25 and 48 of the UN Charter. For the detailed explanation, see, e. g., Malanzuk, P., ed., 
Akerhurst's Modern Introduction to International Law, 1997, pp. 373-374 and pp. 387-390. 
Simma, B., ed., The Charter of the United Nations: A Commentary, 2002, pp. 707-710. With 
regard to quasi-judicial functions, Resolution 662(1990) is a case in point. In the resolution, 
the SC affirmed that the annexation of Kuwait by Iraq is null and void and that Iraq was 
liable for damages caused by the invasion of Kuwait. As regards quasi-legislative function, 
Resolution 1306(2000) is an example. With the adoption of the resolution, the international 
diamond market has been forced to adopt an effective mechanism to verify the origin of 
diamonds. Indeed, these measures can lead to changes in state behaviour. 
' See, infra note 136. 
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proved to entail negative side effects as well. ' Accordingly, attempts were 
later made to develop targeted or smart sanctions. " While Resolution 1373 
contains some elements of this smart sanctions policy, Resolution 1390 
definitely falls into this category. " 
Bearing this aspect in mind, let us look at the nature of Resolution 
1373. Above all, since the resolution is also derived from Article 41, it could 
be said to be binding. Of course, there might be some criticism that not all 
contents of the resolution are binding since some of it takes the form of a 
recommendation. In relation to this criticism, however, it should be noted 
that although only paragraphs 1 and 2 of the resolution are explicitly 
mandatory, the remaining paragraphs also could be implicitly binding in 
practice. This reasoning is based on the fact that the Security Council has 
expressed its determination to ensure the full implementation of the 
resolution, 12 and at the same time, the Counter-Terrorism Committee (CTC) 
(examined in detail below) monitors the implementation of the resolution as 
a whole regardless of the degree of binding power of respective paragraphs. 13 
' It was the unintended side effects on the civilian population. For the general discussion on 
the remedies for victims of UN sanctions, see, e. g., Reinisch, A., "Developing Human Rights 
and Humanitarian Law Accountability of the Security Council for the Imposition of 
Economic Sanctions", (2001) The American Journal of International Law, vol. 95, pp. 863-869. 
10 For relevant discussions, see, e. g., infra note 104. 
" Smart sanctions is usually assumed to include: the freezing of financial assets of regime 
members or elites who support them; suspension of credits and grant aid; denial and 
limitation of access to overseas financial markets; trade embargoes on arms and luxury 
goods; flight ban; and, denial of overseas travel. See, UN, "Report of the Secretary-General to 
the Security Council on the Protection of Civilians in Armed Conflict", S/1997/957,8 
September 1997, p. 16. 
12 Resolution 1373, para. 8. 
" IMF, Suppressing the Financing of Terrorismn: A Handbook for Legislative Drafting, 2003, p. 16; 
Ward, C. A., supra note 5, pp. 3-4. For example, if we take a close look at the priorities of the 
CTC's review, no distinction is made based on the degree of the binding power between 
paragraphs of Resolution 1373, but only sequential priority has been given to the 
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In addition to this binding nature, Resolution 1373 is distinct in 
two respects; permanence and universality, when compared with other 
Security Council resolutions prior to 9/11.14 To begin with, the permanent 
nature of the resolution results from the exercise of a quasi-legislative 
function by the Security Council. Under the 1373 mandate, all states are 
required to construct the prescribed legal framework in their national laws 
and institutions, and furthermore to promote international cooperation. 15 By 
so doing, a permanent obligation seems to be placed on a national legal 
system to enforce the mandate. For example, whenever future terrorists try 
to utilise the loopholes of existing legislation and regulations, there arises a 
need to improve the existing legislation and regulations. Perhaps, with 
continuous development of terrorists' skills and technology, the nature of a 
permanent mandate will be more highlighted in the future. In particular, the 
permanent nature is reinforced by the fact that the CTC, the monitoring body 
of the resolution, was virtually given a permanent mandate to do its job. 
Interestingly, this aspect stands in sharp contrast to the 
operational aspect of other terrorism-related Security Council resolutions 
which have an end point to their mandate. For example, in Resolution 748 
which was adopted in March 1992 following the aerial incident at Lockerbie, 
the Security Council demanded that Libya hand over the terrorist suspects to 
implementation of the resolution. 
14 The Working Group on the United Nation and Terrorism also noted that the character and 
scope of Resolution 1373 represents an important innovation and opens up new possibilities 
for inter-state cooperation. See, Policy Working Group Report, infra note 41, p. 8. 
15 Ward, C. A., supra note 5, p. 2. For the utility of UN resolutions in developing new 
law in 
national and international jurisprudence, see, e. g., Schachter, 0., 
"United Nations Law", The 
American Journal of International Law(1994), vol. 88, pp. 1-5. 
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the US or UK and required UN member states to participate in a sanctions 
regime. This mandate eventually came to an end when Libya surrendered to 
the Security Council's demand. 16 
Now, let us proceed to the universal nature of this measure. First 
of all, this universality results from the fact that the mandate applies to all 
terrorist-related entities no matter whether they are state, organisation or 
individual, and no matter where they are. " This nature stands out against 
that of other Security Council resolutions which usually designated specific 
targets in a fixed region. Again the Lockerbie incident and the Taliban are 
cases in point. In both instances, the target was specified as the Libyan 
government and the Taliban regime respectively. Secondly, note should also 
be taken that Resolution 1373 is universal in terms of the scope of states that 
are under the direct mandate of the resolution. 18 This means that the 1373 
mandate imposed active obligations on all states, while other binding 
Security Council resolutions usually imposed passive obligations thus 
affecting a limited number of states. Put simply, under active obligations, all 
states are obliged to take positive action by themselves as is the case with 
Resolution 1373 which obliges all states to actively build up counter- 
terrorism infrastructures in their legal and administrative system. In contrast, 
16 For the reference to the entire course of sanctioning, see, Gerson, A. & Adler, J., The Price of 
Terror, 2001, pp. 104-108, pp. 272-284. 
" See, Policy Working Group Report, infra note 41, p. 8. 
With regard to non-member states, the universal application of the UN resolution might 
be 
called into question. Indeed, the Security Council practice in this respect is not conclusive, 
although the Security Council recently addresses decision under Article 
41 to 'all states', 
implying that non-member states are subject to enforcement actions. In any event, the 
problem become less important due to the decrease in number of non-member states. 
See, 
Simma, B., supra note 7, p. 715. 
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under passive obligations, states have only to refrain from some proscribed 
acts such as permitting the operation of the targeted state's airline within 
their territory and the supplying of specific industrial components. t9 Given 
that passive obligations might be considered as meaningless for most states 
which do not consider engaging in those activities with the targeted state, 
resolutions of this kind do not seem to enjoy universality in a real sense. 
Symbolically, the uniqueness of Resolution 1373 in several 
respects is well illustrated by a UK comment in her state report to the UN 
Counter-Terrorism Committee that "the unanimous adoption of Security 
Council Resolution 1373(2001) was a historic event. This was the first 
resolution to impose obligations on all states to respond to the global threat of 
terrorism". " Indeed, the resolution is binding because the Security Council, 
acting under its Chapter VII powers, sets the tone with an obligatory 
mandate; it is permanent because it is targeted at the endless threat of global 
terrorism; and, finally it is universal because it related to all states and to 
terrorism in general. 
3. The general framework of the resolution 
Resolution 1373 tries to cover every major aspect of counter- 
terrorism tactics and accordingly its content could be divided into four 
groups based on the area that the tactics focus on: suppression of financing of 
'9 UN, S/RES/748,21 January 1992. 
20 UN, "Report to the Counter-Terrorism Committee pursuant to paragraph 6 of Security 
Council resolution 1373(2001) of 28 September 2001", enclosed in 
"Letter dated 19 December 
2001 from the Chairman of the Security Council Committee established pursuant to 
resolution 1373(2001) concerning counter-terrorism addressed to 
the President of the 
Security Council", S/2001/1232,24 December 2001, p. 3. 
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terrorism(para. 1); general counter-terrorism measures at the national 
level(para. 2); counter-terrorism measures at the international level(para. 3); 
and, the expansion of the counter-terrorism campaign into a broader 
area(para. 4). 21 
The common feature of these elements is that they impose 
legislative and administrative obligations on member states, and the 
implementation of these obligations could entail structural reform in legal 
and administrative systems at both national and international level. For 
example, in order to criminalise the provision of funds for terrorism, states 
need to create a criminal offence for this act of funding. ' Furthermore, for 
the purpose of bringing terrorist-related persons to justice, states need to 
improve their legislation, and their judicial and administrative systems. 23 
Another aspect of note is that although Resolution 1373 attempts 
to deal with every possible tactic to combat terrorism, it is clear that this 
resolution adds more weight to the suppression of the financing of terrorism 
than to other areas. This is illustrated in opening paragraph 1(a) which 
requires that all states shall prevent and suppress the financing of terrorist 
acts. 24 However, this stance can also be implicitly found in other paragraphs. 
21 In some sense, Resolution 1373 created a mini-treaty containing obligations that the 
majority of states had not been willing to accept in the recent past in treaty form (Bantekas, I., 
"Current Development: The International Law of Terrorist Financing", The American Journal 
of International Law(2003), vol. 97, p. 326). 
22 Resolution 1373(2001), para. 1(a). 
23 Ibid., para. 2(e). 
2' This aspect is also well illustrated by the CTC's practice in carrying out the 1373 mandate. 
For example, the CTC set the priority of its review of states' reports in which it singled out 
counter-terrorist financing as a priority issue for developing executive machinery at stage 
A. 
This decision stands in marked contrast to the fact that as noted below the executive 
machinery for other areas was to be reviewed at stage B("Focus Paper: 
Stage B", 22 
November 2002, p. 1). 
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For example, the act of financing is inserted in the first place of proscribed 
offences in the original text of paragraph 2(c), (d), (e), and (f). Moreover, in 
paragraph 3(d), the International Convention for the Suppression of the 
Financing of Terrorism (ICSFT)(1999), which was examined in detail in the 
previous chapter, is alone mentioned as an example of the international legal 
conventions and protocols relating to terrorism. 25 Considering that 
Resolution 1373 was the first concrete and meaningful measure that the 
Security Council took following the unprecedented terrorists attack, this 
stance of the resolution alludes to the fact that the Security Council regards 
the suppression of financing as a top priority. 
In this context, it seems noteworthy to make a comparative study 
between Resolution 1373 and the ICSFT which is the only multilateral 
convention of global reach regulating this area. In fact, there are distinct parts 
as well as similar provisions between these two instruments. 
With regard to the similar provisions, paragraph 1(a) and (b) of 
Resolution 1373 are cases in point. Paragraph 1(a) which states that all states 
shall prevent and suppress the financing of terrorist acts can find a similar 
message in the preamble of the ICSFT. Also, paragraph 1(b) which requires 
the criminalisation of the provision or collection of funds for terrorist acts 
finds a very close counterpart in Articles 2 and 4 of the ICSFT. 
26 
With regard to the distinctive parts, paragraph 1(c) and (d) are 
25 There are 19 global or regional treaties directly pertaining to the subject of 
international 
terrorism. For the full list of the conventions, see, Policy Working 
Group Report, infra note 41, 
pp. 17-18. 
Z6 IMF, supra note 13, p. 20. 
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examples. Firstly, paragraph 1(c)27 makes a step forward by way of requiring 
immediate action, while Article 8 of the ICSFT requires changes in domestic 
law to enable action to be taken. 28 Namely, operative paragraph 1(c) 
stipulates that all states shall freeze without delay funds and other financial 
assets or economic resources of persons or entities associated with terrorist 
acts. In contrast, Article 8 provides that each state party shall take 
appropriate measures in accordance with its domestic legal principles for the 
identification, detection and freezing or seizure of any funds used or 
allocated for the purpose of committing the proscribed offences set forth in 
the ICSFT. On the other hand, paragraph 1(c) has some weak points in that it 
only contains a provision as to freezing whereas the ICSFT elaborates on 
freezing, seizing and forfeiture in Article 8. Secondly, in addition to dealing 
with the financing of "concrete terrorist acts" in paragraph 1(b), paragraph 
1(d) touches upon the issue of the financing of "terrorists" aimed at 
supporting their infrastructure. 29 The practice of charities is a good example 
under this category. By comparison, the ICSFT does not deal with this 
Z' Paragraph 1(c) provides that "all states shall freeze without delay funds and other 
financial assets or economic resources of persons who commit, or attempt to commit, 
terrorist acts or participate in or facilitate the commission of terrorist acts, of entities owned 
or controlled directly or indirectly by persons; and of persons and entities acting on behalf of, 
or at the discretion of such persons and entities, including funds derived or generated from 
property owned or controlled directly or indirectly by such persons and associated persons 
and entities". 
28 Gilmore, W. C., "International Initiative" in Graham, T., ed., Butterworths International Guide 
to Money Laundering Law and Practice, 2003, pp. 138-139. 
29 IMF, Suppressing the Financing of Terrorism, supra note 13, p. 20. Paragraph 1(d) stipulates 
that " all states shall prohibit their nationals or any persons and entities 
from making any 
funds, financial assets or economic resources or financial or other related services available, 
directly or indirectly, for the benefit of persons who commit or attempt to commit or 
facilitate 
or participate in the commission of terrorist acts, of entities owned or controlled, 
directly or 
indirectly, by such persons and of persons and entities acting on 
behalf of or at the discretion 
of such persons" (emphasis added). 
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aspect. 30 
Lastly, attention should be given to the fact that the Security 
Council tries to address the threat of terrorism more broadly and in a longer 
term. In paragraph 4, the Security Council pointed out the close link between 
international terrorism and transnational organised crime such as drug- 
trafficking, money-laundering, arms-trafficking, etc. 31 With the help of this 
paragraph 4, there is secured some room for dealing with terrorism and 
transnational organised crime together in the international arena in the 
future. 32 
4. The monitoring mechanism 
As the 1373 mandate is permanent in its nature, the will of the 
international community to continue to combat international terrorism might 
be assessed by whether it establishes a feedback mechanism or not. In this 
context, the mandate to establish the Counter-Terrorism Committee(CTC) 
could be said to be a milestone in the counter-terrorism campaign. 33 In fact, in 
the past, there did not exist such a permanent body to monitor and ensure 
compliance with the enforcement measures of Security Council resolutions 
30 Ward, C. A., supra note 5, pp. 5-6. 
31 The link between terrorism and other transnational crimes was once again emphasised at 
the Security Council Meeting at the level of the Ministers for Foreign Affairs on 20 January 
2003(UN, S/RES/1456,20 January 2003). 
32 With regard to this issue, Policy Working Group made a recommendation that the 
UN 
Office on Drugs and Crime, and the Department for Disarmament 
Affairs should study the 
links between terrorism and organised crime, including drug trafficking, money 
laundering, 
illicit trafficking of arms and corruption. See, Policy Working Group Report, 
infra note 41, 
p. 15. 
33 Resolution 1373, para. 6. 
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but only some temporary mechanisms. -" Furthermore, with a view to 
facilitating the monitoring process, the Security Council called upon all states 
to report to the CTC on the steps that they have taken to implement the 
resolution, no later than 90 days from the date of the adoption of the 
resolution. 35 This request might also set a real standard for the feedback on 
the implementation of a Security Council resolution in terms of its speed and 
scope. Since its birth, the CTC "has become the UN's leading body to 
promote collective action against international terrorism. Its mandate is to 
bring Member states to an acceptable level of compliance with Resolution 
1373 and the terrorism-related conventions and protocols which were 
negotiated over four decades", 36 and indeed it "will remain at the centre of 
global efforts to build capacity to combat terrorism" in the future. 37 
a. The operating procedure of the CTC 
The CTC consists of all members of the Security Council and 
meets in closed session, unless it decides otherwise. The Secretariat of the 
CTC is provided by the Secretariat of the UN. In addition to experts, the CTC 
" Usually, the Security Council established a sanctions committee, the enforcement body, to 
ensure compliance with its measure under Article 41. Since the 1990s, two Sanctions 
Committees have been established in relation to combating terrorism. One is the Sanctions 
Committee established pursuant to Resolution 748(1992) and in this case, the Sanctions 
Committee itself monitored the implementation of the resolution. The other is the Sanctions 
Committee established pursuant to Resolution 1267(1999). To monitor the implementation of 
this resolution, a temporary monitoring group was established. For detailed information, see, 
section 111.4. of this chapter. 
35 UN, S/RES/1373,28 September 2001, para. 6. 
36 UNODC, "The Global Programme Against Terrorism", in "Global Programmes", p. 23 
(updated May 2003 and visited on 28 July 2003) 
<http: //www. unodc. org/pdf/crime/publications/cicp global_programmes. pdf>. 
37 Ward, C. A., "Building Capacity to Combat International Terrorism: The Role of the United 
Nations Security Council", (2003) Journal of Conflict & Security, vol. 8, no. 2, p. 305. 
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may invite any member of the UN to participate in the discussion of any 
question brought before it, if the interests of the invited member are 
specifically affected. When reaching a decision, the CTC generally acts by 
consensus of its members. 38 If consensus cannot be reached on a particular 
issue, the matter will be submitted to the Security Council. Lastly, the CTC 
will submit regular reports, including recommendations as necessary, to the 
Security Council on the implementation of Resolution 1373.39 
b. The monitoring priorities of the CTC 
Originally, given that Resolution 1373 is broad in scope, the CTC 
has divided its monitoring work into three phases, with plans to move from 
a lower to a higher stage as each stage is finished. " 
Stage A 
- Having in place legislation covering all aspects of 1373, and a process in 
hand for becoming a party as soon as possible to the 12 international 
conventions and protocols relating to terrorism; 
- Having in place executive machinery 
for preventing and suppressing 
terrorist financing; 
Stage B 
- Having in place executive machinery covering all aspects 
of 1373; 
Stage C 
- Cooperation on 
bilateral, regional and international levels, including 
exchanges of information; 
31 Where the CTC agrees, decisions may be taken 
by a written procedure. In such cases, the 
chairman of the CTC will circulate the proposal 
to all members of the CTC, and if no 
objection is received within 48 
hours, the decision will be deemed adopted. 
39 UN, "Guidelines of the Committee for the Conduct of 
Its Work", S/AC. 40/2001/CRP. 1,16 
October 2001. 
40 UN, "Focus Paper: Stage B", the CTC document, 
22 November 2002. 
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- Judicial cooperation between states and actions on bringing terrorists to 
justice; 
- Increased attention to the links between terrorism and other transnational 
organised crime 
From this division of the monitoring phases, it can be noticed that 
the CTC's first priority is to establish a national legislative infrastructure by 
placing it at stage A. Simultaneously, in line with Section 11.3 of this chapter, 
the CTC placed an emphasis on the area of the suppression of the financing 
of terrorism by mentioning only the executive machinery to cut off financing 
of terrorism at this stage. Then, the CTC moves to stage B at which point it 
touches upon the issue of building up the executive machinery covering all 
other aspects of Resolution 1373. Finally at stage C, after vertically 
establishing a legislative and executive infrastructure to combat terrorism at 
national level, the CTC tries to horizontally weave a cooperative network 
within the international community. Moreover, in the long term, the CTC 
seems to pursue the broadening of its battle front to other areas such as drug- 
trafficking, money-laundering, arms trafficking, people-smuggling, etc. ' It 
follows from the above that these stages are interrelated and could be 
classified into two categories: legislative and operational. 42 
In practice, however, a criticism has been raised that this 
categorisation has become increasingly artificial as the monitoring of the 
4' See, e. g., "Remarks of the Chairman at the Closing Session", UN, S/AC. 40/2003/SM. 
1/5,26 
March 2003, p. 3. Furthermore, as the UN Conventions against Transnational Organized 
Crime entered into force, the UN Office at Vienna (where the secretariat of the 
Convention is 
located) seems to have an important role to play in further exploring the 
links and in 
promoting such coordination (UN, "Report of the Policy Working 
Group on the United 
Nations and Terrorism" (hereafter Policy Working Group Report), 
S/2002/875,6 August 2002, 
p. 7). 
42 UN, "Note by the President of the Security Council", S/2004/70,26 January 2004, p. 
11. 
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CTC proceeds and does not provide a clear picture of a state's real situation 
or development in its implementation of Resolution 1373.43 In this regard, 
there arises a need for the revaluation of this categorisation. 
c. The various activities of the CTC 
The CTC renews its programme of work every 90 days. Since the 
first working programme covered the period from 28 September to 27 
December 2001, as of 1 June 2005, the thirteenth working programme has 
been adopted. On analysing the development of the working programmes, it 
can easily be seen that it has been an evolving mechanism rather than a fixed 
one. The first working programme divided its area of interest into five fields: 
(a) establishment of contact points; (b) securing of advisers to the CTC; (c) 
reviewing of state reports; (d) provision of assistance to states; and, (e) 
promotion of the activities of the CTC. ̀  This original format has been 
maintained throughout all programmes of work except an important change 
in the third programme in which there was added the issue of promoting 
dialogue with regional and subregional organisations. 45 
First of all, of note is that the CTC is trying to facilitate efficient 
dialogue with states and relevant international organisations, and among 
states themselves as to the matters covered by Resolution 1373. In this sense, 
the CTC collated a list of contact points, and published it in the period of the 
''3 Ibid. 
UN, "CTC Programme of Work for the first 90-day period", attached to the Letter dated 19 
October 2001 from the Chairman of the Counter-Terrorism Committee addressed to the 
President of the Security Council, S/2001/986,19 October 2001. 
" UN, "CTC Programme of Work for the third 90-day period", attached to the 
Letter dated 
27 March 2002 from the Chairman of the Counter-Terrorism Committee addressed to the 
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first programme of work. In principle, two contact points are to be 
designated: one in each state's Permanent Mission to the UN in New York 
and the other in each state's ministry or agency principally responsible for 
the implementation of the resolution. In the first instance, the CTC will 
approach the permanent mission contact points. 46 The CTC continues to 
update the directory of contact points at regular intervals. 
Secondly, the CTC takes steps to furnish itself with the sources of 
appropriate expertise that it needs in order to do its work. To this end, the 
CTC invited states to submit lists of experts who would be available to be 
appointed to assist the CTC. 47 These experts, as independent advisers to the 
CTC, were first appointed during the period of the second programme, 48 and 
have since been assigned the task of reviewing state reports. 49 
Thirdly, the CTC takes as its primary task to review state 
reports. 5° The CTC established three sub-committees in the second 
programme, each made up of five of its members, to facilitate the reviewing 
51 process. Initially, experts as mentioned above analyse each report, and the 
President of the Security Council, S/2002/318,27 March 2002. 
" The first programme of work, supra note 44, p. 2. The contact points will be identified by (a) 
the name and address of the office and a general description of its function; (b) a telephone 
number; (c) a fax number; and, (d) an email address. 
4' The first programme of work, supra note 44, p. 3. 
48 UN, "CTC Programme of Work for the second 90-day period", attached to the Letter dated 
15 January 2002 from the Chairman of the Counter-Terrorism Committee addressed to the 
President of the Security Council, S/2002/67,15 January 2002. 
'9 Upon the request of the CTC, the UN Secretariat tries to maintain a list of a wider pool of 
experts who will be available to advise the CTC. The CTC itself also invited all states to 
consider whether they can put forward candidates (Note Verbal SCA 3/02(6)). 
s0 In order to assist states in fulfilling their obligation in reporting, the CTC produced and 
circulated to all states guidelines for the preparation of their reports. 
51 For the example of these sub-committees' operation, see, "Tentative Timetable for Member 
States' Participation in the Process of Reviewing Reports" (visited in 28 July 
2003)<http: //www. un. org/Docs/sc/committees/1373/participation. html>. 
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sub-committees provide a forum of discussion of the report with the 
presence of all concerned, i. e., members of the CTC, representatives of the 
state concerned, and experts. The sub-committee reports to the CTC on the 
conclusions reached and any proposed follow-up action. On receiving the 
report from its sub-committee, the CTC follows up with the state by way of 
informing the state of a time limit for the submission of further information 
or a further report. At the same time, the CTC sends a letter to the Chairman 
of the Security Council for the purpose of recording the fact, and this letter 
would be circulated as a document of the Security Council. 52 
Fourthly, the CTC is trying to explore ways in which states could 
be assisted in their implementation of Resolution 1373.53 For this purpose, the 
CTC has set up a database of available assistance which can be found on its 
web site. " This so-called CTC Assistance Database contains best practices, 
model legislation, available training programmes, etc. 55 The CTC encourages 
all states and international, regional, and sub-regional organisations to 
submit information to strengthen the database. 56 In addition, the CTC 
maintains a "Matrix of Assistance Requests" which summarises the 
52 UN, "Guidelines of the Committee for the Conduct of Its Work", S/AC. 40/2001/CRP. 1,16 
October 2001. 
"In Resolution 1377(2001), the Security Council asked the CTC to explore ways in which 
states can be assisted, and in particular to explore with international, regional and 
subregional organisations; the promotion of best practices; the availability of existing 
technical, financial, regulatory, legislative programmes; and, the promotion of possible 
synergies between these assistance programmes. 
s4 (visited on 1 June 2005) 
<http: //domino. un. org/ctc/CTCDirectory. nsf/frmSearch? OpenForm>. 
" The CTC divided the database into eight categories: legislation drafting; financial law & 
practice; customs law & practice; immigration law & practice; extradition 
law & practice; 
police & law enforcement; illegal arms trafficking; other areas. 
See, UN, "Information Note 
on Submissions to the CTC Directory", SCA /20/01(8), 
27 November 2001. 
56 Ibid. 
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assistance needs and requests in the areas covered by Resolution 1373. This 
matrix is intended to make it possible to comprehensively overview states' 
assistance needs, as well as information on any assistance being delivered. " 
However, the CTC mainly confines its role to that of a "switchboard" and 
does not directly provide assistance to states. 58 
Fifthly, the CTC promotes dialogue with international, regional 
and subregional organisations with a view to encouraging these 
organisations to play an active and coordinated role in combating terrorism 
within their areas of responsibility. A good example of its initial effort in this 
direction was a special meeting with some 60 international, regional, and 
subregional organisations on global action against terrorism, held on 6 
March 2003.59 This meeting was unprecedented in its scope of attendance, 
and might be regarded as a landmark in the history of combating terrorism. 
The CTC intends to encourage these organisations to develop guidance on 
best practices and codes, and to share information on monitoring. 60 The CTC 
meets periodically with these organisations and has called three follow-up 
57 However, this matrix is not available online, but accessible through the Technical 
Assistance Team <email: ctcC@un. org>. 
"Rosand, E., "Security Council Resolution 1373 and the Counter-Terrorism Committee: the 
Cornerstone of the United Nations Contribution to the Fight against Terrorism", 
in Fijnaut, 
C., & Wouters, J. & Naert, F., eds., Legal Instruments in the Fight against International Terrorism: 
A Transnational Dialogue, 2004, p. 623. 
s9 For the wide range of participants, see, UN, "List of International, 
Regional and 
Subregional Organizations with which the Counter-Terrorism Committee Will 
Deepen 
Contact" attached to "Special Meeting of the Counter-Terrorism 
Committee with 
International, Regional and Subregional Orgnaizations", S/AC. 40/2003/SM. 
1/6/Rev. 1,3 April 
2003. 
Fo UN, "Outcome Document of the Special Meeting of the Counter-Terrorism 
Committee 
with International, Regional and Subregional 
Organizations" (hereafter Special Meeting 
Document), S/AC. 40/2003/SM. 1/4,31 March 2003, p. 3. 
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Special Meetings as a result. " 
Lastly, the CTC commits itself to maintaining transparency in its 
work. To this end, it remains in close contact with other UN organisations, 
and holds regular briefings of member states and of the media to promote 
the work of the CTC. This area seems to be very important in drawing the 
attention of the international community and maintaining the momentum of 
the work of the CTC. 
d. The current progress and revitalisation of the CTC 
Taking the monitoring priorities and working programmes of the 
CTC together, there automatically arises the question of which stage the CTC 
is now monitoring. Simply speaking, in order to finish stage A and to move 
to stage B, the CTC should not have any further comments at stage A. Thus, 
reviews of subsequent reports from many states will probably continue to 
focus on stage A until the CTC is satisfied that adequate legislation covering 
all aspects of Resolution 1373 is in place. " 
Nonetheless, at this point, note should be taken that considering 
the ever-increasing complexity of terrorist tactics and technology in modern 
times, 63 it seems necessary that the CTC always keep an eye on the lower 
stages even after moving to a higher stage. As of 1 June 2005, all 191 UN 
member states had submitted their first report to the CTC, and most of them 
61 The first hosted by the OAS, was held in Washington on October 2003. The second, co- 
sponsored by the UNODC and the OSCE, took place in Vienna on 
March 2004. The third, co- 
hosted by the CIS and Kazakhstan, was held in Almaty on January 2005 
<http: //www. un. org/Docs/sc/committees/1373/ctc-meeting. html>. 
62 Rosand, E., supra note 58, p. 611. 
63 See, e. g., Monitoring Group Report II, infra note 93, p. 5. 
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are now on the second or third round of their submissions. ̀  
On the other hand, to cope with the increasing workload and 
sustain the momentum in implementing Resolution 1373, the Security 
Council adopted Resolution 1535 in March 2004 for the purpose of 
revitalising the CTC. This initiative included the establishment of the 
Counter-Terrorism Committee Executive Directorate(CTED) and provides for 
"on-site" visits by the CTC to member states. This CTED has replaced the 
group of experts with reinforced manpower and specialisation. 65 
Furthermore, with an on-site visit available, it has become possible to assess 
the "ground truth" as well as the "paper truth" based on written reports. 66 
The first on-site visit was made to Morocco in March 2005.67 
5. The criticism 
Perhaps the fundamental criticism is that the question of what is 
meant by terrorism is not answered by the resolution. In order to combat 
terrorism, there should be a clear definition of terrorism through which the 
international community could differentiate terrorists' activities from 
ordinary crime or a political campaign. However, Resolution 1373 does not 
address this matter, and up until now, there has been no such a definition 
" The last report was received on 22 May 2003 from Sao Tome & Principe(Ward, C. A., supra 
note 37, p. 299). 
65 The CTED was established for an initial period ending 31 December 2007. See, UN, "Letter 
dated 11 August 2004 from the President of the Security Council addressed to the Secretary- 
General, UN. Doc., S/2004/642,12 August 2004, p. 5. 
66 Rosand, E., supra note 58, p. 624. See also, CTC, "Procedures for CTC visits to member 
states", 15 September 2004. 
67 UN Information Service, "Country Visits Signal New Phase of Work for United Nations 
Counter-Terrorism Body", SC/8333,15 March 2005. 
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available. " Accordingly, many problems arise in the course of the 
implementation of Resolution 1373 at both national and international level. 
For example, in order to create a criminal offence for the provision and 
collection of funds for terrorism, relevant legislation requires some definition 
of terrorism. 69 Without it, a terrorist or terrorist organisation in some state 
can be considered as patriotic or is a good cause in another state. For instance, 
in November 2001, Lebanon rejected a U. S. demand to freeze the assets of 
Hezbollah since Lebanon noted the difference between resistance and 
terrorist organisations, considering Hezbollah as a political movement in 
opposition to Israel. 7° 
Secondly, Resolution 1373 might be criticised for its lack of human 
rights protection provisions. 71 Most of the provisions in Resolution 1373 
entail some restriction on civil liberties in a democratic society. In this case, 
6R For the history of discussion on the definition of terrorism, see, e. g., Higgins, R., "The 
general international law of terrorism", pp. 14-17 and Flory, M., "International Law: an 
instrument to combat terrorism", in Higgins, R. & Flory, M., eds., Terrorism and International 
Law, 1997, pp. 31-33. 
69 Commonwealth Secretariat, "Report of Expert Working Group on Legislative and 
Administrative Measures to Combat Terrorism" (hereafter Commonwealth Secretariat 
Report), February 2002, pp. 4-5. 
70 See, e. g., Hardister, A. D., "Can We Buy Peace On Earth?: The Price of Freezing Assets in a 
Post September 11 World", (2003) Nortli Carolina Journal of International Lau) & Commercial 
Regulation, vol. 28, at section V. 
71 The concerns for the lack of human rights protection have frequently been expressed in 
relation to the activities of the CTC. See. e. g., Policy Working Group Report, supra note 41, 
p. 8; UN, Press Release, SG/SM/8583,20 January 2003 ; UN, Press Release, SC/7667,20 
February 2003, p. 7,10 ; UN, "Letter dated 26 February 2003 from the Chairman of the 
Security Council Committee established pursuant to Resolution 1373(2001) Concerning 
Counter-Terrorism Addressed to the President of the Security Council", 
S/AC. 40/2003/SM. 1/2,26 February 2003, p. 129; UN, "Provisional Summary Record of the 
First Part of the 57th Meeting", S/AC. 40/SR. 57,18 March 2003, pp. 9-10; Special Meeting 
Document, supra note 60, p. 2. 
To make matters worse, there are some extreme cases in which some countries 
have used 
their counter-terrorism campaign as a tool for repressing citizen's 
freedoms. See, e. g., 
Hardister, A. D. supra note 70, at section VII. 
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there should be some exceptional clauses or paragraphs to buffer the shock 
of the aggressive mandate, striking a balance between protection of security 
and guarantees of basic human rights. However, Resolution 1373 contains no 
such a clause or paragraph anywhere within its mandate, and to make 
matters worse, it explicitly restricts the international human rights 
mechanism by demanding that all states ensure that the asylum-seeker who 
planned, facilitated or participated in the commission of terrorist acts is not 
granted refugee status, and that claims of political motivation are not 
recognised as grounds for refusing requests for the extradition of alleged 
terrorists. 72 
Thirdly, some of the provisions are not complete and therefore 
need further consideration. For example, given that Resolution 1373 adds 
more weight to the suppression of the financing of terrorism within its 
mandate, the measures for the freezing of financial resources play a pivotal 
role in this area. However, it is problematic that there are no further 
instructions concerning the situation following the freezing of assets. 
Indefinite freezing of assets, needless to say, might cause serious legal 
problems73 as well as loss of opportunity. In other words, the asset owner 
might seek to challenge the decision in a domestic court or before the 
international community. Moreover, there is the question of how to dispose 
of frozen assets that do not belong to any specific claimant. 
72 S/RES/1373, para. 3(f) and (g). For the relevant national practices since 
9/11, see, Salt, S., 
"International Refugee Law: Excluding the Palestinians" in Strawson, J. (ed. ), Law After 
Ground Zero, 2002, p. 99. For more general criticism from human rights perspective, see, 
Talbot, R., "The Balancing Act: Counter-Terrorism and Civil Liberties in British 
Anti- 
Terrorism Law" in Strawson, J., ibid., pp. 123-135. 
73 See, e. g., Commonwealth Secretariat Report, supra note 
69, p. 9. 
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Finally but most importantly, Resolution 1373 seems to have lost 
its initial momentum. Shortly after the September 11`h attack, the 
international community was shocked into adopting Resolution 1373, 
consensus on which was reached out of sense of urgency. There was 
generated some sense of solidarity and sympathy in the international 
community seeing the collapse of the Twin Towers. Almost four years later, 
this sense of solidarity is being diluted, and the attention of the international 
community is shifting to other issues. In fact, considering that the 1373 
mandate is permanent by its nature, it seems to be a great challenge to 
prevent the lessening of its momentum in practice. 
111. The Operational Approach: Security Council Resolution 1390 
1. The context 
The operational approach to the combat of terrorism at the 
Security Council level had already been adopted before the September 11th 
attack. Following the bombing of the US embassies in Kenya and Tanzania, 
the Security Council in its Resolution 1267(1999) demanded that the Taliban 
surrender Usama bin Laden, and imposed sanctions on the Taliban regime 
such as the freezing of its overseas financial resources and applying aviation 
restrictions. It could be called operational in that this sanctions regime was 
aimed at bringing particular perpetrators and their organisation to justice 
and at preventing them from committing further attacks. 
The operational 
approach can be characterised in the main as an international administrative 
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asset-freezing system. 74 This is of particular importance in that freezing 
orders can be issued even without criminal proceedings being instituted and 
they can (indeed must) be recognised immediately in each national legal 
system. In fact, this kind of international criminal cooperation was 
inconceivable under the conventional rules of mutual legal assistance which 
require strict standards to be met as a condition of assistance such as a formal 
decision of foreign or domestic courts, or dual criminality. 
The sanctions regime which had been established by Resolution 
1267, was reasserted in Resolution 1333(2000), 75 and a monitoring mechanism 
was established with the adoption of the subsequent Resolution 1363(2001). 76 
Resolution 1390(2002), the first of an operational type since the September 
11th attack, was on similar lines with previous resolutions aimed at the 
Taliban, Usama bin Laden, and entities associated with them. " 
However, Resolution 1390 further strengthens this sanctions 
regime. For example, it provides momentum in monitoring process with the 
renewal of the mandate of the Monitoring Group that was established by 
Resolution 1363.78 The resolution also requests all states to submit their state 
report, no later than 90 days from the date of the adoption of the resolution 
and thereafter according to a timetable to be proposed by the 1267 
Sanctions 
' The EU is also working on this issue. See, Council of the European 
Union, "The fight 
against terrorist financing", the note from the Secretary 
General/High Representative and 
the Commission to European Council, JAI 566, ECOFIN 424, EF 64, RELEX 
655, COTER 91, 
16089/04, Brussels, 14 December 2004, p. 11. 
75 UN, S/RES/1333,19 December 2000. 
76 UN, S/RES/1363,30 July 2001. 
" UN, S/RES/1390,16 January 2002. 
'' For the subsequent renewal of the mandate of the 
Monitoring Group, see, Section III. 4. c. of 
this chapter. 
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Committee which will be explained below in detail. Thereby, a feedback 
mechanism of Resolution 1390 has been institutionalised. This aspect is in 
marked contrast with previous resolutions in which the Security Council 
simply urged states to submit their report without any time limit and any 
obligation to regularly report. 79 
2. The nature of Resolution 1390 
As Resolution 1390 was adopted by the Security Council acting 
under Chapter VII, most of its content-in particular paragraph 2 relating to 
the suppression of the financing of bin Laden and the Al-Qaida network-is 
as binding as Resolution 1373 is. However, whereas Resolution 1373 is 
universal and permanent in its nature, Resolution 1390 seems to be particular 
and temporary like other Security Council resolutions. Indeed, in Resolution 
1390, the Security Council explicitly designated Usama bin Laden, members 
of the Al-Qaida organisation and the Taliban and other individuals, groups, 
undertakings and entities associated with them as targets of its sanctions 
regime. From this particularisation, a logical conclusion could be reached 
that once the designated individuals and entities are successfully dealt with, 
and their threat is substantially removed, the mandate of Resolution 1390 
should expire thereafter. The practice of other Security Council's resolutions 
that have built their own sanctions regimes demonstrates this temporary 
nature of Resolution 1390. For example, since 1990, seventeen sanctions 
regimes have been set up by the Security Council, and seven of them were 
" Resolution 1267 has no fixed time limit, but it is questionable how many states followed 
the instruction. To make matters worse, Resolution 1363 has not even imposed an obligation 
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later terminated with the end to their mandate. 80 Yet, given that the war 
against Usama bin Laden and the Al-Qaida organisation is unlikely to come 
to an end in the near future, this temporariness of Resolution 1390 mandate 
remains to be seen in practice. 8' 
3. The general framework of the resolution 
As noted above, the original framework of Resolution 1390 is 
derived from that of Resolution 1267(1999). However, with the development 
of the situation in Afghanistan, substantial changes were made to the original 
framework. 
First of all, the focus of the sanctions regime has shifted from the 
Taliban to Usama bin Laden and his Al-Qaida network. For example, in 
Resolution 1267, the Security Council decided that all states should freeze 
funds or other financial resources associated with the Taliban, whereas the 
freezing orders of Resolution 1390 have been extended to Usama bin Laden 
and his Al-Qaida network. As a matter of fact, it is not surprising, given that 
the Taliban regime almost collapsed at the time of the adoption of Resolution 
1390, while Usama bin Laden and the cell network of the Al-Qaida 
organisation are still seen as posing a serious threat to international security. 
Secondly and more precisely, considering that the target is not 
fixed in one place but very mobile and elusive around the world, Resolution 
1390 focuses on the tackling of individual activities. Indeed, besides tackling 
to report. 
s0 It is as of 1 June 2005 < http: //www. un. org/Docs/sc/committees/INTRO. 
htm>. 
For the discussion on the future of the campaign against Usama Bin Laden and 
his Al- 
Qaida network, See, Gunaratna, R., Inside Al 
Qaeda: Global Network of Terror, 2002, pp. 221-233. 
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the financing of terrorism, the Security Council also added travel bans and 
arms embargoes on these entities. At this point, note should be taken that a 
travel ban is different from the former aviation restrictions in that it is 
imposed on each individual rather than on the entire Afghanistan region. 
Likewise, arms embargoes aim at preventing arms supplies to the proscribed 
individuals and entities no matter where they are, rather than to Afghanistan 
as a whole. Obviously, this is the characteristic of the "smart sanction". " 
Another important change in this line is that the Security Council 
gave a new mandate to the sanctions committee established by Resolution 
1267(1999) by requiring it to update the list of targeted entities based on 
relevant information provided by member states and regional 
organisations. 83 
4. The enforcement body and the monitoring mechanism 
While Resolution 1373 has only its monitoring mechanism, 
Resolution 1390 has its own enforcement body as well as a monitoring 
mechanism. Obviously, this aspect is due to the operational nature of 
Resolution 1390. Indeed since Resolution 1390 aims at dealing with 
individual terrorists, in some sense, the enforcement body might conceivably 
be compared to a police headquarter at the international level, directing each 
state to freeze this individual's asset or that organisation's property. This 
enforcement body is called the 1267 Sanctions Committee 
(hereafter 
Wessel, R., "Debating the 'Smartness' of Anti-Terrorism Sanctions: The UN Security 
Council and the Individual Citizen", in Fijnaut, 
C., & Wouters, J. & Naert, F., eds., supra note 
58, p. 634. 
83 Resolution 1390, para. 5(a). 
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Sanctions Committee) which was established by Resolution 1267(1999) and 
whose mandate has been amended by Resolution 1390. 
Furthermore, for the feedback on the outcome of its enforcement, 
as noted above resolution 1390 gave a new lease of life to the expiring 
Monitoring Group established by Resolution 1363(2001) with the renewal of 
its mandate by one year. ' With a new mandate which obligates all states to 
submit a state report within 90 days, this renewal of a monitoring mechanism 
provided critical momentum in the securing of states' compliance with the 
1390 mandate as below. 
a. The operating procedure of the Sanctions Committee 
Basically, the operating procedure of the Sanctions Committee is 
quite similar to that of the CTC. The Sanctions Committee consists of all 
members of the Security Council and meets in closed session. It may invite 
any member of the UN to participate in the discussion of any question 
brought before it if the interests of the member are specifically affected, as 
well as the members of the Monitoring Group. When reaching a decision, the 
Sanctions Committee makes it by consensus of its members. If consensus 
cannot be reached on a particular issue, the matter is submitted to the 
Security Council. However, given the specific nature of the information, the 
Chairman may encourage bilateral negotiations between member states. 
Lastly, the Sanctions Committee submits regular reports, including 
recommendations as necessary, to the 
Security Council on the 
' Originally, the 1363 mandate of the Monitoring Group was supposed to expire on 
19 
January 2002. For the history of the renewal of the mandate of this monitoring group, see_ 
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implementation of Resolution 1390.85 
Added to this common aspect of the procedure, however, it 
should be noted that the Sanctions Committee has some additional operating 
procedures on listing and delisting, which is obviously derived from its 
operational character. Firstly, so far as new listings are concerned, the 
Sanctions Committee follows the normal decision-making procedure but 
does so more quickly, i. e., within less than 48 hours. When member states or 
regional organisations propose new additions of individuals or organisations 
to the list, the Sanctions Committee expeditiously considers the proposal and 
makes a decision by the consensus of its members. 
Secondly, it is in relation to updating the existing data on the list 
that usually includes detailed information such as a name, acronyms, 
addresses, headquarters, subsidiaries, affiliates, fronts, the nature of business 
or activity, and the leadership of the entities. 86 If member states or regional 
organisations provide new information on the list, the Monitoring Group 
will review the information, and within four weeks, advise the Sanctions 
Committee on whether to update the existing data or not. In this case, the 
decision-making procedure does not seem to be as expeditious as that of the 
new listing. 
Thirdly, there is a procedure for de-listing. 87 Under this procedure, 
(a) a petitioner(individuals, groups, or entities on the list) may petition the 
Section III. 4. c. of this chapter. 
" UN, "Guidelines of the Committee for the Conduct of its Work", 
Sanctions Committee 
document adopted on 7 November 2002 and amended on 
10 April 2003. 
"For individuals, name, date of birth, nationality, alias, and passport number. 
87 UN, "Statement of the Chairman of the 1267 Committee on 
De-listing Procedures", Press 
Release, SC/7487/AFG/203,16 August 2002. 
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government of residence or citizenship to request a review of the case; (b) the 
government to which a petition is submitted should review all relevant 
information and approach bilaterally the designating government; (c) if the 
petitioned government wishes to pursue a de-listing request, it should seek 
to persuade the designating government to this end; (d) the petitioned 
government may submit a request for de-listing to the Sanctions Committee, 
either alone or jointly with the designating government; (e) the Sanctions 
Committee will reach decision by consensus, and if consensus cannot be 
reached, the Chairman of the Committee will undertake such further 
consultation as may facilitate agreement; (f) if, after consultation, consensus 
still cannot be reached, the matter may be submitted to the Security Council. 
b. The activities of the Sanctions Committee 
Since it was given a new mandate with the adoption of Resolution 
1390, the two major tools of the Committee to implement its mandate have 
been the updating of the list and the reviewing of state reports. " As of 1 June 
2005, there were 325 individuals and 117 entities on the list, while 5 
individuals and 11 entities had been removed from the list. 89 Progress has 
also been made in listing the names according to their actual cultural usage. 
88 For an overview of the Sanctions Committee activities, see, e. g., UN, "Report of the Security 
Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 1267(1999) concerning Afghanistan" 
attached to "Letter dated 17 January 2002 from the Chairman of the Security 
Council 
Committee established pursuant to resolution 1267(1999) concerning Afghanistan addressed 
to the President of the Security Council", S/2002/101,5 February 2002; UN, "Report of the 
Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 1267(1999) attached to 
"Letter dated 20 December 2002 from the Chairman of the Security Council Committee 
established pursuant to resolution 1267(1999) addressed to the 
President of the Security 
Council", S/2002/1423,26 December 2002. 
89 The 1267 Sanctions Committee web site 
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As a result of this ongoing effort, approximately US$ 85 million in assets 
have been blocked worldwide mostly in the form of bank accounts since the 
September 11th attack. " 
c. The Monitoring Group 
As noted above, the monitoring mechanism was originally 
created by Resolution 1363(2001) for a period of 12 months, and later its 
mandate was renewed twice through the adoption of Resolution 1390(2002), 
and Resolution 1455(2003) until 19 July 2004.91 Shortly after the expiration of 
the mandate of the Resolution 1363 Monitoring Group, the Security Council 
again established for a period of 18 months a New-York based Analytical 
Support and Sanctions Monitoring Team(the Monitoring Team) by adopting 
Resolution 1526(2004). 92 Once again, it could be pointed out that the 
temporary nature of the Monitoring Group also results from the operational 
aspect of Resolution 1390. By its mandate, the Monitoring Group is supposed 
to report to the Sanctions Committee regularly, and most of its reports 
submitted so far contained valuable assessments and recommendations. 93 
<http: //www. un. org/Docs/sc/committees/1267/1267ListEng. htm>. 
y0 As of 30 July 2004. See, Monitoring Group Report VI, infra note 93, p. 23. 
91 UN, S/RES/1455,17 January 2003. 
92 UN, S/RES/1526,30 January 2004. 
93 See, UN, "Report of the Monitoring Group established pursuant to Security Council 
resolution 1363(2001) and extended by resolution 1390(2002)" (hereafter Monitoring Group 
Report I)enclosed in "Letter dated 13 May 2002 from the Chairman of the Security Council 
Committee established pursuant to resolution 1267(1999) concerning Afghanistan addressed 
to the President of the Security Council", S/2002/541,15 May 2002; UN, "Second report of the 
Monitoring Group established pursuant to Security Council resolution 1363 and extended by 
resolution 1390(2002)"(hereafter Monitoring Group Report II) enclosed in "Letter 
dated 19 
September 2002 from the Chairman of the Security Council established pursuant to 
resolution 1267(1999) addressed to the President of the Security 
Council", S/2002/1050 and 
Corr. 1,27 September 2002; UN, "Third report of the Monitoring Group established pursuant 
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This study deals with the viewpoint of the Monitoring Group and with other 
relevant criticisms of Resolution 1390 in the following sub-section. 
5. The criticism 
The strongest criticism against Resolution 1390 concerns its 
procedure for new listing and de-listing. 94 According to a UN report, 
individuals and entities have filed at least 13 lawsuits around the world 
directly related to the sanctions. 95 The most common grounds alleged were 
violation of basic human rights, particularly the right to a fair hearing and an 
effective counter remedy, right to property and freedom of association. 96 
Understandably, in the case of a new listing, it is very difficult to maintain a 
to Security Council resolution 1363 and extended by resolution 1390(2002)"(hereafter 
Monitoring Group Report III ) enclosed in "Letter dated 16 December 2002 from the 
Chairman of the Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 1267(1999) 
addressed to the President of the Security Council", S/2002/1338,17 December 2002; UN, 
"Fourth report of the Monitoring Group established pursuant to Security Council resolution 
1363 and extended by resolution 1390(2002)"(hereafter Monitoring Group Report IV) 
enclosed in "Letter dated 7 July 2003 from the Chairman of the Security Council Committee 
established pursuant to resolution 1267(1999) addressed to the President of the Security 
Council", S/2003/669,8 July 2003; UN, "Letter dated 1 December 2003 from the Chairman of 
the Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 1267 (1999) addressed to 
the President of the Security Council containing the SECOND REPORT of the 
MONITORING GROUP pursuant to resolution 1455 (2003)"(hereafter Monitoring Group 
Report V), S/2003/1070,2 December 2003; UN, "Letter dated 23 August 2004 from the 
Chairman of the Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 1267 (1999) 
concerning Al-Qaida and the Taliban and associated individuals and entities addressed to 
the President of the Security Council containing the FIRST REPORT of the MONITORING 
TEAM pursuant to resolution 1526 (2004)"(hereafter Monitoring Group Report VI), 
S/2004/679,25 August 2004. 
94 See, e. g., Monitoring Group Report I, supra note 93, pp. 5-6; Monitoring 
Group Report II, 
supra note 93, pp. 7-9; De Wet, E., The Chapter VII Powers of the United 
Nations Security Council, 
2004, p. 354. 
95 UN, "Letter dated 14 February 2005 form the Chairman of the Security Council Committee 
established pursuant to resolution 1267(1999) concerning 
Al-Qaida and the Taliban and 
associated individuals and entities addressed to the 
President of the Security Council", 
S/2005/83,15 February 2005, p. 16. 
" Ibid., p. 16. 
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degree of judicial control on the targeting process, and in the case of de- 
listing, it is a great challenge to make it happen. 97 The expeditious decision- 
making procedure which should be finished within less than 48 hours means 
that there is very little time for the involved states to check the listing process 
properly. 98 Particularly, the intelligence material provided to the Sanctions 
Committee may be of limited reliability. 9 In the case of de-listing, criticism 
becomes more serious. Once the suspected individuals or entities realise that 
their funds or assets are frozen, they might wish to complain about the 
decision. However, they have no choice but to make a petition to the state of 
residence or citizenship for the purpose of getting the diplomatic protection 
of that state. 10° If that state is not sympathetic, the petition might not be 
presented to the Committee, regardless of its merits. 1°' Indeed, on the 
international plane, the Security Council and the individuals are not on an 
equal legal footing. Whereas the Security Council sanctions have started to 
target individuals or non-government entities, they are totally denied the 
right to a fair trial. Based on common sense, when one's rights are 
undermined, there should be guaranteed the opportunity to protect one's 
legal interest on an equal legal basis. 102 To make matters worse, given that 
decisions in the Sanctions Committee are made by consensus of member 
9' Cameron, I., "Targeted Sanctions and Legal Safeguards", Report to the Swedish Foreign 
Office, October 2002, pp. 9-10. 
98 Ibid., p. 9. 
99 See, e. g., Monitoring Group Report II, supra note 93, p. 10. 
10° UN Doc., S/2005/83, supra note 95, p. 17. 
101 Ibid., p. 17. 
102 For the discussion on 'equality of arms' which means each party must be afforded a 
reasonable opportunity to present his case under on an equal 
basis in relations to his 
opponent, see, e. g., Reed, R. & Murdoch, J., A Guide to Human 
Rights Lau, in Scotland, 2001, 
pp. 302-312. 
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states, just one negative vote could impede the de-listing process. " 
Another criticism also has a human rights dimension. So long as 
individuals or entities remain on the list, there arises the issue of 
fundamental human rights of listed persons and their families. '`4 For 
example, if the entire funds and assets of the listed person should be frozen, 
there arises a question of how the listed person and his or her family can 
sustain themselves without any economic resources. They need to buy food 
or go to hospital, etc. Fortunately, there has been some attempt to alleviate 
this negative effect as in the case with Resolution 1452(2002). 105 This 
resolution constitutes the Security Council's major concession to the criticism 
against its rigid and inflexible attitude towards freezing orders. In the 
resolution, the Security Council admits some humanitarian exceptions to its 
sanctions regime such as basic expenses and legal service fees. However, the 
1390 mechanism is still vulnerable to criticism since in reality, it is still 
difficult for the listed person to obtain the "unfreezing" order. For instance, 
with regard to basic expenses, the unfreezing order can only be obtained 
after notification by the relevant state to the Sanctions Committee and in the 
'03 UN Doc., S/2005/83, supra note 95, p. 18. 
104 In more general terms, the negative side effect of the Security Council sanctions is already 
pointed out in much academic literature, and the 1390 sanctions regime could be described 
as sort of "smart sanction" in that it focuses on specific terrorists, in particular an elite class 
rather than a population in general. However, it does not entirely overcome the criticism 
in 
human rights context as illustrated here. For the discussion about smarter sanctions, see e. g. 
"Security Council Sanctions Committee: An Overview" (visited on 28 July 
2003)<http: //www. un. org/Docs/sc/committees/INTRO. htm>; UN, "Report of the Secretary- 
General on the Humanitarian Implication of the Measures imposed 
by Security Council 
Resolution 1267(1999) and 1333(2000) on Afghanistan", S/2001/241,20 March 2001; 
UN, 
"Report of the Secretary-General on the humanitarian implication of the 
Measures imposed 
by Security Council resolution 1267(1999) and 1333(2000) on Afghanistan", 
S/2001/695,13 
July 2001. 
105 UN, S/RES/1452,20 December 2002. 
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absence of negative decision by the Committee within 48 hours of such 
notification. 106 In the case of extraordinary expenses, the unfreezing order can 
be obtained, provided that a request is made by the relevant state(s) to the 
Sanctions Committee and is approved by the Committee. However, in this 
case, there is no time limit to the decision-making process of the Sanctions 
Committee after the notification. 107 
Thirdly, there is a criticism that despite the effort of the Sanctions 
Committee, charities and the use of informal transfer mechanism such as 
hawala, continue to pose an important challenge in the war on terrorist 
financing. 108 The Monitoring Group noted that the funding of Al-Qaida and 
associated terrorist groups through charities and other organisations 
continued to be unregulated in many states. 109 Particularly, the current legal 
and administrative frameworks of most states is said to focus only on the 
formal financial sector while some informal sectors such as the diamond 
trade and the alternative remittance system are still left outside the 
regulation regime. "' Considering some allegations that Al-Qaida diversified 
the movement of their finances such as acquiring gold and diamonds, and is 
106 Resolution 1452, para. 1(a). 
107 Resolution 1452, para. 1(b). 
10' For the related issues within the 1390 mechanism, see, e. g., Monitoring Group Report I, 
supra note 93 p. 8; Monitoring Group Report IV, supra note 93 p. 4. For a general overview of 
hawala, see, Gilmore, W., Dirty Money: The Evolution of Money Laundering Counter-Measures, 
2004, pp. 37-38. 
109 Monitoring Group Report III, supra note 93, p. 12. Surprisingly, Al-Qaida is presumed to 
receive US$ 16 million annually in donations. See, e. g., Monitoring 
Group Report IV, supra 
note 93 pp. 13-14. 
'10 An estimated US$ 80 billion moves yearly through such system. According to the 
estimation of the Pakistani bankers, haivala account 
for around US$ 3 billion entering 
Pakistan, while the formal banking system processed only US$ 1 
billion(see Monitoring 
Group Report IV, supra note 93, pp. 17-18). 
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resorting to long-established informal remittance system, this loophole looms 
large. "' 
Fourthly, some critics point out that the 1390 mechanism does not 
concentrate on the issue of the link between terrorism and other 
transnational crimes, in particular drug trafficking. Given that Afghanistan 
accounted for over 80 percent(4,200 metric tonnes, US$ 2.8 billion's worth) of 
the world's opium supply in 2004, the drug trade may remain a substantial 
source of Al-Qaida funding which is not directly dealt with under 1390 
mandate. 112 Such concerns seem to hold water, in particular considering some 
indications that Al-Qaida continued to profit from revenues connected with 
the Afghanistan illicit drug trade. 113 
Lastly, some of the criticisms of Resolution 1373 could also be true 
of the Resolution 1390 mechanism: the issue of incomplete provision and 
maintaining of momentum. For instance, Resolution 1390 also demanded that 
all states freeze financial resources of listed persons or entities, without 
further instruction. Moreover, the Sanctions Committee also has a difficulty 
in maintaining the original momentum. For example, the Security Council 
adopted Resolution 1455(2003)114 in which it demanded all states to submit 
their report on the measures to implement Resolutions 1267,1333, and 1390, 
no later than 90 days from the date of the adoption of the resolution, 
but as of 
"' Monitoring Group Report IV, supra note 93, p. 16. For a further discussion, see, supra note 
108. 
112 Monitoring Group Report IV, supra note 93, p. 11; UNODC, Afghanistan Opium Surzvty 2004, 
p. 4. 
113 Monitoring Group Report IV, supra note 93, p. 14. 
114 UN, S/RES/1455,17 January 2003. 
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1 June 2005, only some 130 states had responded to the call. " 
IV. The Lessons for Further Security Council Involvement in the 
Fight against the Financing of Terrorism 
1. General 
In order to successfully tackle the financing of terrorism, it is 
crucial to promote the synergy effect of the two distinctive approaches. For 
instance, the hands-on experience of the Sanctions Committee that has been 
accumulated in the course of pursuing these individuals and organisations 
could provide a valuable input to the work of the CTC. At the same time, the 
outcome from the structural approach could support the operation of the 
Sanctions Committee since the reinforced or newly established legal and 
administrative framework would create a more hostile environment in which 
Usama bin Laden and the Al-Qaida network operate. 1 ' 
Besides the promotion of a synergy effect, the Security Council 
needs to note some lessons to facilitate its further involvement in this area, 
"s 1267 Sanctions Committee web site 
<http: //www. un. org/Docs/sc/committees/1267/1455reportsEng. htm>. 
116 In fact this cooperative mechanism is already operating in the current system of the CTC 
and the Sanctions Committee. For instance, para. 5(f) of Resolution 1390 stipulates that the 
Sanctions Committee is required to cooperate with the CTC as well as other relevant Security 
Council Sanctions Committees. Furthermore, besides Resolution 1373, Resolution 1390 also 
imposes some obligations on all states to establish a legal and administrative 
framework on 
an operational basis that is necessary to pursue Usama bin Laden and the 
Al-Qaida network. 
Given that all states have to report to the Sanctions Committee on the measures to 
implement Resolution 1390, there is automatically established a sort of feedback mechanism 
between Resolution 1373 and 1390 on the effectiveness of the measures adopted under 1373 
mandate in a real situation. See, e. g., UN, "Report of the 
Government of the United States 
called for under Security Council resolution 
1455(2003)" attached to "Letter dated 17 April 
2003 from the Permanent Representative of the United States of America to the 
United 
Nations addressed to the Chairman of the 
Committee", S/AC. 37/2003/(1455)/26,22 April 
2003, p. 3. 
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which have already been teased out above. These lessons could be classified 
into two categories: substantive matters and procedural matters. 
For instance, in substantive respects, the Security Council should 
introduce the definition of terrorism because the defining of terrorism is the 
logical step in taking any specific measure on a harmonised basis. Also, the 
Security Council needs to provide further instructions following its freezing 
orders, and to strengthen its regulation on charities and informal value 
transfer systems. Furthermore, the Security Council needs to clarify the link 
between terrorism and other transnational crimes for effective campaigns in 
both areas. "' 
In procedural respects, the Security Council should develop a 
fairer and more objective mechanism for listing and de-listing. Moreover, in 
the course of initiating the counter-terrorism campaign on a broader front 
than ever before, the Security Council should reduce the duplication of 
activities of relevant bodies as well as being an engine for maintaining 
international momentum. 
Last but not the least, regardless of whether it is a substantive or 
procedural matter, note should be taken that "our response to terrorism, as 
"' To begin with, the link needs to be researched to prevent other crimes from being used as 
a means of terrorism. See, e. g., Monitoring Group Report IV, supra note 93, pp. 18-31. In 
particular, the understanding of this link might be of value to fight other transnational 
crimes in the field of the suppression of financing of terrorism. This is because the 
countermeasure to tackle the link might end up with strengthening the crime-prevention 
infrastructure with regard to other transnational crime. However, the effort to elucidate the 
link has been quite limited so far. See, e. g., UN, "First Report of the Monitoring Group on 
Afghanistan Established Pursuant to Security Council Resolution 1363(2001) attached to 
"Letter dated 14 January 2002 from the Chairman of the Security Council Committee 
established pursuant to resolution 1267(1999) concerning Afghanistan addressed to the 
President of the Security Council", S/2002/65,15 January 2002, p. 5. 
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well as our efforts to thwart it and prevent it should uphold human rights 
that terrorists would aim to destroy. Respect for human rights, fundamental 
freedoms and the rule of law are essential tools in the effort to combat 
terrorism -not privileges to be sacrificed at a time of tension. " 8 
In fact, all of the above issues need to be dealt with in greater 
depth. However, given that the scope of study in this chapter is confined to 
the general role of the Security Council and that major substantive issues 
such as charities and an informal value transfer system are being undertaken 
in detail by the specialist bodies such as the FATF based on the soft law 
approach, this chapter will focus on four issues to which the Security Council 
needs to pay urgent attention: the definition of terrorism; the establishment 
of a fairer and more objective mechanism for listing and de-listing; the 
avoidance of duplication; and, the sustaining of momentum. 
2. The definition of terrorism 
So far, there has been no consensus on the definition of terrorism 
in international law, and relevant international instruments have bypassed 
"8Kofi Annan, the Secretary-General of the UN, at the "Special Meeting of Security Council's 
Counter-Terrorism Committee Hears Calls for Systematic International, Regional 
Cooperation", UN Press Release SC/7679,6 March 2003. 
Fortunately, some progress has been made since in this respect. The Office of the UN High 
Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) has exchanged views with the CTC and 
submitted a note with proposals for "Further Guidance" for the submission of a state report 
on the implementation of Resolution 1373 to the chairman of the CTC on 23 September 2002. 
This note and proposals included some guiding principles for protecting human rights in the 
course of combating terrorism such as the right to recognition everywhere as a person 
before 
the law, principle of due process, etc. (visited on 28 July 
2003)<http: //www. un. org. /Docs/sc/committees/'1373/ohchrl. htm>. 
Of course, the CTC could utilise the input from the monitoring 
by other international 
human rights protection bodies and NGOs as remarked by Ambassador 
Jeremy Greenstock, 
the then Chairman of the CTC, at the Symposium: "Combating International Terrorism: 
The 
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the problem by usually dealing with specific types of terrorist acts. 19 
Currently, the preponderant practice of the existing UN counter-terrorism 
conventions is to define terrorism in the form of a list of underlying acts with 
a requirement that these acts are committed to threaten the population or to 
force some change in government policy. Sometimes a requirement of a 
political or religious motivation is added. 12o 
Of course, in the meantime, the General Assembly has been 
making efforts to draft a comprehensive convention against international 
terrorism and an international convention for the suppression of nuclear 
terrorism, 121 but it still remains to be seen if and when these initiatives will be 
finalised, signed, and brought into force. 
Under these circumstances, given that the definition of terrorism 
directly affects the ongoing effort of the Security Council to construct an 
international counter-terrorism infrastructure, the Security Council cannot 
safely rely on the current imperfect practice. It needs to seek alternative ways. 
Indeed, it is important to provide states with some guidance and information 
as to the definition of terrorism, and some uniformity achieved by this effort 
will eventually enhance international cooperation to combat terrorism. 122 For 
Contribution of the United Nations", Vienna, 3-4 June 2002. 
'19 This attitude was supported in the Special Meeting on March 2003. See, e. g. UN, 
"Provisional Summary Record of the First Part of the 57th Meeting", S/AC. 40/SR. 57,18 March 
2003, p. 4. 
120Commonwealth Secretariat Report, supra note 69, p. 4. 
12' The drafting work is under way by the ad lioc committee established by General Assembly 
Resolution 51/210 of 17 December 1996, and it was given a mandate to harmonise legal 
structures for combating international terrorism. So far it has led to the adoption of two 
treaties: one on terrorist bombings and the other on suppression of financing of terrorist 
activities. For more information, see, Press Release, UN Doc., L/2993,1 February 2002. 
" Commonwealth Secretariat Report, supra note 69, p. 4. 
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this purpose, this study will suggest two methods. One is to borrow the 
definition of the ICSFT(1999), and the other is to consult some internationally 
recognised model law. 123 
Firstly, the Security Council might set an ICSFT-style standard. In 
the view of the writer, there exist solid grounds on which states can rely in 
adopting the ICSFT approach since the Security Council called upon all 
states to become parties to the ICSFT in Resolution 1373, thus establishing a 
bridge between the resolution and the ICSFT. Furthermore, the ICSFT has 
now secured substantial universality by itself, given that some 140 states 
have ratified it. 
Secondly, the Security Council could recommend the definition of 
terrorism contained in an internationally recognised model law such as the 
"Model Legislative Provisions on Measures to Combat Terrorism" drafted by 
the Commonwealth Secretariat. On a broader look, the approach adopted in 
this model law does not deviate much from other international practice such 
as the ICSFT-style since it included both the listing approach and a 
supplementary definition. Of course, however, it should be noted that this 
model law has made some minor changes such as the direct enumeration of 
the acts which constitute offences, instead of indirectly referring to relevant 
conventions. Furthermore, it is broader in scope than the ICSFT because it 
touches upon new issues such as chemical and biological weapons, and the 
disruption of communication infrastructures, computer systems, and medical 
123 See, e. g., Commonwealth Secretariat, "Model Legislative 
Provisions on Measures to 
Combat Terrorism", September 2002. 
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services. 124 In fact, this kind of advanced approach of the model law is 
already adopted in the EU Council Framework Decision on Combating 
Terrorism(2002) which also directly enumerates a list of offences and 
introduces new issues as well. " Generally, upon a closer look at the 
developing trend of these new instruments, the focus of the international 
community seems to shift from an attack on an individual object on a small 
scale to that on the social and financial infrastructure. Given that the CTC has 
referred to this "Model Legislative Provisions on Measures to Combat 
Terrorism" as an example of guidance, and it is quite similar to the relevant 
international instrument, there also exists some room for the member states 
to safely benchmark it. 126 
3. The establishment of a fair and objective mechanism for listing and 
de-listing 
As noted above, the most important lesson from the practice of 
the Sanctions Committee seems to relate to the listing and de-listing 
procedure. The list is indeed a key to the success of the sanctions regime. 
However, in order to remain as a useful tool in the future, it should focus on 
securing its international acceptance on as wide a basis as possible. 127 In this 
regard, some suggestions for improvement might be worthy of review. 
Firstly, it is conceivable to maintain the present system with some minor 
124 See, e. g., Commonwealth Secretariat Report, supra note 69, p. 4. 
125 Official Journal of the European Communities, L 164,22.6.2002, p. 3. 
126 Ambassador Jeremy Greenstock, the then chairman of the CTC, commented on this model 
legislative provision at the 4618`h Meeting of the Security Council. 
See, e. g., Press Release, 
UN Doc., SC/7522,4 October 2002. 
127 Monitoring Group Report VI, supra note 93, p. 10. 
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changes. For instance, a minimum standard by which the Sanctions 
Committee can make a decision of listing might be introduced with a view to 
making lists as accurate and consistent as possible, paying attention to the 
cultural usage of names. 12' Moreover, the Sanctions Committee might require 
a national indictment as a precondition to listing for the purpose of 
reinforced human rights protection. 129 In this case, national judges could 
scrutinise the relevant evidence and information, providing some legal 
safeguards at the national level. "' Moreover, the Sanctions Committee could 
obligate all state to guarantee an effective appeal procedure in their domestic 
legal system. 131 This proposal has the merit of utilising existing 
infrastructures without dramatically introducing a new system. 
However, it is vulnerable to criticism on the ground that it does 
not fundamentally address the issue of the right to a fair trial. Even if a 
national indictment or appeal procedure before national courts is introduced, 
these safeguards cannot guarantee the right to a fair trial in the full sense 
without a genuinely effective judicial review procedure operating in each 
national legal system. 132 Moreover, these changes could not guarantee the 
listed persons a fair opportunity of being allowed humanitarian exceptions at 
128 This idea might substantially relieve the burden of financial institutions, given that with 
vague lists, computerised warning systems produce too many "false hits" entailing 
human 
double checks on the hits. See, Cameron, I., supra note 97, p. 11. 
129 Ibid., p. 42. 
130 Ibid., pp. 40-43. However, in order to maintain a minimum level of quality control on 
national legal systems, it might be conceivable that the authority 
to issue a national 
indictment is confined to the states that have joined the ICSFT (1999). 
Indeed, if a state 
ratified the ICSFT, the state may be presumed to 
in a degree have a will to participate in the 
international coalition to combat terrorism, compared with non-party states. 
131 Ibid., p. 43. 
132 Ibid., p. 46. 
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the international level. 
Secondly and more fundamentally, the idea of establishing an 
international review mechanism can be considered. In this regard, the 
establishment of the Security Council's own sub-organ of a judicial nature is 
one of the options. "' It definitely guarantees the individual's right to a fair 
trial, and the court's capacity for reviewing each case with relevant expertise 
and speed might be incomparable since it would be a specialised court for 
the sole purpose of dealing with terrorists. Furthermore, it is more likely to 
enjoy the support of the international community because it could be 
established by a decision of the Security Council. In fact, there are precedents 
to this scenario in the Security Council's recent practice as illustrated by the 
International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY)'M and the 
International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR). '35 Of course, there was a 
challenge against the authority of the Security Council to establish a 
subsidiary tribunal in the Prosecutor v. Tadic case but the court successfully 
justified it. 136 
'33 De Wet, E., The Chapter VII Powers of the United Nations Security Council, 2004, pp. 354-357. 
'34 The ICTY was established by the Security Council Resolutions 808 (22 February1993) and 
827 (25 May 1993). This practice well illustrates the flexibility with which the Security 
Council interprets its Chapter VII powers. For the legal basis for the establishment of the 
international tribunal, see, UN, "Report of the Secretary-General under Security Council 
Resolution 808", S/2504(1993); Roman, A. K., "An Ad Hoc International Tribunal for the 
Prosecution of Serious Violations of International Humanitarian Law in the Former 
Yugoslavia" in Clark, R. & Sann, M., eds., The Prosecution of International Crimes, 1996. 
135 S/RES/955,8 November 1994. 
136 Prosecutor v. Tadic, Case No. IT-94-1-AR72,2 October 1995. In this case, Tadic challenged 
the authority of the Security Council in an interlocutory appeal before the Appeals Chamber 
of the ICTY on three grounds(a) the establishment of such a tribunal was never 
contemplated by the framers of the Charter as one of the measures to be taken under 
Chapter VII; (b) the Security Council is constitutionally or inherently incapable of creating a 
judicial organ, as it is conceived in the Charter as an executive organ, hence not possessed of 
judicial powers which can be exercised through a subsidiary organ; and, (c) the 
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However, this approach also is not free of criticism in that the 
establishment of a subsidiary body involves huge costs and manpower, 
especially at a time when the UN is trying to streamline its organisational 
structure. 137 With regard to this criticism, it should be pointed out that this 
new sub-organ might be designed to utilise temporary judges, which would 
enable the Security Council to launch a new mechanism with less cost and 
manpower. Furthermore, this body can meet the demand from all sanctions 
committees, thus considerably relieving the overall burden on the Security 
Council in terms of human rights criticism. As a matter of fact, the workload 
might not be so high in practice as is feared. For example, it is unlikely that 
most of the elusive terrorists, including bin Laden himself, who have been 
put on the list by the Sanctions Committee, would officially challenge the 
decision as to listing. "' Moreover, the body might restrict its role only to the 
reviewing of listing and de-listing procedures without extending its mandate 
to broader issues. 139 
establishment of the International Tribunal has neither promoted, nor was capable of 
promoting, international peace, as demonstrated by the current situation in the former 
Yugoslavia. 
In response to this argument, the Court said that (a) the measures set out in Article 41 are 
merely illustrative examples and the International Tribunal matches perfectly the 
description in Article 41 of 'measures not involving the use of force'; (b) the separation of 
powers has meaning only in a national system, and among the principal organs of the UN, 
the divisions between judicial, executive and legislative functions are not clear cut. However, 
more essentially, it is not the matter of delegation of its function but what is important is that 
the Security Council has chosen the option as an instrument for the exercise of its own 
principal function of maintenance of peace and security; and, (c) the legality of measures 
could not be tested by their success or failure to achieve their ends. Nonetheless, the 
effectiveness of the International Tribunal was repeatedly endorsed 
by the representative 
organ of the UN in various resolutions. 
137 Rosand, E., supra note 58, p. 621. 
138 See, e. g., Monitoring Group Report V, supra note 93, p. 5. 
1; 9 However, desirably, once the mechanism is established, the extension of its mandate to 
another area such as the trial of terrorist suspects could 
be reviewed, depending on the 
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Thirdly, the possibility of utilising the International Criminal 
Court (ICC) can be reviewed. Although earlier drafts of the statute for the 
ICC included jurisdiction over terrorist offence, drafters decided to include 
only crimes which are recognised under customary international law, i. e., the 
crime of genocide, crimes against humanity, war crimes, and the crime of 
aggression. 14° Treaty-based crimes were not considered. "' The drafters feared 
that the investigation of the crime of terrorism requires long-term planning 
and infiltration into the organisations involved. "' Furthermore, it became 
clear that there was no time to secure a generally acceptable definition of 
terrorism. 143 As a result, the ICC has no "explicit" subject matter jurisdiction 
over the crime of terrorism. However, in a resolution annexed to the ICC 
statute, the participants of the Rome conference recognised terrorism as 
serious crimes of concern to the international community and stressed that 
the statute could be amended regarding terrorism in a review conference 
according to Article 123 of the ICC statute. 1" This conference should take 
place in 2009.145 
Under these circumstances, it should also be noted that the 
category of crimes against humanity includes murder and extermination 
consensus of the international community and the situation at the time. 
140 Selbmann, F., "Terrorism-A Case for the International Criminal 
Court", <http: //voelkerstrafrecht. org/literatur/ICC_Terrorism. pdf >. 
141 Schabas, W. A., An Introduction to the International Criminal Court, 2001, p. 28. 
142 Arsanjani, M., "The Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court", (1999) The 
American Journal of International Law, vol. 93, p. 29. 
143 Ibid., p. 29. 
14' Selbmann, F., supra note 140; UN, "Final Act of the United Nations 
Diplomatic Conference 
of Plenipotentiaries on the Establishment of an 
International Criminal Court; Annex I", UN 
Doc. A/CONF. 183/10*, 17 July 1998, pp. 7-8. 
" Selbmann, F., supra note 140. 
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committed as part of a widespread or systematic attack on any civilian 
population. Thus, -there 
is secured some room for the ICC to be involved in 
the fight against international terrorism. Perhaps, certain terrorist acts like 
the 9/11 attack might be tried under this category of crimes against humanity. 
In this regard, note should be made of Article 13(b) of the Rome statute 
which allows the ICC to exercise its jurisdiction with respect to such crimes if 
a situation in which one or more of these crimes appears to have been 
committed is referred to the Prosecutor of the ICC by the Security Council 
acting under Chapter VII powers. Accordingly, if there is a referral from the 
Security Council and certain terrorist acts could be interpreted to fall into the 
category of crimes against humanity, the ICC could exercise its jurisdiction 
over the case. 1 ' In this scenario, the individual right to a fair trial is perfectly 
guaranteed, and the ICC might operate efficiently to deal with each 
individual case since the ICC is a proper court for this purpose. This idea was 
also supported by the Policy Working Group on the United Nations and 
Terrorism. 14' 
However, the ICC scenario is vulnerable to the criticism that the 
Rome statute is not accepted by all states in the international community. In 
146 Article 7(1) of the ICC statute. For an insight into the elements of crime against humanity, 
see, Robinson, D., "Defining "Crimes Against Humanity" at the Rome 
Conference", (1999) 
American Journal of International Law, vol. 93, p. 43. See also, Neff, S., "Past and Future Lessons 
from the Ad Hoc Tribunals for the Former Yugoslavia and Rwanda", in Cullen, P. J. & 
Gilmore, W. C., eds., Crime Sans Frontieres: International and European Legal Approaches, 
1998, 
pp. 63-65. 
14' See, Policy Working Group Report, supra note 41, p. 8. For the cooperative relationship 
between the Security Council and the International Criminal Court, see, Yee, L., "The 
International Criminal Court and the Security Council: Article 13(b) and 16", in Lee, 
R. S., ed., 
The International Criminal Court: The Making of the Rome Statute-- Issues, Negotiations, 
Results, 
1999, pp. 146-149. 
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particular, the U. S., a permanent member of the Security Council, did not 
sign the statute to establish the ICC. Furthermore, the possibility of its joining 
the statute in the near future seems extremely low. 14' Nonetheless, the 
Security Council recently made a breakthrough in its cooperative 
relationship with the ICC by adopting Resolution 1593(2005). 149 This 
resolution was originally aimed at subduing armed conflicts in Sudan. 
However it provides significant policy implications in that for the first time 
the Security Council sought the assistance of the ICC in dealing with 
individuals suspected of committing international crimes during armed 
conflicts. It could act as a precedent for the future relationship between the 
Security Council and the ICC. 15o If accompanied by a consensus among the 
members of the Security Council, the current experiment with armed 
conflicts could be extended to other issues such as international terrorism. 
Fourthly and theoretically, the establishment of other joint review 
mechanisms at the international level can be conceived such as involving the 
Human Rights Committee151 and the International Court of justice. 152 
"' The major concern of the U. S. is that American servicemembers deployed overseas might 
be tried by the ICC. For details on the US objection, see, e. g., Everett, R., "American 
Servicemembers and the ICC", in Sewall, S. B. & Kaysen, C., eds., The United States and the 
International Criminal Court, 2000, pp. 137-148; Scheffer, D., "The United States and the 
International Criminal Court", (1999) The American Journal of International Lazu, vol. 93, p. 18. 
149 S/RES/1593,31 March 2005. 
150 However, Resolution 1593 excludes the nationals of states which are not a party to the 
Rome statute from the jurisdiction of the ICC. Furthermore, the resolution makes it clear that 
the expenses incurred with the activities of the ICC shall be borne by the parties to the Rome 
statute and those states that wish to contribute voluntarily. 
15' Given that the HRC could receive communications from individuals, it could allow 
individuals to initiate and make their own case. However, it is doubtful whether the HRC 
has adequate expertise to deal with intelligence material and make a proper decision. 
Furthermore, the HRC faces the problem of delay. Since the HRC meets three times a year 
while individual communications are increasing every year, it could not meet the 
requirement of efficiency and speed. In addition, the HRC does not enjoy universal 
159 
However, in terms of feasibility, these options are quite a remote possibility. 
4. The avoidance of duplication 
As the counter-terrorism campaign involves numerous 
international organisations and regional bodies, the question of how to avoid 
duplication among these concerned parties in the implementation of their 
mandates becomes a crucial issue. 
153 
First of all, within the Security Council, the duplication of the 
membership. As at 8 June 2005,154 states has became a party to the ICCPR, and 107 of them 
became a party to the Protocol <http: //www. unhchr. ch/pdf/report. pdf>. Lastly, since the 
HRC is a treaty-based body and its decisions are not binding, there is an inherent limit to the 
HRC's involvement in the Security Council's primary area. For further information, See, e. g., 
Shaw, Malcolm, International Law, 1997, p. 238. 
152 The ICJ option is also not desirable, because only a state could file a suit before the ICJ. 
Perhaps, in this case, a state might exercise its right of the diplomatic protection of its 
nationals, but this aspect fundamentally contradicts the idea of guaranteeing an individual 
the right to a fair trial. Moreover, the scenario might lead to a conflict between the Security 
Council and the ICJ, introducing the issue of a judicial review of the decision of the Security 
Council by the ICJ. In fact, several attempts were carefully made with regard to the issue of 
the judicial review, but the issue is still unsettled. See, e. g., Alvarez, J. E., "Judging the 
Security Council", (1996) The American Journal of International Law, vol. 90, pp. 2-4; Vera, G. D., 
"The Relationship between the International Court of Justice and the Security Council in the 
Light of the Lockerbie Case", (1994) The American Journal of International Law, vol. 88, p. 647, 
pp. 661-675; Martenczuk, B., "The Security Council, the International Court and Judicial 
Review: What lessons from Lockerbie? ", (1999) European Journal of International Law, vol. 10, 
pp. 525-546; Akande, D., "The International Court of Justice and the Security Council: Is there 
room for judicial control of decisions of the political organs of the United Nations", (1997) 
International and Comparative Law Quarterly, vol. 46, pp. 325-342. 
From a different perspective, the ICJ might support the weak points of the Sanctions 
Committee by way of its advisory opinions. However, this option is also not attractive since 
this advisory opinion could be requested by an international organisation, and in this case, 
the Security Council itself. Moreover, there is no room for individuals to intervene on their 
behalf in this scenario. To make matters worse, the ICJ might be incapable of dealing with its 
heavy workloads expeditiously, considering its manpower and the current demands by 
states. With regard to the structure and activities of the ICJ, See, e. g., Oda, S., "The 
International Court of Justice viewed from the Bench(1976-1993)" (1993) Recueil des Cours, 
Tome 244, pp. 110-111; Jennings, R. Y. "The United Nations At Fifty: The International Court 
of Justice After Fifty Years", (1995) The American Journal of International Law, vol. 89, pp. 496-497. 
153 See. e. g. UN, "Provisional Summary Record of the First Part of the 57th Meeting", 
S/AC. 40/SR. 57,18 March 2003, p. 4,13; Special Meeting Document, supra note 60, p. 2. 
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activities between the CTC and the Sanctions Committee should be avoided. 
Moreover, the new 1540 Committee has some overlapping areas with the 
CTC and the Sanctions Committee in general terms. For example, the CTC 
and the Sanctions Committee partly deal with the issue concerning the 
supply of weapons to terrorists, while the 1540 committee in the main aims at 
preventing the proliferation of the weapons of mass destruction as well as 
their means of delivery. Particularly in the context of terrorist financing, 
Resolution 1540 also makes a very brief remark on the need for the 
prevention of financing any non-State actor which involves the issue of 
WMD, 154 In this regard, although the weight given to the financial issue 
considerably varies, there is some room to coordinate the activities of these 
three Security Council committees. 
"' 
Furthermore, at the entire UN level, this duplication issue is also 
applicable to the relations between the Security Council and other relevant 
organs within the UN such as the Office on Drugs and Crime156 and the Sixth 
Committee. 
In a broad perspective, the issue of duplication could be further 
extended to the relations between the UN and other specialist bodies and 
regional organisations such as the FATF, IMF, World Bank, the Asia/Pacific 
Group on Money Laundering, etc. Given that the discussion on specialist 
" UN, S/RES/1540,28 April 2004, para. 2. 
iss UN, "Letter dated 14 February 2005 from the Chairman of the Security Council 
Committee established pursuant to resolution 1267(1999) concerning Al-Qaeda and the 
Taliban and associated individuals and entities addressed to the President of the Security 
Council", S/2005/83,15 February 2005, p. 38. 
15' The United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime delivers technical assistance to strengthen 
a legal regime against terrorism. For details, see 
<http: //www. unodc. org/unodc/en/terrorism. html>. 
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bodies comes in the following chapters, the issue of duplication in a broad 
perspective will be revisited on that occasion in more detail. 157 
At this point, note should be taken that this aspect of duplication 
is a double-edged sword which could be turned into a benefit in disguise, 
depending on the management of the situation. In this context, the CTC 
could utilise the input from other UN organs and international and regional 
organisations in combating terrorism, as well as making use of their 
mechanisms in implementing the 1373 mandate. At the same time, these 
organisations also could enjoy the support of the Security Council in carrying 
out the mandate within their area of responsibility through the CTC's 
capability to communicate with the Security Council. "' 
Fortunately, the CTC have made a positive step in this direction 
as is shown by the special meeting held by the CTC on 6 March 2003, which 
brought together some 60 international, regional, and sub-regional 
organisations, all with their counter-terrorism programmes. Of course, there 
is also a contrary example that the CTC visits other relevant organisations to 
brief them on its work as illustrated by the regular attendance of the CTC's 
representatives at the FATF's plenary meetings. 
159 Certainly, the effort to 
avoid duplication will contribute to the boosting of the synergy effect of 
cooperation in the future by way of giving a proper mandate to a suitable 
organisation, removing uncovered grey areas. 
's' Particularly, Chapter Six provides an overview of the duplication issue. 
's' Johnston, R. B., the representative of the IMF at the Special Meeting on 6 March 2003, in 
UN, "Provisional Summary Record of the First Part of the 57`h Meeting", S/AC. 40/SR. 57,18 
March 2003, p-5- 
151 FATF, "Annual Report: 2002-2003", p. 9. 
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5. The sustaining of momentum 
Further success of all these counter-terrorism measures finally 
depends on the will of all parties concerned with the counter-terrorism 
campaign to follow up on these international efforts. 16' Indeed, every party 
has to take responsibility for maintaining the momentum in its own area. As 
far as the Security Council is concerned, it has made efforts in this context by 
way of adopting subsequent resolutions to urge all states, international, and 
regional organisations to implement the 1373 and the 1390 mandate as is 
illustrated by the Resolution 1455,1456,1535,1566, etc. 
Another point of note is to strengthen the CTC operation. If the 
Security Council could be said to be in the centre of the counter-terrorism 
campaign, the CTC could be said to be at the heart of that campaign. It is the 
CTC that helps and urges states to implement the instructions of the Security 
Council and other relevant organisations, and at the same time, coordinates 
and encourages other international and regional organisations to participate 
in combating terrorism. Thus, given the role of the CTC as an engine in the 
counter-terrorism campaign with a capacity to make a huge difference to the 
maintenance of momentum, it seems better to "become something more: a 
full-time, professional and global body of experts, working with the Security 
Council, but following up all avenues which resolution 1373 had opened". "' 
160 The importance of sustaining momentum is frequently noted. See, e. g., Policy Working 
Group Report, supra note 41, p. 11; UN, "Memorandum From the Russian Federation 
Submitted in accordance with Paragraph 12 of Security Council Resolution 1456(2003) on the 
Issue of Combating International Terrorism" S/2003/191,18 February 2003, p. 4; UN, Press 
Release, SG/SM/8583,20 January 2003. 
161 Jeremy Greenstock, the Chairman of the CTC, at the Security Council Meeting on 
Terrorism on 4 April 200, UN Press Release SC/7718,4 April 2003. 
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In this vein, the revitalisation process of the CTC initiated by Resolution 1535 
constitute a step forward. Particularly, the establishment of the CTED and 
"on-site" visits by the CTC would have substantial impacts on member states 
in terms of securing their continuous engagement in the counter-terrorism 
campaign. 
V. Conclusion 
This chapter has outlined the two parallel approaches to the 
suppression of financing of terrorism at the Security Council level since 9/11. 
One is the structural approach characterised by Resolution 1373 and its CTC. 
The other is the operational approach represented by Resolution 1390 and its 
Sanctions Committee. Both approaches are mutually complementary in that 
one is aimed at establishing a permanent counter-terrorism infrastructure in 
the international society and the other attempts to hunt down Usama bin 
Laden and his Al-Qaida network that are posing imminent threat to the 
international community. 
However, these parallel efforts within the Security Council need 
some improvement to further its advancement. First of all, the Security 
Council needs to indicate some alternative ways to define terrorism. Then, 
the Security Council also needs to pay attention to procedural issues such as 
the establishment of a fair and objective procedure of listing and de-listing of 
terrorists, and the avoidance of duplication. However, needless to say, all 
these efforts should be made with continuous momentum to bear fruit in the 
field of the suppression of the financing of terrorism. 
Lastly, considering that the Security Council noted the link 
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between terrorism and other transnational crimes, and has indicated its will 
to deal with transnational crimes in the course of combating terrorism, the 
international community needs to be aware that the window of opportunity 
in this area is wide open, and consequently to make all efforts to ensure the 
best use of it. 
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Chapter Four: 
The Role of Specialist Bodies Since 9/11 (I): 
The Establishment of Standards 
I. Introduction 
The September 11tß' attack dramatically changed the legal regime 
in the field of the suppression of the financing of terrorism by inducing the 
full-scale involvement of the Security Council and the consequent 
introduction in this area of its binding Chapter VII powers. ' Nevertheless, the 
work of the specialist bodies such as the FATF is of note since they have also 
played an important role in this area, especially in laying the groundwork 
long before 9/11.2 Interestingly, their approach was quite distinct from that of 
the Security Council in the sense that importantly they rely upon what are 
technically non-binding standards supported by a soft enforcement 
mechanism. The approach of these specialist bodies deviates from the 
traditional law-making process of public international law such as custom 
' See, e. g, the Security Council Resolutions 1267(1999), 1333(2000), 1363(2001), 1373(2001) and 
1390(2002). 
2 The FATF was established in 1989, and at first it dealt with the money laundering in the 
context of drug trafficking, but later in 1996 its mandate was extended to the proceeds of 
other crimes including indirectly financing of terrorism. See, e. g. FATF, Annual Report: 1995- 
1996, on 28 June 1996, p. 7; the 1996 Recommendation 4 and its interpretative note. 
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and treaty. However, even though they employ non-binding methods, the 
approach of the specialist bodies does not appear to be less effective than that 
of the Security Council which can be characterised as a hard law approach. ' 
Rather, the specialist bodies seem to be more effective and work more 
efficiently in some senses. ' 9/11 has also brought about changes in the work 
of these specialist bodies through the attraction of more participants and 
strengthening of their commitment in the campaign. ' 
Bearing this perspective in mind, this chapter will analyse 
developing international standards in the field of the suppression of the 
financing of terrorism. Then, the next chapter (Chapter Five) will examine 
the way in which these standards are monitored and enforced. At the end of 
these two chapters, note will also be made of the soft law implication of these 
activities. Given the weight of soft law in the main discussions of these two 
chapters, it firstly would be of value to review what soft law means. 
1. The definition of soft law 
In general, there is no clear-cut definition of soft law, ' but several 
'See, e. g., S/RES/1373, para. 1; UN, S/RES1390, para. 1. As mentioned below, there are three 
major standards to define hard law, and the resolutions of the Security Council seem to meet 
all these standards. For discussions on the effectiveness of soft law, see, section IV of this 
chapter. 
' For example, the soft law approach of specialist bodies can avoid difficulties involved in 
the law-making process by relieving a state's concern about their sovereignty or may 
supplement the interpretation of already-existing hard law by fleshing out its simple 
structure. For details, see, the utility of soft law in Section 1.2. of this chapter. 
'As mentioned below, since 9/11, actors not related to the banking sector have actively 
involved in the AML/CFT areas, and, furthermore, the regulatory regime goes deeply into 
the heart of supervisory bodies and the supervised businesses as illustrated by the 2003 
FATF Forty Recommendations and the Nine Special Recommendations. 
6 Indeed, the difficulty of defining soft law is expressed by many scholars. See, e. g., 
Schachter, 0., "The Twilight Existence of Nonbinding International Agreement", (1977) The 
American Journal of International Law, vol. 71, pp. 297-298; Chinkin, C. M., "The Challenge of 
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elements have been identified as relevant in making a distinction between 
soft law and hard law. Among these, the absence of three prevalent elements 
can be noted as follows: (a) a binding force; (b) precision; and, (c) compulsory 
binding dispute settlement. 7 
Firstly, in terms of a binding force, if an international agreement 
has a legal binding force it might be hard law, whereas if not, it has definitely 
a soft law element. By this standard, the legal form is decisive in 
differentiating soft law from hard law 8 If the form is a treaty, it cannot be soft 
law under this category. ' Generally, resolutions of the UN General Assembly, 
guidelines and declarations of international conferences are cases in point. " 
In a counter-terrorist financing context, the FATF's 2003 Forty 
Recommendations and the Nine Special Recommendations on Terrorist 
Financing can be pointed out. 
Secondly, depending on the precision of the contents of law, a 
distinction can be made between soft law and hard law. " From this 
Soft Law: Development and Change in International Law", (1989) International and 
Comparative Law Quarterly, vol. 38, p. 852; Tadeusz, G. W., "A Framework for Understanding 
"Soft Law"", (1984) McGill Law journal, vol. 30, p. 44; Guzman, A. T., "A Compliance-Based 
Theory of International Law", (2002) California Law Review, vol. 90, pp. 1879-1880. 
See, Boyle, A. E., "Some Reflection on the Relationship of Treaties and Soft Law", (1999) 
International and Comparative Law Quarterly, vol. 48, pp. 901-902; Chinkin, C. M., supra note 6, 
p. 852; Abbott, K. W. & Snidal, D., "Hard and Soft Law in International Governance", (2000) 
International Organization, vol. 54, pp. 422-424; Elias, O. & Lim, C., "'General Principle of Law', 
'Soft' Law and the Identification of International Law", (1997) Netherlands Yearbook of 
International Law, vol. 28, pp. 44-45; Cullet, P., "Differential Treatment In International Law: 
Towards A New Paradigm of Inter-State Relations", (1999) European Journal of International 
Law, vol. 10, p. 575. 
'Boyle, A. E., supra note 7, p. 902. 
Ibid. 
'0 Ibid. 
Dupuy, P. M., "Soft law and the International Law of the Environment", (1991) Michigan 
Journal of International Law, vol. 12, pp. 429-430; Baxter, R. R., "International Law in "Her 
Infinite Variety"", (1980) International and Comparative Law Quarterly, vol. 29, pp. 561-562; 
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perspective, hard law involves clear and specific commitments whereas soft 
law is more open-textured or general in its content. 'Z Soft law under this 
category may be found even in a binding treaty. Particularly, some provisions 
are considered to be soft in that they impose no real obligations on the 
parties. 13 For example, Article 12 of the International Convention for the 
Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism (ICSFT) imposes a binding 
obligation on all state parties to afford one another the greatest measure of 
assistance in criminal matters, but it is merely hortatory and not precise 
enough to identify a concrete violation of the obligation of the convention in 
a real situation. 
Thirdly, in respect of methods of dispute settlement, a contrast 
can be made between soft law and hard law. In a case of non-compliance, 
hard law can resort to compulsory binding settlement of disputes, while soft 
law makes use of non-binding compliance procedures. ' The obvious cases of 
hard law in this category are what involves the Chapter VII powers of the 
Security Council. As was seen in Chapter Three of this study, the operative 
paragraphs of Resolution 1373 and 1390 are good examples. 15 Put simply, the 
financing of terrorism as well as terrorism itself are prohibited under 
international law and those who violate this mandate, whether states or 
individuals, are subject to international sanctions imposed by the Security 
Council. Moreover, the 1982 UN Convention on the Law of the Sea is another 
Chinkin, C. M., supra note 6, p. 851; Elias, 0. & Lim, C., supra note 7, p. 45. 
'Boyle, A. E., supra note 7, p. 902. 
13 Ibid., p. 906. 
Ibid., p. 909; Abbott, K. W. & Snidal D., supra note 7, p. 421; Tadeusz, G. W., supra note 6, p. 49. 
'S Resolution 1373, para. 1 and 2; Resolution 1390, para. 1 and 2. 
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case in point, equipped as it is with a sophisticated scheme for compulsory 
dispute settlement involving various international courts. 16 By way of 
contrast, some soft law instruments have recourse to soft enforcement which 
consists of a wide variety of methods of "inducements" and "value 
deprivations". 17 The combination of non-confrontational inducement and 
value deprivation is best exemplified by the non-compliance procedure 
adopted by the parties to the 1987 Montreal Protocol to the 1985 Ozone 
Convention. 18 When a non-compliant state is identified by an 
Implementation Committee of the convention, the state may be given 
financial and/or technical assistance as an incentive to secure compliance. If 
these measures are inadequate, a caution can be issued or as a last resort, 
rights and privileges under the treaty can be suspended in the full Meeting of 
the Parties in accordance with the law of treaties. 19 
Lastly it should be pointed out that, in reality, all these standards 
do not exist separately but work in close connection with each other. In other 
words, when all these standards are satisfied, an international instrument 
can be called hard law in its true sense, but "the realm of soft law begins" 
once one of these standards is not met and "this softening can occur in 
'6 Boyle, A. E, supra note 7, p. 909. For details of the scheme, see, Boyle, A. E., "Dispute 
Settlement and the Law of the Sea Convention: Problems of Fragmentation and Jurisdiction", 
(1997) International and Comparative Law Quarterly, vol. 46, p. 37. 
17 Chinkin, C. M., supra note 6, p. 862; Bothe, M., "Legal and Non-Legal Norms- A 
Meaningful Distinction in International Relations? ", (1980) Netherlands Yearbook of 
International Law, vol. 11, p. 88; Tadeusz, G. W., supra note 6, p. 48; Contini, P. & Sand, P. H., 
"Methods to Expedite Environment Protection: International Ecostandards", (1972) The 
American Journal of International Law, vol. 66, p. 54. 
'$ Ibid., p. 910. For the text of the non-compliance procedure revised in 1992, see, UN Doc., 
UNEP/OzL. Pro/WG. 3/3/3,9 November 1991 




varying degrees". " Thus, every international agreement can be placed 
somewhere on the broad spectrum between hard law and soft law that exist 
at either end in their strictest sense. 
2. The utility of soft law 
The contribution that soft law makes to the development of 
international law cannot be ignored for the following reasons. Firstly, soft 
law can avoid difficulties involved in the law-making process in a specific 
area by relieving a state's concern about its sovereignty. 21 By adopting a non- 
binding form or vague provisions or a soft enforcement mechanism, soft law 
may make it possible for states to reach an agreement faster or sometimes 
with a more detailed content. 22 Furthermore, soft law makes it easier for 
states to avoid the domestic parliamentary ratification process, or to amend 
or replace its text in the future. 23 Soft law may also provide more immediate 
evidence of international support and consensus than a treaty, given that the 
legal effect of a treaty is often heavily qualified by reservations and it takes 
time to ratify a multilateral treaty and secure its entry into force. 24 Perhaps, 
this role of soft law to facilitate a law-making process is best illustrated by 
the success of the OECD in its dealing with the issue of corruption. The 
OECD first adopted a soft law approach in the law-making process and it 
eventually brought about the conclusion of a binding treaty. 
25 
20 Abbott, K. W. & Snidal, D., supra note 7, p. 422. 
21 Bothe, M., supra note 17, p. 90,92; Elias, 0. & Lim, C., supra note 7, p. 45. 
' Bothe, M., supra note 17, pp. 90-92; Lipson, C., "Why are some international agreements 
informal? ", (1991) International Organization, vol. 45, pp. 514 -518. 
23 Boyle, A. E., supra note7, p. 903; Bothe, M., supra note 17, p. 90. 
24 Boyle, A. E., supra note 7, p. 903; Bothe, M., supra note 17, p. 92. 
25 For the detailed process how soft law approach enmeshed negotiating governments over 
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Secondly, soft law may supplement the interpretation or 
implementation of already-existing hard law by fleshing out its simple 
structure. 26 For instance, UN General Assembly Resolution 1514(1960) 
provided authoritative guidance to the interpretation of the UN Charter as 
indicated in Western Sahara Advisory Opinion(1975). 27 So to speak, the 
principle of self-determination enshrined in Articles 1 and 55 of the UN 
Charter can be interpreted by way of Resolution 1514 to support the process 
of decolonisation based on a free and genuine expression of the will of the 
peoples concerned. 28 Furthermore, as an example of complementing 
implementation, the 2003 FATF Forty Recommendations and Nine Special 
Recommendations on Terrorist Financing can be quoted. The 
recommendations and their interpretative notes provide detailed guidelines 
on many issues related to the implementation of Resolution 1373,1390 and 
the ICSFT, such as how to criminalise terrorist financing in a national legal 
system or how to deal with non-profit charity organisations. 
Thirdly, soft law may contribute to the formation of hard law in a 
specific area. Soft law instruments may lead to the conclusion of a new treaty 
as exemplified by the relationship between UN General Assembly Resolution 
XVIII on Outer Space of 1963 and the Treaty on Outer Space of 1967.29 
time, see, Abbott, K. W., "Rule-Making in the WTO: Lessons From the Case of Bribery and 
Corruption", (2001) Journal of International Economic Law, vol. 4, p. 275. 
2' Hillgenberg, H., "A Fresh Look at Soft Law", (1999) European Journal of International Law, 
vol. 10, p. 506. 
27 Boyle, A. E., supra note 7, p. 905. 
28 UNGA Resolution 1514(1960) titled "Declaration on the Granting of Independence to 
Colonial Countries and People". See also, Western Sahara Advisory Opinion(1975), I. C. J. Report, 
para. 55,57 and 58. 
29 Baxter, R. R., supra note 11, p. 564. 
172 
Furthermore, soft law may generate widespread and consistent state practice 
and/or provide evidence of opinio juris in support of customary law. To begin 
with, non-binding soft law may generate state practice by way of creating the 
expectations that have an impact on state behaviour in a specific area. 30 This 
is true especially where there are no rules or standards for states to 
benchmark. It would be far better for states to have some kind of guidance 
rather than an all or nothing situation when faced with uncertainty in a certain 
area. 31 The legal vacuum created by the rapid development of space 
technology in the 1960s, and the use of UN General Assembly Resolution 
XVIII as mentioned above is once again a good example. 32 Also, soft law 
instruments may provide evidence of opinio juris as shown in the Nicaragua 
Case(1986) with regard to the legal effects of several UN General Assembly 
resolutions. 33 
In sum, from these useful aspects of soft law, it can hardly be 
denied that soft law constitutes "another tool in the professional lawyer's 
armoury". ' 
3o See, e. g, Tadeusz, G. W., supra note 6, pp. 46-47; Chinkin, C. M., supra note 6, p. 862. 
31 Contini, P. & Sand, P. H., supra note 17, p. 49; Gold, J., "Strengthening the Soft International 
Law of Exchange Arrangements", (1983) The American Journal of International Law, vol. 77, 
p. 443. 
32 For example, para. 3 declares the prohibition of sovereignty claims to outer space and 
celestial bodies, and para. 8 provides for the liability of a state for the harm 
done by its object 
launched in outer space. 
Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua(1986), I. C. J. Report, para. 188. 
Boyle, A. E., supra note 7, p. 913. 
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II. The Major International Standard Setter: the FATF 
1. Context 
Following the 9/11 attack the FATF met in extraordinary session 
on 29-30 October 2001 in Washington DC to consider necessary measures to 
combat terrorist financing activities. Consequently, the FATF expanded its 
mandate to formally include terrorist financing, and adopted Eight Special 
Recommendations to this end. 35 
In addition, action was taken to amend the 1996 version of the 
Forty Recommendations on money laundering. It was a natural response 
from the FATF given that the Forty Recommendations should be subject to 
periodic review to reflect the ever-developing techniques and methods used 
by criminals as recognised in the 1990 annual report. 36 The experience gained 
through the Non-Cooperative Countries and Territories (NCCT) process also 
provided a catalyst for the FATF decision to review and revise the 1996 
version of the Forty Recommendations. 37 To this end, the FATF issued a 
public consultation document, entitled "Review of the FATF Forty 
Recommendations: Consultation Paper" on 30 May 2002, which examined 
many issues of concern and proposed options for dealing with them. All 
states, international organisations, and interested parties were invited to 
provide their comments to the FATF on these issues. 38 As a result, new Forty 
Recommendations were formally agreed at the June 2003 Plenary Meeting in 
3s FATF, "Annual Report: 2001-2002", 21 June 2002, p. 4. 
FATF, "Annual Report: 1989-1990", 7 February 1990, p. 16. 
3' FATF, "Annual Report: 2002-2003", 20 June 2003, p. 4. 
38 FATF, "Review of the FATF Forty Recommendations: Consultation Paper", 30 May 2002, 
174 
Berlin. 39 More recently, cash smuggling has been repeatedly highlighted as 
one of the major tools for terrorist financing, 40 and the FATF consequently 
issued Special Recommendation IX(Cash couriers) on 22 October 2004, thus 
making a total of Nine Special Recommendations. At this point, however, it 
should be noted that the revised Forty Recommendations are not separated 
from the Nine Special Recommendations, but should be read together, thus 
providing a combined set of enhanced measures to combat terrorist 
financing. 41 
Since its inception in 1989, the FATF which has been operating 
under a temporary life-span, has made considerable progress in the fight 
against money laundering and the financing of terrorism. However, it is clear 
that the FATF still has a major task to perform in continuing to set standards, 
considering the increasingly sophisticated international financial system. 42 In 
this context, the mandate of the FATF was extended for a further eight years 
(i. e. expiration of the mandate in December 2012) to promote better the 
AML/CFT strategy worldwide. " 
pp. 3-4. 
39 FATF, "Annual Report: 2002-2003", 20 June 2003, p. 4. 
40 See its use for Bali bombing(2002) as illustrated in APG, "APG Typologies Report 2003-04", 
June 2004, p. 38. 
41 FATF, "Annual Report: 2002-2003", 20 June 2003, p. 5. 
42 Ibid., p. 1. 
43 FATF, "Annual Report: 2003-2004", 2 July 2004, p. 1; FATF, "Mandate For the Future of the 
FATF", 14 May 2004, p. 4. 
The FATF was established by the G-7 Economic Summit in Paris in July 1989 as an 
independent international body whose Secretariat is housed at the OECD. It is a temporary 
body and its mandate has been renewed four times (1989-1994,1994-1999,1999-2004,2004- 
2012). The thirty-one member jurisdiction of the FATF are: Argentina; Australia; Belgium; 
Brazil; Canada; Denmark; Finland; France; Germany; Greece; Hong Kong, China; Iceland; 
Italy; Japan; Luxembourg; Mexico; the Kingdom of the Netherlands; New Zealand; Norway; 
Portugal; the Russian Federation; Singapore; South Africa; Spain; Sweden; Switzerland; 
Turkey; the United Kingdom; and, the United States. The European Commission and the 
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2. The general framework of the Nine Special Recommendations on 
Terrorist Financing and the 2003 Forty Recommendations 
a. Major changes 
First of all, the FATF began to make direct reference to the 
financing of terrorism in its standards. Indeed, it goes without saying that the 
Special Recommendations have been adopted for the sole purpose of dealing 
with terrorist financing. Nevertheless, the issue of terrorist financing has 
been once again highlighted and has also been given a significant status in 
the 2003 Forty Recommendations as illustrated by the subtitles that afford 
equal footing to money laundering and terrorist financing. ' 
Secondly, under the new regime, the scope of application ratione 
personae has been substantially extended to include non-financial institutions 
with explicit enumeration, " such as casinos, real estate agents, dealers in 
precious metals and stones, lawyers, notaries, other independent legal 
professionals and accountants, and trust and company service providers. 46 
Thirdly, the standards themselves have also become more 
sophisticated as illustrated by the detailed provisions on customer due 
diligence (CDD) measures in general and specifications on the CDD 
Gulf-Cooperation Council are also FATF members. In addition, the People's Republic of 
China is an observer. 
See the subtitles of the 2003 Forty Recommendations in the following; 
"B. Measures to be taken by financial institutions and non-financial businesses and 
professions to prevent money laundering and terrorist financing; 
C. Institutional and other measures necessary in systems for combating money laundering 
and terrorist financing" 
Recommendations 12,16, and 24. 
For the examples of these professions' involvement in money laundering, See, e. g., Egmont 
Group, "FIU's in action: 100 cases from the Egmont Group", 2000, pp. 50-69; Bell, R. E., "The 
Prosecution of Lawyers for Money Laundering Offences", (2002) Journal of Money Laundering 
Control, vol. 1, no. 1, pp. 17-22. 
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procedures in relation to individual categories of subjects and activities such 
as politically exposed persons, intermediaries and cross-border 
correspondent banking. 47 
Fourthly, in line with the above, attempts have also been made to 
alleviate the consequent burden in terms of implementation and in 
supervision, 48 such as the introduction of a risk-based approach49; the 
exemption of non-financial institutions from the strict application of "no 
professional secrecy privilege" in respect of suspicious transaction reports-50; 
lenient standards of "no-tipping off" for non-financial institutions; and, the 
narrowing down of the scope of activities of non-financial institutions that 
are subject to the reporting of suspicious transactions. 51 Indeed, these 
measures seems to be an effort to guarantee the successful operation of the 
Anti-Money Laundering and Combating the Financing of Terrorism 
(AML/CFT) regime, while at the same time minimising the accompanying 
cost such as duplication of resources and the resistance from related sectors. 
`7 Recommendations 5-9. 
48 IMF, Financial Intelligence Unit: An Overview, 2004, pp. 39-42. 
9 Of course, in 1990 and 1996 version, the elements of risk based approach existed such as 
the reporting obligation based on the suspicion which stood in contrast with the objective 
threshold model. However, in 2003, this trend becomes stronger as illustrated by 
Recommendation 5,23, and 24. Risk based approach allows the discretion of individual 
states and makes the application of AML/CFT framework flexible according to each state's 
own assessment of the vulnerability of a certain domestic sector. See, FATF, "Annual Report: 
2002-2003", 20 June 2003, p. 7; Interpretative Note to Recommendation 5, para. 9-13. For 
further discussions on the application of this concept in the context of the Forty 
Recommendations, see, FATF, "'Review of the FATF Forty Recommendations: Consultation 
Paper", pp. 22-35. 
so Recommendation 16; Interpretative Note to Recommendation 16. 
51 Recommendation 16. For the detailed discussion on the qualifications imposed on the 
reporting of suspicious transaction in relation to non-financial institutions, see, FATF, 
""Review of the FATF Forty Recommendations: Consultation Paper", 30 May 2002, p. 86,90, 
94,98,101,106, and 109. 
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Fifthly, the concept of the FlU has been explicitly dealt with for 
the first time in the main text of the Forty Recommendations. Given the 
significance of the role of the FlU in the public, private and international 
sectors, it seems clear that this change will make a great contribution to the 
successful worldwide operation of the AML/CFT framework. 
Lastly but interestingly, specific reference is increasingly made to 
the standards set by other organisations in the text of the 2003 Forty 
Recommendations. 52 For example, in the 1990 Forty Recommendations, only 
the 1988 Vienna Convention and the then draft Convention of the Council of 
Europe on Confiscation of the Proceeds from Offences were referred to, 53 In 
the 1996 Forty Recommendations, nothing changed except the title of the 
Council of Europe Convention(1990) since that convention had been finally 
agreed. However, in the Special Recommendations and the 2003 version of 
the Forty Recommendations, " in addition to the above, specific reference has 
been made to numerous other standards such as the International 
Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism (ICSFT)(1999), 
the Security Council Resolution 1373 (2001), 55 the 2000 Palermo Convention, 
"Core Principles", 56 and the 2002 Inter-American Convention against 
Terrorism. In some sense this is understandable because the FATF alone is 
52 I am indebted to Professor W. C. Gilmore for sparking this point. 
53 The 1990 Recommendations 1,4,6,8, and 35. 
5' The 2003 Recommendations 1,2,3,23, and 35. 
ss The Special Recommendation 1 in respect of Resolution 1373. 
5' The Glossary of the 2003 Forty Recommendations defines the Core Principles as follows, 
"The Core Principles refers to the Core Principles for Effective Banking Supervision issued 
by the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, the Objective and Principles for Securities 
Regulation issued by the International Organisation of Securities Commissions, and the 
Insurance Supervisory Principles issued by the International Association of Insurance 
Supervisors. " 
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not in a position to cover every aspect of the counter-measures, given the 
fast-developing techniques of money laundering and terrorist financing and 
the interdisciplinary nature of such measures. Accordingly, the standards set 
by other organisations are believed to significantly complement the gap in 
applying the FATF Forty Recommendations to a specific area of their 
responsibility. In the following, the changes will be analysed in more detail 
under the specific categories of the AML/CFT framework. 57 
b. The criminal justice measures in the public sector 
The criminalisation of the financing of terrorism and money laundering58 
Special Recommendation II provides that each country should 
criminalise the financing of terrorism, terrorist acts and terrorist 
organisations, and should also ensure such offences are designated as money 
laundering predicate offences. 59 In addition, the revised 2003 
Recommendation 1 stipulates that countries should apply the crime of 
s' The AML/CFT framework can be divided into four categories: (a) public sector; (b) private 
sector; (c) a bridging mechanism; and, (d) international cooperation. For backgrounds of this 
categorisation, see, Gilmore, W. C., Dirty Money: The evolution of international measures to 
counter money laundering and the financing of terrorism, 3`d edn., 2004, pp. 19-23 and pp. 93-94; 
Mitsilegas, V., Money Laundering Counter-Measures in the European Union: A New Paradigm of 
Security Governance versus Fundamental Legal Principles, 2003, pp. 8-14; UN, "Commentary on 
the United Nations Convention Against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic 
Substances 1988", 1998, pp. 65-70. For further details, see also, Section Ill. l. a. of Chapter Two. 
58 For the justification for criminalisation of the financing of terrorism, see Section 111.2. c. of 
Chapter Two. 
59 Generally, money laundering predicate offence means the original offence that precedes 
money laundering offence. However, there is some controversy on the nature of financing of 
terrorism as money laundering predicate offences because in some case, it is difficult to 
prove the unlawfulness of the money related to terrorism when terrorist activity has not 
taken place yet. For a detailed discussion, see, e. g., Kersten, A., "Financing of Terrorism-A 
Predicate Offence to Money Laundering? ", in Pieth, M., ed., Financing of Terrorism, 2002. See 
also, FATF, "Interpretative Note to Special Recommendation II", 2 July 2004. 
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money laundering to all serious offences, with a view to including the widest 
range of predicate offences. To this end, the recommendation suggests three 
approaches to describe predicate offences: an all-inclusive approach, a 
threshold approach and a list approach. The all-inclusive approach means 
that all serious offences could be predicate offences. The threshold approach 
describes a predicate offence by reference to a threshold linked either to a 
category of serious offences or to the penalty of imprisonment. Lastly, the list 
approach simply enumerates a list of predicate offences. Of course, countries 
could use a combination of all three approaches. However, whichever 
approach is adopted, Recommendation 1 makes it mandatory that predicate 
offences should comprise at a minimum the designated categories of offences 
in the Glossary of the 2003 text. 60 This specifically includes terrorist financing. 
Moreover, Recommendation 1 attempts to remove jurisdictional 
The designated categories of offences by the FATF are as follows: 
- Participation in an organised criminal group and racketeering; 
- Terrorism, including terrorist financing; 
- Trafficking in human beings and migrant smuggling; 
- Sexual exploitation, including sexual exploitation of children; 
- Illicit trafficking in narcotic drugs and psychotropic substances; 
- Illicit arms trafficking; 
- Illicit trafficking in stolen and other goods; 
- Corruption and bribery; 
- Fraud; 
- Counterfeiting currency; 
- Counterfeiting and piracy of products; 
- Environmental crime; 
- Murder, grievous bodily injury; 
- Kidnapping, illegal restraint and 
hostage-taking; 




- Piracy; and, 
- Insider trading and market manipulation. 
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obstacles based on the territoriality of the offence by stipulating that 
predicate offences should be extended to conduct that occurred in another 
country, which constitutes an offence in that country, and which would have 
constituted a predicate offence had it occurred domestically. " However, 
Recommendation 1 does not make it obligatory to apply the offence of 
money laundering to persons who committed the predicate offence. " These 
measures constitute considerable progress in relation to the criminalisation 
aspect of terrorist financing and associated money laundering, particularly 
given that the 1996 Forty Recommendations placed the decision of predicate 
offences at the discretion of individual countries without giving any detailed 
guidance, let alone mentioning terrorism itself. " 
Confiscation 
Special Recommendation III provides that each country should 
implement measures to freeze terrorist-related funds or assets in accordance 
with relevant UN resolutions, and should have measures in place that would 
enable the competent authorities to seize and confiscate them. Moreover, its 
interpretative note and best practices paper provide additional guidance to 
strengthen the freezing regime as well as facilitating cooperation with foreign 
governments and the private sector, and subsequent confiscation. 64 
Furthermore, a major breakthrough was made in the revised 2003 
61 Recommendation 1, para. 5. 
Recommendation 1, para. 6. For a relevant discussion, see, Schott, P. A., Reference Guide to 
Anti-Money Laundering and Combating the Financing of Terrorism, 2003, p. V-10. 
63 The 1996 Recommendation 4. 
' FATF, "Interpretative Note to Special Recommendation III", 3 October 2003; FATF, 
"Freezing of Terrorist Assets: International Best Practice", 3 October 2003. 
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Recommendation 3 for the purpose of strengthening confiscation measures. 65 
To begin with, the revised recommendation cautiously introduces the 
controversial concept of civil confiscation by stipulating that countries may 
consider adopting measures that allow such proceeds or instrumentalities to 
be confiscated without requiring a criminal conviction. ` What is more, the 
recommendation also prudently touches upon a concept of the reversed 
burden of proof, a powerful legal tool, by saying that "countries may require 
an offender to demonstrate the lawful origin of the property alleged to be 
liable to confiscation". 67 
Indeed, besides the system of value confiscation which had 
already found its place in the 1990 and 1996 Forty Recommendations, these 
new legal tools that appear in the main text of the revised recommendations 
65 Basically, it should be recalled that the provisional measures such as freezing and seizing 
that were included in the 1990 version, remain in the 2003 revised text. 
" While criminal confiscation is operating in personam (against a specific person) and needs a 
criminal confiscation, the civil confiscation is an in rem (against a thing) procedure by nature 
and is not conditional upon a criminal confiscation. For an overview of the civil confiscation, 
see, Palm, C. W., "RICO Forfeiture and the Eighth Amendment: When is Everything too 
much? ", (1991) The University of Pittsburgh Law Review, vol. 53, at section II ; Jankowski, M. A., 
"Tempering the Relation-Back Doctrine: A More Reasonable Approach to Civil Forfeiture in 
Drug Cases", (1990) Virginia Law Review, vol. 76, p. 165; Tonry, M., "Forfeiture Laws, Practices 
and Controversies in the US", (1997) European Journal of Crime, Criminal Law and Criminal 
Justice, vol. 5, pp. 294-307; Gallant, M. M., Money Laundering and the Proceeds of Crime: Economic 
Crime and Civil Remedies, 2005. For details of civil confiscation, see also, Section III. 1. b. of 
Chapter Two, and its footnote 68. 
6' For justification of the reversed burden of proof, see, Stessens, G., Money Laundering, 2000, 
p. 67; Bell, R. E., "The Confiscation, Forfeiture and Disruption of Terrorist Finances", (2003) 
Journal of Money Laundering Control, vol. 7, no. 2, p. 113; Gallant, M. M., Money Laundering and 
the Proceeds of Crime: Economic Crime and Civil Remedies, 2005, pp. 30-32; Smellie, A., 
"Prosecutorial Challenges in Freezing and Forfeiting Proceeds of Transnational Crime and 
the Use of International Asset Sharing to Promote International Cooperation", (2004) Journal 
of Money Laundering Control, vol. 8, no. 2, p. 107. Particularly, Smellie notes that someone who 
acquires property lawfully should be able to establish that fact with relative ease as the 
standard is only a balance of probabilities. See also, Section III. 1. b. of Chapter Two and its 
footnote 68. 
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would, without doubt, give added impetus to the development of 
confiscation law in the international arena. 
c. The prevention of money laundering in the private sector68 
Customer due diligence 
The customer due diligence(CDD) regime in the Special 
Recommendations and the 2003 Forty Recommendations can be 
characterised by reference to three modifications: (a) the incorporation of the 
basic principles on the CDD process in more detail; (b) specification of the 
CDD procedures dependent upon the type of activity and subject; and, (c) 
the introduction of flexibility. " 
First of all, as suggested in the review process, ' the 2003 Forty 
Recommendations explicitly set out guidelines on the basic principles of the 
CDD process in the context of answering the following three questions: 
- What does the customer due diligence process consist of ?; 
- When does customer identification and verification need to be carried out ?; 
and, 
68 This section should be understood in the context of the responsibilisation strategy. As 
explained in Chapter Two, since there is a limit to the capacity of a state in preventing crime 
in every corner of society in the modern era, contemporary governments have developed a 
strategy by which a government delegates its responsibility for crime control to relevant 
actors in the private sector. It regards the private sector as a valuable counterpart to share the 
burden of policing society and at the same time, attempts to utilise the expertise and 
resources of the private sector to the maximum. Garland, D., "The Limits of the Sovereign 
State: Strategies of Crime Control in Contemporary Society", (1996) The British Journal of 
Criminology, vol. 36, p. 448; Mitsilegas, V., supra note 57, p. 12. 
69 Basically, the CDD regime of the Special Recommendations and the 2003 Forty 
Recommendations is heavily influenced by the Basel Committee's "Customers due diligence 
for banks"(2001). For relevant discussions, see, Gilmore, W. C., supra note 57, p. 108; Zagaris, 
B., "Basel Group Supports FATF's Revised Recommendations", (2003) International Law 
Enforcement Reporter, vol. 19, issue 9, pp. 333-334. 
70 FATF, ""Review of the FATF Forty Recommendations: Consultation Paper", 30 May 2002, 
pp. 9-10. 
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- What should the obligations be if customer identification and verification 
cannot be carried out ? 
With regard to the question "what", the revised Recommendation 5 
enumerates four measures which are, 
- Identifying the customer and verifying the customer's identity; 
- Identifying the beneficial owner and verifying the identity of the beneficial 
owner; 
- Obtaining information on the purpose and intended nature of the business 
relationship; and, 
- Conducting ongoing due diligence on the business relationship and scrutiny of 
transactions. 
Moreover, in respect of the question "when", the revised recommendation 
indicates four situations which are: 
- Establishing business relations; 
- Carrying out occasional transactions; (i) above the applicable threshold, 71 or (ii) 
that are wire transfers in the circumstances covered by the Interpretative Note 
to Special Recommendation VII; 
- There is a suspicion of money laundering or terrorist financing; or 
- The financial institution has doubts about the veracity or adequacy of 
previously obtained customer identification data. 
Lastly, in relation to the question of "what to do if the identification is not 
possible", the revised Recommendation 5 suggests that the financial 
institution: 
- Should not open the account, commence business relations or perform 
71 Interpretative Notes indicates the designated thresholds for transactions (under 
Recommendation 5 and 12) as follows: 
- Financial Institutions(for occasional customers under 
Recommendation 5): 
USD/¬15,000; 
- Casinos, including internet casinos(under 
Recomendation12): USD/¬3,000; and, 
- For dealers in precious metals and 
dealers in precious stones when engaged in any 
cash transaction (under Recommendation 12 and 16): USD/¬15,000 
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transactions; or 
- Should terminate the business relationship; and, 
- Should consider making a suspicious transactions report in relation to the 
customer. 72 
Given that the 1996 version included some guidelines to the question of 
"what" and "when", the answer to the third question of "what to do if the 
identification is not possible" is of particular note in the context of change in 
the revised new text. 
Secondly, the Special Recommendations and the 2003 Forty 
Recommendations afford distinctive treatment to some categories of subject 
and activity, by way of providing individual specifications on the CDD 
procedures in each case. To begin with, in respect of the subject, the 2003 
Forty Recommendations allocate a single recommendation to the issue of a 
"politically exposed person", the content of which is a reflection of the 
guidelines set by the Basel Committee. 73 Also another independent 
recommendation is provided for the sole purpose of dealing with the matter 
of "intermediary or the third parties" which is also heavily influenced by the 
Basel Committee's guidance. 74 Moreover, in a very detailed independent 
72 For the issue of simply attempted and not completed transactions, see, FATF, "Review of 
the FATF Forty Recommendations: Consultation Paper", 30 May 2002, p. 43. 
73 Recommendation 6. For the details of the guideline of the Basel Committee, see, BCBS, 
"Customer due diligence for banks", October 2001, pp. 10-11. This document suggests several 
measures such as: banks should gather sufficient information from a new customer, and 
check quickly available information, in order to establish whether or not the customer is a 
PEP; banks should investigate the source of funds before accepting a PEP; and, the decision 
to open an account for a PEP should be taken at a senior management level. 
" Recommendation 9. For the details of the guidelines of the Basel Committee, see, ibid., 
pp. 9-10. The document suggests that all beneficial owners of the accounts held by the 
intermediary should be identified. However, at the same time, the document show some 
flexibility by providing that banks may not need to look beyond the intermediary, for 
example, when the intermediary applies the same CDD standards to client as the bank does. 
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recommendation, the 2003 version fully engages with the issue of "non- 
financial institutions". Without doubt, this special treatment of the non- 
financial institutions, so-called "gate keepers", has benefited greatly from the 
groundwork laid by the 2"d EU Money Laundering Directive (2001). 75 In the 
2003 text, non-financial institutions are enumerated with limited situations 
which trigger CDD process. 76 The 2003 version also leaves the possibility of 
the expansion of the list open, by providing that "countries should consider 
applying the FATF Recommendations to businesses and professions, other 
than designated non-financial businesses and professions, that pose a money 
laundering or terrorist financing risk". " Furthermore, it should be 
remembered that cash smuggling was mentioned as a unique case of the 
responsibilisation strategy which is imposed, mainly, on an individual rather 
than an institution. 78 Special Recommendation IX provides detailed 
guidelines on this issue such as the establishment of a declaration and 
disclosure system. 79 
Similarly, in respect to the activity, Special Recommendation VII 
throws the issue of "wire transfer" into sharp relief, by stipulating that 
countries should require financial institutions to include accurate and 
meaningful originator information on funds transfers and requiring that the 
information remain with the transfer through the payment chain. This 
75 See, the 2001 EU Directive Amending Council Directive 91/308/EEC on Prevention of the 
Use of the Financial System For the Purpose of Money Laundering, Article 2. a. For further 
details, see, Gilmore, W. C., supra note 57, p. 109, pp. 202-206. 
76 Recommendation 12. For a further discussion on the qualification, see, FATF, ""Review of 
the FATF Forty Recommendations: Consultation Paper", 30 May 2002, pp. 79-110. 
" Recommendation 20. 
78 See, Section III. 1. c. of Chapter Two of this study, and its footnote 111. 
79 FATF, "Interpretative Note to Special Recommendation IX", 22 October 2004. 
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special recommendation also requires the enhanced scrutiny of the 
transaction process. 8° Indeed, given the role of "wire transfers" in the events 
leading up to the 9/11 attack, this issue was deserving of special treatment by 
the FATF. 81 It is also dealt with in the 2003 Forty Recommendations in the 
context of customer due diligence. 82 Furthermore, the important issue of 
"correspondent banking" is highlighted in the 2003 Recommendation 7, 
again reflecting the influence of the Basel Committee's guidance. " The issue 
was once again emphasised in a subsequent recommendation on "shell 
banks". 84 
In sum, the sophistication of the CDD principles and the separate 
treatment of individual categories of problematic areas which are attempted 
under the new regime constitute a step forward, in comparison with the 1996 
Forty Recommendations which simply contains a general description of the 
CDD principles with no specific treatment of individual issues in this area. 
Thirdly, the 2003 Forty Recommendations introduce several 
elements of flexibility as a buffer, given that with the hardening of the 
AML/CFT regime relevant sectors would be overburdened, possibly 
incurring their resistance. 85 First of all, the concept of the "risk-based 
80 FATF, "Interpretative Note to Special Recommendation VII", 10 June 2003. 
81 Wire transfer was the main tool of financing the 9/11 terrorists. See, Gunaratna, R., Inside 
Al Qaeda: Global Network of Terror, 2002, pp. 64-65. 
82 Recommendation 5. For the text, see the italicised part of the text in relation to the question 
"when" as above. 
R3 See, BCBS, "Customer due diligence for banks", October 2001, p. 12. The Basel Committee 
suggests that banks should gather sufficient information about their respondent banks, and 
if they have strong suspicion on the nature of the respondent banks, they should refuse to 
enter into or continue a correspondent banking relationship with the respondent banks. 
84 The 2003 Recommendation 18. 
" See, e. g., IMF, Financial Intelligence Unit: An Overview, 2004, pp. 39-42; Zagaris, B., "Lawyers 
Challenge to Money Laundering Delays Gatekeepers Law in Zimbabwe", (2005) International 
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approach" comes to the fore in the 2003 Forty Recommendations. ' Through 
the adoption of this approach, the 2003 Forty Recommendations afford great 
discretion to individual countries in the implementation of relevant 
measures. 87 Namely, individual countries assess the risk of money laundering 
and terrorist financing in a specific domestic business sector, and based on 
the assessment, they may tailor the right level of measures to types of 
customers, transactions or products. This risk-based approach can be found 
across the main text of the 2003 Forty Recommendations. For instance, 
simplified and reduced CDD procedures are applied where the risk of 
terrorist financing and money laundering is lower, say because information 
on the identity of the customer and the beneficial owner is publicly available, 
or adequate checks and controls exists elsewhere in the national system or in 
any other jurisdiction. " Also financial institutions do not have to repeatedly 
Enforcement Law Reporter, vol. 21, issue 5, p. 177. 
86 See, e. g., Recommendations 5,23 and 24. For the benefit of the "risk-based approach", see, 
Bazley, S. & Foster, C., Money laundering: business compliance, 2004, pp. 118-119. Bazley and 
Foster emphasise that businesses which have limited financial resources must apply these 
resources in a responsible manner by concentrating on those areas that are more likely than 
others to face regulatory risk, and that regulators who also do not have limitless resources 
should have a process by which they can focus its attention on those things which matters 
most in the market place. 
87 For a comparison between simplified CDD procedures and reinforced CDD procedures 
resulting from the risk-based approach, see, Gilmore, W. C., supra note 57, pp. 108-109. 
88 The Interpretative Notes for Recommendation 5 set out examples of customer where 
simplified or reduced CDD measures could apply are: 
- Financial institution- where they are subject to requirement to combat money 
laundering and terrorist financing consistent with the FATF Recommendations and 
are supervised for compliance with those controls; 
- Public companies that are subject to regulatory 
disclosure requirements; 
- Government administrations or enterprises; 
- Life insurance policies where the annual premium 
is no more than USD/ ¬1,000 or a 
single premium of no more than USD/ ¬2,500; 
- Insurance policies for pension schemes 
if there is no surrender clause and the policy 
cannot be used as collateral; and, 
-A pension, superannuation or similar scheme that provides retirement 
benefits to 
188 
identify and verify the identity of each customer whenever a customer 
conducts a transaction, unless they have doubts about the veracity of the 
relevant information. 89 Furthermore, in exceptional situations, the 
Interpretative Notes allow verification of customer identity to be completed 
after the establishment of the business relationship because it would be 
essential not to interrupt the normal conduct of business. 90 
Another element of flexibility at this stage can be found in 
connection with non-financial institutions. Being conscious of the rapid 
extension of regulations to non-financial institutions, the 2003 Forty 
Recommendations provide a kind of buffer zone. In the context of the CDD 
procedures, Recommendation 12 sets out some qualifications with regard to 
the scope of activities of non-financial institutions that are subject to the 
reporting of suspicious transaction. 91 For instance, dealers in precious metals 
and stones are required to apply CDD measures only when they engage in 
any cash transactions with customers equal to or above an applicable 
designated threshold. 92 Similar qualifications can be found in relation to 
employees, where contributions are made by way of deduction from wages and the 
scheme rules do not permit the assignment of a member's interest under the scheme. 
For the justification for the simplified CDD measures, see, FATF, "Review of the FATF Forty 
Recommendations: Consultation Paper", 30 May 2002, p. 25. 
89 Interpretative Note to Recommendation 5, para. 5. 
90 Interpretative Note to Recommendation 5, para. 6. The examples include: 
- Non face-to-face business; 
- Security transactions; and, 
- Life insurance business. 
Recommendation 16. For the detailed discussion on the qualifications imposed on the 
reporting of suspicious transaction in relation to non-financial institutions, see, FATF, 
"'Review of the FATF Forty Recommendations: Consultation Paper", p. 86,90,94,98,101,106, 
and 109. 
92 Originally, there were three options as follows: 
- Option 1: An agreed minimum list of dealers in high value items e. g., dealers in 
precious stones or metals, or in works of art or auctioneers; 
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other non-financial institutions and professions such as casinos, real estate 
agents, lawyers, and, trust and company service providers. 93 
Reporting obligation 
Special Recommendation IV provides that if financial institutions 
or other businesses or entities suspect, or have reasonable grounds to suspect 
that funds are related in some way to terrorism, they should be required to 
report promptly their suspicions to the competent authorities. In the revised 
2003 Recommendation 13, if a financial institution suspects or has reasonable 
grounds to suspect, that funds are the proceeds of a criminal activity, or are 
related to terrorist financing, it should be required, directly by law or 
regulation, to report promptly its suspicions to the financial intelligence 
unit(FIU). 94 By way of comparison with the 1996 Forty Recommendations, 
- Option 2: Such other dealers in high value items as are perceived by each jurisdiction 
to be vulnerable to money laundering. 
- Option3: Option for 2, but only if it involves cash transaction (including multiple 
linked transactions) exceeding a certain threshold e. g., USD/¬15,000. 
For the revised 2003 Forty Recommendations, the Option 3 was chosen. See, FATF, "Review 
of the FATF Forty Recommendations: Consultation Paper", p. 89. 
" For example, with regard to lawyers, notaries, other independent legal professionals and 
accountants, they do not have to exercise due diligence for all their activities but only for the 
following activities: 
- Buying and selling of real estates; 
- Managing of client money, securities or other assets; 
- Management of bank, savings, or securities accounts; 
- Organisation of contributions for the creation, operation or management of 
companies; and, 
- Creation, operation or management of legal persons or arrangements, and 
buying 
and selling of business entities. 
These provisions are heavily influenced by the 2"d EU money laundering directive (2001) and 
the limited Swiss approach. For relevant discussions, see, Gilmore, W. C., supra note 57, p. 109; 
Zagaris, B., "FATF Gatekeepers Likely to Settle on a Modified Swiss Version of the Law", 
(2003) International Enforcement Law Reporter, vol. 19, issue 7, pp. 249-250. 
94 This is a suspicion-based reporting model. For an overview of this model, see, Stessens, G., 
Money Laundering: A New International Law Enforcement Model, 2000, p. 161. For the 
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three changes are of note. Firstly, the requirement applies to both proceeds of 
a criminal activity and funds related to terrorist financing. 95 Secondly, the 
new regime now provides for a negligence standard as well, by adding "have 
reasonable grounds to suspect". Thus, it is clear that the obligation imposed 
on financial institutions becomes far stricter than before. 96 Thirdly, according 
to the Interpretative Notes, attempted suspicious transactions must also be 
reported regardless of the amount of the transaction. If a financial institution 
chooses not to enter into a suspicious transaction without reporting it, the 
suspected customer might go "on the loose", thus finding a loophole 
somewhere else. 97 
Interestingly, another element of flexibility can be found at this 
stage. The 2003 Recommendation 16 provides that non-financial businesses 
and professions such as lawyers, notaries, and accountants are not required 
to report their suspicions if the relevant information was obtained in 
circumstances where they are subject to professional secrecy or legal 
comparison of a suspicion-based model and a threshold-based model, see, Noble, P. K. & 
Golumbic, C. E., "A New Anti-Crime Framework For the World: Merging The Objective and 
Subjective Models for Fighting Money Laundering", (1998) New York University Journal of 
International Law and Politics, vol. 30, p. 79; Grant, T. D., "Toward a Swiss Solution for an 
American Problem: An Alternative Approach for Banks in the War on Drugs", (1995) Annual 
Review of Banking Law(1995), vol. 14, p. 225. See also, Section III. 1. c. of Chapter Two of this 
study and its footnote 121. 
9s FATF, "Annual Report: 2002-2003", 20 June 2003, p. 5. 
96 Indeed, by the negligence standard, it is not necessary to prove that a responsible officer 
actually suspected illegality, but just that a reasonable person should and would have 
suspected illegality based on the circumstances surrounding the transaction. Thus, the 
negligence standards test is generally regarded as a wider reporting requirement than the 
standard of intent. See, FATF, "Review of the FATF Forty Recommendations: Consultation 
Paper", p. 43; FATF, "Guidance notes for the Special Recommendations on Terrorist 
Financing and the Self-Assessment Questionnaire", 27 March 2002, p. 4. 
17 FATF, "Review of the FATF Forty Recommendations: Consultation Paper", p. 43. 
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professional privilege. " In addition, while the 1996 Forty Recommendations 
provided for a "no-tipping off" obligation in relation to financial institutions 
and the main text of the 2003 Recommendation 14(b) also adheres to this 
position, exceptions can be found only with regard to "non-financial 
businesses and professions". The Interpretative Note to Recommendation 
14(b) says that "where lawyers, notaries...... seek to dissuade a client from 
engaging in illegal activity, this does not amount to tipping off". " Indeed, 
these elements of flexibility once again prove the intention of the drafters of 
the 2003 Revised Forty Recommendations to alleviate the overburdening and 
to reduce the resistance in implementation of the international standards in 
specific sectors that come under the influence of AML/CFT regime. 
Internal controls 
The 2003 Recommendation 15 provides for internal controls by 
financial institutions and non-financial institutions themselves such as the 
development of internal policies and procedures, an ongoing training 
programme, and auditing procedures to test the entire system. This position 
is nearly identical to that of the 1996 position. However, interestingly, this 
98 A similar position can be found in the preamble of the 2"d EU Money Laundering 
Directive(2001) which stipulates that: 
"Where independent members of professions providing legal advice which are legally 
recognised and controlled, such as lawyers, are ascertaining the legal position of a client or 
representing a client in legal proceedings, it would not be appropriate under the Directive to 
put these legal professionals in respect of these activities under an obligation to report 
suspicion of money laundering. " 
These difficulties in reconciling a reporting obligation with the professional secrecy rules 
have been frequently indicated in literature. For relevant discussions, see, e. g, Gilmore, W. C., 
supra note 57, pp. 202-206; Mitsilegas, V., supra note 57, pp. 146-151; IMF, Financial Intelligence 
Unit, 2004, pp. 39-41. For an overview of professional confidentiality, see also, Auburn, J., 
Legal Professional Privilege: Law and Theory, 2000, pp. 57-78. 
"A similar attitude can be found in the recital 17 of the 2001 EU directive. 
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provision is also permeated by an element of the "risk based approach". For 
instance, the Interpretative Note to Recommendation 15 explains that the 
type and extent of measures to be taken for each of the requirements set out 
in the recommendation should be appropriate having regard to the risk of 
money laundering and terrorist financing and the size of the business. 10° 
Supervision 
The 2003 Forty Recommendations provide for supervision in a 
manner which is remarkably different from the treatment of the 1996 
version. "' It covers a wider area in scope and gives detailed guidelines to 
each type of institutions or businesses to be supervised. 
Firstly, in relation to financial institutions, the 2003 
Recommendation 23 divides them into two categories: one is of the sectors 
that are subject to the Core Principles, namely, banking, securities, and 
insurance industries, and the second is simply all other institutions. With 
regard to the first category, an element of flexibility can be identified again. 
Given that these three sectors already have supervisory mechanisms in place 
which are also relevant to money laundering and terrorist financing, they do 
not have to develop a new review system but deal with AML/CFT issues 
within their existing mechanisms, thus avoiding duplication of resources. "' 
goo To this end, first of all, it would be necessary to conduct a thorough risk assessment 
identifying the areas which are more likely than others to face a regulatory risk. For a 
relevant discussion, see, Bazley, S. & Foster, C., Money laundering: business compliance, 2004, 
p. 118. 
'01 Of course, the text of the 1996 Recommendations has an impact on the 2003 
Recommendations in the sense that the 1996 Recommendations 26-29 have been integrated 
into the 2003 Recommendation 23 which describes the general principles of supervision. 
102 This attitude can be well illustrated by the Interpretative Note to the 2003 
Recommendation 23 which says: 
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In respect of the second category(all other institutions), the approach of the 
2003 Recommendation 23 is aimed at pulling these institutions into a formal 
supervisory regime, by providing that they should be licensed or registered, 
and then be subject to an effective system for monitoring. In fact, given that 
informal value transfer systems such as hawala are causing a serous problem 
in terms of the AML/CFT efforts, this approach had already been adopted in 
Special Recommendation VI. 103 
Secondly, for designated non-financial businesses and professions, 
the 2003 Recommendation 24 provides for a two-track treatment which is 
similar to the prior Recommendation 23 in terms of structure. Namely, one is 
to focus solely on casinos, and the other is to simply deal with all other 
businesses and professions in very general terms. " With regard to the 
former, the 2003 Recommendation 24 sets out several measures for effective 
supervision such as the licensing of casinos, the prevention of criminals from 
" Recommendation 23 should not be read so as to require the introduction of a system of 
regular review of licensing of controlling interests in financial institutions merely for anti- 
money laundering purposes, but as to stress the desirability of suitability review for 
controlling shareholders in financial institutions (banks and non-banks in particular) from a 
FATF point of view. Hence, where shareholder suitability (or "fit and proper") tests exist, the 
attention of supervisors should be drawn to their relevance for anti-money laundering 
purposes. " 
103 For example, in order to prevent the abuse of alternative remittance systems, the paper 
"International best practices" points out five areas of focus: (a) Licensing/registration; (b) 
Identification and awareness raising; (c) Anti-money laundering regulations; (d) Compliance 
monitoring; and, (v) Sanctions. In each area, very detailed procedures are illustrated. For 
details, see, FATF, "Interpretative Note to Special Recommendation VI", 14 February 2003; 
FATF, "Combating the Abuse of Alternative Remittance System: International Best Practices", 
20 June 2003. 
104 Recommendation 23: 
- Financial institutions subject to the Core principles; 
- All other institutions. 
Recommendation 24: 
- Casino; 
- The other categories of 
designated non-financial businesses and professions. 
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owning a casino in any form, etc. In respect of the second category (all other 
businesses or professions), the 2003 Recommendation 24(b) adopts an 
element of flexibility by stipulating that countries should ensure the effective 
supervision of all other designated non-financial businesses and professions 
"on a risk-sensitive basis". Indeed, the new 2003 regime affords discretion to 
individual countries in relation to supervision of non-financial businesses 
and professions. 105 
Thirdly, non-profit organisations which are highly likely to be 
misused by terrorists need to be supervised in a broader perspective. The 
structure and activities of non-profit organisations could be made in reality 
much more complicated and clandestine if they so intended. Thus, the 
ordinary AML/CFT measures employed by the private sector may not suffice 
to prevent the misuse of these organisations. In this regard, competent 
government authorities may need to supervise the overall activities of the 
entities rather than simply focusing on the financial aspects of their activities. 
With this perception, Special Recommendation VIII extends its supervisory 
regime to cover the entire management of non-profit organisations. 106 Of 
course, to this end, supervisory roles may be shared among relevant 
government authorities or law enforcement bodies if necessary. 
1°s Also interestingly, and in a similar context of flexibility, the 2003 text sets out two options 
with regard to the question of who is going to supervise concerning the second category. 
Namely, the supervision may be performed either by a government authority or by an 
appropriate self-regulatory organisation. See, Recommendation 24, b). 
'06 For detailed strategies, see, FATF, "Combating the Abuse of Non-Profit Organisations: 
International Best Practices", 11 October 2002. For example, the monitoring regime of 
governments could be extended to the following areas: the securing of the transparency of 
the financial accounting of non-profit organisations; the overseeing of the implementation of 
projects of non-profit organisations, including field inspection; the examination of the 
administrative and managerial documents, etc. 
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Fourthly, minor changes can be seen in relation to a general 
requirement for supervision in the 2003 text. To begin with, while the 1996 
version provided for only criminal corporate liability, the 2003 text mentions 
civil and administrative corporate liability as well. 107 Furthermore, the 2003 
text stipulates that supervisors should have adequate powers to monitor and 
ensure compliance, including the authority to conduct inspections. 1 ' Last but 
not least, the 2003 text requires that the competent authorities should 
establish guidelines, and "provide feedback" for the purpose of assisting 
financial institutions and designated non-financial businesses and 
professions in applying the AML/CFT measures. "' 
d. The FIU: a bridging body between relevant sectors 
The 2003 Forty Recommendations not only for the first time 
introduce the concept of the FIU but also provide added weight to the role of 
the FIU in the overall text. "' With a summary definition of the FIU, the 2003 
107 The 1996 Recommendation 6 vs. the 2003 Recommendation 17. For discussions on the 
corporate liability between different legal systems, see also, Schott, P. A., Reference Guide to 
Anti-Money Laundering and Combating the Financing of Terrorism, 2003, p. V-9; Council of 
Europe, "Liability of enterprises for offences: Recommendation No. R(88) adopted by the 
Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe on 20 October 1988 and explanatory 
memorandum", 1990, pp. 10-11; Savla, S., Money Laundering and Financial Intermediaries, 2001, 
pp. 186-188. 
10' Recommendation 29. 
109 Recommendation 25. The provision of feedback is of significance to promote a climate of 
mutual trust between the public sector and the private sector. Thus it could elicit more 
proactive cooperation from the private sector. For detailed guidelines, see, FATF, "Annual 
Report 1997-1998: Annex E-Providing Feedback to Reporting Financial Institutions and 
Other Persons: Best Practice Guidelines", June 1998. 
110 With the introduction of the responsibilisation strategy into the private sector, there could 
be generated a flow of substantial financial data from the private sector to the public sector, 
for example by way of record-keeping and reporting requirements. The FIU acts as an 
intermediary between the two sectors in effect providing a service of information-filtering, 
and encouraging a climate of mutual trust (Stessens, G., Money Laundering, 
2000, p. 185). For 
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text provides for a state's obligation to establish its own FlU. Furthermore, it 
is also made obligatory for the private sector to submit a suspicious 
transaction report to the FIU. il' The 2003 text also requires that states should 
provide their competent authorities with adequate powers, such as authority 
to get access to records held by financial institutions as well as adequate 
financial, human, and technical resources. 112 Moreover, the 2003 text indicates 
the importance of coordinating mechanism between all relevant parties such 
as the FlU, law enforcement authorities, supervisors, and policy makers. 1' 
e. International cooperation 
Like the 1996 text, the 2003 Forty Recommendations provide for 
general principles on mutual legal assistance and extradition. "' However, the 
revised text is more developed and refined, "' and in this regard, some 
changes are of particular note. Firstly, the 2003 Recommendation 36 explicitly 
eliminates the fiscal offence exception"' and lifts financial institutions' 
secrecy rules in the context of international cooperation. Furthermore, given 
that the 2003 Recommendation 35 and Special Recommendation I requires 
states to become party to and implement fully the ICSFT(1999), it could be 
interpreted that the political offence exception is also implicitly eliminated in 
detailed functions and categorisations of the FIU, see, IMF, Financial Intelligence Units: An 
Overview, 2004, pp. 33-82; Mitsilegas, V., supra note 57,2003, pp. 155-170. 
"' Recommendations 13 and 26. For the revised definition of the FIU, see "Statement of 
Purpose of the Egmont Group of Financial Intelligence Units", 23 June 2004. 
112 Recommendations 28 and 30. 
13 Recommendation 31. 
114 For an overview of international cooperation in criminal matters, see, McClean, D., 
International Co-operation in Civil and Criminal Matters, 2002. 
115 See, e. g., FATF, "Annual Report: 2002-2003", 20 June 2003, p. 7. 
16 The specific removal of the fiscal offence exception was in the main due to the treatment 
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the counter-terrorist financing context. 117 
Secondly, the 2003 Recommendation 40 makes a most important 
addition for the sole purpose of dealing with international cooperation other 
than mutual legal assistance and extradition, namely cooperation between 
administrative and law enforcement authorities, including the FIUs. 118 This 
addition touches upon the matter of a clear and effective gateway for 
cooperation. 
119 It also supports the elimination of restrictive conditions such 
as the bank secrecy rule and fiscal offence exemption once again following 
the position of Recommendation 36. 
III. Other Standard Setters 
1. Context 
Generally, the FATF has played a leading role in setting the 
relevant international standards. Yet, as the development of the techniques 
used by terrorists and criminals to finance their activities and launder their 
that this issue is afforded in NCCT criteria 18 and 22 (Gilmore, W. C., supra note 57, p. 107). 
"' Article 14 of the ICSFT stipulates: 
"None of the offences set forth in article 2 shall be regarded for the purposes of extradition 
or mutual legal assistance as a political offence or as an offence connected with a political 
offence or as an offence inspired by political motives. " 
For an overview of the relationship between terrorism and the political offence exemption, 
see, e. g., Gilbert, G., Transnational Fugitive Offenders in International Law, 1998, pp. 203-246, 
and pp. 251-261. 
"' FATF, "Annual Report: 2002-2003", 20 June 2003, p. 7. 
19 For example, Recommendation 40 indicates the manner in which to establish a gateway as 
follows: 
"Where the ability to obtain information sought by a foreign competent authority is not 
within the mandate of its counterpart, countries are also encouraged to permit a prompt and 
constructive exchange of information with non-counterparts. Co-operation with foreign 
authorities other than counterparts could occur directly or indirectly. When uncertain about 
the appropriate avenue to follow, competent authorities should first contact their foreign 
counterparts for assistance. " 
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money involves not only financial institutions but also other businesses and 
professions, it has become clear that the FATF alone cannot cover every 
aspect of problems effectively. In this regard, there arises a need for setting 
standards in more detail which are tailored to specific businesses or 
professions, thus complementing the FATF framework. For example, the 
securities sector and insurance sectors were recently subsumed under the 
AML/CFT framework. 12° Furthermore, in order to facilitate cooperation 
between the government sector and the private sector, an association of the 
FIUs to set up their own standards and to promote best practices has also 
been established; namely, the Egmont Group. 
In sum, the standards set by these specialist bodies are playing a 
significant role in supplementing the FATF Forty Recommendations. These 
complementary standards will be introduced briefly in what follows, but 
note should also be taken that the scope of these complementary 
international standards might be extended further, depending on the 
development in techniques of money laundering and terrorist financing, as 
pointed out in the 2003 Recommendation 20. 
2. Basel Committee on Banking Supervision 
The Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (BCBS) is a 
committee of banking supervisory authorities that was established by the 
central bank governors of the Group of 10 countries in 1974, and meets four 
120 See, e. g., FATF, "Methodology for Assessing Compliance with Anti-Money Laundering 
and Combating the Financing of Terrorism Standards", 11 October 2002; FATF, 
"Methodology for Assessing Compliance with the FATF 40 Recommendations and the FATF 
8 Special Recommendations", 27 February 2004. 
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times a year. 12' The BCBS has no formal international supervisory authority, 
and its conclusions have no legally binding force. 1 Rather, "it formulates 
broad supervisory standards and guidelines and recommends statements of 
best practice in the expectation that individual authorities will take steps to 
implement them through detailed arrangements - statutory or otherwise - 
which are best suited to their own national systems". 123 The BCBS aims at 
closing gaps in international supervisory coverage, with a specific reference 
to two basic principles: that no foreign banking establishment should escape 
supervision; and, that supervision should be adequate. 124 To this end, the 
BCBS has issued a series of documents since 1975, and the following are of 
relevance in terms of the global AML/CFT framework. Already from the 
1990s, the BCBS has expressed its will to support the work of the FATF, and 
recently, also engaged in the revision of the Forty Recommendations. "' 
a. Prevention of Criminal Use of the Banking System for the Purpose of 
Money-Laundering (1988) 
This historic paper "Prevention of criminal use of the banking 
system for the purpose of money-laundering" is aimed at the outlining of 
basic principles and procedures that banks' managements should ensure are 
1z' Lee, L. L. C., "The Basle Accords as Soft law: Strengthening International Banking 
Supervision", (1999) Virginia Journal of International Law, vol. 39, pp. 16-17. See also (visited on 
1 March 2004)<http: //www. bis. org/bcbs>. As of 1 June 2005, its membership consists of 13 
countries: Belgium, Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, 
Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, United Kingdom and United States. 
'22 Schott, P. A., supra note 62, p. III-12. 
123 Ibid., p. 111-12. 
124 (visited on 1 June 2005)<http: //www. bis. org/bcbs/aboutbcbs. htm>. 
125 FATF, "Methodology for Assessing Compliance with Anti-Money Laundering and 
Combating the Financing of Terrorism Standards", 11 October 2002, p. 4; FATF, "Annual 
Report: 2002-2003", 20 June 2003, p. 4. 
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in place within their institutions with a view to assist in suppressing money 
laundering through the banking system, national and international. 126 This 
document is of value since it heavily influenced the initial composition of the 
1990 Forty Recommendations with its four major principles: (a) know your 
customer; (b) conduct business in compliance with high ethical standards 
and laws; (c) cooperate fully with law enforcement authorities; and, (d) have 
in place policies and procedures to carry out the above three principles. 127 
b. Core Principles for Effective Banking Supervision (1997) 
In September 1997, through the adoption of the document 
entitled "Core Principles for Effective Banking Supervision", the BCBS 
established twenty-five principles that need to be in place for a supervisory 
system to operate effectively. Besides the principles themselves, this 
document also includes explanations of the various methods which 
supervisors can employ to implement them. Indeed, these principles cover a 
wide range of topics, and one of these principles deals directly with money 
laundering. It is Core Principle 15 which stipulates: 128 
"Banking supervisors must determine that banks have adequate policies, 
practices and procedures in place, including strict "know your customer" rules, 
that promote high ethical and professional standards in the financial sector and 
prevent the bank being used, intentionally or unintentionally, by criminal 
elements. " 
However, as is pointed out in the document, the key objective of 
'26 Schott, P. A., supra note 62, p. III-13. 
''' For a further analysis, see, Drage, J., "Countering Money Laundering: The Response of the 
Financial Sector", Macqueen, H. L., ed., Money Laundering, 1993, p. 65. 
128 <http: //www. bis. org/publibcbs3Oa. pdf>. 
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supervision is to maintain stability and confidence in the financial system, 
thereby reducing the risk of loss to depositors and other creditors. 129 In this 
sense, although not in a direct way, the application of all other twenty-four 
principles is essential to support the AML/CFT framework as a whole 
package. "' 
c. Core Principles Methodology (1999)13' 
The Core Principles(1997) as above were originally designed to 
provide general guidance. However, in terms of implementation, the BCBS 
realised that national supervisory authorities might misinterpret them. 132 At 
the same time, also with regard to the assessment of compliance with the 
Core Principles, it was important that concerned parties, such as the IMF, the 
World Bank, and regional development banks, should be provided with a 
common basis of interpretation. Otherwise it was possible that they might 
misunderstand the principles and have varied interpretations possibly 
resulting in the provision of inconsistent advice. 133 In this context, the BCBS 
developed a methodology for use in compliance assessment in 1999 which is 
entitled the "Core Principles Methodology". This document discusses each 
Core Principle in detail. Namely, for each Core Principle, various criteria are 
enumerated, which are then divided into two categories: "essential criteria" 
129 BCBS, "Core Principles for Effective Banking Supervision", p. 8. 
130 See, e. g., IMF/World Bank, "Enhancing Contributions To Combating Money Laundering: 
Policy Paper; Annex II", 26 April 2001, pp. 29-32. 
131 (visited on 31 March 2004)< http: //www. bis. org/publ/bcbs6l. htm>. 
132 BCBS, "Core Principles Methodology", p. 5 
1331bid., p. 5. 
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and "additional criteria". 1M Consequently, the application of the Core 
Principle 15 (1997) is considerably strengthened with the provision of eleven 
essential criteria and five additional criteria by the 1999 methodology. 135 
d. Customer due diligence for banks (2001)136 
Without due diligence, banks can become subject to reputational, 
operational, legal and concentrational risks, which can result in significant 
financial cost. 137 Accordingly, the BCBS issued another crucial paper on the 
know-your-customer(KYC) issue in October 2001, which is entitled 
"Customer due diligence for banks". This paper builds upon the three 
documents as explained above, thus dealing with the KYC issue in more 
detail. "' For instance, in addition to the general elements of KYC standards, 
the paper provides for an in-depth analysis of specific identification issues 
such as trust, corporate vehicles, introduced business, politically exposed 
persons, and correspondent banking. In February 2003, the "General Guide 
to Account Opening and Customer Identification" was issued as an addition 
' Ibid., p. 2. This division facilitates the discerning of the priority among the criteria. 
' For the details of the criteria, see ibid., pp. 33-34. 
136 <http: //www. bis. org/publ/bcbs85. htm>. 
137 Reputational risks take place where a bad reputation may result in the loss of confidence 
by depositors, creditors and the general market place. Operational risk is with regard to a 
situation where failed internal processes, or systems may bring about direct or indirect loss 
to banks. Legal risks exist where banks may be subject to lawsuits resulting from the failure 
to observe mandatory KYC procedures. Concentration risks are concerned with a situation 
where banks are exposed to single borrowers or groups of related borrowers without 
knowing precisely who the customers are (BCBS, "Customer due diligence for banks", pp. 4- 
5). For a further discussion, see, Codd, E., "Reputational Risk" in Clark, A. & Burrell, P., eds., 
A Practitioner's Guide to International Money Laundering Lain and Regulation, 1" edn., 2003, 
pp. 69-76. 
138 For a relevant discussion, see, Clark, A. & Russell, M., "Know Your Customer", in Clark, 
A. & Burrell, P., eds., A Practitioner's Guide to International Money Laundering Law and 
Regulation, Ist edn., 2003, pp. 88-89. 
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to this KYC paper. These guidelines are also of value beyond the money 
laundering context in that they aim to protect the safety and soundness of 
banks. 13' More recently, in October 2004, the BCBS issued another supporting 
document for the 2001 KYC paper, the "Consolidated KYC Risk 
Management". This document emphasises the importance of a centralised 
approach in promulgating KYC standards. In other words, international 
banking groups should establish a centralised process for coordinating and 
promoting KYC policies and procedures as well as sharing information 
across the head office and all branches and subsidiaries worldwide. 
3. Wolfsberg Group of Banks 
The Wolfsberg Group of Banks, which was established in 2000 
and named after a town in Switzerland, is an association of twelve 
international private banks. '"' Interestingly, while the BCBS is an association 
of supervisory bodies in the banking industry, the Wolfsberg Group is an 
association of the supervised banks themselves. In fact, the Wolfsberg Group 
of Banks is the only international AML/CFT initiative which is taken by the 
private sector. Indeed this aspect stands in stark contrast with the "public" 
nature of practices of other international standard setters such as the BCBS 
and IOSCO. Outwith this comparison, there naturally arose a question of 
why the private sector should become active in this area. As a matter of fact, 
this change in position of the private banks was brought about by virtue of 
139 See, Schott, P. A., supra note 62, p. III-15. 
140 The members of the Wolfsberg Group are as follows: BN AMRO NV, Banco Santander 
Central Hispanco, S. A., Bank of Tokyo-Mitsubishi, Ltd., Barclays Bank plc, Citigroup, Credit 
Suisse Group, Deutsche Bank AG, HSBC Holdings plc, J. P. Morgan Chase, Societe Generale, 
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the existence of a non-level playing field in the banking industry. Namely, 
although banking supervisors struggled to implement international 
AML/CFT standards in the 1990s, the outcome was the "creation of a 
patchwork of rather diverse rules which enabled money launderers to profit 
from the discrepancies between various financial centres". 141 Under these 
circumstances, it is indeed intolerable for internationally active banks which 
had to apply all these diverse standards while at the same time they 
constantly risked losing clients to competitors operating under a more 
flexible regulatory framework elsewhere. "' It was apparently necessary for 
these major banks to be guaranteed the "level playing field" but for some 
time, they waited for the regulators to make the next move. 143 However, at 
the end of the 1990s, the FATF developed other priorities such as non- 
cooperative countries and territories (NCCT) rather than refining the existing 
standards and its own performance. ' Furthermore, another pressure was 
placed on the banking industry by a series of banking scandals in connection 
with highly placed political officials in the 1990s, seriously damaging the 
reputation of the involved banks. 
145 Thus, this time "the affected banks 
themselves" made the next move by adopting their own guidelines as 
explained below. This movement influenced not only the banking industry 
UBS AG. 
141 Pieth, M. & Aiofi, G., "The Private Sector becomes active: The Wolfsberg Process", p. 3. 
.. 2 Ibid., p. 3 
143 Ibid., p. 3. 
144 Ibid., p. 3 
145 For examples of the banking scandals, see, e. g., US Senate, "Minority Staff Report for 
Permanent Subcommittee on Investigation; Hearing on Private Banking and Money 
Laundering: A Case Study of Opportunities and Vulnerabilities", 9 November 1999; 
Hinterseer, K., Criminal Finance: The Political Economy of Money Laundering in a Comparative 
Legal Context, 2002, pp. 262-264. 
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itself but also the regulators in the public sector. 146 With this momentum, the 
Wolfsberg Group also participated as a key partner in the drafting process of 
the 2003 Forty Recommendations. 147 Thus, the reciprocal process between the 
private sector and public sector has been put into full effect. By so doing, 
both sectors will, without doubt, benefit from narrowing the gap of the 
understanding of diverse issues concerning the AML/CFT campaign. 1 ' In 
fact, the real strength of the Wolfsberg Group lies in the fact that its members 
allegedly make up more than 60% of the world market in private banking. "' 
a. Anti-Money Laundering Principles for Private Banking (2000) 
The first relevant initiative of the Wolfsberg Group was to adopt 
"Anti-Money Laundering Principles for Private Banking" in October 2000 
which were subsequently revised in 2002. These principles cover the full set 
of preventive anti-money laundering measures, ranging from customer due 
diligence to supervision and internal contro1.15o The eleven principles are 
related to the following issues: 
- Client acceptance: general guidelines; 
- Client acceptance: situations requiring additional diligence/attention; 
- Updating client files; 
- Practices when identifying unusual or suspicious activities; 
- Monitoring; 
- Control responsibilities; 
146 Pieth, M. & Aiofi, G., "The Private Sector becomes active: The Wolfsberg Process", p. 5. 
Ibid., p. 5. 
18 It could be said that one of the main achievements of the banking industry in the early 21st 
century has been to win the regulators over to follow a "risk-based approach" when 
developing norms rather than a "rule-based approach"(Ibid., pp. 5-6). 
149 Ibid., p. 5. 
'50 See, Wolfsberg Group, "Wolfsberg Press Releases", 30 October 2000. 
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- Reporting; 
- Education, training and information; 
- Record retention requirements; 
- Exceptions and deviations based on risk assessment; and, 
- Adequately staffed independent department responsible for the prevention 
of money laundering. 15' 
b. Statement on the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism (2002) 
Following 9/11, the Wolfsberg Group adopted the "Statement on 
the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism" in May 2002.152 This 
document first points out that funds used in the financing of terrorism do not 
necessarily derive from criminal activity. Then it emphsises the role of 
financial institutions in the fight against terrorism such as proper 
identification of customers and enhanced due diligence. 15' Interestingly, this 
document includes human rights aspects of the counter-terrorism campaign, 
by mentioning that the Wolfsberg Group is committed to participate in the 
counter-terrorism campaign in a manner which is non-discriminatory and is 
respectful of the rights of individuals. " 
c. Anti-Money Laundering Principles for Correspondent Banking (2002) 
Shortly after 9/11, global correspondent banking was highlighted 
as playing an important role in the financing of terrorism and money 
laundering. "' However, at the time, no initiative existed to focus on this issue, 
151 <http: ///www. wolfsberg-principles. com/privat-banking. html>. 
's2 (visited on 20 March 2004)<http: //www. wolfsberg-principles. com/financing- 
terrorism. html>. 
153 Principles 2,4,5, and 6. 
'54 Principle 3. 
155 See, Wolfsberg Group, Press Release, 5 November 2002. 
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thus making it difficult to tackle it as a means to frustrate the financing of 
terrorism and criminal activity. '56 In this regard, the Wolfsberg Group 
adopted the "Wolfsberg Anti-Money Laundering Principles for 
Correspondent Banking" in November 2002. It affords an in-depth treatment 
to the issue concerning correspondent banking as illustrated by the due 
diligence standards with regard to client banks, "' and the elements requiring 
enhanced due diligence. 158 In addition, what is peculiar in this document is 
its use of the risk-based approach. 159 It encourages each institution to give 
appropriate weight to each risk factor as it deems necessary and stipulates 
that it may adjust the level of due diligence subsequently. 10 
d. Monitoring Screening and Searching Wolfsberg Statement (2003)161 
Since its inception, the Wolfsberg Group has issued three 
documents for the purpose of combating terrorist financing and money 
laundering in the banking industry. However, these documents lacked a 
'sb Ibid. 
Principle 5 provides that a bank shall consider the client bank's: 
- Client domicile and organisation; 
- Client ownership and executive management; 
- Correspondent banking client's business; 
- Products or services offered; 
- Regulatory status and history; 
- Anti-money laundering controls; 
- No business arrangements with shell banks; and, 
- Client visit 
158 Principle 6 provides for the elements that require enhanced due diligence as follows: 
- Ownership and management; 
- PEP involvement; 
- Correspondent banking client's anti-money laundering controls; and, 
- Downstream correspondent banking. 
159 Schott, P. A., supra note 62, p. IV 5. 
160 See, e. g., Principles 4,5,6, and 8. 
161 <http: //www. wolfsberg-principles. com/monitoring. html> 
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detailed standard operating procedure as to monitoring and reporting matter 
based on the assessment of risk that each type of transaction poses. 162 In this 
context, the Wolfsberg Group issued the "Monitoring Screening and 
Searching Wolfsberg Statement" in September 2003 for the purpose of filling 
the gap by introducing three important concepts: real-time screening; 
retroactive search; and, risk-based transaction monitoring. " Indeed, this 
refinement of the risked-based CDD process provides more clear-cut 
guidance in the implementation of the AML/CFT standards for supervisory 
authorities as well as for the banking industry itself. 
4. The International Association of Insurance Supervisors 
The International Association of Insurance Supervisors(IAIS), 
established in 1994, is an organisation which represents the insurance 
supervisory authorities from some 130 jurisdictions. "4 The functions of the 
IAIS are to: 
- Promote cooperation among insurance regulators; 
- Set international standards for insurance supervision; 
- Provide training to members; and, 
- Coordinate work with regulators in the other financial sectors and 
international financial institutions. 165 
See, ibid., preamble. 
'63 See, ibid., article 2(definitions). Real-time screening means the screening or filtering of 
payment instructions prior to their execution in order to prevent making funds available in 
breach of sanctions, embargoes and other measures. Retroactive searches are defined as the 
identification of specific past transactions, as well as existing and closed accounts. 
Transaction monitoring means the process of monitoring transaction after their execution in 
order to identify unusual transactions, including monitoring single transactions, as well as 
transaction flows. 
" (visited on 1 June 2005)<http: //www. iaisweb. org>. 
'65 Ibid. 
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a. Anti-Money Laundering Guidance Notes for Insurance Supervisors and 
Insurance Entities (2002) 
In relation to the AML/CFT issues, the IAIS issued the "Anti- 
Money Laundering Guidance Notes for Insurance Supervisors and Insurance 
Entities" in January 2002.166 Like other documents issued by specialist bodies, 
the notes are just guidance in a literal sense, and implementation is entirely 
at the discretion of individual countries. For the insurance entities, these 
guidance notes indicate the following basic principles: 
- Comply with anti-money laundering laws ; 
- Know your customer ; 
- Cooperate with law enforcement authorities, insurance supervisors, and 
other investigative and supervisory authorities ; and, 
- Have in place anti-money laundering policies, procedures and a training 
programme. 
Indeed, these four principles are very similar to the four 
principles in the BCBS's "Statement of Principle on Money Laundering" 
(1988). 16' The notes provide an insight into how to apply the AML/CFT 
framework, such as customer identification and suspicious transactions, 
within the insurance industry. Later, in order to reflect the revised 2003 text 
of the FATF Forty Recommendations, another guidance note of a similar 
nature entitled "Guidance Paper on Anti-Money Laundering and Combating 
the Financing of Terrorism", was issued in October 2004.161 This document is 
in effect the revised version of the 2002 guidance notes, and is seeking more 
166 For an overview of these notes, see, Butterworth, S., "Regulators: IAIS Anti-Money 
Laundering Guidelines" in Clark, A. & Burrell, P., eds., A Practitioner's Guide to International 
Money Laundering Law and Regulation, 1st edn., 2003, pp. 231-242. 
167 Schott, P. A., supra note 62, p. III-16. 
168<http: //www. iaisweb. org/041013_GP5_Guidance_paper_on_anti_money_laundering_and_ 
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harmonisation with the FATF text. 
b. Insurance Core Principles and Methodology (2003) 
In October 2003, the IRIS adopted the "Insurance Core Principles 
and Methodology" for the purpose of clarifying essential principles that need 
to be in place for a supervisory system to be effective. The IRIS sets out 
twenty-eight Core Principles the last of which provides for the AML/CFT 
strategy: 
"The supervisory authority requires insurers and intermediaries, at a minimum 
those insurers and intermediaries offering life insurance products or other 
investment related insurance, to take effective measures to deter, detect and 
report money laundering and the financing of terrorism consistent with the 
Recommendations of the Financial Action Task Force on Money Laundering 
(FATF). "169 
Furthermore, the five essential criteria attached to this principle 
provides detailed guidelines concerning its application in practice in relation 
to such as powers and resources of supervision, authority to cooperate with 
the domestic FIU, and consistency with the FATF Recommendations. 
S. International Organization of Securities Commissions 
The International Organization of Securities Commissions 
(IOSCO) was established in 1983 as an association of securities regulatory 
agencies. 17' Currently the IOSCO consists of regulatory bodies from some 110 
comb ating_the_financing_of_terrorism_approved_040107. pdf>. 
169 Core Principle 28. 
10 (visited on 23 March 2004)<http: //www. iosco. org/about/>. 
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jurisdictions. 171 In fact, there are three kinds of membership categories which 
are ordinary, associate, and affiliate. Usually, a governmental regulatory 
body becomes an ordinary member, and an associate member means any 
other eligible public body with an appropriate responsibility for securities 
regulation beyond the ordinary member in a country. Lastly, the affiliate 
members are self-regulatory organisations. Among these three categories of 
membership, only the ordinary membership can exercise voting powers. 12 
Exceptionally, however, if there is no governmental regulatory body in a 
country, a self-regulatory organisation, such as a stock exchange, from that 
country is eligible for ordinary membership of the Organisation. 17' The 
IOSCO have three core principles in place with regard to securities 
regulation: 
- The protection of investors; 
- Ensuring that markets are fair, efficient and transparent; and, 
- The reduction of systemic risk, 174 
a. Resolution on Money Laundering (1992) 
The IOSCO became involved in dealing with money laundering 
in the early 1990s. An important step was taken with the adoption of the 
"Resolution on Money Laundering" in 1992 which briefly touched upon the 
basic rules for combating money laundering such as customer identification, 
and record keeping requirements. 7' 
171 (visited on 1 June 2005)<http: //www. iosco. org/lists/>. 
172 (visited on 23 March 2004)< http: //www. iosco. org/about/about. cfm? whereami=page5>. 
173 Schott, P. A., supra note 62, p. 111-17. 
174 IOSOC, "Objectives and Principles of Securities Regulation", May 2003, pp. 5-6. 
1's For the detailed text, see (visited on 23 March 2003)< 
http: //www. iosco. org/resolutions/pdf/IOSCORES5. pdf>. 
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b. Principles on Client Identification and Beneficial Ownership for the 
Securities Industry(2004) 
In May 2003, the IOSCO adopted a document on the basic 
principles of securities regulations entitled "Objectives and Principles of 
Securities Regulations". This document allocated one principle to the money 
laundering issue but it was drafted in such a general way that no detailed 
guidelines could be drawn. 
17' Indeed, the progress of the AML/CFT strategy 
in the securities sector seems to have been slower than in other sectors 
despite its earlier initiative in 1992.17 However, a major breakthrough was 
made with the adoption of "Principles on Client Identification and Beneficial 
Ownership for the Securities Industry" in May 2004. These principles are 
heavily influenced by the 2003 FATF Forty Recommendations and are very 
detailed providing specific advice to the staff in the industry. These include 
requirements that compel authorised securities service providers(ASSP) to: 
identify their clients; obtain adequate information about their clients' 
circumstances and investment objectives; as well as maintaining records of 
this data. 178 
16 Principle 8.5 provides for the basic position of the IOSCO with regard to money 
laundering as follows: 
"Securities regulators should consider the sufficiency of domestic legislation to address the 
risks of money laundering. The regulator should also require that market intermediaries 
have in place policies and procedures designed to minimize the risk of the use of an 
intermediaries business as a vehicle for money laundering. " 
" For the explanation on the delayed progress in securities sector, see, "The Initiatives 
by 
the BCBS, IAIS and IOSCO to combat money laundering and the financing of terrorism", 
June 2003, pp. 8-9. 
178 IOSCO, "Principles on Client Identification and Beneficial Ownership for the Securities 
Industry", p. 2. 
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6. Egmont Group of Financial Intelligence Units 
The Egmont Group which is named for the location of its first 
meeting in the Egmont-Arenberg Palace in Brussels in 1995, is an informal 
organisation of FIUs. 179 The Egmont Group aims at providing a forum for 
FIUs to improve support for each of their national AML/CFT programmes 
and to coordinate AML/CFT initiatives. "' For the purpose of membership, an 
operational AML/CFT agency should meet the definition of the FIU 
established by the Egmont Group, which is: 
"A central, national agency responsible for receiving(and, as permitted, 
requesting), analysing and disseminating to the competent authorities, 
disclosures of financial information (i) concerning suspected proceeds of crime 
and potential financing of terrorism, or (ii) required by national legislation, in 
order to counter money laundering and terrorism financing. " 181 
Membership of the Egmont Group is in the region of 100 states and 
territories. 182 With a view to promote the cooperation of the FIUs, it has set 
out international standards called "Principles for Information Exchange 
between Financial Intelligence Units for Money Laundering Cases" on 13 
June 2001. This document provides for cooperation based on mutual trust 
and reciprocity, and conditions for the exchange of information such as the 
rules of specialty and confidentiality. "' It was subsequently reinforced with 
the adoption of "Best Practices for the Exchange of Information Between 
19 Egmont Group, "Information Paper on Financial Intelligence Units and the Egmont 
Group", p. 3. Thus, the Egmont Group has no permanent Secretariat and administration 
functions are shared on a rotating basis. 
1.0 Schott, P. A., supra note 62, p. III-19. 
'. ' Egmont Group, "Statement of the Purpose", p. 2. Terrorist financing has been inserted 
through the revision in June 2004 Plenary meeting. 
1R2<http: //www. egmontgroup. org>. 
183 Ibid. 
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Financial Intelligence Units" on 15 November 2004.1& The Egmont Group 
became an observer to the FATF in February 2002, '85 and the interpretative 
notes to the revised 2003 FATF Forty Recommendations make direct 
reference to the Egmont Group as a standard-setter concerning the role and 
functions of FIUs. 
186 
IV. The soft law phenomena: non-binding but detailed provisions 
To begin with, it needs to be clarified whether all these standards 
could be classified as soft law. In fact, what all these standards of specialist 
bodies as mentioned above have in common is that firstly, they are legally 
non-binding in nature. Thus, as it is symbolically indicated by the BCBS, 
these standards "will become the benchmark for supervisors to establish 
national practices and for the supervised to design their own programmes. """' 
Secondly, all these standards are very detailed and tailored to particular 
institutions and risks in a specific industry, thus complementing the 
generality of the hard law with regard to implementation in practice. Namely, 
in the field of terrorist financing, the hard law in the strictest sense has been 
developed by the Security Council through the adoption of Resolution 1267, 
Resolution 1373, and its subsequent resolutions. "' One of the major 
'84 <http: //www. egmontgroup. org/bestpractices. pdf>. 
185 FATF, "Annual Report: 2003-2004", 2 July 2004, p. 18. 
186 Interpretative Note to the 2003 Recommendation 26. 
"' BCBS, "Customer due diligence for banks", October 2001, p. 2. The italicised phrased is 
replaced by the author. 
188 See, e. g., Resolution 1333(2000), para. 8; Resolution 1373(2001), para. 1; Resolution 
1390(2001), para. 2. First of all, these resolutions impose binding obligations on all states. 
Moreover, the contents of the obligations are clear enough to point out their violation in a 
real situation. Furthermore, the Security Council itself can act as an independent dispute 
settlement mechanism which can make a compulsory binding decision. 
215 
obligations imposed by these resolutions is to suppress the financing of 
terrorism, for example, by way of criminalising terrorist financing or freezing 
terrorism-related assets. 18' However, the resolutions do not provide 
additional guidance for their implementation in a real situation. In these 
circumstances, the standards set up by specialist bodies are very useful in 
filling the gap between the general hard law and various problematic 
circumstances which require tailored countermeasures. For instance, the 
FATF Special Recommendation III along with its supporting documents19° 
and the revised 2003 Recommendation 3, provide valuable guidance and 
legal weapons to deal with frozen terrorist assets. To be more particular, "' 
the International Best Practice of Special Recommendation III encourages 
countries to develop a system for mutual, early, and rapid pre-notification of 
pending designations of terrorists, through diplomatic and other appropriate 
channels. Moreover, it also calls upon countries to prepare a packet of 
information for each potential designation that include as much information 
as is available to identify the designated person, and to submit it with the 
request of designation. This practice would apparently render assistance to 
the government which intends to file a judicial proceeding in relation to the 
assets which are frozen following the designation of a owner as a terrorist 
suspect. If these measures could be coupled with the legal tools such as civil 
confiscation or the reversed burden of proof as mentioned in the 2003 
189 For further details, see, Section 11.3. and Section 111.3. of Chapter Three of this study. 
190 See, FATF, "Interpretative Note to Special Recommendation III: Freezing and Confiscating 
Terrorist Assets", 3 October 2003; FATF, "Freezing of Terrorist Assets: International Best 
Practices", 3 October 2003. 
"' FATF, "Freezing of Terrorist Assets: International Best Practices", 3 October 2003. 
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Recommendation 3, they would definitely help the prosecution office to win 
the case. Similarly, with regard to alternative remittance systems on which 
the Security Council's resolutions are silent, the FATF Special 
Recommendation VI accompanied by its supporting documents, gives 
detailed instructions and promotes best practices to tackle the issue. 192 
Likewise, in respect of non-profit organisations, the FATF Special 
Recommendation VIII provides for detailed guidelines and "food for 
thought" in order to crack down on their clandestine operations. 193 
Another point of note in relation to the development of 
international standards is the contribution made by the private sector. As was 
seen above, the Wolfsberg Group of Banks, in the absence of coercion by the 
public sector, has taken the initiative in establishing a set of principles 
concerning money laundering and the financing of terrorism. 1 ' Although 
some may dismiss this kind of movement as a mere public relation 
exercise, 195 in practice these voluntary codes of conduct can be of 
considerable value in underpinning regulatory guidance, by giving practical 
advice to banks on operational matters. 196 Of course, it should be noted that 
such codes cannot be regarded as a substitute for formal regulatory 
guidance, "' but they indeed have the potential to make a meaningful 
contribution to the development of AML/CFT standards based on the 
'92 For details, see, supra note 103. 
193 For details, see, supra note 106, 
'94 I owe much to Professor Gilmore for sparking this point. 
'95 Hinterseer, K., Criminal Finance: The Political Economy of Money Laundering in a Comparative 
Legal Context, 2002, p. 264. 
196 BCBS, "Customer due diligence for banks", October 2001, p. 5. 
'9' Ibid., p. 5. 
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consensus of both the private and public sectors. 19' In terms of the 
development of soft law, the voluntary participation of the private sector can 
promote great synergy effects since they are the ones who actually 
implement the "non-binding" standards. 
199 
All in all, the Security Council is supported by the FATF in 
general terms, and the FATF is assisted by other specialist bodies in a specific 
sub-areas, such as the BCBS, Wolfsberg Group, IAIS, IOSCO, and the Egmont 
Group. 20° In sum, all these are excellent cases of the usage of soft law as non- 
binding law with detailed contents. The standards set by specialist bodies are 
indeed supplementing the authoritative approach of the Security Council in 
fighting terrorist financing by way of fleshing out the simple structure of its 
resolutions with their own "'specialty". 201 
198 Hinterseer, K., supra note 195, p. 282. 
'99 For relevant discussions on soft law, see also, Section I of this chapter. 
200 Indeed, the FATF aids the Security Council in a practical sense. However, other specialist 
bodies openly express their will to assist the FATF. See, e. g., BCBS, "Customer due diligence 
for banks", October 2001, p. 2; Pieth, M. & Aiofi, G., "The Private Sector becomes active: The 
Wolfsberg Process", p. 7; IAIS, "Insurance Core Principles and Methodology", October 2003, 
p. 45; The Joint Forum, "The Initiatives by the BCBS, IAIS and IOSCO to combat money 
laundering and the financing of terrorism", June 2003, pp. 9-10. 
For details on the monitoring and enforcement mechanisms of specialist bodies, see, 
Chapter Five of this study. 
201 Hillgenberg, H., supra note 26, pp. 506-507. 
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Chapter Five: 
The Role of Specialist Bodies Since 9/11 (II): 
The Monitoring and Enforcement of Standards 
I. Introduction: level playing fields 
Following the discussion in the last chapter(Chapter Four) on the 
establishment of international standards in the suppression of the financing 
of terrorism by specialist bodies, this chapter will examine the manner in 
which these standards are being monitored and enforced by them. After 
reviewing this monitoring and enforcement work, some soft law implications 
will also be highlighted as well as the prospects of the transformation from 
soft law into hard law of certain of the standards in question. 
Not to mention establishing international standards, in the course 
of analysing the monitoring and enforcement work, a common threshold 
underlying all initiatives can be identified. This is the establishment of a 
"level playing field". There are three areas to which this concept is of 
relevance. Firstly, a level playing field is to be secured within an industry 
itself. Then, a level playing field should be extended between industries. 
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Lastly and more broadly, there should be a level playing field between 
countries. This concept of the level playing field has significant policy 
implications since it is aimed at: (i) reducing loopholes within the AML/CFT 
framework; (ii) encouraging fair competition between concerned parties; and, 
(iii) promoting efficiency. 
For example, if one bank has a well-organised AML/CFT 
framework in place while another is not equipped with adequate AML/CFT 
measures, criminals or terrorists will be motivated to deal with the latter 
bank in order to exploit the loophole. Moreover, ordinary customers might 
prefer to establish business relationships with the latter bank since it is 
simpler and less troublesome. ' Furthermore, under these circumstances, it 
would be difficult for the former bank to apply simplified AML/CFT 
measures with regard to customers introduced by the latter bank, for 
example, based on a correspondent banking contract since it could not trust 
the customer due diligence(CDD)-related data provided by the latter bank. 
This would cause the duplication of a surveillance regime, eventually 
undermining the efficiency of the AML/CFT measures. ' 
In a broader context, if the banking industry has strong AML/CFT 
measures in place whereas other industries such as securities or insurance 
sectors have not adequate AML/CFT measures in place, dirty money could 
be expected to flow into these sectors. This would compromise the rule of fair 
competition between sectors since other sectors would benefit from the 
' Pieth, M. & Aiofi, G., "The Private Sector becomes active: The Wolfsberg Process", p-4- 
'See, e. g., the simplified CDD regime which is intended in the 2003 FATF Forty 
Recommendations. 
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capital inflow from the banking industry. Moreover, the banking industry 
could not trust the results of the surveillance measures of other sectors, thus 
generating duplication of AML/CFT efforts. If these monitoring systems by 
other sectors were not reliable, the concerned sector would have to re-apply 
its own CDD measures from scratch. ' 
A similar logic can be applied between states. Terrorists or 
criminals will be tempted to approach a state with a weak AML/CFT 
infrastructure in order to find a loophole. Furthermore, a state with a strong 
AML/CFT framework will be placed at a disadvantage in comparison with 
states with a weak one, and cannot rely on the inadequate CDD measures 
already taken by other states, causing the duplication of AML/CFT resources 
in the international arena. 
In sum, considering the diversification of the terrorist financing 
and money laundering phenomena ratione personae' and ratione materiae, 5 it is 
essential to pay continuous attention to the establishment of a level playing 
field throughout the campaign. In this context, the current practice of the UN 
CTC Special Meeting which involves some 60 international, and regional 
organisations, 6 or the initiative of the Financial Stability Forum(FSF) which 
seeks to co-ordinate the efforts of various bodies involving international 
'On the contrary, as noted in the revised 2003 FATF Forty Recommendations, when 
adequate checks and controls exist elsewhere in the national systems, simplified CDD 
measures can be applied See, Interpretative Note to Recommendation 5, para. 9. 
'The vehicle for money laundering and the financing of terrorism may sprawl across various 
professions such as lawyers and accountants. 
5 Money laundering and the financing of terrorism may be carried out involving various 
things such as securities, insurance policies, or diamonds. 
6 For details of the CTC Special Meeting, see the CTC website 
<http: //www. un. org/Docs/sc/committees/1373/ctc_meeting. html>. 
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financial institutions, sector-specific international groupings of regulators 
and supervisors, and senior representatives of national financial authorities, 
is the right way forward in designing a "cobweb" strategy. 7 Herein, 
respective expertise as well as the sense of problems in different sectors can 
be shared. However, it should always be remembered that the success of this 
evolving cobweb strategy lies in the will of the final and most important 
actor, individual states, who put these international standards into practice. 
This is the area where monitoring and enforcement work most matters. 
11. FATF 
1. The monitoring of standards 
a. Context 
For the purpose of monitoring countries' implementation of its 
Forty Recommendations, the FATF has developed four methods: self- 
assessment, mutual evaluation, cross-country review, and, the non- 
cooperative countries and territories(NCCT) initiative. The self-assessment 
and mutual evaluation processes were adopted during the FATF II 
period(1990-1991)8 and continued to be used as the main tools for monitoring. 
The cross-country review was first tried during the FATF VI period(1994- 
1995)9 but was not a frequently-used method, being last used during the 
'The FSF was convened in April 1999 to promote international financial stability through 
information exchange and international co-operation in financial supervision and 
surveillance <http: //www. fsforum. org/home/home. html>. For details of its recent work, see, 
FSF, "Ongoing and Recent Work Relevant to Sound Financial Systems", Note by the FSF 
Secretariat, September 2004. 
FATF, "Annual Report: 1990-1991", 13 May 1991, p. 3. 
FATF, "Annual Report: 1994-1995", 8 June 1995, p. 15. 
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FATF VIII period(1996-1997). 1° Finally, the NCCT initiative was launched to 
in effect deal with non-FATF member countries during the FATF X 
period (1998-1999). " Based on their current status of usage, the three main 
devices for monitoring except the cross-country review will be analysed as 
follows. 
b. Self-assessment 
A self-assessment exercise was invented out of the need to check 
the FATF member countries' progress in the implementation of the specialist 
body's standards. Given that it usually took more than three years to finish 
one round of mutual evaluations of the all FATF member countries, the 
annual self-assessment exercise provided a yearly inventory record of 
member countries' counter-measures in the related area. 12 Self-assessment 
also played a complementary role by way of providing the necessary 
preliminary information for a coming round of mutual evaluations. " 
In this exercise, each member country was required to provide 
information on their implementation of the Forty Recommendations by way 
10 FATF, "Annual Report: 1996-1997", 19 June 1997, p. 20. The cross-country evaluation was 
conducted on the basis of questionnaires which sought information on the nature and results 
so far achieved of measures taken by FATF members to implement specific 
Recommendations. Namely, it was an intensified theme-specific approach. The subject 
chosen for this evaluation was "suspicious transaction report" during the FATF VI period 
(1994-1995): "identifying, freezing, seizing and confiscating the proceeds of crime" from the 
FATF VII(1995-1996) to the FATF VIII period(1996-1997). Since then no cross-country 
evaluation has been taken thus far. 
" FATF, "Annual Report: 1998-1999", 2 July 1999, p. 35. 
12 FATF, "Annual Report: 2002-2003", 20 June 2003, p. 28. 
13 FATF, "Review of FATF Anti-Money Laundering Systems and Mutual Evaluation 
Procedures 1992-1999", 16 February 2001, p. 1. 
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of filling in a questionnaire. 14 This information was then compiled and 
analysed, and provided the basis for an in-depth assessment at the final 
Plenary meeting for each yearly cycle of the level of the implementation of 
the Forty Recommendations by both individual countries and the group as a 
whole-" 
Following the adoption of the Special Recommendations on 
Terrorist Financing, the FATF also started to assess the status of the 
implementation of the special recommendations through a self-assessment 
exercise. 16 The questionnaire used in the exercise took into account and was 
cross-referenced to the requirements of the Security Council Resolutions 
1373(2001) and 1390(2002). 17 Importantly, the scope of the self-assessment 
exercises on this occasion was not confined to the FATF member countries 
but was extended to non-FATF member countries. The FATF invited all 
countries around the world to join the exercise. As a result, some 130 
countries responded to the call. 18 
However, given that the new standards and monitoring methods 
developed following 9/11 are significantly broader in scope and detail than 
the 1996 Recommendations, in 2004, the FATF decided not to conduct self- 
14 The questionnaire was subject to constant review and change dependent upon the 
development of situations. In 1999, two important changes were made to the questionnaire. 
Firstly, in the past there had been two sets of questionnaires on legal and financial matters 
respectively but these two questionnaires were combined into a single document and 
considerably reduced in size. Secondly, compliance analysis focused only on specific 
recommendations which require a mandatory action or specific measures. See, FATF, 
"Annual Report 1999-2000", 22 June 2000, p. 20. 
is FATF, "Annual Report: 1997-1998", 25 June 1998, p. 10. 
FATF, "Annual Report: 2002-2003", 20 June 2003, p. 8. 
"FATF, " Annual Report: 2001-2002", 21 June 2002, p. 5. 
18 For the list of the responding countries as of 24 February 2004, see (visited on 19 April 
2004) <http: //wwwl. oecd. org/fatf/SAQTF_en. htm>. 
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assessment exercises modelled on previous exercises any longer. 19 Instead, 
the FATF decided to initiate a process of following-up reports to mutual 
evaluations. 20 These follow-up reports directly build up on the results from 
the mutual evaluation reports by providing an annual update of progress 
made on specific issues highlighted in the mutual evaluation. " 
c. Mutual evaluation 
Within the FATF, mutual evaluation was created as "the primary 
measurement of the FATF member countries' progress" in implementing the 
AML/CFT standards. 22 It also serves as a principal means of evaluating the 
overall effectiveness of the national AML/CFT framework. 23 
The mutual evaluation process begins with the preparation for an 
on-site visit. 24 Generally, experts are selected from lists which the FATF 
Secretariat has received from each member country. 25 Then a questionnaire is 
sent to the country concerned and later collected by the FATF Secretariat at 
least 30 days prior to the on-site visit. 26 Usually, the on-site visit lasts for three 
working days, and meetings are arranged with individual agencies. 27 When 
the on-site visit is finished, the FATF Secretariat prepares the draft report 
19 FATF, "Annual Report: 2003-2004", 2 July 2004, p. 10. 
20 Ibid., p. 10. 
21 Ibid., p. 10. 
22 FATF, "Annual Report: 2001-2002 ", 21 June 2002, p. 13. 
23 Ibid., p. 19. 
24 FATF, "Review of FATF Anti-Money Laundering Systems and Mutual Evaluation 
Procedures 1992-1999", 16 February 2001, p. 37. 
25 Each examination team consists of a legal, a financial, and a law enforcement expert, with 
the examiners being drawn from different jurisdictions (Ibid., p. 37). 
26 Ibid., p. 37. 
27 Ibid., pp. 38-39. 
225 
through communication with the examiners and the examined country. ' 
Upon the completion of the draft report, the FATF Secretariat sends it to all 
delegations, and it is discussed in the FATF Plenary meeting. 29 The report is 
then revised as necessary and formally adopted at the following Plenary 
meeting. " 
The first round of mutual evaluations lasted from 1992 to 1995, 
focusing on the description of the laws and other anti-money laundering 
measures in place. " The second round then focused on the effectiveness of 
the implementation of the 1990 Forty Recommendations, ending in 1999 with 
regard to the then 26 member countries. 32 The third round of mutual 
evaluations was due to start in 2002, but was delayed during the review 
period of the 1996 FATF Forty Recommendations. 33 In the meantime, the 
FATF, the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the World Bank, and other 
related organisations jointly developed a common methodology to monitor 
countries' compliance with the AML/CFT standards in October 2002. ' 
28 Ibid., pp. 39-41. 
29 Ibid., p. 42. 
30 The procedure for the discussion of the draft report at the Plenary meeting is as follows: 
The examiner briefly present their report; the examined country makes its opening 
statement; and, the discussion is launched by two intervenor countries, selected by the 
President on a proposal by the Secretariat. The draft report is then open for general 
discussion by the Plenary. See, ibid., p. 42. 
31 Ibid., p. 35 
32 Ibid., p. 35. Given that it took several years to finish one round of mutual evaluations, only 
the 1990 version of Forty Recommendations was used as a standard of reference during this 
period of mutual evaluation. Argentina, Brazil, and Mexico became FATF members in June 
2000 and their mutual evaluation was finished during 2003-2004 period. Furthermore, the 
mutual evaluation of Saudi Arabia was also made during this period, completing the 
evaluation process of all six Gulf Co-operation Council (GCC) countries. See, FATF, "Annual 
Report: 2003-2004", 2 July 2004, p. 8. 
33 FATF, "Annual Report: 2002-2003", 20 June 2003, p. 29. 
" FATF, "Methodology for Assessing Compliance with Anti-Money Laundering and 
Combating the Financing of Terrorism Standards", 11 October 2002. 
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However, with the revision of the Forty Recommendations in 2003, this 
common methodology was also revised in February 2004. -5 This 2004 
methodology is broader in scope and detail than the 2002 methodology. In 
particular, it provides useful guidance on new concepts or topics introduced 
by the 2003 Forty Recommendations, including the concept of the risk-based 
approach and the issue of non-financial institutions (e. g. lawyers and 
notaries). 36 The FATF commenced a third round of mutual evaluation at the 
end of 2004, using the 2004 AML/CFT Methodology as well as evaluation 
documentation as agreed between the FATF, the IMF, the World Bank, FATF- 
style regional bodies (FSRBs) and the Offshore Group of Banking Supervisors 
(OGBS). 37 This will allow for increased consistency at a global level. ' 
d. NCCT 
Unlike other monitoring mechanisms, the NCCT initiative has 
been developed, in fact if not in form, for the purpose of dealing with non- 
FATF member countries. It is based on the concerns that as the FATF member 
countries have strengthened their AML/CFT framework, terrorists and 
criminals have had recourse to loopholes that can be found in non-FATF 
member countries. It was felt that this situation could considerably 
undermine the overall effectiveness of the FATF system. 39 
35 FATF, "Methodology for Assessing Compliance with the FATF 40 Recommendations and 
the FATF 8 Special Recommendations", 27 February 2004. 
For a relevant discussion, see also, Section 111.2. of this chapter. 
36 FATF, "Annual Report: 2003-2004", 2 July 2004, p. 9. 
37 Ibid., p. 9. 
38 Ibid., p. 9. 
39 FATF, "Review to Identify Non-Cooperative Countries or Territories: Increasing The 
Worldwide Effectiveness of Anti-Money Laundering Measures", 22 June 2000, p. 1. 
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To this end, in February 2000, the FATF set out twenty-five criteria 
which are consistent with the 1996 version of the Forty Recommendations 
with a view to identifying non-cooperative jurisdictions outside the FATF 
circle. 40 At the same time, the FATF also set up four ad hoc regional groups 
(Americas; Asia/Pacific; Europe; and Africa and the Middle East) to analyse 
the AML/CFT regime of a number of jurisdictions against these criteria. 41 
Then the jurisdictions to be reviewed were informed of this 
monitoring work to be conducted by the FATF. " The review process involved 
the gathering of such information as laws and regulations, any mutual 
evaluation reports, related progress reports, and self-assessment surveys. " 
Following this work, draft reports were prepared and sent to the reviewed 
jurisdictions for comment. ' These comments and the draft reports were then 
discussed between the FATF and the reviewed jurisdictions during a series of 
face-to-face meetings. 45 The assessment of whether a jurisdiction was non- 
cooperative was first made by the ad hoc group, and then discussed and 
endorsed in the FATF Plenary meetings. 46 
" FATF, "Report on Non-Cooperative Countries and Territories", 14 February 2000, pp. 10-12. 
4' Ibid., pp. 1-2. For the details of the NCCT criteria, see the appendix. However, there was 
criticism that the twenty-five criteria were much stricter than the 1996 Forty 
Recommendations, thus placing a heavier burden on the non-FATF member countries. For 
example, NCCT criterion 25 provides for the concept of the FIU upon which the 1996 version 
of the Forty Recommendations did not touch. For further discussions, see, Levi, M. & 
Gilmore, W. C., "Terrorist Finance, Money Laundering and the Rise and Rise of Mutual 
Evaluation: A New Paradigm for Crime Control? ", in Pieth, M., ed., Financing Terrorism, 2002 
p. 104. 
42 FATF, "Review to Identify Non-Cooperative Countries or Territories: Increasing The 
Worldwide Effectiveness of Anti-Money Laundering Measures", 22 June 2001, p. 6. 
FATF, "Report on Non-Cooperative Countries and Territories", 14 February 2000, p. 7. 
' FATF, "Review to Identify Non-Cooperative Countries or Territories: Increasing The 
Worldwide Effectiveness of Anti-Money Laundering Measures", 22 June 2001, p. 6. 
45 Ibid., p. 6. 
46 FATF, "Report on Non-Cooperative Countries and Territories", 14 February 2000, p. 7. 
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The last round of the NCCT review was carried out in 2001, and 
since then, the FATF suspended the third round of the NCCT review of any 
new jurisdiction, for the purpose of promoting cooperation with the IMF and 
the World Bank. 47 Nonetheless, the FATF continues to monitor the 
jurisdictions on the current list and those once on the list but later removed. 48 
2. The enforcement of standards 
a. FATF member countries 
Although the FATF does not have a formal binding enforcement 
mechanism, it has developed a non-compliance policy to ensure that all FATF 
member countries reach a satisfactory level of compliance with the Forty 
Recommendations. For the purpose of applying the policy, it has relied on a 
combination of the findings of both mutual evaluations and self-assessment 
exercises. 49 The measures contemplated by this policy represent a graduated 
approach aimed at enhancing peer pressure. 5° The formal policy which had 
been developed by 1994 is as follows: 
1. Requiring the members to provide regular reports on their progress in 
implementing the Recommendations within a fixed timeframe; 
2. Sending a letter from the FATF President to the relevant minister(s) in the 
member jurisdiction drawing their attention to non-compliance with the FATF 
Recommendations; 
3. Arranging a high-level mission to the member jurisdiction in question to 
" The tension between the FATF and the IMF/World Bank over the NCCT initiative will be 
dealt with in more detail in Section III. 2. b. of this chapter and Section 11.3. of Chapter Six. 
" IMF, "Report on the Outcome of the FATF Plenary Meeting and Proposal for the 
Endorsement of the Methodology for Assessing Compliance with Anti-Money Laundering 
and Combating the Financing of Terrorism (AML/CFT) Standard", 8 November 2002, p. 4. 
49 FATF, "Review of FATF Anti-Money Laundering Systems and Mutual Evaluation 
Procedures 1992-1999", 16 February 2001, p. 43. 
su FATF, "Annual Report: 1996-1997", 19 June 1997, p. 10. 
229 
reinforce this message; 
4. In the context of the application of Recommendation 2151 by its members, 
issuing a formal FATF statement to the effect that a member jurisdiction is 
insufficiently in compliance with the FATF Recommendations; and, 
5. Suspending the jurisdiction's membership of the FATF until the 
Recommendations have been implemented. 52 
Since the adoption of this non-compliance policy, it has been 
employed in a couple of cases. For instance, Turkey and Austria are cases in 
point. Both were subject to measures above the second step of the procedure. 
In 1995 during the first round of mutual evaluations, Turkey was found to 
lack the necessary laws to cope with money laundering. Accordingly, the 
measures contained in Recommendation 21 were imposed in 1996, and it 
responded to this sanction by enacting the necessary laws and regulations, 
thus resulting in the lifting of Recommendation 21 in 1997.53 Similarly, in 
1997 during the second round of mutual evaluations, Austria was designated 
51 The 2003 FATF Recommendation 21 is as follows: 
"Financial institutions should give special attention to business relationships and 
transactions with persons, including companies and financial institutions, from countries 
which do not or insufficiently apply the FATF Recommendations, Whenever these 
transactions have no apparent economic or visible lawful purpose, their background and 
purposes should, as far as possible, be examined, the findings established in writing, and be 
available to help competent authorities. Where such a country continues not to apply or 
insufficiently applies the FATF Recommendations, countries should be able to apply 
appropriate countermeasures". 
Thus, when this Recommendation 21 is put into effect, there should be corresponding 
measures of the FATF member countries to support it. For example, in the UK, the 2003 
Money Laundering Regulation 28 provides that "the treasury may direct any person or 
institution carrying out relevant business not to enter into a business relationship or carry 
out any one-off transaction, or not to proceed any further with a customer relationship or 
transaction, if the customer is based or incorporated in a country to which the FATF has 
decided to apply countermeasures..... "(See, joint Money Laundering Steering Group, 
"Prevention of Money Laundering: Guidance Notes for the UK Financial Sector", 2003, p. 
29). 
52 FATF, "Review of FATF Anti-Money Laundering Systems and Mutual Evaluation 
Procedures 1992-1999", 16 February 2001, p. 43. 
s3 FATF, "Annual Report: 1996-1997", 19 June 1997, pp. 10-11. 
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to be a non-compliant member. However, this time despite continuous 
attempts at persuasion by the FATF, Austria persistently adhered to its 
position with regard to anonymous passbooks for Austrian residents, thus 
incurring the imposition of a further step according to the above procedure. ' 
Finally, since no major breakthrough seemed to be plausible in the near 
future, the FATF issued a public statement on 3 February 2000 which 
stipulated that Austria would be suspended as a member of the FATF unless 
by 20 May 2000 the Austrian government took corrective actions. 
Interestingly, following this statement, the Austrian government responded 
immediately and consequently the suspension of membership did not take 
place. 55 
b. Non-FATF member countries 
With regard to non-member countries, first of all, the FATF can 
apply the measures of Recommendation 21 as it does with member 
countries. 56 However, sometimes the FATF can recommend broader 
countermeasures which should be "gradual, proportionate and flexible 
regarding their means and taken in concerted action towards a common 
objective". 57 For instance, in the NCCT context, stronger measures are in 
FATF, "Annual Report: 1997-1998", 25 June 1998, p. 24. 
ss For the details on the FATF's dealing with the Austrian government, see, FATF, "Annual 
Report: 1999-2000", 22 June 2000, pp. 20-22. 
56 For example, Seychelles, as a non-member, was subject to the measures of 
Recommendation 21 in 1996 due to its investment law. For further details, see, FATF, 
"Financial Action Task Force on Money Laundering Condemns New Investment Law in 
Seychelles", SG/COM/NEWS (96) 9. 
57 FATF, "Review to Identify Non-Cooperative Countries or Territories: Increasing The 
World-Wide Effectiveness of Anti-Money Laundering Measures", 21 June 2002, p. 6. 
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place as follows: 58 
1. Actions to put an end to the detrimental rules and practices 
(i) Actions designed to encourage non-cooperative jurisdictions to adopt laws 
in compliance with FATF recommendations; ̀  and, 
(ii) Application of Recommendation 21 
2. Counter-measures designed to protect economies against money of unlawful 
origin 
(i) Customer identification obligations for financial institutions in FATF 
members with respect to financial transactions carried out with or by 
individuals or legal entities whose account is in a "non-cooperative 
jurisdiction"; 
(ii) Specific requirements for financial institutions in FATF members to pay 
special attention to or to report financial transactions conducted with 
individuals or legal entities having their account at a financial institutions 
established in a "non-cooperative jurisdiction"; and, 
(iii) Conditioning, restricting, targeting or even prohibiting financial 
transactions with non-cooperative jurisdictions. 
As a result of the two rounds of the NCCT initiative which were 
carried out in 2000 and 2001, a total of 47 jurisdictions were reviewed and 23 
of them were identified as NCCTs. 6° The NCCT practices have been 
"extremely productive" in that many jurisdictions enacted significant 
reforms and are well on their way towards a comprehensive AML regime. 61 
Consequently, as of 1 June 2005, only 3 jurisdictions (Myanmar, Nauru, and 
58 FATF, "Report on Non-Cooperative Countries and Territories", 14 February 2000, pp. 7-9. 
59 At this stage, the FATF seeks a dialogue, in conjunction with relevant FATF-style regional 
bodies or appropriate international organisations/bodies, with the identified jurisdictions in 
order to prompt them to amend their laws and change their practices. Specific actions could 
also be taken by other multilateral fora (e. g., the G-7, the OECD, the BCBS, IOSCO, IAIS) to 
seek the issuance of public statements or other appropriate action (Ibid., p. 7). 
60 See, FATF website(visited on 8 May 2005)<http: //www. fatf- 
gafi. org/document/51/0,2340, en_32250379_32236992_ 33916403_1_1_1_1,00. 
html>. 
61 FATF, "Review to Identify Non-Cooperative Countries or Territories: Increasing The 
World-Wide Effectiveness of Anti-Money Laundering Measures", 21 June 2002, p. 19. 
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Nigeria) remain on the list. 62 
However, it should be admitted that the NCCT initiative is quite 
unique and controversial in the sense that a non-universal body seeks to 
enforce non-binding standards on non-member countries. 
63 Thus, the countries 
assessed may view this unilateral stigmatisation as a form of "normative 
imperialism" on their fragile economies. ` In relation to this criticism, 
however, the current development of treaty and customary law in this area 
would be worthy of note. So to speak, in the past the unilateral nature of the 
NCCT certainly met with great difficulties in terms of legal justification. Yet, 
as will be seen in the last section of this chapter, multilateral instruments 
concerning criminal matters increasingly include the AML measure as an 
essential tool in their strategy to combat crime, and they are being widely 
ratified. 65 Furthermore, a majority of countries in the international 
community are nowadays participating voluntarily in AML assessment 
exercises of some kind by way of their relationship to the FATF, FSRBs, 
IMF/World Bank, and other specialist bodies. In this sense, the ground for 
justification seems to be gradually being built up. " In the end, if the legal 
62 See, the FATF website (visited on 1 June 2005) < http: //www. fatf- 
gafi. org/document/4/0,2340, en_32250379_32236992_33916420_1_1_1_1,00. html>. 
63 Professor Gilmore, W. C. at an LL. M seminar on international criminal law, Edinburgh, 5 
December 2003. As of 1 June 2005, the FATF membership consists of 31 countries and two 
regional organisations. 
Mitsilegas, V., "Countering the chameleon threat of dirty money: 'Hard' and 'soft' law in 
the emergence of a global regime against money laundering and terrorist finance", in 
Edwards, A. & Gill, P., eds., Transnational organised crime: perspectives on global security, 2003, 
p. 205. Furthermore, the NCCT review was critisised for its nature of a "double standard". 
For a relevant discussion, see, Gilmore, W. C., "Changes to the Global Regime", in Clark, A. & 
Burrell, P., eds., A Practitioner's Guide to International Money Laundering Law and Regulation, 1'` 
edn., 2003, pp. 286-287. 
65 For a relevant discussion, see, Section V. 2. of this chapter. 
66 Johnson, J, "Repairing Legitimacy after Blacklisting by the Financial Action Task Force", 
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basis for the AML strategy can be firmly established in the international 
community by way of either treaty or custom, the NCCT initiative might take 
on the nature of soft enforcement, say in the context of "reprisals" by the 
affected peer countries. 67 
Moreover, although the current NCCT criteria do not contain CFT 
elements, if they included these elements in the future, there could be 
secured a link to the binding resolutions of the Security Council. In other 
words, Security Council Resolution 1373 imposes binding obligations on all 
states to suppress the financing of terrorism and in this sense, there could be 
further justification for the NCCT initiative under the authority of the 
Security Council. 68 
(2003) Journal of Money Laundering Control, vol. 7, no. 1, p. 40. Johnson argues that the 
legitimacy of the FATF is "growing" by an ever increasing number of countries and 
organisations that want to become aligned with its goal and objectives, and that the FATF's 
authority continues to increase as more and more countries enact AML legislation as a result 
of the 9/11 and the following war against the funding of terrorist and its associated terrorist 
groups. For a relevant discussion, see also, Section V. 2. of this chapter. 
67 If it does not involve use of force, it can be understood that reprisal is still permitted under 
public international law (Seidl-Hohenveldern, I., "International economic "soft law"", 
(1979)Recueil des Cours, tome 163, p. 205). 
The important elements of "reprisals" are (i) that the acting state and the addressee be 
states; (ii) that the act be a retort to a previous act of the addressee which the act can 
reasonably consider to be a violation of international law of any kind; and, (iii) that its 
purpose be to coerce the addressee to change its policy and to bring it into line with the 
requirements of international law, thus being a measure to implement the observance of the 
law (Partsch, K. J., "Reprisals", (2000) Encyclopedia of Public International Law, vol. 4, London: 
Elsevier, p. 201). 
In this regard, it is interesting to note the title of the countermeasures of the NCCT as 
stipulated in the cited paragraph above which says " Counter-measures designed to protect 
economies against money of unlawful origin". Thus, it can be inferred from the wording that 
the FATF member countries consider the domestic policies and legal systems of identified 
NCCTs to be undermining their legitimate national interest. 
6R Furthermore, if the Security Council made explicit reference to the FATF guidelines as 
international standards in the context of combating terrorist financing, it could lay a solid 
groundwork for the FATF in all aspects. 
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3. Other supporting activities 
For the purpose of promoting the effectiveness of its AML/CFT 
framework as a whole, the FATF is involved in a number of supporting 
activities. Firstly, the FATF has conducted research activities of terrorist 
financing and money laundering typologies since its establishment in 1989.69 
These research activities provide the groundwork for diagnosing the 
deficiencies in practice, thus facilitating the amendment of relevant standards, 
and the development of enforcement methods. Secondly, the FATF attempts 
to spread the AML/CFT framework all around the world, and in this regard, 
it expands its membership to strategically important countries, 70 and resorts 
to regional mobilisation through cooperation with other international 
organisations, such as FSRBs and United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, 
and through the arrangement of regional seminars and conferences. 
69 Originally, the analysis of money laundering typologies had been included in the Annual 
Report but since the FATF VIII period (1996-1997), the FATF has published a separate 
document "Report on Money Laundering Typologies" on an annual basis. 
70 Originally the FATF is not active in expanding its membership for the reason that it might 
undermine the effective and efficient operation of the FATF itself. However, in the review of 
the FATF future which was carried out in 1998, the FATF decided to expand its membership 
to include a limited number of strategically important countries which could play a major 
role in their regions. In this sense, the requirements of new membership is quite demanding 
which is as follows: 
- To implement the 1996 Recommendations within a reasonable 
timeframe (three 
years), and (ii) to undergo annual self-assessment exercises and two rounds of 
mutual evaluations; 
- To be a full and active member of the relevant 
FATF-style regional body (where one 
exists), or be prepared to work with the FATF or even to take the lead, to establish 
such a body(where none exists); 
- To be a strategically important country; 
- To have already made the 
laundering of the proceeds of drug trafficking and other 
serious crimes a criminal offence; and, 
- To have already made it mandatory 
for financial institutions to identify their 
customers and to report unusual or suspicious transactions (FATF, 
"Annual Report: 
1998-1999", 2 July 1999, p. 34). 
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However, given the mandate of the FATF as a "policy-making body"" and 
the inadequate manpower and resources of its Secretariat, " the FATF itself 
does not actively engage in the rendering of technical assistance. 
Ill. The IMF / World Bank 
1. Context 
The IMF is an international organisation of 184 member countries, 
and it was established to promote international monetary cooperation, 
exchange stability, and economic growth. 73 To this end, the IMF is involved in 
three essential operations which are surveillance, financial assistance, and 
technical assistance. ' Namely, the IMF monitors the development of 
international financial situations, and assists member countries in 
maintaining orderly exchange arrangements among themselves. Particularly, 
if the IMF identifies a crisis of foreign exchange in member countries, it 
provides temporary financial assistance to the countries with a view to 
helping them to adjust their balance of payments without resorting to 
measures destructive of national or international prosperity. 75 Thus, 
symbolically, the IMF can be said to play the role of the "fire brigade" in the 
" (visited on 1 June 2005> < http: //www. fatf- 
gafi. org/pages/0,2987, en_32250379_32235720_1_1_1_1_1,00. html>. 
72 There are around 10 people who work at the FATF Secretariat which is financed by the 
individual contributions from the 31 member countries and 2 member organisations 
(Vandergrift, K., "Re: Inquiry", E-mail to Jae-myong Koh, 8 March 2004). 
73 See, the purposes in the "Articles of Agreement of the IMF", the IMF website(visited on 20 
March 2004)< http: //www. imf. org/external/pubs/ft/aa/aa0l. htm>. 
74 See, "About the IMF", the IMF website(visited on 20 March 2004) 
<http: //www. imf. org/external/about. htm>. 
75 Schott, P. A. Reference Guide to Anti-Money Laundering and Combating the Financing of 
Terrorism, 2003, p. X-2. 
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international financial system. 76 
By comparison, the World Bank is an organisation which operates 
with a long-term perspective and its membership is also comprised of 184 
countries. In principle, this membership of the World Bank overlaps with 
that of the IMF since countries first join the IMF to become members of the 
World Bank. " The mission of the World Bank is to fight poverty and improve 
the living standards of people in the developing world. For these purposes, 
the World Bank provides loans, analysis and policy advice, as well as 
technical assistance to low and middle income countries. 
Despite the fundamental difference between these two 
organisations in their goals, one common area is that they both focus on the 
protection and improvement in the financial sector in the course of pursuing 
their objectives. ' Accordingly, both organisations have sought cooperation in 
dealing with the financial sector by way of jointly launching assessment 
programmes or rendering technical assistance, thus attempting to avoid 
duplication and promoting a synergy effect. 79 Under these circumstances, as 
76 Forget, L., Interview at the headquarters of the IMF, Washington DC, 19 February 2004. 
See the World Bank website (visited on 3 March 
2004)<http: //web. worldbank. org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/EXTABOUTUS/0,, pagePK: 43912--piP 
K: 36602-theSitePK: 29708,00. html>. 
78 IMF/World Bank, "Strengthening IMF-World Bank Collaboration on Country Programs 
and Conditionality-Progress Report", 19 August 2002, p. 7. 
79In this context, the division of labour between the IMF and the World Bank has been 
continuously reviewed. Originally, in 2001, both organisations endorsed a joint paper with a 
view to promoting the cooperation between themselves (IMF/World Bank, "Strengthening 
IMF-World Bank Collaboration on Country Programs and Conditionality", 23 August 2001). 
The IMF/World Bank also issued a staff guidance note on "Operationalizing Bank-Fund 
Collaboration in Country Programs and Conditionality" in April 2002 which stresses 
division of labour based on the concept of a "lead agency", "discussions and coordination at 
an early stage", "adequate information sharing", and "transparency in presenting 
information to the Boards". More recently, the IMF/World Bank published progress reports 
such as: (i) "Strengthening IMF-World Bank Collaboration on Country Programs and 
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money laundering increasingly becomes seen as a threat to the financial 
sector, the IMF and World Bank began to consider their engagement in this 
area to protect the global financial system since early 2001.80 However, it was 
9/11 which provided critical momentum to both organisations' involvement 
in the AML/CFT area. 81 In the view of the IMF, money laundering and 
terrorist financing have a full range of macroeconomic consequences, such as 
unpredictable changes in money demand and risks to the soundness of the 
financial systems. 82 Also in terms of the World Bank, money laundering and 
terrorist financing have potentially devastating economic, political and social 
consequences for developing countries. 83 
Accordingly, the IMF and the World Bank developed action plans 
Conditionality-Progress Report", 19 August 2002; (ii)"Strengthening IMF-World Bank 
Collaboration on Country Programs and Conditionality-Progress Report", 24 February 2004. 
For the text of the 2002 guidance note, see, the first progress report published in August 2002, 
pp. 21-24. 
" The IMF/World Bank issued a joint policy paper which proposed both organisations 
strengthen their role in the global fight against money laundering. See, "Enhancing 
Contributions to Combating Money Laundering: Policy Paper", 26 April 2001. 
8' IMF, "Intensified Fund Involvement in Anti-Money Laundering Work and Combating the 
Financing of Terrorism", 5 November 2001. 
82 Schott, P. A., supra note 75, p. X-2. 
" Ibid., X-2. Although it would not be an objective analysis of the adverse effects of terrorist 
financing, it is interesting to note the remarks of Bin Laden of the impact of 9/11 on the 
global economy, which reads as follows: 
"I say the events that happened on Tuesday 11 September in New York and Washington, 
that is truly a great event in all measures, and its claims until this moment are not over and 
are still continuing.... According to their own admissions, the share of the losses on the Wall 
Street market reached 16%. They said that this number is a record, which has never 
happened since the opening of the market more than 230 years ago. This large collapse has 
never happened. The gross amount that is traded in that market reaches $4 trillion. So if we 
multiply 16% by $4 trillion to find out the loss that affected the stocks, it reaches $ 640 
billion of losses from stocks, by Allah's grace. So this amount, for example, is the budget of 
Sudan for 640 years. They have lost this, due to an attack that happened with the success of 
Allah lasting one hour only. " (reproduced from Gunaratna, R., Inside Al Qaeda: Global Netzvork 
of Terror, 2002, pp. 225-226). For relevant discussions, see, Johnston, R. B. & Nelelescu, O. M., 
"The Impact of Terrorism on Financial Markets", IMF Working Paper, WP/05/60. 
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with regard to the AML/CFT issue in November 2001 and January 2002, 
respectively. " The action plans call for joint action in the following areas: 
1. Expanding Fund/Bank involvement in AML work to include CFT; 
2. Expanding Fund/Bank AML work to cover legal and institutional framework 
issues in addition to financial sector supervisory issues; 
3. Agreeing with the FATF on a converged global AML/CFT standard and 
associated Reports on Observance of Standards and Codes(ROSC) process; ̀  
4. Increasing Fund/Bank technical assistance in response to members' requests 
to strengthen AML/CFT regimes; and, 
5. Conducting a joint Fund/Bank study of informal funds transfer systems. 
In addition, under its Action Plan, the IMF is: 
1. Circulating over time a voluntary questionnaire on AML/CFT in the context 
of Fund Article IV missions"; and, 
2. Accelerating the Fund's OFC assessment program. 
Under its Action Plan, the World Bank is also: 
1. Integrating AML/CFT issues in Country Assistance Strategies(CASs). 87 
2. The monitoring of standards 
As mentioned above, in broader terms, the work of the IMF and 
the World Bank falls into three major categories: assessment of a country's 
situation, lending and technical assistance. Thus, the monitoring of the 
84 For the IMF Action Plan, see, "Intensified Fund Involvement in Anti-Money Laundering 
Work and Combating the Financing of Terrorism", 5 November 2001, pp. 14-17. For the 
World Bank Action Plan, see, "Proposed Action Plan for Enhancing the Bank's Ability to 
Respond to Clients in Combating Money Laundering and the Financing of Terrorism", 22 
January 2002. 
For details on ROSCs, see infra note 96 
86 For details on Article IV missions, see infra note 108 and its related text. 
87 IMF/World Bank, "Intensified Work on Anti-Money Laundering and Combating Financing 
of Terrorism (AML/CFT)", 17 April 2002, p. 3. For details on the CASs, see, infra note 119 and 
its related text. 
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AML/CFT standards can be understood in the context of the assessment 
activities. However, given that the IMF/World Bank are not standard setting 
bodies, these organisations simply borrowed internationally recognised 
standards for their purposes. In other words, the IMF/World Bank agreed to 
adopt the FATF 8+40 Recommendations as relevant standards in the 
AML/CFT area in July 2002, with some conditions that should be met by the 
FATF. 88 Of particular note among the conditions are the development of a 
common assessment tool and the suspension of a further NCCT round. 89 
Consequently, both sides(the IMF/World Bank and the FATF) jointly 
developed and adopted a common assessment tool, namely, the 
"Comprehensive Methodology for Assessing Compliance with AML/CFT 
88 "Anti-Money Laundering and Combating the Financing of Terrorism (AML/CFT): 
Proposals To assess A Global Standard And To Prepare ROSCs", 17 July 2002, pp. 6-7. The 
conditions were as follows: 
- The FATF Secretariat, in consultation with Fund/Bank staff, satisfactorily completes 
the draft of the comprehensive and integrated assessment methodology by the 
Annual Meetings for consideration at the October Plenary; 
- In its October Plenary, the FATF endorses the comprehensive methodology and its 
use in undertaking FATF/FSRB mutual evaluations and Fund/Bank staff-led 
assessments; 
- In its October Plenary, the FATF agrees to undertake its mutual evaluations consistent 
with the ROSC process; and, 
- The FATF does not undertake a further round of the NCCT process, at least during 
the period of a 12-month pilot project. 
For the response of the FATF, see, IMF, "Report on the Outcome of the FATF Plenary Meeting 
and Proposal for the Endorsement of the Methodology for Assessing Compliance with Anti- 
Money Laundering and Combating the Financing of Terrorism (AML/CFT) Standard", 8 
November 2002, p. 3. 
89 The reason for the demand for the suspension of the NCCT initiative is that usually, the 
assessment of the IMF and World Bank is conducted on a voluntary basis at the request of 
the assessed country, while the NCCT initiative is a unilateral measure of assessment toward 
unwilling countries. For a good comparison between the NCCT process and the work of the 
IMF/World Bank, see, IMF/World Bank, "Anti-Money Laundering and Combating the 
Financing of Terrorism (AML/CFT): Materials Concerning Staff Progress Towards the 
Development of a Comprehensive AML/CFT Methodology and Assessment Process", 11 
June 2002, p. 10. 
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Standards" in October 2002. It was mainly based on the 8+40 
Recommendations. Then, both sides jointly launched a 12-month pilot 
programme of AML/CFT assessment on 15 November 2002, using this 
common methodology. 90 The FATF kept the promise not to take the third 
round of the NCCT initiative at least during the period of the pilot 
programme. 91 With the success of this programme, the IMF/World Bank 
decided in March 2004 to make the assessment practice a regular part of their 
work, and endorsed the revised 2003 Forty Recommendations and its revised 
2004 AML/CFT methodology as well. 92 This 2004 methodology became 
effective for IMF/World Bank from September 2004.93 Correspondingly, the 
FATF reciprocated the cooperation from the IMF/World Bank by declaring 
that it "has no plans at present to conduct a third round of the NCCT 
reviews". 94 
The cooperative mechanism which has been developed through 
the 12-month pilot programme is as follows. For their part, the IMF/World 
Bank decided to participate in the pilot programme in the main in the context 
90 For the progress and the results of the 12-month pilot programme, see, IMF/World Bank, 
"Twelve-Month Pilot Program of Anti-Money Laundering and Combating the Financing of 
Terrorism (AML/CFT) Assessments and Delivery of AML/CFT Technical Assistance", 31 
March 2003; IMF/World Bank, "Status Report of the Work of the IMF and the World Bank on 
the Twelve-Month Pilot Program of AML/CFT assessments and Delivery of AML/CFT 
Technical Assistance", 5 September 2003; IMF/World Bank, "Twelve Month Pilot Program of 
AML/CFT Assessments: Joint Report on the Review of the Pilot Program", 10 March 2004. 
91 IMF, "Report on the Outcome of the FATF Plenary Meeting and Proposal for the 
Endorsement of the Methodology for Assessing Compliance with Anti-Money Laundering 
and Combating the Financing of Terrorism (AML/CFT) Standard", 8 November 2002, p. 3. 
92 IMF, "IMF Executive Board Reviews and Enhances Efforts for Anti-Money Laundering and 
Combating the Financing of Terrorism", Public Information Notice (PIN) No. 04/33,2 April 
2004; FATF, "Annual Report: 2003-2004", 2 July 2004, p. 9. 
93 <http: //wwwl. worldbank. org/finance/html/amlcft/methodology. htm>. 
94"Letter from the FATF President to Mr. Kohler", in IMF/World Bank, "Twelve-Month Pilot 
Program of AML/CFT Assessments", 10 March 2004, p. 63. 
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of their normal operation of the Financial Sector Assessment Program 
(FSAP)95 and the Offshore Financial Center (OFC) programme. 
Firstly, for the purpose of implementing the FSAP, the IMF/World 
Bank have set the standards and codes in 12 areas under which the 
AML/CFT issue is subsumed. 96 By the FSAP, the IMF/World Bank prepare 
country reports. These reports analyse each country's status on the 
implementation of the 12 standards and codes, thus being called "Reports on 
Observance of Standards and Codes (ROSCs). Then, these ROSC modules 
constitute the basis for the publication of the documents called the "Financial 
95 In fact, the FSAP, a joint IMF/World Bank effort introduced in May 1999, aims to identify 
the strengths and vulnerabilities of a country's financial system; to determine how key 
sources of risk are being managed; to ascertain the sector's developmental and technical 
assistance needs; and, to help prioritise policy responses. See, IMF/World Bank, "Financial 
Sector Assessment Program-Review, Lessons, and Issues Going Forward", 24 February 2003, 
p. 8. 
Initially, there was a criticism that it was not desirable for the IMF and World Bank to 
assess legal/criminal enforcement measures since these areas are beyond the mandate of 
both organisations. However, it should be noted that the FATF Forty Recommendations were 
designed to be assessed as a unified whole rather than separately (IMF/World Bank, 
"Strengthening IMF-World Bank Collaboration on Country Programs and Conditionality", 
23 August 2001. p. 16). 
Thus, subsequently, the work of the IMF/the World Bank has been expanded to cover legal 
and institutional framework issues (IMF/World Bank, "Intensified Work on Anti-Money 
Laundering and Combating Financing of Terrorism (AML/CFT)", 17 April 2002, p. 3). 
However, for the pilot programme, the IMF/World Bank staff assess compliance with all 
criteria except those relating to the implementation of criminal justice measures and to 
sectors that are not macroeconomically relevant. One or more independent AML/CFT 
experts (IAEs) assessed the remaining criteria (IMF/World Bank, "Twelve-Month Pilot 
Program of AML/CFT Assessments", 10 March 2004, p. 8). 
Later, the IMF decided to expand its AML/CFT assessment and technical assistance work 
to cover the full scope of the 2004 FATF Forty Recommendations including the criminal 
justice area, and non-financial institutions such as lawyers and notaries (IMF, "IMF 
Executive Board Reviews and Enhances Efforts for Anti-Money Laundering and Combating 
the Financing of Terrorism", Public Information Notice (PIN) No. 04/33,2 April 2004). 
" The list of the 12 areas are: transparency standards; fiscal transparency; financial sector 
standards; banking supervision; securities; insurance; payments systems; anti-money 
laundering and combating the financing of terrorism; standards concerned with market 
integrity; corporate governance; accounting; auditing; insolvency and creditor rights. See, 
the IMF website (visited on 25 January 2005)<http: //www. imf. org>. 
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System Stability Assessments (FSSAs)" in the IMF context, and the "Financial 
Sector Assessment (FSA)" in the World Bank context, respectively. 97 Namely 
the same ROSCs are incorporated into the texts of each organisation's 
document. Given the voluntary nature of the ROSC procedure, the 
assessment process of the IMF/World Bank can be triggered only at the 
request of the assessed country. 98 
Secondly, the OFC programme was initiated by the Executive 
Board in July 2000 to address potential vulnerabilities in the global financial 
system. 99 It assesses financial regulation and supervision in jurisdictions with 
significant financial activity and few previous assessments of standards, 
following a request from the jurisdiction. "' On this occasion, jurisdictions' 
AML/CFT regime is also assessed using the version of the common 
methodology available at the time of assessment. 101 
'' IMF/World Bank, "Financial Sector Assessment Program-Review, Lessons, and Issues 
Going Forward", 24 February 2003, p. 7. 
98 The four guiding principles for the ROSC process: 
- The staff's involvement in assessing non-prudently-regulated financial sector 
activities should be confined to those that are macro-economically relevant and pose 
a significant risk of money laundering/terrorism financing; 
- All assessment procedures should be transparent and consistent with the mandate 
and core expertise of the different institutions involved, and compatible with the 
uniform, voluntary, and cooperative nature of the ROSC exercise; 
- The assessments should be followed up with appropriate technical assistance at the 
request of the countries assessed in order to build their institutional capacity and 
develop their financial sectors; and, 
- The assessments would be conducted in accordance with the comprehensive and 
integrated methodology (IMF, "Report on the Outcome of the FATF Plenary Meeting 
and Proposal for the Endorsement of the Methodology for Assessing Compliance 
with Anti-Money Laundering and Combating the Financing of Terrorism(AML/CFT) 
Standard", 8 November 2002, p. 2). 
y9 IMF, "Offshore Financial Center Reform: A Progress Report", 14 March 2003, p. 4. 
10° IMF, "Offshore Financial Centers: The Assessment Program: An Information Note", 29 
August 2002. 
101 IMF, "Offshore Financial Center Reform: A Progress Report", 14 March 2003, p. 12. 
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In contrast, the FATF and FATF-Style Regional Bodies(FSRBs) 
joined the 12-month pilot programme in the context of conducting their own 
mutual evaluation. The results of these mutual evaluations were 
subsequently transformed into the ROSC format for IMF/World Bank 
purposes. 102 A total of 8 assessments were completed by the FATF or FSRBs 
during this test period. "' To this end, the FATF and FSRBs used the 2002 
methodology shared by the IMF/World Bank. "' In terms of reciprocity, it is 
interesting to note that the IMF/World Bank agreed to incorporate the results 
of the mutual evaluation exercises by the FATF into the ROSCs when 
available, urging a reciprocal approach by the FATF and FSRBs to use a 
Fund/Bank-led assessment in lieu of a mutual evaluation. 105 Fortunately, 
some FSRBs such as the Asia/Pacific Group on Money Laundering(APG) and 
the Caribbean Financial Action Task Force (CFATF) decided that they would 
use an IMF/World Bank-led assessment when available in lieu of mutual 
evaluation in the future. 
106 
Besides the FSAP, for the purpose of monitoring the AML/CFT 
standards, the IMF alone conducts assessment exercises in the context of 
102 FATF, "Annual Report: 2002-2003", p. 22; IMF/World Bank, "Twelve-Month Pilot Program 
of AML/CFT Assessments", 10 March 2004, p. 9, p. 13. 
103 IMF/World Bank, "Twelve-Month Pilot Program of AML/CFT Assessments", 10 March 
2004, p. 4. 
104 FATF conducted assessment on South Africa, Russia, and Germany as part of the pilot 
programme. See, IMF/World Bank, "Twelve Month Pilot Program of AML/CFT 
Assessments", 10 March 2004, p. 13. 
'os For a relevant discussion, see, ibid., p. 9. The IMF/World Bank-led missions conducted 
assessments of some FATF member countries such as the UK and Austria but these reports 
were not adopted as formal mutual evaluation reports by the FATF. 
'06 IMF/World Bank, "Twelve Month Pilot Program of AML/CFT Assessments", 10 March 
2004, p. 9. 
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Article IV consultations. "' The IMF shall oversee the international monetary 
system to ensure its effective operation and for this reason, member countries 
are required to undertake consultation with the IMF on their exchange rate 
policies usually on a yearly basis. 108 However, it should be pointed out that 
the scope of consultation topics is not narrowly confined to exchange rate 
policies but covers all aspects of an economic situation because exchange rate 
policies are one of the variables which operate linked with each other in a 
national economy. 10' Thus, the IMF included the AML/CFT issue in the topics 
for consultation and consequently, it developed an AML/CFT questionnaire 
and has distributed it to member countries to be visited by Article IV 
consultation missions since early 2002. However, it should be seen as a 
complement to and not as a substitute for FSAPs and OFC assessments. "' 
3. Other supporting activities 
The IMF and the World Bank are actively involved in supportive 
activities for the purpose of spreading the AML/CFT message worldwide. 
Interestingly, it should be noted that although they do not have a formal 
enforcement policy, "' some of these supportive activities can be characterised 
as a kind of soft enforcement(examined in detail below). 
107 Ibid., p. 17. 
108 Articles of Agreement of the International Monetary Fund, Article IV, section 3(b). 
'09 Gold, J., "Strengthening the Soft International Law of Exchange Arrangements", (1983) 
The American Journal of International Law, vol. 77, p. 474 (This article provides an excellent 
overview of the relationship between the Article IV and its soft law nature). 
10 IMF, "Intensified Work on Anti-Money Laundering and Combating the Financing of 
Terrorism (AML/CFT)", 10 September 2002, section II, para. 3-6. 
"' See, e. g., IMF/World Bank, "Anti-Money Laundering and Combating the Financing of 
Terrorism (AML/CFT): Materials Concerning Staff Progress Towards the Development of a 
Comprehensive AML/CFT Methodology and Assessment Process", 11 June 2002, p. 28. 
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Firstly, the IMF and the World Bank render technical assistance 
based on the findings from the FSAPs and separate AML/CFT assessments. ' 12 
The World Bank includes technical assistance in respect of the AML/CFT 
issue in its Country Assistance Strategy (CAS) for developing countries. 113 
Moreover, for the purpose of improving systematic and coordinated 
technical assistance follow-up procedures, the Financial Sector Reform and 
Strengthening(FIRST) initiative was developed. 114 The FIRST initiative seeks 
to support countries' implementation of recommendations made from the 
assessment reports. 1' Also the IMF/World Bank publish reference guides on 
AML/CFT issues to facilitate the establishment of countries' legislative and 
institutional frameworks. 116 Furthermore, the World Bank is operating a 
database on its website for the purpose of matchmaking the requests and the 
donation of technical assistance. "' As a result, by way of illustration, during 
the period January 2002-December 2003, the IMF/World Bank delivered 116 
TA projects, including 85 direct TA to 63 countries, and 32 regional projects 
12 Schott, P. A., supra note 75, p. X-7. 
113 IMF/Word Bank, "Intensified Work on Anti-Money Laundering and Combating the 
Financing of Terrorism (AML/CFT): Joint Progress Report on the Work of the IMF and World 
Bank", 25 September 2002, para. 38. 
'14 IMF/World Bank, "Implementation of the Basel Core Principles for Effective Banking 
Supervision, Experiences, Influences, and Perspectives", 23 September 2002, p. 39. 
115 The FIRST Initiative is a multi-donor trust fund aimed at promoting robust and diverse 
financial sectors in developing and transition countries, utilising the resources pledged by 
initial donors (UK, Canada, Sweden, Switzerland, the World Bank, and the IMF). The initial 
commitment was approximately US$ 10-12 million over four years (IMF/World Bank, 
"Intensified Work on Anti-Money Laundering and Combating Financing of 
Terrorism(AML/CFT)", 17 April 2002, p. 13). 
16 Schott, P. A., supra note 75, p. X-9. 
IMF/World Bank, "Twelve-Month Pilot Program of Anti-Money Laundering and 
Combating the Financing of Terrorism (AML/CFT) Assessments and Delivery of AML/CFT 
Technical Assistance", 31 March 2003, p. 16. 
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reaching more than 130 countries. 118 
Secondly, as indicated above, the IMF/World Bank provide lending 
assistance. For instance, the World Bank includes the AML/CFT components 
in its lending projects. It integrates the findings of the FSAP in respect of the 
AML/CFT issues into the broader Country Assistance Strategy (CAS), 119 and 
incorporates the AML/CFT component into country programmes or 
individual lending operations. In this context, several loans by the World 
Bank already have the AML/CFT components in place in relation to the 
reform in the financial sector. "' 
Thirdly, the IMF/World Bank conduct research into the AML/CFT 
typologies, a case in point being the recent analysis of the hawala System. 121 
These studies examine the operational characteristics of the informal value 
transfer system, and discuss the implications for regulatory and supervisory 
"' IMF/World Bank, "Twelve Month Pilot Program of AML/CFT Assessments: Joint Report 
on the Review of the Pilot Program", 11 March 2004, p. 14. 
19 For the purpose of achieving the goal of "development", the World Bank employs several 
strategies as a means. The CAS is one of these strategies. It is a development framework for 
the World Bank's assistance in a client country, in the sense that it sets out the priorities for 
the World Bank's programme on a three-year basis in consultation with the concerned 
government. Its objective is to identify the key areas where the World Bank's assistance can 
have the largest impact on poverty reduction. In producing its CAS, the World Bank 
conducts extensive analysis of the country's economic and social situation in consultation 
with the government (visited on 19 April 
2004)<http: //www. worldbank. org/html/extdr/casconsult. htm>. 
120 For example, the AML/CFT Technical Assistance totaling US$ 2.2 million has been 
included in lending programs for 4 countries-Bangladesh, Guatemala, Honduras, and 
Pakistan. In addition, for Serbia/Montenegro, the AML/CFT is an area to be covered in the 
adjustment loan (IMF/World Bank, "Twelve Month Pilot Program of AML/CFT Assessments: 
Joint Report on the Review of the Pilot Program", 11 March 2004, p. 17); Halligan, J., 
Interview, Washington, D. C., 19 February 2004. 
12' The IMF and the World Bank recently published their work on the hauwala system, 
respectively. See, Qorchi, M. E. & Maimbo, S. M. & Wilson, J. F., "Informal Funds Transfer 
systems: An Analysis of the Informal Hawala System", Occasional Paper 222,18 August 2003; 
Maimbo, S. M., "The Money Exchange Dealers of Kabul: A Study of the Hawala System in 
Afghanistan", 2003. 
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responses to the system. '" 
Lastly, the IMF/World Bank also focus on the awareness raising 
campaign in the AML/CFT area, as illustrated by the recent Global Dialogue 
Series which is a live video conference for the purpose of establishing a 
communication network on AML/CFT issues with leading experts and high 
level country officials. 123 
IV. FATF-Style Regional Bodies (FSRBs) 
1. The development of FSRBs 
As one of the regional mobilisation strategies to combat money 
laundering, the FATF has supported or fostered the development of FATF- 
style regional bodies all over the world. This cooperative relationship 
between the FATF and FSRBs is of considerable importance for several 
reasons. For instance, the FSRBs could engage "non-FATF" member countries 
in the AML/CFT campaign in the "FATF" manner. Furthermore, given the 
small size of the FATF Secretariat in Paris, FSRBs could play an essential role 
in ensuring the appropriate provision of technical assistance and other 
follow-up activities in non-FATF member countries. 124 These aspects are well 
illustrated by the agreement of FATF Plenary meeting in 1998: 
".... the ideal model for an FATF-style regional body would be: a local group 
exerting peer pressure among its members and whose mutual evaluation 
Schott, P. A., supra note 75, p. X-9. 
123 The first of the series started in January 2002 (IMF/World Bank, "Intensified Work on Anti- 
Money Laundering and Combating the Financing of Terrorism(AML/CFT)", 25 September 
2002). 
12' Gilmore, W. C., Dirty Money: The evolution of international measures to counter money 
laundering and the financing of terrorism, 2004, pp. 144-145. 
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procedures had been endorsed by the FATF; one or several FATF members 
present in it and a secretariat which would liaise regularly with the FATF. 
Moreover, the presidents/secretariats of each FATF-style regional body should 
become full members of the FATF. The FATF-style regional bodies should also 
be committed to the Forty Recommendations and to any other anti-money 
laundering principles they wish to endorse to reflect local problems. The main 
task of these bodies should include conducting mutual evaluations of their 
members and carrying out self-assessment surveys and regional typologies 
exercises". 
125 
In this context, there have been established seven FSRBs thus far: 
the Caribbean Financial Action Task Force (CFATF)126; the Asia/Pacific Group 
on Money Laundering (APG); '27 the Council of Europe Select Committee of 
Experts on the Evaluation of Anti-Money Laundering Measures 
(MONEYVAL) (formerly PC-R-EV)128; the Eastern and Southern Africa Anti- 
Money Laundering Group (ESAAMLG)129; the Financial Action Task Force on 
Money Laundering in South America (GAFISUD)13"; the Eurasian Group on 
Money Laundering and Terrorism Funding (EAG)131; and, the Middle East & 
North African Financial Action Task Force on Money Laundering 
(MENAFATF). 132 
Given that the operating mechanism of all these FSRBs is not so 
125 FATF, "Review of the Future of FATF: Strategic Issues", FATF-IX, PLEN/12. BIS. REV 1, 
reproduced from Gilmore, W. C., supra note 124, pp. 145-146. 
12' For details, see its website <http: //www. cfatf. org/>. 
127 For details, see its website < http: //www. apgml. org/>. 
128 For details, see its website <http: //www. coe. int/T/E/Legal_affairs/Legal_co- 
operation/Combating_economic_crime/Money_laundering/>. 
129 For details, see its website <http: //www. esaamlg. org/>. 
130 For details, see its website <http: //www. gafisud. org/>. 
13' The EAG was founded in Moscow in October 2004. The founding members are Belarus, 
Kazakhstan, People's Republic of China, the Russian Federation and Tajikstan. 
132 The MENAFATF was created in November 2004 in Bahrain. For details, see its website 
<http: //www. mofne. gov. bh/menafatf/ArticleDetail. asp? rid=548>. 
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different from each other and utilising the writer's familiarity with the Asia/ 
Pacific region, this chapter will make a case study of the APG to examine the 
role of the FSRBs in the global AML/CFT campaign. 
2. The nature and scope of the FSRBs work 
a. The background to the APG 
Like other regions, the Asia/Pacific region has also suffered from 
transnational criminal activities. This is, for example, the case with the trade 
in heroin based on the Golden Triangle and Golden Crescent area and 
trafficking in people and small arms in South Asia, 
133 Moreover, the region 
includes the home countries of major world criminal organisations such as 
the Japanese Yakuza, the Chinese Triads, and the Russian Mafia. " Furthermore, in 
the money laundering context, the extensive and efficient underground 
banking systems have been operating either as a substitute for or as a 
complement to the orthodox financial sector in the region. 135 Under these 
circumstances, the vast geographical area and loose governmental control, 
and corruption have contributed to the aggravation of the problems. '36 
Consequently, Asia/Pacific was one of the regions to which the 
FATF gave priority consideration. In conjunction with the Commonwealth 
133 McFarlane, J., "Transnational Crime and Asia-Pacific Security", in Simon, S. W., ed., The 
Many Faces of Asian Security, Boston: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc., 2001, pp. 202-208. 
13' For an overview of these organisations, see, Williams, P. & Savona, E. U., The United 
Nations and Transnational Organised Crime, 1996, pp. 14-18. 
135 Gilmore, W. C., supra note 124, pp. 228-229. 
136 Koh, J. M., "Transnational Organised Crime and International Countering Efforts", in 
Theory and Practice of Multilateral Security Policy, 2002, p. 245. 
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Secretariat, the FATF began an "awareness raising" campaign in the region. 13' 
A number of symposia were held. The first was held in Singapore in April 
1993. The second took place in Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia in 
November/December 1994, at which the 16 attending governments endorsed 
and agreed to implement the FATF Forty Recommendations. "' In order to 
achieve more concrete results, Australia agreed in 1995 to set up a Secretariat 
in Australia. 1 ' The Secretariat, in cooperation with the Commonwealth 
Secretartiat and other international bodies, worked to garner support for 
anti-money laundering measures. 14' As a result, Typologies Workshops were 
held in Hong Kong in October 1995 and November 1996, and the Third Asia 
Money Laundering Symposium was held in Tokyo in December 1995.141 
Eventually, the APG was officially established as a regional anti-money 
laundering body in February 1997 at the Fourth (and last) Asia Money 
Laundering Symposium in Bangkok, 142 
b. The structure and functions of the APG 
The purpose of the APG is to facilitate the adoption, 
implementation and enforcement of internationally accepted anti-money 
laundering and counter-terrorist financing standards, such as the FATF Forty 
Recommendations and Special Recommendations, while taking into account 
137 APG, "First Annual Report: 1999-2000", April 2001, p. 6. 
138 Ibid., p. 6. 
'39 Ibid., p. 6. 
Ibid., p. 6. 
Ibid., p. 6. 
'. z See, "Relationship to the FATF", the APG website (visited on 3 March 
2004)<http: //www. apgml. org/content/relationship_to_the_fatf. jsp>; APG, "Annual Report 
1 
July 2001-30 June 2002", December 2002, p. 1. 
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regional factors, 
143 The APG was established by agreement among its 
members rather than being based on an international treaty. In the 2004 
Annual Meeting, it was agreed that the APG continue in existence until 
December 2012, corresponding to the recent extension of the mandate of the 
FATF until December 2012. 
The requirements for the APG membership are as follows: 
- Recognises the need for action to be taken to combat money laundering and 
terrorist financing; 
- Recognises the benefits to be obtained by sharing knowledge and experience; 
- Has taken or is actively taking steps to develop, pass and implement anti- 
money laundering and anti-terrorist financing legislation and other 
measures based on accepted international standards; 
- Subject to its domestic laws, commits itself to implementing the decisions 
made by the APG; 
- Commits itself to participate in the mutual evaluation programme; 
- Contributes to the APG budget in accordance with arrangements agreed by 
the APG. " 
It is interesting to note that these requirements are not as strict as those of the 
FATF. Indeed, it is not necessary that candidates jurisdictions be considered 
as strategically important or that they have AML laws already in place. 
145 In 
this sense, the APG seems to be quite open to nearly all regional jurisdictions. 
At present, it comprises 28 member jurisdictions, "' 11 observer 
143 APG, "Terms of Reference" in "Annual Report: 1 July 2001-30 June 2002", December 2002, 
pp. 34-35. 
" APG, "Terms of Reference" in "Annual Report: 1 October 2003-30 June 2004", November 
2004, p. 35. 
'4' For the FATF criteria for admission, see, supra note 70. 
14h Australia; Bangladesh; Brunei Darussalam; Cambodia; Chinese Taipei; Cook Islands; Fiji 
Islands; Hong Kong, China; India; Indonesia; Japan; Korea, Republic of; Macau, China; 
Malaysia; Marshall Islands; Mongolia; Nepal; New Zealand; Niue; Pakistan; Palau; 
Philippines; Samoa; Singapore; Sri Lanka; Thailand; United States of America; Vanuatu. See, 
the APG's website(visited on 1 June 2005) 
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jurisdictions, 147 and 15 observer international and regional organisations. 14' 
The APG meets at least once a year, and decisions are made by 
consensus. 149 The Secretariat is located in Sydney, Australia. With regard to 
the leadership of the APG, there are two co-chairs, and originally it was 
agreed that during the formative stage, one co-chair position would be held 
by Australia which should host the annual meeting on alternative years, 15° 
and the other co-chair would be rotated every two years amongst member 
jurisdictions. 15' At the 2004 Annual Meeting, however, it was decided that 
while the "formative stage" should be considered completed, the status quo 
be maintained and that no change to APG's Co-Chairing arrangements 
should be made for some time. 152 This is mainly due to the fact that the 
current system is operating well and Australia has been providing an 
essential support to the APG by hosting the secretariat or other financial 
means. 
Generally, the APG develops a Strategic Plan every three years, 
and makes an annual Business Plan of a detailed nature. 153 At present, the 2nd 
Strategic Plan has been adopted for the period of 2003-06 which reads as 
<http: //www. apgml. org/content/member-jurisdiction. jsp>. 
147 Canada; France; Kiribati; Lao People's Democratic Republic; The Maldives; Nauru; Papua 
New Guinea; Tonga; Myanmar; United Kingdom; Vietnam. See, ibid. 
148 ADB; APEC; ASEAN; CFATF; Commonwealth Secretariat; Egmont Group; FATF; IMF; 
INTERPOL; OGBS; Pacific Financial Technical Assistance Centre (PFTAC); Pacific Islands 
Forum Secretariat (PIFS); UNODC; World Bank; World Customs Organisation (WCO). See 
ibid. 
"' APG, "Terms of Reference" in "Annual Report: 1 October 2003-30 June 2004", November 
2004, p. 36. 
150 Ibid., p. 37. 
Ibid., p. 37. 
152 Ibid., p. 14. 
153 Ibid., p. 36. 
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follows. " 
1. Provide an autonomous regional body for APG members and observers to 
work together against money laundering and the financing of 
terrorism(ML/FT); 
2. Conduct outreach activities to promote membership of the APG and 
encourage non-member to cooperate in the global fight against ML/FT; 
3. Participate in and cooperate with the global AML network primarily the FATF 
and other regional anti-money laundering groups; 
4. Carry out education, research and analysis activities to enhance the 
understanding of the ML/FT environment and the global fights against it; 
5. Assist APG members to implement the global standards against ML/FT; and, 
6. Assess APG members' compliance with the global standards against ML/FT. 
With regard to the implementation of these strategic and action plans of the 
APG, of particular note is the role of the APG Steering Group which was 
established at the Annual Meeting in September 2003.155 The major functions 
of the Steering Group are: 
156 (a) to consider governance and other issues of 
strategic importance referred to it; (b) to engage and consult with APG 
members to obtain their input on key issues; (c) to provide advice to the APG 
Co-chairs and APG members through the Secretariat; (d) to assist with 
engaging and influencing all APG members to effectively participate in its 
activities, including leading or sponsoring specific APG projects; and, 
(e) to 
encourage non-members in their geographic area to join the 
APG. The 
membership of the Steering Group includes a representative 
from each of 
five broad geographical areas within the Asia/Pacific region, namely 
North 
Asia, Pacific Islands, South Asia, South East Asia, and 'Other'. 157 Each 
' APG, "Annual Report: 1 July 2002-30 September 2003", September 2004, p-4- 
" APG, "Annual Report: 1 October 2003-30 June 2004", November 2004, p-13- 
156 Ibid., pp. 12-13. 
157 Under the category of "others", Australia, New Zealand, and 
US are subsumed. 
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representative will be selected by consensus within each geographical area 
on an annual basis. 15' In addition, the current Co-Chairs and immediate past 
and nominated future Co-Chair are also subsumed under the membership. 159 
Without doubt, these functions considerably reinforce the activities of the 
APG, especially in securing political momentum and solid financing. This 
implementation-oriented administrative structure stands in contrast with the 
simple organisational structure of the FATF which mainly focuses on 
standard-setting activities. 160 This is one of aspects which characterise the 
relationship between the FATF and FSRBs. 
c. The monitoring of standards by the APG 
Having its origins in the initial awareness-raising efforts of the 
FATF, the APG naturally adopted the FATF Forty Recommendations as the 
AML/CFT standard. 16' Moreover, as it is stipulated in its terms of reference, 
the APG can also review the best way to apply the standards within the 
region considering regional factors. 162 The CFATF already tried this approach 
by adopting the Nineteen Recommendations. "' However, at the 2002 Annual 
Meeting, APG agreed not to develop its own standards at this time but rather 
to feed into the review of the global standards set up by the FATF. 1` In this 
'SR Ibid., p. 13. 
159 Ibid., p. 13. 
Basically, the administrative structure of the FATF simply consists of a Chair and 
Secretariat, but it does not have a Steering Group of an APG type. For details on the 
structure of the FATF, see, Gilmore, W. C., supra note 124, pp. 91-92. 
161 APG, "First Annual Report: 1999-2000", April 2001, p. 1. 
162 APG, "Terms of Reference", in APG, "Annual Report: 1999-2000", April 2001, p. 35. 
"3 For the 1999 revised Nineteen Recommendation, see (visited on 1 June 2005) 
<http: //www. cfatf. org/documentation/getfile. asp? fileid=l2&option=1>. 
16' APG, "Annual Report: 1 July 2001-30 June 2002", December 2002, p. 17. 
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context, the APG endorsed the revised 2003 FATF Forty Recommendations in 
September 2003 and its revised 2004 AML/CFT methodology in June 2004. "5 
Being influenced by the FATF, the APG similarly employed self 
assessment and mutual evaluation with a view to the monitoring of the 
regional implementation of international standards. For the self-assessment 
exercise, the APG used the FATF's self-assessment questionnaire, and the 
procedures of analysis and discussion in the annual meetings are quite 
similar to those of the FATF. " In fact, the APG conducted its own self- 
assessment exercises as well as participating in the FATF self-assessment 
exercise on terrorist financing. 167 The self-assessment exercise was first 
conducted in 1997 and continued to be a valuable information source on the 
status of the AML/CFT measures in much of the region. It also served to 
enable the participating jurisdictions to assess their situation against the 
world's best practice. 168 However, at the 2003 Annual Meeting, members 
postponed a decision on whether and when to conduct further self- 
assessment exercises until the next APG Annual Meeting. 169 More recently, at 
the 2004 Meeting, it was agreed to postpone any self-assessment exercise for 
a further year until the release of a revised self-assessment methodology by 
the FATF. 17° However, given that in 2004, the FATF decided not to conduct 
', ' APG, "Annual Report: 1 July 2002-30 September 2003", September 2004. p. 17; APG, 
"Annual Report: 1 October 2003-30 June 2004", November 2004, p. 26. 
166 For the details of the procedure, see, "Self-Assessment Exercises" on the APG website 
<http: //www. apgml. org/content/self_assessment_exercises. jsp>. 
167 APG, "Annual Report: 1 October 2003-30 June 2004", November 2004, p. 24. 
1h8 APG, "First Annual Report: 1999-2000", April 2001, p. 13. 
169 APG, "Annual Report: 1 July 2002-30 September 2003", September 2004, p. 23. 
10 APG, "Annual Report: 1 October 2003-30 June 2004", November 2004, p. 25. 
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self-assessment exercises any morel" it remains to be seen how the APG will 
proceed in this area in the future. 12 
Likewise, the APG's mutual evaluation process is not so different 
from that of the FATF. 173 Interestingly, however, all evaluated APG members 
are required to provide a follow-up report at each APG Annual Meeting on 
the progress they have made. 14 The APG intends to assess a minimum of five 
APG members each year, either through an APG mutual evaluation or an 
IMF/World Bank-led assessment. 1' APG members who are also members of 
the FATF, are evaluated by the FATF or jointly by the FATF and the APG. 
176 
The first round of mutual evaluations began with Vanuatu in 
March 2000, and as of 30 June 2004,16 had been completed. ` The APG's six 
FATF members have also undergone an FATF evaluation, and the APG 
shares reports with the FATF on a reciprocal basis. "' For instance, New 
Zealand was assessed by a joint APG/FATF mission in October 2003. The 
APG also shares reports with the IMF/World Bank. 17' As explained above, the 
"' For a relevant discussion, see, Section II. 1. b. of this chapter. 
172 It is expected that future planning will be outlined following the 2005 APG Annual 
meeting. 
13 For the details of the procedure, see, APG, "Procedures for APG mutual evaluations: As 
adopted at the Sixth APG Annual Meeting, Macau, China", September 2003. 
"' Ibid., p. 6. Moreover, this obligation is stricter than that of the MONEYVAL which requires 
all countries to present written progress reports to the plenary one year after their report has 
been adopted. For the details of the MONEYVAL practices, see, Gilmore, W. C., supra note 
124, pp. 173-176. 
15 APG, "Annual Report: 1 October 2003-30 June 2004", November 2004, p. 24. 
The six APG/FATF member jurisdictions are Australia; Hong Kong, China; Japan; New 
Zealand; Singapore; and, the U. S. (APG, "Annual Report: 1 July 2001-30 June 2002", 
December 2002, p. 26). For the first round of mutual evaluations, the APG accepted the 
FATF's mutual evaluation reports for APG purposes of the six members who are also FATF 
members. 
APG, "Annual Report: 1 October 2003-30 June 2004", November 2004, p. 24. 
Ibid., p. 24. 
179 Ibid., p. 24. 
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APG agreed to use a Fund/Bank-led assessment when available in lieu of a 
mutual evaluation. "' The seven remaining APG members (Brunei 
Darussalam; India; Marshall Islands; Nepal; Niue; Pakistan; and, Sri Lanka) 
are to be evaluated by mid 2005.181 Interestingly, the APG has used the 2004 
revised AML/CFT methodology for the first round of mutual evaluations of 
the remaining jurisdictions conducted since January 2005.182 Although this 
approach is vulnerable to a criticism in terms of the equality of treatment of 
this remaining jurisdictions which are to be evaluated by the higher 
standards of the revised 2003 version, "' the APG appears to put a more 
emphasis on consistency with most recent international standards and the 
increased reciprocity with other specialist bodies such as the IMF/World 
Bank. ' The second round of mutual evaluations will commence following 
the APG's 2005 Annual Meeting. "' 
d. The enforcement of standards by the APG 
The APG's non-compliance policy is also influenced by that of the 
FATF. In its "Explanatory Note on Membership"(2002), the APG provides for 
the following measures to be taken which include: 
180 For a relevant discussion, see, supra note 105 and its related text. 
181 APG, "Annual Report: 1 October 2003-30 June 2004", November 2004, p-25- 
182 Ibid., p. 26. Brunei Darussalam became one of the first countries in the world to 
be assessed 
by this 2004 methodology (APG, The AsialPacific Group on Money Laundering 
Information 
Quarterly, February 2005, p. 2). 
183 This is due to the fact that most of jurisdictions were assessed against the 1996 FATF Forty 
Recommendations during this first round (APG, "Annual Report: 1 October 2003-30 June 
2004", November 2004, p. 24). 
184 The IMF/World Bank have already started to use the 2004 methodology since the 
last 
quarter of that year. 
185 APG, "Annual Report: 1 October 2003-30 June 2004", November 2004, p. 25. 
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1. Requiring the member to provide regular reports on their progress in meeting 
the membership requirements within a fixed timeframe; 
2. Sending a letter from the APG Co-Chairs to the relevant minister(s) in the 
member jurisdiction drawing their attention to non-compliance with the APG 
membership requirements; 
3. Arranging a high-level mission to the member jurisdiction in question to 
reinforce this message; 
4. Suspending the jurisdiction from some of the APG's activities, for example its 
technical assistance and training program until all membership requirements 
have been met; and, 
5. Suspending the jurisdiction's APG membership entirely until all membership 
requirements have been met. 
The steps proposed are divided into two parts. Steps 1,2 and 3 essentially 
involve enhanced peer pressure to assist non-complying members in 
expediting implementation of the Recommendations, 186 while Steps 4 and 5 
entail more serious action. 18' Indeed, this non-compliance policy is nearly 
identical to that of the FATF. However, it is of note that there is a lack of 
countermeasures which correspond to FATF Recommendation 21. In this 
sense, the APG's non-compliance policy is not as powerful as that of the 
FATF. It does not directly interfere with the flow of international financial 
transactions. Nevertheless, the application of the non-compliance policy itself 
could serve as a strong incentive for the applied jurisdiction to correct its 
behaviour by way of damaging its reputation in the regional society. 
In practice, concerns about non-compliance have been raised with 
regard to the failure in financial contributions which are necessary 
for 
membership. 188 Thus, in the 2004 Annual Meeting, it was agreed 
that the APG 
186 APG, "Explanatory Note on Membership", August 2002, para. 4.3. 
Ibid., para. 4.3. 
'ýý APG, "Annual Report: 1 October 2003-30 June 2004", November 2004, p. 14. 
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Secretariat should make a formal contact at a high level with any members 
who have failed to pay their contributions or who have been late with 
payments in order to encourage their future compliance and explain the 
possible consequences of non-payment. "' 
e. Other supporting activities 
Besides the monitoring and enforcing activities of relevant 
international standards, the APG is involved in other important activities to 
support the spread of the AML/CFT message in the region. First of all, 
technical assistance is of particular note. In fact, the role of the FSRBs in 
coordinating technical assistance was endorsed at a meeting of AML bodies 
and various donor organisations held in Washington in April 2002.190 In this 
meeting which was co-hosted by the IMF/World Bank, the participants 
agreed that the needs of technical assistance should be identified and the 
delivery of technical assistance should also be coordinated, on a regional 
basis through the FSRBs. In this context, the APG plays an active role in 
coordinating technical assistance in the region. For example, the Annual 
Forum on Technical Assistance and Training was held on 14 June 2004 just 
prior to the Annual Meeting in Seoul, with the attendance of all APG 
jurisdictions and the APG's Donors and Providers Group. Subsequently 
throughout the Annual Meeting period(15-18 June 2004), a series of 
individual meetings were held between priority jurisdictions and interested 
donors and providers, including a combined meeting involving Myanmar, 
189 Ibid., p. 14. 
190 IMF/World Bank, "Intensified Work on Anti-Money Laundering and Combating the 
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Lao PDR, Vietnam and Cambodia. 191 Interestingly, this position of the APG 
on technical assistance stands in contrast with the practice of the FATF that 
does not actively engage in the area. 192 This is due to the implementation- 
oriented nature of the APG and also one of aspects that characterise the 
relationship between the FATF and FSRBs. 
Secondly, the APG operates several Working Groups of a 
temporary nature to cope with various tasks. For instance, the Typologies 
Working Group was established at the 2003 Annual Meeting for the purpose 
of the better understanding of the nature, extent and impact of money 
laundering in the region. 193 Moreover, the APG Implementation Issues 
Working Group was set up at the 2003 Annual Meeting to undertake a series 
of coordinated and intensive examinations of particular AML/CFT 
implementation issues; to support and develop a network of APG experts on 
key implementation issues; and to act as an informal consultation group to 
provide practical advice to APG members on AML/CFT issues. 19' This aspect 
once again illustrates the implementation-oriented nature of the APG. 
Thirdly, the APG actively participates in the activities of the 
global AML/CFT network. For example, it participated in all activities 
undertaken by the FATF, including attendance at Plenary Meetings as an 
observer and participation in reviews of AML/CFT standards. 19' In June 2005, 
Financing of Terrorism (AML/CFT)", 25 September 2002. 
19' APG, "Annual Report: 1 October 2003-30 June 2004", November 2004, p. 22. 
192 For relevant discussions, see, Section 11.3. of this chapter and Section II. 3. b. of Chapter Six. 
193 APG, "Annual Report: 2000-2001", November 2001, p. 10; APG, "Annual Report: 1 July 
2002-30 September 2003", September 2004, p. 10. 
194 APG, "Annual Report: 1 July 2002-30 September 2003", September 2004, p. 12. 
'95 Ibid., p. 16. 
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the FATF even held a joint Plenary with the APG in Singapore-the first FATF 
Plenary with an FSRB in attendance. 
196 Furthermore, the APG Secretariat 
attends the FATF NCCT Review Group meetings as an observer and, where 
appropriate, seeks to provide a bridge for communication and information to 
APG members and observers on the NCCT list. 197 
3. The FSRBs strategy : developments and prospects 
Currently, efforts to create similar regional bodies in western and 
central Africa are under way. Following the December 1999 Summit of the 
Heads of State and Government of the Economic Community of West African 
States(ECOWAS) in Lome, Togo, it was decided to establish an Inter- 
Governmental Action Group against Money Laundering (GIABA). 
198 A 
permanent Secretariat is in the process of being established. "' Similarly, an 
Action Group against Money Laundering in Africa (GABAC) was created in 
December 2000, in N'Djamena, Chad, by the Conference of the Heads of State 
of the Economic and Monetary Community(CEMAC). 200 If these initiatives 
are consolidated, nearly all countries in the world will be placed under the 
AML/CFT regime through their commitment to their regional FSRBs and 
thus establishing a close link with the FATF. 
In sum, as a case study of the APG suggests, the strategy to 
19' FATF, "Annual Report: 2004-2005", 10 June 2005, p. 10. 
197 Ibid., p. 17. Among the APG member jurisdictions, Cook Islands, Indonesia, Marshall 
Islands, Niue, Philippines were once designated as an NCCT. As of 1 June 2005, however, all 
these jurisdictions were removed from the NCCT list. However, Myanmar which is an 
observer jurisdiction of the APG is still on the NCCT list. 
198 FATF, "Annual Report: 2003-2004", 2 July 2004, p. 15. 
199 Ibid., p. 15. 
200 Ibid., p. 15. 
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spread FSRBs all over the world proved very useful, inducing "non-FATF" 
member countries to engage in the AML/CFT campaign in the "FATF" 
manner. Furthermore, it is clear that FSRBs play an essential role in ensuring 
the appropriate provision of technical assistance and other follow-up 
activities in non-FATF member countries. 
What is more, note should also be given to a pivotal policy 
implication in relation to the FSRBs strategy particularly in the post 9/11 
context. Namely, as seen above, there is some tension in the ongoing 
cooperation between the FATF and IMF/Word Bank since the IMF/World 
Bank conditioned their collaboration with the FATF on the agreement that 
the FATF does not undertake a further round of the NCCT exercise. "' 
Accordingly, it is possible that the IMF/World Bank might withdraw from the 
AML/CFT campaign if the NCCT exercise should be resumed at some time in 
the future. 202 Then, it is apparent that the global AML/CFT campaign could 
not avoid suffering a serious setback since the IMF/World Bank are 
particularly noteworthy contributors in this area. 203 In these circumstances, 
the FSRBs strategy can be used as a backup plan for the global reach of the 
AML/CFT regime. 204 In other words, the FSRBs can play a buffer role 
between the FATF and non-FATF member countries. In the absence of the 
FSRBs, non-compliant non-FATF member countries would have no friendly 
20' For a relevant discussion, see, Section 111.2. of this chapter, and particularly supra note 
89. 
202 The FATF still seems to regard the NCCT initiative as an important policy tool. 
See, FATF, 
"Annual Report: 2004-2005", p-12- 
203 These organisations have played a significant complementary role 
in relation to the FATF, 
given their capability of mobilising a good level of manpower and resources as well as 
their 
near universal membership which lends both organisations 
legitimacy and acceptance. For a 
relevant discussion, see also, Section II. 3. of Chapter 
Six. 
204 1 am grateful to Professor Gilmore, W. C. for an insightful seed comment 
in this respect. 
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mediator to link them to an institutionalised circle in the international arena. 
Furthermore, given the small Secretariat of the FATF, there could hardly be 
found any major technical assistance provider comparable to the IMF/World 
Bank. 205 Accordingly, it is the FSRBs that can play a crucial role in bridging 
the gap between the FATF and the non-FATF member countries. They would 
hold the "alienated" countries within the institutionalised world in the 
AML/CFT context encouraging them to listen to the message of the 
international community. 
V. The soft law phenomena 
1. The soft enforcement and the blurring boundary between 
monitoring and enforcement 
In Section I of Chapter Four, the requirement for hard 
enforcement is defined as compulsory binding settlement of disputes. If not, 
the realm of soft enforcement begins. In this context, various cases of soft 
enforcement can be identified. For example, the technical assistance provided 
by the IMF/World Bank or the FSRBs can be subsumed under the category of 
soft enforcement through "'inducement". 206 
Moreover, soft enforcement can be sought by way of various 
methods of "value deprivation". 207 The conditionality of the IMF/World Bank 
linked to their lending assistance is a case in point. When these organisations 
provide financial loans to needy countries, they generally attach some 
2°5 For a relevant discussion, see also, Section 11.3. of this chapter. 
206 For a relevant discussion, see, Section I. I. of Chapter Four, and particularly 
footnote 17 
and its related text. 
207 See, footnote 17 of Chapter Four and its related text. 
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conditionality to the loans, and if the needy countries are not willing to agree 
on the conditionality, the IMF/World Bank might not render financial 
assistance. 208 Also even when the contract is already established and the loans 
are being provided, further loans might be stopped if the assisted countries 
are not complying with the conditionality. Moreover, if both organisations 
could closely collaborate on conditionality, it would further strengthen this de 
facto enforcement powers. 2o9 
What is more, the non-compliance policies of the FATF and FSRBs 
provide further insight into the current analysis of the soft enforcement 
phenomena. When the result of a mutual evaluation exercise which indicate 
a country's serious deficiencies is submitted to an FATF plenary meeting, it 
would work as a form of stigmatisation of the country concerned. 21' This is in 
effect a soft sanction, "naming and shaming measure", designed to inflict 
damage to a country's reputation. If counter-measures go further such as the 
application of Recommendation 21, the economy of the country can be 
20. The possibility that the IMF/World Bank might use its lending power as a de facto 
enforcement tool has been often pointed out. See, e. g., Bothe, M., "Legal and Non-Legal 
Norms-A Meaningful Distinction in International Relations? ", (1980) Netherlands Yearbook of 
International Law, vol. 11, pp. 82-83; Hillgenberg, H., "A Fresh Look at Soft Law", (1999) 
European Journal of International Law, vol. 10, p. 511; Tadeusz, G. W., "A Framework for 
Understanding "Soft Law""', (1984) McGill Law journal, vol. 30, p. 77, p. 85. 
Conditionality is central to policy-based lending. It elaborates the basis of a commitment 
between the country and the IMF or the World Bank throughout the period of a policy 
reform program. It also provides the basis for financing assurances for the country and for 
ensuring that funds are used in support of the objectives of the program (IMF/World Bank, 
"Strengthening IMF-World Bank Collaboration on Country Programs and Conditionality- 
Progress Report", 19 August 2002, p. 7, at para. 6). 
209 This aspect was once pointed out by a joint paper. See, IMF/World Bank, "Strengthening 
IMF-World Bank Collaboration on Country Programs and Conditionality", 23 August 2001, 
p. iv. For the history of the cooperation between the IMF and World 
Bank on conditionality, 
see, the annex of this joint paper. 
210 For details of the procedure, see, FATF, "Review of FATF Anti-Money Laundering 
Systems 
and Mutual Evaluation Procedures 1992-1999", 16 February 
2001, pp. 35-42. 
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seriously affected because all other countries pay special attention to 
business relationships and transactions with the country in question. For 
example, the major banks of other FATF member jurisdictions may reject the 
letters of credit drawn by the banks of non-compliant FATF member 
jurisdictions or by NCCT banks. 211 They may also impose tight scrutiny and 
premium charges on any transactions conducted by the banks of non- 
compliant jurisdictions, and thus create a high-cost economy. 212 Sometimes, 
correspondent banking relations between the banks of non-compliant 
jurisdictions and their counterparts in FATF countries may be halted. 21' All 
these countermeasures may also trigger capital flight. 214 Indeed, these can be 
understood as a kind of political pressure under the category of soft 
enforcement rather than formal legal sanctioning, given the non-binding 
nature of the original instrument. 
All in all, the potential damage which a non-compliant 
jurisdiction might suffer is not to be ignored, and it is apparent that the 
211 Witular, R. A., "Govt upbeat RI to be dropped from money laundering list", The Jakarta 
Post, 8 February 2005. 
212 Ibid., With regard to the tight scrutiny on the transactions between the FATF member 
jurisdictions and NCCTs, for example, concerns were raised in the Philippines that it could 
lead to delays in the transmittal of overseas Filipino work remittances, which are an 
important source of foreign exchange (Tenorio, A. S., "RP excluded in FATF Feb. meet, 
remains blacklisted", The Manila Times, 8 March 2004). 
213 For example, the non-compliance policy of the FATF with regard to NCCTs allows 
member jurisdictions to condition, restrict, target or even prohibit financial transactions with 
non-cooperative jurisdictions (FATF, "Report on Non-Cooperative Countries and Territories", 
14 February 2000, pp. 7-9). 
214 For instance, the blacklisting was a severe threat to the Panamanian international banking 
system, which accounts for 80 percent of the country's gross domestic product. Bank 
Superintendent Delia Cardenas of Panama said a number of banks left Panama because the 
blacklist made it difficult for them to make international transactions ("Money laundering 
list", Latinamerica Press, 9 July 2001). See also, Council for Security Cooperation in Asia 
Pacific (CSCAP), "Report on the 11th Meeting of the CSCAP Working Group on 
Transnational Crime", 13-14 May 2002, Shanghai, China, p. 7. 
266 
jurisdictions in question could hardly resist the request of the FATF as 
illustrated by the responses of jurisdictions to the two rounds of mutual 
evaluations. 215 Interestingly, for most jurisdictions, the indication of their 
deficiencies was enough to secure their compliance and further measures 
beyond it, in reality, were seldom necessary. 216 In short, this kind of "naming 
and shaming" measures exerts a huge influence on the behaviour of 
individual jurisdictions, and at the core of this enforcing power lies the 
manipulation of jurisdictions' concerns about their "reputation", which can 
be regarded as a typical type of soft enforcement. 217 
In this sense, the relationship of soft law with the market 
economy is also worthy of note. The system of the market economy can 
significantly strengthen the enforcement power of soft law. In a global 
market economy which is characterised as an unlimited competitive 
environment, reputation is a crucial factor to be taken into account for 
success. 218 The confidential nature of mutual evaluation reports by the FATF 
215 FATF, "Review of FATF Anti-Money Laundering Systems and Mutual Evaluation 
Procedures 1992-1999", 16 February 2001, pp. 43-44. 
216 Ibid., pp. 43-44. During two rounds of mutual evaluations, 12 countries took part in follow- 
up measures. As a result, except Turkey and Austria, all other countries enacted the 
necessary anti-money laundering measures in a speedy fashion, without being subject to any 
substantial sanctions such as the application of Recommendation 21 or the suspension of the 
FATF membership. In fact, reporting itself results in considerable political pressure. 
21' For further discussions on reputation, see, e. g., Guzman, A., "A Compliance-Based Theory 
of International Law", (2002) California Law Review, vol. 90, pp. 1861-1864; Tadeusz, G. W., "A 
Framework for Understanding "Soft Law"", (1984) McGill Law journal, vol. 30, p. 86. 
218 For the important relationship between reputation and market economy, see, e. g., Wai, R., 
"Countering, Branding, Dealing: Using Economic And Social Rights In and Around The 
International Trade Regime", (2003) European Journal of International Law, vol. 14, issue 1, at 
section 6; Simmons, B. A., "Legalization of International Monetary Affairs", (2000) 
International Organization, vol. 54, pp. 586-587, and p. 595; Simmons, B. A., "Money and the 
Law: Why Comply with the Public International Law of Money? ", (2000) The Yale Journal of 
International Law, vol. 25, pp. 361-362. 
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and FSRBs should also be understood in this context. 219 This is particularly 
true for the financial industry whose success is based on the trust of clients 
and the cooperative network with foreign counterparts. 72° The remarkable 
speed with which the assessed countries under the second round of the FATF 
mutual evaluations responded to the criticism of peer countries is already 
providing hard evidence of this trend. 721 
Furthermore, in this context of soft enforcement, another 
interesting phenomenon can be found with regard to the two separate 
concepts: monitoring and enforcement. In other words, the pressure on the 
"reputation" already starts with the monitoring process, and consequently, 
monitoring itself might well fit into the concept of "enforcement" by soft law 
standards. 222 For instance, the results of the FATF self-assessment exercises 
are collected and analysed by the Secretariat, and later they are put on the 
table for discussion at the FATF Plenary meeting with the attendance of all 
member countries and observers. During this process, it is needless to say 
that the self-assessing countries are placed under considerable peer pressure. 
In the case of mutual evaluations, peer pressure would work earlier than in 
self-assessment exercises and the degree of psychological pressure would be 
much higher, given the objective and demanding nature of this assessment 
219 Mostly, only summaries of the mutual evaluation reports are publicly available. 
220 For examples of firms' concern about their reputation in a market economy system, see, 
Bazley, S. & Foster, C., Money laundering: business compliance, 2004, pp. 266-267. Bazley and 
Foster emphasise that firms have to appreciate that bad news travels fast and, with modem 
technology, is prominent, no matter how skillful the work of a PR company. 
221 See, e. g., FATF, " Review of FATF Anti-Money Laundering Systems and 
Mutual 
Evaluation Procedures 1992-1999", 16 February 2001, pp. 43-45. 
272 FATF, "Annual Report: 1998-1999", 2 July 1999, p. 7. This phenomenon was correctly 
pointed out by Chinkin. See, Chinkin, C. M., "The Challenge of 
Soft Law: Development and 
Change in International Law", (1989) International and Comparative Lain Review, vol. 54, p. 862. 
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mechanism. 223 It is an international system of periodic peer review under 
which each member is subject to a form of on-site examination. 224 Thus, even 
before the results of the evaluation are produced in the plenary meeting, the 
peer pressure is already working, i. e., from the beginning of the monitoring 
process. In short, even "before" or "in the absence of" the official 
employment of non-compliance policy, a substantial degree of peer pressure 
is operating in the monitoring work of the specialist bodies. This can then be 
regarded as another kind of soft enforcement situation. The FATF's success in 
enforcing its standards with mutual evaluation exercises was so impressive 
that the OECD and the Council of Europe 'GRECO"5 followed suit by 
introducing similar mutual evaluation procedures in dealing with corruption 
issues. 226 In addition, the similar effect of a soft enforcement can be found in 
the monitoring process of the IMF and the World Bank. 22' However, in that 
case, the implication of monitoring would be much more far-reaching, given 
the two organisations' universal membership. 228 
In sum, it is apparent that even without invoking a strong non- 
223 See, Section II. 2. c. of this chapter. 
224 Levi, M. & Gilmore, W. C., "Terrorist Finance, Money Laundering and the Rise and Rise of 
Mutual Evaluation: A New Paradigm for Crime Control? ", in Pieth, M., ed., Financing 
Terrorism, 2002, p. 97. 
225 The GRECO is the "Group of States against Corruption" established by the Council of 
Europe in 1998 < http: //www. greco. coe. int/Default. htm>. 
226 Article 12 of the OECD 1997 bribery convention provides for monitoring and follow-up to 
be undertaken by the OECD Working Group on Bribery (WGB) and the terms of reference of 
the WGB adopts self- and mutual evaluations for these purposes. Furthermore, the 1998 
Council of Europe agreement establishing GRECO contains detailed procedures (Levi, M. & 
Gilmore, W. C., supra note 224, p. 107). 
227 For details of the monitoring activities of the IMF/World Bank, see, Section 111.2. of this 
chapter. 
228 For details of the work and membership of the IMF/World Bank, see, Section III. 1. of this 
chapter. 
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compliance measure, the reputation formed through this monitoring process 
would already have a tremendous impact on changing the practices of 
individual countries in the international financial system and other 
concerned areas. 229 Indeed, this phenomenon of the blurring boundary 
between the monitoring stage and the enforcement stage seems to derive 
from the unique nature of soft enforcement. 
2. Future developments: transformation from soft law into hard law 
In general, there seem to exist two positions on the issue of the 
transformation of soft law into hard law. The first insists that transformation 
is not desirable and soft law should exist as it is, while the second argues that 
the final goal of soft law is to reach the status of hard law. In fact, it is not 
right to say that one side is correct while the other is wrong. Rather, it should 
be reviewed in the context of the nature of specific issue areas. In other 
words, (a) when an issue area is always full of uncertainty and thus, it is very 
difficult to establish any concrete norms; (b) the legal norms play the role of 
coordinating conflicting interests, it is soft law that fits the needs of that area 
rather than inflexible hard law. 23° For example, in the field of arms control 
where it is very difficult to predict the development of technologies, states 
may prefer to leave agreements imprecise rather than to face the possibility 
of being caught with unfavorable commitments. 231 Let us consider the case of 
the anti-ballistic missile (ABM) treaty between the U. S. and the then Soviet 
229 For the role of reputation in securing a country's compliance, see, e. g., Guzman, A. 
T., 
supra note 217, pp. 1860-1865. 
230 Abbott, K. W. & Snidal, D., "Hard and Soft Law in International Governance", (2000) 
International Organization, vol. 54, p. 442. 
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Union. In this case, it is the U. S. that was caught with unfavorable and strict 
commitments. 232 Although the U. S. had widened its lead in the relevant nerv 
technologies with its more advanced economy, its detailed earlier 
commitment in the ABM treaty placed one of the major obstacles to the 
testing of new weaponry, undermining its legal basis to develop the Strategic 
Defense Initiative (SDI) project. " Learning from this experience, states might 
be tempted not to conclude an agreement of a similar nature with potential 
rivals in the future. 234 Nonetheless, rather than sticking to a hard law 
approach and facing an all or nothing situation, it would be better for states to 
have some kind of regulatory regime in the form of soft law, thus minimising 
uncertainty in a specific issue area. 
However, (a) when uncertainty in an issue area is of a lesser 
degree; (b) legal norms play the role of promoting common good, it seems 
desirable to have hard law in the concerned area, considering the stability 
that established hard law accords. Of course, due to the difficulty in the 
course of establishing hard law in a specific area, the soft law form might be 
provisionally preferred as an alternative, but in this case, it should be 
23' Ibid., p. 442. 
232 For example, see, Article V of the ABM treaty (1972) which stipulates: 
"1. Each Party undertakes not to develop, test, or deploy ABM systems or components which 
are sea-based, air-based, space-based, or mobile land-based. 
2. Each Party undertakes not to develop, test or deploy ABM launchers for launching more 
than one ABM interceptor missile at a time from each launcher, not to modify deployed 
launchers to provide them with such a capacity, not to develop, test, or deploy automatic or 
semi-automatic or other similar systems for rapid reload of ABM launchers. " 
233 Lipson, C., "Why are some international agreements informal? ", (1991) Inter, iationial 
Organization, vol. 45, pp. 522-523. 
2' The US eventually withdrew from the ABM treaty in June 2002. For details, see, Rivas, M. 
P., "U. S. quits ABM treaty", 14 December 2001, CNN. com 
<http: //archives. cnn. com/2001/ALLPOLITICS/12/13/rec. bush. abm/>. 
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understood as a means to achieve the status of hard law, rather than as the 
goal itself. 235 In the view of the writer, the AML/CFT area falls into this 
second category and thus, it is desirable that soft law ultimately develops 
into hard law. 
Generally, soft law develops into binding hard law such as treaty 
or custom. In the course of this, soft law operates alone, or sometimes in 
conjunction with the hard law. 236 
With regard to the transformation into treaty form, the process is 
already triggered, and currently there can be identified three types of 
transformation. 237 The first type is that the content of a soft law is 
incorporated into the text of a treaty without any specific reference to the 
original sources, as illustrated by the International Convention for the 
Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism(1999). 238 The second type is that 
the content of a soft law is integrated into the text of a treaty with implicit 
reference to the original sources, as with the case of the Palermo 
Convention(2000). 239 The third type is that the content of soft law is reflected 
in the text of a treaty with explicit reference to the original sources like the 
235 For a successful case study of the utility of soft law as a means to achieve the status of 
hard law, see, e. g., Abbott, K. W., "Rule-Making in the WTO: Lessons From The Case Of 
Bribery and Corruption", (2001) Journal of International Economic Law, vol. 4(2), pp. 275-296. 
236 To this end, one of the methods that the soft law approach employs is the reiteration of 
principles through the proliferation of instruments and standards in order to reinforce the 
dynamics as illustrated by the practices of the specialist bodies such as the FATF, the BCBS, 
the Wolfsberg Group, etc. See, Thomas, C., "Trade-Related Labour and Environment 
Agreements? ", (2002) Journal of International Economic Law, vol. 5(4), at section I. A. 
237 I am grateful to Professor Gilmore for this classification of three types of transformation. 
238 Article 18. 
239 Article 7(3) stipulates that: 
"In establishing a domestic regulatory and supervisory regime under the terms of this 
article, ... 
State Parties are called upon to use as a guideline the relevant initiatives of regional, 
interregional and multilateral organizations against money-laundering. " 
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Inter-American Convention Against Terrorism(2002), 240 and the Council of 
Europe Convention on Laundering, Search, Seizure and Confiscation of the 
Proceeds from Crime and on the Financing of Terrorism (2005). 24' Particularly, 
this 2005 Council of Europe Convention can be considered to be a very 
advanced instrument in that by providing for a simplified amendment 
procedure, it can even deal with a situation when the standards of the FATF 
have evolved considerably with time. " 
On the other hand, with regard to the transformation into 
customary law, it is a bit difficult to produce clear-cut evidence, but it is 
basically because customary law requires opinio juris which is a psychological 
element as well as general and consistent state practice. 243 Of course, it is 
argued that sometimes only one requirement can in effect establish 
customary law. 2' However, this does not seem to be the case in the AML/CFT 
Z. 0 Article 4(2) provides that: 
"When implementing paragraph 1 of this article, state parties shall use as guidelines the 
recommendations developed by specialized international and regional entities, in particular 
the Financial Action Task Force and, as appropriate, the Inter-American Drug Abuse Control 
Commission, the Caribbean Financial Action Task Force, and the South American Financial 
Action Task Force. " 
24' Article 13(1) stipulates that: 
"Each Party shall adopt such legislative and other measures as may be necessary to institute 
a comprehensive domestic regulatory and supervisory or monitoring regime to prevent 
money laundering and shall take due account of applicable international standards, 
including in particular the recommendations adopted by the Financial Action Task Force on 
Money Laundering (FATF)". 
242 See, Article 54; the explanatory report, p. 54. Indeed, there arises a question of how to re- 
draw consensus among state parties when the standards of the FATF are considerably 
revised after the initial adoption of the convention. 
243 Brownlie, I., Principles of Public International Law, 2003, pp. 4-11; Dixon, M., Textbook on 
International Law, 2002, pp. 32-33; Akehurst, M., "Custom as a Source of International Law", 
(1974/1975)The British Yearbook of International Law, vol. 47, pp. 1-53. 
2` Brownlie, I, supra note 243, p. 8; D'Amato, A. A., The Concept of Custom in International Law, 
1971, pp. 51-56; Roberts, A. E., "Traditional and Modern Approaches to Customary 
International Law: A Reconciliation", (2001) The American Journal of International Law, vol. 95, 
pp. 757-758; Cheng, B., "United Nations Resolutions on Outer Space: "Instant" 
International 
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area since recent evidence suggests that customary law-making processes are 
already under way in terms of both requirements. For example, some 150 
states are now members of either the FATF or FSRBs, or both, and they are 
regularly participating in self-assessment and mutual evaluation exercises. 
What is more, the existence of the multilateral treaty is also a significant 
factor to be taken into account. 137 states have already ratified the ICSFT, 
binding themselves to the CFT regime. "' This commitment to FATF 
standards and multilateral treaties can provide valuable evidence of opinio 
juris as well as state practices. 246 Also other specialist bodies are repeatedly 
adopting and promoting the FATF-drafted AML/CFT standards as their rules 
of reference as exemplified by the practices of the IMF, World Bank, BCBS, 
IOSCO, and IAIS. 247 In particular, the IMF/World Bank which has 184 
jurisdictions as members, actively promote the AML/CFT standards on 
various occasions. Last but not least, the role of the Security Council should 
be remembered. As mentioned before, the resolutions of the Security Council 
regard terrorism as a threat to international peace and impose binding 
Customary Law", in Cheng, B., ed., International Law: Teaching and Practice, 1982, pp. 249-252. 
245 It is as of 1 June 2005. If the focus is extended further to the Palermo Convention(2000), 
some 110 countries are placed overlappingly under the AML/CFT framework (It entered into 
force on 29 September 2003. As of 1 June 2005, there are 106 parties). 
246 Baxter, R. R., "Multilateral Treaties as Evidence of Customary International Law", 
(1965/1966) The British Yearbook of International Law, vol. 41, pp. 277-278; Byers, M., Customs, 
Power and the Power of Rules, 1999, pp. 166-170; D'Amato, A. A., supra note 244, pp. 70-71; Boyle, 
A. E., "Some Reflection on the Relationship of Treaties and Soft Law", (1999) International and 
Comparative Law Quarterly, vol. 48, p. 906. In particular, Akehurst emphasised that a treaty is 
not a physical act; it is a statement and a promise. For further details, see, Akehurst, supra 
note 243, pp. 3-4. 
247 For the effect of "repetition", see, e. g, Dupuy, P. M., "Soft law and the International Law of 
the Environment", (1991) Michigan Journal of International Law, vol. 12, pp. 424-428; Thomas, C., 
"Trade-Related Labour and Environment Agreements? ", (2002) Journal of International 
Economic Law, vol. 5(4), at section I (A). 
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obligations on all countries to suppress terrorist financing. 248 Accordingly, 
although at present there is no explicit link between the mandate of the FATF 
and that of the Security Council, there is building up a strong basis for the 
transformation of the FATF-inspired AML/CFT soft law into customary law 
under the umbrella of the Security Council's direct mandate. 
249 
In sum, there are developing customary law as well as treaty law 
in the AML/CFT area, and both soft law and hard law interact with each 
other or within themselves thus creating synergy in the transformation 
processes. However, given that international standards in this area develop 
fast and become increasingly detailed to cover various typologies and 
situations, it should be remembered that the transformation process cannot 
be completed simply as a one-off operation. Thus, continuous attention 
should be given to sustaining this transformation process engaging relevant 
and necessary actors. "' 
248 See, e. g., UN SC Resolution 1373 and 1390. 
2.9 In our fast-changing times, the requirements to be customary law such as opinio juris as 
well as general, uniform and consistent country practices, may prove to be obstacles in the 
timely application of new rules which are necessary due to new developments. Thus, the 
role of the Security Council is once again highlighted in the sense that it could 
have a strong 
influence on the requirements through the adoption of relevant binding resolutions as an 
opinion leader. For the relevant discussion, see, Seidl-Hohenveldern, 
I., "International 
Economic Soft Law", (1980) Recueil des Cours, tome 163, pp. 188-191. 
250 This will be revisited in Section 11.3. of Chapter Six. 
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Chapter Six: 
Financing of Terrorism as a Trojan Horse in the 
Fight against Transnational Organised Crime 
I. Context 
Through the analysis of the evolution and implementation of 
international standards on the financing of terrorism, two major findings 
should be noted. Firstly, the strategy to combat the financing of terrorism 
(CFT) has considerably contributed to the development of the anti-money 
laundering(AML) strategy which was originally created in the context of 
targeting criminal finances - these criminal finances are in the main from 
transnational organised crime such as drug trafficking and people smuggling. 
Secondly, the CFT strategy provided a prototype of a new law enforcement 
weapon to wage a financial war on criminal groups, i. e. the international 
administrative asset-freezing system as illustrated by the practices of the 
1267 Sanctions Committee. ' 
In this context, strategies will be explored that make best use of 
these new CFT mechanisms as a Trojan horse in order to further facilitate the 
anti-money laundering campaign and to target criminal finances in general. 
' For details, see, Section III of Chapter Three of this study. 
2-6 
II. Further Support for the Anti-Money Laundering Campaign 
1. The impact of 9/11 on the AML campaign 
In Chapter One, the relationship between the financing of 
terrorism and money laundering was examined. As a matter of fact, these 
two concepts are essentially different. 2 Money laundering begins with 
brushing out the audit trail of dirty money and ends by achieving 
legitimisation. In contrast, the financing of terrorism which is used to 
promote a political cause by terrorist organisations begins with money 
making activities and ends by distributing the money to final users. Despite 
the difference in their final goals, what money laundering and terrorist 
financing share are the concerns about how to erase money trails. Out of this 
similarity, it should be noted that the skills of the money launderer have 
already become an indispensable tool for terrorists to hide the flow of their 
money as well as to keep sustainable financing sources intact. 3 
Correspondingly, the anti-money laundering tools have been employed by 
policy makers in order to combat the distribution process of terrorist 
financing. 
When this partnership was established between the CFT and 
AML areas, it seemed that the CFT side was getting a "free ride", utilising the 
already-established AML infrastructure. However, it has gradually become 
clear that in reality this was not the case. It was the AML area that benefited 
most from the partnership. 
2 For in depth discussions, see, Section 111.2. of Chapter One of this study. 
Thachuk, K. L., "Terrorism's Financial Lifeline: Can It be Severed? ", Strategic Foruni, 
Institute for National Strategic Studies, National Defense University, no. 191, May 2002, p. 3. 
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Chapter Three indicated that the Security Council became 
involved in the CFT area with its binding Chapter VII powers. Under these 
circumstances, it was in the main an AML framework that the Counter- 
Terrorism Committee (CTC) has requested each state to establish in its legal 
and executive system in the name of the CFT campaign. For instance, the 
checklist of on-site visits to member states includes anti-money laundering 
legislation; structures for the oversight of the financial system; supervision of 
the non-financial sector; mechanisms for the seizure and confiscation of the 
proceeds of crime, etc. ' Similarly, it should be noted that the 1267 Sanctions 
Committee has indirectly supported the global AML campaign through its 
operational approach. For example, its monitoring group has urged states, in 
the context of targeting the finances of currently active terrorists, to take 
some (in effect) AML measures such as the establishment of FIUs; regulation 
of cash couriers, alternative remittance systems, and trade in precious 
commodities; and, cooperation with FATF, FSRBs, and IMF/World Bank. ' 
Furthermore, Chapters Four and Five showed that specialist 
bodies gained more importance and justification with regard to their work in 
the international community by inserting the word "CFT" behind their 
original slogan "AML". The 9/11 also engaged new, but previously reluctant, 
international organisations such as the IMF and World Bank in the AML/CFT 
'See, UN CTC, "Framework document for CTC visits to states in order to enhance the 
monitoring of the implementation of resolution 1373(2001)", 9 March 2005. 
For details, see, UN, "Letter dated 14 February 2005 from the Chairman of the 
Security 
Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 1267(1999) concerning Al-Qaeda and 
the Taliban and associated individuals and entities addressed to the President of the 
Security 
Council", UN Doc., S/2005/83,15 February 2005. 
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area. ' The participation of these organisations is important because they have 
the resources and manpower to mobilise as well as near universal 
membership. What is more, the 9/11 reinforced regional AML movements as 
exemplified by the increase in the membership of the APG and other FSRBs. 
Similarly, the number of national FIUs, which are key players in the 
AML/CFT campaign, nearly doubled following 9/11.7 Indeed, the storm 
following 9/11 silenced nearly all remaining criticism and the reluctance of 
those involved, and made the AML/CFT a universal cause which no one 
dared challenge. 
In short, it cannot be emphasised too much that the CFT has been 
a very useful engine in promoting the AML strategy on a global scale 
following 9/11.8 However, while this window of opportunity is open, there 
are still many tasks of significance to be carried out to make as much 
progress as possible in this area. To this end, several suggestions will be 
made in what follows. 
2. Issues concerning duplication 
Since a number of international organisations engage in diverse 
activities in the AML/CFT area, there arise issues concerning duplication. 
For 
the purposes of this study, they are classified into four categories: assessment, 
technical assistance, research, and sanctions. 
' Gilmore, W. C., Dirty Money: The evolution of international measures to counter money 
laundering and the financing of terrorism, 2004, p. 150. 
'As of July 2005, some 100 jurisdictions established their 
FIU. 
Johnson, J., "11" September, 2001: Will It Make a Difference to the 
Global Anti-Money 
Laundering Movement? ", (2002) Journal of Money Laundering Control, vol. 
6, no. 1, p. 9. 
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a. Assessment 
Given that various organisations have become involved in the 
AML/CFT campaign since 9/11, and that their first step usually begins with 
the assessment of current development, there arises a concern about the 
duplication of assessment efforts and resources in three dimensions: (a) 
within the Security Council between the works of the CTC, the 1267 
Sanctions Committee, and the 1540 Committee; (b) within the circle of 
specialist bodies such as the FATF and the IMF/World Bank; and, (c) in broad 
terms, between the Security Council and the specialist bodies. 
To begin with, in relation to the duplication of assessment in the 
first two dimensions, points have already been made in Chapter Three and 
Five. There have been repeated calls for greater coordination between the 
CTC, the Sanctions Committee, and the 1540 Committee particularly with 
regard to reporting requirements and the potential to share information. ' On 
the other hand, considerable progress is already being made with respect to 
the duplication within the circle of specialist bodies. The FATF and the 
IMF/World Bank have sought to cooperate in assessing the implementation 
of the AML/CFT standards, illustrated by the 12-month pilot programme. '° 
Given that this 12-month programme proved to be a success, the IMF/World 
Bank decided further to make AML/CFT assessments a regular part of their 
'Although the weight to given to the financial aspect is considerably different from each 
other, these three committees have some room to coordinate their activities in the context of 
terrorist financing. For relevant discussions, see, Section IV. 4. of Chapter Three of this study. 
See also, UN SC, "Letter dated 23 August 2004 from the Chairman of the Security Council 
Committee established pursuant to resolution 1267(1999) concerning Al-Qaida and the 
Taliban and associated individuals and entities addressed to the President of the Security 
Council", S/2004/679,25 August 2004, pp. 20-21; UN SC, 5059th Meeting, S/PV. 5059,19 
October 2004, p. 4. 
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work. " They also endorsed the revised 2003 FATF Forty Recommendations 
as the standard for which AML/CFT ROSCs will be prepared, as well as the 
revised 2004 methodology to assess compliance with that standard. 12 
Accordingly, priority attention needs to be given to the 
duplication between the Security Council and the specialist bodies, since the 
least systematic approach is found in this dimension. It should be noted that 
the CTC is now conducting on-site visits to member states. 13 This mission is, 
however, not so different from the mutual evaluation exercise by the 
FATF/FSRBs or assessments by the IMF/World Bank. 14 Thus, although the 
visiting team led by the CTC includes experts from the FATF, 15 both sides 
need to develop further a mechanism to coordinate the assessment activity 
and to share the results of assessment exercises as is the case with the 
relationship between FATF/FSRBs and the IMF/World Bank. Perhaps, in the 
course of this, given that the Security Council covers wider issue areas thus 
addressing the CFT issue in a relatively general sense, added weight might 
See, Section III. 2. of Chapter Five of this study. 
However, considering the FATF's perception of the NCCT practice as a very effective 
policy tool, the future of the relationship between the FATF and IMF/World Bank is still 
uncertain as the following remarks of the FATF president suggests: 
"While the FATF has no plans at present to conduct a third round of the NCCT reviews, it 
will retain the possibility of applying countermeasures to protect the international financial 
system from abuse including in situations where the FATF's recommendation are not 
applied or are insufficiently applied" (IMF/World Bank, "Twelve-Month Pilot Program of 
AML/CFT Assessments", 10 March 2004, p. 63). 
12 IMF, "The IMF and the Fight against Money Laundering and the Financing of Terrorism", 
A Factsheet, September 2004. 
13 The CTC conducted its first visit to one of member states in March 2005. 
'4 This is to develop a direct dialogue with the authorities of the visited states and to identify 
more precisely the technical assistance needs of the visited states for the purpose of effective 
implementation of the Security Council Resolution 1373 (2001). See, UN CTC, "General 
guidelines for conducting CTC visits to member states", 4 August 2004. 
15 UN Information Service, "Country Visits Signal New Phase of Work for United Nations 
Counter-Terrorism Body", SC/8333,15 March 2005. 
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be given to the role of the specialist bodies which focus on the AML/CFT 
issue with greater manpower and more resources. 16 
However, in this last dimension, there remain some factors to be 
considered further. Firstly, whereas the relevant committees of the Security 
Council generally make all state reports public, specialist bodies usually keep 
them confidential, publishing only brief summaries. Thus, in order to share 
information and reports, it seems necessary for concerned parties to develop 
some rules of reference, especially with regard to the level of confidentiality. " 
Perhaps, the practices of the OECD Working Group on Corruption and the 
Council of Europe "GRECO" are of use in this regard since they maintain 
quite open attitudes, making their mutual evaluation reports fully public. 18 
Fortunately, the FATF also decided, as a general rule, in 2005 to publish all 
future mutual evaluation reports. 19 Secondly, the composition of the Security 
Council permanent membership also poses a problem. Given that China is 
not a member of the FATF, the initiative of the Security Council to establish a 
solid cooperative relationship with the FATF might meet with difficulties in 
gathering universal support. 2° In this regard, the current effort to expand the 
'6 For a relevant discussion, see, UN, "Letter dated 14 February 2005 from the Chairman of 
the Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 1267(1999) concerning 
Al-Qaeda and the Taliban and associated individuals and entities addressed to the President 
of the Security Council", UN Doc., S/2005/83,15 February 2005, p. 9. 
17 In the case of the CTC, it has developed some rules of confidentiality in relation to 
its on- 
site visit reports. See, UN CTC, "Framework document for CTC visits to states 
in order to 
enhance the monitoring of implementation of resolution 1373(2001)", 
9 March 2005. 
" Levi, M. & Gilmore, W. C., "Terrorist Finance, Money Laundering and the Rise and Rise of 
Mutual Evaluation: A New Paradigm for Crime Control? ", in Pieth, M., ed., Financing 
Terrorism, 2002, p. 105. 
19 FATF, "Annual Report: 2004-2005", 10 June 2005, p. 11. 
20 FATF, "Annual Report: 2003-2004", 2 July 2004, p. 12. 
282 
FATF membership to China needs to be promoted further. 21 
b. Technical assistance 
Once the status of the national and international AML/CFT 
framework is assessed, there automatically arises a need to render technical 
assistance for the purpose of complementing the gap found in the assessment 
process. In these circumstances, in order to achieve the best efficiency and 
effectiveness, technical assistance should be gathered from the most suitable 
providers and distributed to the most needed receivers. 
In this regard, although the current system seems to be in some 
degree satisfactory, several points are to be noted for further improvement. 
Generally, there are two ways of delivering technical assistance: through 
multilateral channels or bilateral channels. With regard to the multilateral 
channels, the practices of the CTC and IMF/World Bank are good examples. 
If the CTC finds a need for technical assistance, it directs the need either to 
other international organisations or to donor states via its match-making 
database? If the IMF/World Bank finds a need for technical assistance, they 
either deliver technical assistance directly to states or pass the request to 
FSRBs to solve the matter on a regional basis. The World Bank is also 
operating a database to provide match-making services-23 In respect of the 
21 China was given an observer status of the FATF in February 2005, and currently is a 
member of the Eurasian Group on Money Laundering and Terrorism 
Funding (EAG) which 
was founded in October 2004. 
' See <http: //www. un. org/sc/ctc>. 
23 IMF/World Bank, "Intensified Work on Anti-Money Laundering and Combating the 
Financing of Terrorism (AML/CFT)", 25 September 2002, para. 45-48. 
It was agreed in a 
meeting of key technical assistance providers, organised 
by the IMF/World Bank in 2002 that 
the coordination of technical assistance should be organised on a regional 
basis through the 
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bilateral channel, it is simply that one state approaches another state for 
technical assistance. 
Under this system, the major problem is the lack of a centralised 
coordination mechanism. For example, as a command post to coordinate 
technical assistance, at least nine entities might be identified currently: the 
CTC database, the World Bank database, and the Secretariats of the seven 
FSRBs. In these circumstances, it is difficult to consolidate all relevant 
information and make a central database. Inevitably, it would entail some 
kind of inefficiency in coordinating all those needs and the delivery of 
technical assistance. Moreover, it would be difficult for assistance donors to 
provide effective feedback following the delivery of technical assistance. 
Consequently, it is desirable to establish or designate a central 
coordination centre. With this mechanism, all technical assistance donors and 
receivers may be required to provide relevant information to it. Perhaps, 
upon designation, either the CTC or the World Bank may play the role of this 
central coordinating body. Then, it would facilitate the flow of information 
between relevant parties, and assume a feedback function as well, ensuring 
the assistance provided by a donor is fully satisfactory. 24 
Furthermore, the duplication of the CTC database and the World 
Bank database should also be pointed out. Given the similar function of these 
two databases and the close relations between the two organisations, some 
streamlining may be possible without too much trouble, thus preventing 
FSRBs. 
z UN SC, 5059th Meeting, S/PV. 5069,19 October 2004, p. 11. 
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duplication of resources. 25 
c. Research 
Another important field of the AML/CFT strategy is research on 
the typologies of money laundering and terrorist financing. At present, 
various organisations such as the Security Council, the FATF, the UNODC, 
the IMF/World Bank, and many of the FSRBs are involved in these research 
activities, and a high level of duplication can be identified among the efforts 
of these organisations. 26 Of course, if more resources are invested in research, 
the quality of output might be better. However, given the inadequacy of the 
resources and manpower in this area, it seems reasonable to establish a 
coordinating mechanism for research purposes. Considering that experts of 
various organisations attend seminars or workshops hosted by others to 
discuss the results of their research, the international community could use 
those occasions to pick up necessary research issues, and to distribute 
appropriate topics to proper organisations, thus preventing a double 
investment of resources. Fortunately, the recent initiative made by the FATF 
to conduct joint typology exercises with FSRBs is the right step forward in 
this direction. 27 
Z5 IMF/World, "Twelve-Month Pilot Program of Anti-Money Laundering and Combating the 
Financing of Terrorism (AML/CFT) Assessments and Delivery of AML/CFT Technical 
Assistance", 31 March 2003, p. 16. 
26 For example, the typologies of terrorist financing have been researched by all these 
organisations. See, the reports of the monitoring group of the 1267 Sanctions Committee, the 
typologies exercises of the FAFT, the research on the hawala system by the IMF and the 
World Bank, etc. 
27 The FATF held a joint Typologies meeting with MONEYVAL in December 2004, and will 
hold another joint meeting with GAFISUD in November 2005. See, FATF, "Annual Report: 
2004-2005", 10 June 2005, p. 11. 
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d. Sanctions 
When a country is found to be non-compliant with the 
international AML/CFT standards, the international community might 
impose sanctions on that country. Ironically, however, in order to promote 
the effectiveness of "sanctions", it might be better to encourage duplication 
among relevant organisations rather than preventing it. This is indeed 
contrary to the treatment of other issues (assessment, technical assistance, 
and research) as mentioned above. 
Theoretically, the Security Council could impose a hard 
enforcement with its Chapter VII powers while specialist bodies apply only 
soft enforcement. However, in practice, the Security Council, more precisely, 
the CTC has not applied its Chapter VII powers to impose sanctions on states 
which are non-compliant with the requirements of Resolution 1373. 
Furthermore, the committee does not seem to intend to do so in the near 
future, considering its cautious approach in dealing with individual states. 28 
In this vein, the idea of how to engage the Security Council in a sanctions 
regime deserves attention as a promotion strategy of the AML/CFT campaign 
worldwide. 
To this end, it should be remembered that although the CTC is 
not willing to act as a Sanctions Committee at present, it continues to report a 
list of states who are late in submitting state reports in accordance with 
28 Rosand, E., "Security Council Resolution 1373 and the Counter-Terrorism Committee: the 
Cornerstone of the United Nations Contribution to the Fight against Terrorism", 
in Fijnaut, 
C., & Wouters, J. & Naert, F., eds., Legal Instruments in the Figlit against International Terrorism: 
A Transnational Dialogue, 2004, pp. 610-611. 
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Resolution 1373.29 Thus, at the current stage of development, what seems 
realistically possible is to engage the Security Council in the regime of soft 
enforcement, say by way of a naming and shaming approach. For example, 
when the FATF is determined to apply its Recommendation 21 measure to 
states for not observing its AML/CFT recommendations, it can also inform 
the CTC of this fact. In this case, the CTC could report this to the Security 
Council based on its mandate. 30 In other words, this is to announce the listing 
of a state twice. This kind of initiative would provide increased justification 
for the efforts of the specialist bodies to promote the AML/CFT strategy 
worldwide. 31 In this scenario, of course, policy makers might have to 
overcome similar problems as seen above in relation to the duplication of 
assessment. Namely, given that China is not yet an FATF member state, a 
prudent approach would be necessary when consensus is sought within the 
Security Council in relation to the establishment of cooperative relationship 
with the FATF. 32 
3. The securing of further involvement of influential actors 
In relation to the involvement of the influential actors in the 
29 Ibid., p. 612. For example, on 16 October 2003, the Security Council issued a warning that 48 
states were late in submitting their reports to the CTC and that the CTC Chairman would 
send to the Council the list of states which might be late in submitting their reports by 31 
October 2003 (UN SC, "Statement by the President of the Security Council", S/PRST/2003/17, 
16 October 2003). 
30 See, UN SC, "Guidelines of the Committee for the Conduct of Its Work", 
S/AC. 40/2001/CRP. 1,16 October 2001. 
31 However, with a longer perspective, it is desirable that the international community take 
more active measures, coordinating all possible sanctions, irrespective of whether 
it is a hard 
enforcement or a soft enforcement, for the greater good (Tanzi, V., 
"Macroeconomic aspects 
of offshore centres and the importance of money-laundering in offshore 
financial flows", in 
UNODC, Attacking the Profits of Crime: Drugs, Money and Laundering, 1998, p13). 
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future, two aspects are of particular concern to provide further support to the 
AML/CFT campaign. First of all, currently the CTC is not only monitoring 
national progress by requiring all 191 UN member states to submit their state 
reports on the implementation of Resolution 1373 but also consequently 
turning them into an unprecedented database of national legislative and 
executive practices. However, if the CTC stops operating for reasons such as 
that terrorist activities are decreasing or political momentum has been lost, 
the international community would lose valuable opportunities to harmonise 
national AML/CFT law and executive practices, not to mention the already 
accumulated database and know-how in this area. What is more, although 
the work of the CTC is of direct relevance to the financing of terrorism, it 
should also be remembered that it is connected with various issues 
concerning transnational organised crime in general such as border control, 
extradition, illegal arms trafficking, etc. Thus, given this significant role of 
the CTC in the fight against the financing of terrorism and acquisitive crime 
in general, it is important that its current momentum be sustained, for 
example, through further revitalisation and awareness-raising campaigns. 
Secondly, the IMF/World Bank are noteworthy participants in the 
AML/CFT area, given their capability of mobilising a high level of manpower 
and resources. However, there still remains a possibility that the IMF/World 
Bank may withdraw from the AML/CFT campaign should the NCCT 
exercise be resumed. 33 In this case, the international community may suffer a 
32 See, supra note 20. 
33 The IMF/World Bank conditioned their collaboration with the FATF on the agreement that 
the FATF does not undertake a further round of the NCCT exercise. See, supra note 11. 
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serious setback in the fight against terrorism and criminal finances. ' For 
example, it should be noted that although not directly allocated for 
AML/CFT purposes, the IMF/World Bank have relatively strong budgetary 
powers and well-trained experts in various fields. " Moreover, with near 
universal membership which lends both organisations legitimacy and 
acceptance, the IMF/World Bank could be a natural global forum for sharing 
information and developing common approaches to the AML/CFT issues. 36 
Also, the assessed countries may find it not a bad option to have recourse to 
the IMF/World Bank, since the overall assessment of these two organisations 
-including the AML/CFT area-might work as a free "consulting service" to 
diagnose the soundness of the assessed countries' economy. Sometimes this 
"consulting service" may also trigger subsequent lending and technical 
assistance. 37 Accordingly, it is of significance for policy makers to make 
continuous efforts to engage these organisations in the AML/CFT campaign. 
Perhaps when the effectiveness of "inducement" measures is called into 
serious question, the change of tactics might be worthy of consideration. 
Otherwise, it seems better to encourage countries to build up AML/CFT 
3` For the potential of the IMF in complementing the work of the FATF, see also, LEE, L. L. C., 
"The Basle Accords as Soft law: Strengthening International Banking Supervision", (1999) 
Virginia Journal of International Law, vol. 39, pp. 36-39. 
3s For example, the IMF has historically provided a large amount of TA to member countries. 
In terms of person-years, TA activities in the field account for about 18% of the total 
resources of area and specialised functional departments. See, IMF, "Issues paper for an 
evaluation of technical assistance provided by the IMF", 5 November 2003, p. 1. 
36 IMF, "Intensified Fund Involvement in Anti-Money Laundering Work and Combating the 
Financing of Terrorism", 5 November 2001, p. 10. Furthermore, in terms of public relations 
the IMF could secure the solid dialogue channel with national legislators. 
See, e. g., "Report 
of the Working Group of IMF Executive Directors on Enhancing 
Communication with 
National Legislators", 15 January 2004. 
37 IMF/World Bank "Financial Sector Assessment Program-Review, Lessons, and Issues 
Going Forward", 24 February 2003, p. 4. 
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infrastructure with full support involving powerful contributors such as the 
IMF/World Bank. Lastly, even if the time comes for a change in tactics, the 
decision on this timing should be made in close coordination with and the 
understanding between concerned parties. 
4. The introduction of intrusive legal tools 
The AML/CFT strategy is basically aimed at the "financial 
devastation" of terrorist groups and criminal organisations. However, if the 
AML/CFT strategy is not effective in undermining the financial 
infrastructure of terrorist groups and criminal organisations, there arises a 
skeptical question of what all these measures are for. In this sense, some legal 
tools should be promoted with a view to enhancing the effectiveness of the 
financial warfare on these organisations, especially utilising the current 
political momentum of the CFT campaign. To begin with, attention should be 
given to the introduction of civil confiscation. In most of countries, local 
confiscation regimes depending on criminal confiscation systems do not 
seem to be so effective in incapacitating criminal organisations. 38 However, 
civil confiscation has proved to be quite effective in launching financial 
warfare on criminal organisations, exemplified by the experiences of the U. S., 
given that annually its law enforcement authorities confiscate as much as one 
billion dollars. 39 Moreover, the introduction of the reversal of burden of proof 
" Levi, M., "Taking the Profit Out of Crime: The UK Experience", (1997) European Journal of 
Crime, Criminal Law and Criminal justice, vol. 5, p. 239; Daams, C. A., Criminal 
Asset Forfeiture, 
2003, p. 145, p. 158. 
39 FATF, "Review of FATF Anti-Money Laundering System and 
Mutual Evaluation 
Procedures 1992-1999", 16 February 2001, Annex I; Tonry, M., "Forfeiture 
Laws, Practices 
and Controversies in the US", (1997) 
European Journal of Crime, Criminal Law and Criminal 
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should also be considered in that it is often be very difficult for the 
prosecution to prove, beyond reasonable doubt, the criminal origin of 
proceeds, for example when they have been generated in violation of foreign 
criminal law, 4° or when suspicious assets are owned by legal persons that are 
domiciled in offshore finance centres. 41 In particular, it should also be taken 
into account that many predicate offences are without a victim to give 
evidence on the nature of the offences and the extent of the proceeds. 42 
Accordingly, the FATF explicitly included these legal tools in the 
text of the 2003 Recommendation 3. In fact, however, they are introduced in 
non-mandatory terms since it is difficult to require every state to introduce 
these concepts at the current stage of development of international law and 
national legal systems. Nonetheless, if policy makers truly intend to make a 
real difference in their work on crime control by targeting terrorists' financial 
sources and other criminal finances, consideration should be given to the 
introduction of these intrusive legal tools into their domestic legal system. 
Justice, vol. 5, p. 294; Smellie, A., "Prosecutorial Challenges in Freezing and Forfeiting 
Proceeds of Transnational Crime and the Use of International Asset Sharing to Promote 
International Cooperation", (2004) Journal of Money Laundering Control, vol. 8, no. 2, p. 108. 
40 Stessens, G., Money Laundering: A New International Law Enforcement Model, 2000, p. 67. 
4" Council of Europe, Combating organised crime, August 2004, p. 44. 
42 Stessens, G., supra note 40, p. 67. Especially, with regard to the difficulties of conviction for 
terrorist finance offences, Bell explains as follows : 
"The primary difficulty for the prosecution in terrorist finance cases is to prove beyond a 
reasonable doubt that the property is terrorist property. The difficulty is exacerbated when 
the funds are raised in support of terrorism overseas. It is noteworthy that there 
have been 
no successful prosecutions for terrorist funding offences in Northern 
Ireland over the last 30 
years"(Bell, R. E., "The Confiscation, Forfeiture and Disruption of 
Terrorist Finances", (2003) 
Journal of Money Laundering Control, vol. 7, no. 2, p. 113). 
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III. The Extension of the Operational Approach to Criminal 
Finances 
As seen in Chapter Three, the operational approach of the Security 
Council is of importance in that the international community established for 
the first time an administrative asset-freezing system with the participation 
of all 191 UN member states. 43 The policy implication from this approach is 
that freezing orders can be issued even without criminal proceedings and 
they can (indeed must) be recognised immediately in each national legal 
system. In fact, this kind of international criminal cooperation was 
inconceivable under the conventional rules of mutual legal assistance which 
require strict standards to be met as a condition of assistance such as a formal 
decision of foreign or domestic courts, or dual criminality. ' 
With such an innovative mechanism in place as a result of the 
CFT campaign, policy makers cannot help being tempted to apply this 
mechanism to fight other criminal finances. In fact, many of the measures 
taken in the wake of 9/11 are aimed at combating terrorism but also they tend 
to have a long-term effect on the fight against organised crime. 45 This is, for 
example, the case with the introduction of the "European Arrest Warrant"" 
43 The EU is also running its own listing mechanism. See, Council of the European Union, 
"The fight against terrorist financing", the note from the Secretary General/High 
Representative and the Commission to European Council, JAI 566, ECOFIN 424, EF 64, 
RELEX 655, COTER 91,16089/04, Brussels, 14 December 2004, p. 11. 
' Ibid., p. 11. 
45 Wouters, J. & Naert, F., "Police and Judicial Cooperation in the European Union and 
Counterterrorism: an Overview", p. 110; Bruggeman, W., "Countering the Threat of 
Terrorism in the EU in a Broader Organised Crime Perspective", in Fijnaut, C., & Wouters, J. 
& Naert, F., eds., Legal Instruments in the Fight against International Terrorism: A Transnational 
Dialogue, 2004, p. 166. 
" By the European Arrest Warrant system, EU member states automatically recognise each 
other's judicial decisions that order the arrest of a suspect 
(Wouters, J. & Naert, F., supra note 
45, p. 114). For its contribution to the judicial cooperation, see, 
Gilmore, W. C., "The Twin 
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and the setting up of the Eurojust within the European Union. ' It is due to 
the fact that the infrastructures to fight terrorism and organised crime share 
much in common. Accordingly, it can be said that one area benefits from the 
progress made by the other. In this context, given that in the 21St century, 
transnational organised crime and its massive finances pose a serious 
challenge to the international community, 48 the extension of the operational 
approach to this area merits further research and consideration. Under the 
UN Charter, it is not impossible since as pointed out in the Prosecutor v. Tadic 
case(1995), the Security Council has the discretion to adopt appropriate 
measures to maintain international peace and security. " If this initiative 
materialises, the Security Council might freeze the financial resources of the 
so-called drug barons and the senior command of transnational criminal 
organisations. 
To this end, it is necessary that, first of all, "a threat to 
international peace and security" be determined in relation to transnational 
organised crime as the involvement of the Security Council with its Chapter 
VII powers is premised on the existence of this "threat". Given that this 
notion of "a threat to international peace and security" has undergone 
Towers and the Third Pillar: Some Security Agenda Developments", 
European University 
Institute Working Papers, Law no. 2003/7, pp. 5-9. 
47 The Eurojust which consists of prosecutors and judges coming 
from all EU member states, 
aims to promote European judicial cooperation. For 
further details, see, Coninsx, M., 
"Europjust and EU Judicial Cooperation in the Fight against 
Terrorism", in Fijnaut, C., & 
Wouters, J. & Naert, F., eds., Legal Instruments in the Fight against International 
Terrorism: A 
Transnational Dialogue, 2004, pp. 181-182. 
48 Williams, P. & Savona, E. U., The United Nations and Transnational Organised 
Crime, 1996, 
p. 32. 
49 Case No. IT-94-1-AR72,2 October 1995. For details, see, footnote 136 of 
Chapter Three of 
this study. 
293 
considerable evolution over the last decade, 50 this scenario is not a remote 
possibility. The "threat" has already been determined in various contexts51 in 
relation to such as internal armed conflict, 52 violations of human rights and 
humanitarian law, 53 violation of democratic principles, ' terrorism, " and 
WMD control. 56 In 2000, even the possibility of defining HIV/AIDS as a threat 
to peace and security was reviewed. 57 
Furthermore, recently, a precedent of the extension of this 
operational approach beyond the CFT context was also set with the adoption 
of Resolution 1591 (2005). This resolution aims at securing a cease-fire 
agreement between the government and rebel groups in Sudan. 58 In light of 
the failure of all concerned parties including the Sudanese Government, the 
Sudan Liberation Movement/Army and the Justice and Equality Movement, 
to implement a cease-fire agreement, 59 the resolution requires all those who 
impede the peace process to be designated as such and be subject to 
sanctions. 60 Under these sanctioning measures, the freezing of listed 
individuals' assets is subsumed. 61 
However, there is also a growing concern about the "over"- 
extension of the chapter VII powers. In other words, if the 
Security Council 
50 Simma, B., The Charter of the United Nations: A Commentary, 2°d edn., 2002, vol. 1, p. 
726. 
s' Ibid., p. 722-726. 
52 See, e. g., Resolution 733 (1992) concerning Somalia. 
53 See, e. g., Resolution 929 (1994) concerning Rwanda. 
See, e. g., Resolution 841 (1993) concerning 
Haiti. 
ss See, e. g., Resolution 1373 (2001) following 
9/11. 
56 See, e. g., Resolution 1540 (2004) concerning the weapons of mass 
destruction. 
s" De Wet, E., The Chapter VII Powers of the United Nations Security 
Council, 2004, pp. 172-174. 
58 UN, S/RES/1591,29 March 2005. 
59 Para. 3. 
6o Para. 3(c). 
61 Para. 3(e). 
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were increasingly given the status of world government, it could undermine 
the overall efficiency and effectiveness of the organ. 62 Neither the Security 
Council nor the Charter system is structured to accommodate such a role. 63 
Thus, the strategy to utilise the operational approach in the fight against 
transnational organised crime should be dealt with prudently, firstly 
building up the consensus of the international community that the issue of 
transnational organised crime is indeed a matter of a priority consideration. 
Additionally, as already indicated in Chapter Three, ' some 
questions relating to due process and legal safeguards, and delisting 
procedures should be studied further. 65 To this end, consideration should be 
given to options such as the establishment of the Security Council's own sub- 
organ of a judicial nature and utilisation of the International Criminal Court. 
In any case, it should be remembered that while most of the terrorists who 
have been put on the list by the 1267 Sanctions Committee are elusive and 
seldom challenge the decision on the listing, 66 potential candidates to be 
listed in relation to transnational organised crime might act more actively, 
utilising enormous financial resources and legitimatised institutional powers. 
IV. Food for Further Research 
Throughout this study, the writer has attempted to clarify the 
6Z De Wet, E., supra note 57, pp. 176-177. 
63 Ibid., p. 177. 
See, Section IV. 3. of Chapter Three of this study. 
61 Council of the European Union, supra note 43, p. 11. 
66 UN, "Letter dated 1 December 2003 from the Chairman of the Security Council Committee 
established pursuant to resolution 1267 (1999) addressed to the 
President of the Security 
Council containing the SECOND REPORT of the MONITORING 
GROUP pursuant to 
resolution 1455 (2003)", S/2003/1070,2 December 
2003, p. 5. 
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evolution and implementation of international standards on the countering 
of the financing of terrorism and money laundering. However, during these 
efforts, there are some issues of significance which could not be dealt with in 
a comprehensive manner due to the restraint of space as well as the thematic 
focus of the study. However, further research is definitely merited. 
Firstly, it would be a worthwhile effort in academic terms to re- 
examine the changing relationship between international and national law 
following 9/11.67 For instance, Resolution 1373(2001) and the CTC are 
establishing international standards in connection with terrorism, and 
importantly, these are binding on all states. The 1267 Sanctions Committee 
also provides indirect support to the work of the CTC with its compulsory 
enforcement mechanism. A similar phenomenon can be found in relation to 
Resolution 1540(2004) and its monitoring committee, which deals with the 
non-proliferation issue of WMD. Thus, it might be said that the "Security 
Council-made text law" with its monitoring and/or enforcement mechanisms 
is emerging as a new source of international law, fundamentally 
"destabilising" the balance between international and national law. 
Secondly, new mechanisms for the protection of human rights 
tailored to AML/CFT context should be researched and reviewed. It is the flip 
side of the campaign against terrorism and TOC. Without a reliable 
human 
rights protection device, the ongoing AML/CFT campaign cannot 
be justified 
and cannot be successful in the long term. However, 
initially, the Security 
Council and the specialist bodies seemed to surrender to the urgent need to 
6' Rider, B. A. K. & Nakajima, C. eds., "The Funding of Terror: The Legal Implications of 
the 
Financial War on Terror", (2003) Journal of Money Laundering 
Control, vol. 6, no. 3, p. 211. 
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combat terrorism and other criminal finances, in effect delegating this task to 
other human rights watch organisations. 68 The legal dispute concerning the 
listing operation of the 1390 committee and the inadequate discussions on 
human rights in the Security Council Resolution 1373 and the FATF 
recommendations confirm this tendency. Furthermore, the introduction of 
intrusive legal tools as suggested above also inevitably entails legal 
controversies over the poor protection of civil rights. 69 In this regard, a 
golden combination of the poison and the antidote needs to be sought 
through an in-depth study in the near future. 
68 See e. g., the presentation by Ambassador Greenstock, the then Chairman of the CTC at the 
Symposium: "Combating International Terrorism: The Contribution of the United Nations", 
held in Vienna on 3-4 June 2002; UN, "Provisional Summary Record of the First Part of the 
57th Meeting", S/AC. 40/SR. 57,18 March 2003, pp. 9-10. 
69 For civil confiscation, even within the U. S there are many criticisms, and some regional 
courts such as the ECtHR also seems to be still very cautious in introducing these intrusive 
concepts. See, e. g., der Walt, V., "Civil Forfeiture of Instrumentalities and Proceeds of Crime 
and the Constitutional Property Clause", (2000) South African Journal on Hunian Rights, vol. 
16, pp. 24-31. Similarly, in relation to the controversial nature of the reversed burden of proof, 
see, e. g., Tadros, V. & Tierney, S., "The Presumption of Innocence and the Human Rights 
Act", (2004) Modern Law Review, vol. 67, pp. 416-422. 
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